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The global emergence of countries like India and China has given rise to questions 
about how these emergent powers will engage with the various manifestations of the 
West-led liberal world order, including fields of humanitarian assistance, human 
rights, peace processes, and international development. This thesis explores this 
broader debate in the field of peacebuilding. Using the cases of Nepal and Myanmar, 
it probes how emergent powers, India and China, engage in the peace processes in 
countries in their region of influence or their immediate neighbourhood. In doing so, 
it explores how this engagement of emergent powers interacts with, and impacts, 
liberal peacebuilding projects on the ground. Finally, it examines how such plural and 
diverse sources of international engagement impact the political settlements in Nepal 
and Myanmar, at a precise moment when these countries are undertaking a peace 
process. Standing at the juncture of the three distinct bodies of scholarship, namely, 
regional foreign policies of India and China, liberal peacebuilding, and political 
settlements, this research takes a qualitative and inductive approach. It draws primarily 
on document analysis and elite interviews in Nepal and Myanmar, both countries 
having closely witnessed the simultaneous engagement of India and China and of 
liberal peacebuilders.  
 
Empirical evidence from Nepal and Myanmar shows that India and China speak a 
distinct vernacular of peace that cannot be encapsulated within the domain of liberal 
peacebuilding. This thesis proposes an alternative framework, conceptualised as 
Emergent Power Regional Conflict Management (EPRCM). It argues that the key 
features of EPRCM approach are: stability, development, unevenly applied state-
centricity, rejection of the universality of liberal peace, prioritisation of regional actors 
in conflict resolution, and an underlying pragmatism that disdains the use of templates 
and policies in conflict-resolution. It contends that though EPRCM co-exists with 
liberal peacebuilding projects, this co-existence is defined by limited interaction, and 




peacebuilders are thought to be detrimental to the interests of emergent powers. A core 
area of convergence between them, however, is their joint focus on supporting peace 
agreements, which attempt to end conflicts. Within this negotiated co-existence 
between the two forms of international engagement, EPRCM is entrenched and vested, 
while liberal peacebuilding is weak and compromised, both by the strength of the 
EPRCM but also through the agency of local elites, who undercut and co-opt liberal 
peacebuilders. 
This thesis also argues that plural forms of international engagement, defined by the 
pragmatism and strength of EPRCM, and the timidity of liberal peacebuilding, with 
little interaction between the two, enables elites in Nepal and Myanmar to co-opt and 
hedge against all forms of international pressure. This increased autonomy of domestic 
elites leads them to renounce international and domestic pressure to make the political 
settlements inclusive, leading to hybrid peace structures. These structures embody 
some liberal precepts grounded on the agendas of the peace process, but are largely 
status quoist and illiberal. These illiberal hybrid peace structures continue to buoy the 
dominance of the elites and compromise on the key agenda of the peace process: the 



















The world order has been undergoing a transition, with the rise of emergent powers, 
such as India and China, and the associated decline of international influence from the 
West. This thesis offers an analysis of how these shifts in power are reshaping the 
global governance of peace. Firstly, by focussing on Nepal and Myanmar’s peace 
processes, it examines the engagement of India and China in conflict-affected states in 
their immediate neighbourhood or region. Secondly, it explores how the engagement 
of these emergent powers interacts with, and impacts upon, the practice of liberal 
peacebuilding. Finally, it examines how such diverse sources of international influence 
impact domestic political processes in Nepal and Myanmar.  
This research has found that India and China speak a language of peace that is distinct 
from the dominant form of liberal peacebuilding. This thesis conceptualises this form 
of engagement as Emergent Power Regional Conflict Management (EPRCM). 
EPRCM is characterised by the following features: stability, development, unevenly 
applied state-centricity, rejection of the universality of liberal peace, prioritisation of 
regional actors in conflict resolution, and an underlying pragmatism that rejects the 
use of templates and policies in conflict-resolution. Despite these distinct 
characteristics, EPRCM ‘co-exists’ with liberal peacebuilding projects, and also 
supports peace agreements, in Nepal and Myanmar. This co-existence is defined by 
limited interaction, and a few instances of active contestation between the two, 
specifically when liberal peacebuilders are thought to be detrimental to the interests of 
emergent powers. The thesis also argues that the existence of different forms of 
international engagement, and the absence of synergy between these international 
approaches, allows domestic elites to manipulate international engagement in their 
favour. In doing so, they adopt some liberal precepts while rejecting others, producing 
hybrid outcomes, which encompass both liberal and illiberal elements. In analysing 
these hybrid outcomes, this research finds that they continue to facilitate the 
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The world order is shifting, marked by a decline of the West, its accompanying liberal 
order, and the rise of a disparate group of emergent powers, who have yet to establish 
a coherent alternative model (Kupchan, 2012). This has led to lively discussion in 
International Relations, on how emergent powers will engage with the liberal world 
order, in all its manifestations, such as humanitarian interventions, global human rights 
regimes and peacebuilding; and what their interaction will mean for its future 
(Duncombe and Dunne, 2018; Etzioni, 2011; Hurrell, 2007; Ikenberry et al., 2018; 
Jacques, 2009; Johnston, 2007; Kupchan, 2012; Stokes, 2018). This discussion is seen 
to be of great importance, as emergent powers have not only remained at the margins, 
in the making of this world order, but have risen in a world order, not of their own 
making (Ikenberry, 2001; Zhang, 2016). Grand initiatives, such as China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen to reaffirm China’s dominance, by transforming 
transport, trade and connectivity patterns in Asia and beyond, have further stimulated 
the debate (Cau, 2018; Jones, 2020).  
 
Largely focussing on China, the world-order debate has tangentially touched on India 
too, and the resulting prophecies have been wide-ranging. Some scholars have 
presented the liberal international order as integrative and flexible, creating incentives 
for emergent powers to join in (Ikenberry, 2011). Others have refuted this optimism, 
arguing that emerging powers will not adapt to the existing liberal order, given the 
fundamental differences in their understanding of sovereignty, threats to international 
security, and statehood (Halper, 2010; Hurrell, 2006; Jacques, 2009; Kupchan, 2012). 
Beyond these binaries, others have contended the rise of a more ‘cooperative and 
symmetrical partnership’ (Zeng and Breslin, 2016), or even a ‘co-existence’ between 
the US and China (De Graaff and Van Apeldoorn, 2018). Though extremely insightful 
and varied in their reading of the interaction between emergent powers and the liberal 





This thesis seeks to engage with one element of this ‘unknown’, by examining the 
debate in the field of peacebuilding. More specifically, it seeks to empirically examine 
how emergent powers support, or engage in, international peace processes- an arena 
traditionally dominated by liberal peacebuilding projects. In seeking to understand 
how emergent powers engage in this arena, three inter-related questions inform this 
thesis. Firstly, how do emergent powers, such as India and China, engage in peace 
processes in neighbouring countries within their region of influence, with a specific 
focus on Nepal and Myanmar? Secondly, how does the engagement of emergent 
powers interact with, and impact upon, liberal peacebuilding projects in Nepal and 
Myanmar? Finally, how do these plural forms of engagement, of emergent powers and 
liberal peacebuilding projects, impact upon domestic political settlements in Nepal and 
Myanmar?  In studying international engagement in peace processes, this thesis 
focuses on three core arenas of the process: Inclusion, Security Sector Reform, and 
Transtional Justice, which will be discussed in following sections.  
 
To do so, this thesis turns to countries in their immediate neighbourhood, or their 
regional sphere of influence, which this thesis presents as ‘regions’. The focus on 
‘regions’, serves two functions here. Firstly, while the engagement of emergent powers 
with the liberal world order is still speculative, concrete inferences could be made at a 
regional level. In South Asia and Southeast Asia, India and China respectively, have 
always been crucial regional powers, long before any discussion of their global 
emergence. As Cohen asserts, India has always been a great power for countries in 
South Asia (2001). Similarly, despite not being situated in Southeast Asia, and having 
many powerful regional competitors, China has been a dominant actor historically in 
the region, and currently stands as a counterweight to the US dominance (Lee, 2017). 
Thus, from studying their engagement on conflict management at the regional level, 
where they have always enjoyed a commanding presence, robust predictions can be 
made, as to their engagement, when they emerge globally. Secondly, ‘regions’ can be 
seen as yardsticks, or litmus tests, to gauge the scale, intensity and interest of emergent 
powers in the peacebuilding arena. With immediate stakes in security, and in economic 




countries in the regional periphery are likely to demonstrate their level of interest in 
peacebuilding.  
 
In seeking to study emergent power engagement in this arena, liberal peacebuilding is 
the point of reference of this thesis, or even its point of contrast. The underlying 
reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, peacebuilding, as a form of international support 
to transform conflict-affected states, is a core manifestation of the liberal world order 
in these states. It is not only based on an intellectual heritage, emanating from Western 
experience, but is dominated in discourse and practice by Western states, and the 
global governance institutions they dominate (Kühn, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011). The 
centrality of Western states as core actors in the policy and practice of liberal 
peacebuilding; its quest to promote liberal goals such as human rights and economic 
liberalisation as a means to bring peace (Zaum, 2012);  and finally its  record of 
marginalising or co-opting other non-Western forms (Kühn, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008) 
makes it the perfect yardstick when it is being compared to alternative forms of 
peacebuilding, emanating from non-Western countries.  
 
Secondly, the question of the engagement of emergent powers in peace processes, 
becomes more pertinent, as it becomes apparent that emergent powers such as China 
and India, have a significant impact on conflict processes and systems in many 
conflict-affected states (Alden and Yixiao, 2017; Pant, 2010; Sun, 2012a; United 
States Institute of Peace, 2018; Whitfield, 2012). Further, the engagement of emergent 
powers is seen often to undercut the influence of liberal peacebuilders in these conflicts 
(Alden and Large, 2015; Sørbø et al., 2011). The sovereignty-centred approach of 
India and China (Lei, 2011; Sørbø et al., 2011) and the impact of their developmental 
approach in conflict-affected states (Abb, 2018; Singh, 2017; Xuejun et al., 2017) is 
viewed as introducing competing norms and forms of engagement in the field of 
peacebuilding. However scholars have also noted a shift by emergent powers, to a 
more lenient interpretation of sovereignty, with the potential of fostering a greater 
engagement on conflict resolution (Alden and Yixiao, 2017; Aneja, 2014; Choedon, 
2017; Hall, 2013; Hirono et al., 2019; Kurtz, 2014; Suzuki, 2012; Virk, 2013). 




remain cautious and hesitant (Kulshreshth, 2016; Mukerji, 2014; Yinfan, 2004; 
Zhenmin, 2009).    
 
Finally, beyond practice, liberal peacebuilding also enjoys a discursive hegemony in 
the academic scholarship attributed to it (Bargués-Pedreny, 2018; Chandler, 2017; 
Cooper, 2007).This discursive dominance is apparent in the sheer amount of 
empirically rich and critical scholarship, attributed to ‘liberal peace’, in contrast to the 
few academic works focussing on alternative forms of conflict management, under the 
themes of ‘illiberal peace’ and ‘authoritarian conflict management’ (De Oliveira, 
2011; Lewis et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2020). As regards the study of alternative forms, 
the engagement of India and China in the ‘peacebuilding’ sphere, has received far too 
little attention (Alden and Large, 2015; Call and de Coning, 2017; Lei, 2011; 
Richmond and Tellidis, 2014; Singh, 2017).  Thus, the quest to understand emergent 
power engagement in ‘peacebuilding’, gives consideration to the call of peace studies 
scholars, to explore alternative modes of peacebuilding, and move beyond the confines 
of liberal peacebuilding (Lewis et al., 2018; Mac Ginty, 2008; Smith et al., 2020).  
 
Making liberal peacebuilding, as the point of reference might be debatable, given 
recent appraisals. While liberal peacebuilders have been successful in the ending of 
wars (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), they have been unable to create liberal states, and 
this has bred illiberal practices on the ground (Jahn, 2005; Tadjbakhsh and Richmond, 
2011). Hybrid forms of peace, evidencing liberal and illiberal characteristics, have 
been frequent outcomes of peacebuilding projects (Mac Ginty, 2011). Further, a 
growing pragmatism amongst peacebuilders is said to have led them to abandon their 
goal of creating liberal states (De Coning, 2018), and the absence of coherence 
between liberal peacebuilding actors has led to calls to move away from the very 
concept of peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012). Such negative assessments have been 
expressed in such terms as ‘failure’, ‘crisis’, ‘retreat’, and ‘loss of agency’ (Bargués-
Pedreny, 2018; Chandler, 2017; Pospisil, 2019). These point to a crisis of confidence, 
credibility and coherence. In short, the dominance, and indeed the very existence, of 





While cognisant of these negative appraisals, this thesis notes that liberal 
peacebuilding continues to be a useful dominant concept, to interrogate 
internationally-supported peace-making (Mac Ginty, 2008). In practice, liberal 
peacebuilding projects continue to be the primary approach to funding and supporting 
conflict-affected states, in order to address the root cause of conflict and consolidate 
peace (Ghali, 1992; Mac Ginty, 2011). Initially endorsed and conceptualised by the 
United Nations in the 1990s, it is now deeply embedded within the current global 
governance architecture, given its swift adoption by multilateral, bilateral, and inter-
governmental bodies, diplomatic agencies, and NGOs.   
 
Additionally, arguments against the dominance of peacebuilding, such as liberal 
peacebuilding’s loss of agency (Chandler, 2017), have tended to overlook the 
continued power and pervasiveness of peacebuilding projects, as the very cases of 
Nepal and Myanmar in this thesis attest (Cooper, 2007).  Similarly, arguments about 
the absence of unity between peacebuilders, obscure the remarkable consensus among 
them, on norms such as: open markets, privatisation, sustainable peace, human 
security, promotion of democracy and human rights, and the strengthening of civil 
society (Cooper et al., 2011; Richmond et al., 2011). Moreover, while liberal peace as 
a holistic package, to be deployed on the ground, might have been abandoned for more 
pragmatic versions (De Coning, 2018), the vestiges of liberal peace linger in the form 
of technocratic components. These include: Disarmament Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR); Security Sector Reform (SSR); Transitional Justice; post-peace 
accord elections and civil service reform. Significantly, all of these echo, or at least 
pay lip-service to, liberal prescriptions (Mac Ginty, 2008).  
 
In seeking to explore the three questions, this thesis draws a distinction between 
peacebuilding, as a process conflict-affected countries undertake to transition into 
peace, and peacebuilders or liberal peacebuilders (used interchangeably), as entities, 
largely affiliated to Western states and multilateral bodies supporting peacebuilding 
efforts. So, while this research seeks to investigate how India and China have engaged 
in the realm of peacebuilding, it refrains from calling them peacebuilders, and the 






In engaging with the three questions, this thesis makes three-inter related arguments. 
Firstly, although the engagement of both emergent powers and liberal peacebuilders is 
mired with contradictions, the core difference between them is that emergent powers 
speak a different vernacular of peace, which differs from peacebuilding in its 
fundamental elements. This thesis conceptualises this vernacular as Emergent Powers 
Regional Conflict Management (EPRCM). While not a conscious strategy, EPRCM 
binds together set of priorities, often contradictory in themselves. The key features of 
EPRCM are: stability; development; state-centricity (albeit inconsistent); rejection of 
the universality of ‘liberal’ solutions to post-conflict transitions; prioritisation of 
regional actors as stakeholders; and a pragmatism which abhors a template based 
approach to peacebuilding. It shows that the rejection of templates, and the pragmatic 
insistence on ‘case by case’ examinations of issues in the peace process, makes it 
difficult to neatly interpret Indian and Chinese engagement in their region. EPRCM is 
also distinct from liberal peacebuilding in the strength of its engagement in the region. 
The engagement of emergent powers is deeply entrenched and highly influential, in 
contrast to that of liberal peacebuilders, who appear weak, and selective in comparison. 
While EPRCM synthesises the commonalities between the Indian and Chinese 
approaches, it does not seek to absolve the differences. Factors, including the 
unrivalled rise of China, the escalation of Indian-Chinese competition, and an informal 
emerging coalition between India with Western states, as a counterbalance to China’s 
global ascendancy (Acharya, 2007; Robbani, 2016; Stephen, 2012; Wohlforth, 1999) 
are all likely to determine the relevance of EPRCM in the future. 
 
Secondly, this thesis asserts that although Nepal and Myanmar witness a ‘co-existence’ 
of engagement between emergent powers and liberal peacebuilders, this co-existence 
is ‘negotiated’. This ‘negotiated co-existence’ is marked by substantial differences in 
their approaches, limited avenues of interaction, and some areas of active contestation. 
A core area of convergence, between the two approaches, is focused on forging elite 




accords as a starting-point, to be followed by an institutional engineering of conflict-
affected states to mimic liberal norms; emergent powers are rarely invested in 
institutional support, in the aftermath of peace accords, except when core interests 
prompt them to take part.  
 
Thirdly, the multi-layered interactions, between plural forms of international 
engagement and different competing social groups in conflict-affected states, who 
mobilise different forms of international engagement to their advantage, as they 
negotiate on the political settlements during the peace process, facilitates the formation 
of hybrid peace structures. Such structures, while embodying limited liberal 
characteristics are largely compromised and illiberal, seeking to change the course of 
the political settlements to the status quo, thus continuing to benefit the elites. The 
plurality of international engagement and its strength, defined by a weak liberal 
peacebuilding, and a pragmatic emergent power engagement, presents opportunities 
for elites to selectively embed international prescriptions, to suit their dominance in 
the political settlements. They do so, by co-opting benefits from multiple international 
sources, and hedging against one form of international pressure for the other. Co-
option is evident, with elites appropriating the liberal language and institutions to serve 
their dominance. Similarly, hedging, while a much discussed concept in the field of 
Asian International Relations, albeit not referenced in Peace studies, is apparent in 
elites, who rely on multiple countering international options to offset diverse 
international pressures (Cheng-Chwee, 2008). Such strategies ensure that these hybrid 
peace structures continue to reify the position of the elites as seen in the exclusive 
political settlements of Nepal and Myanmar, while bringing minimal benefits for 
marginalised groups.  
 
In the context of the added autonomy of elites, EPRCM, both, constrains and facilitates 
the leverage of liberal peacebuilding. On the one hand, given their opportunities for 
co-option and hedging, elites invoke both forms of international engagement, more 
specifically liberal peacebuilding, which forms a useful counter-weight to the 
dominance of India and China in regional affairs. This results in some liberal 




On the other hand, the plurality of international engagement, not only allows for elites 
to co-opt liberal peacebuilders more easily, but also permits EPRCM to constrain the 
scope of liberal peacebuilding, when the latter’s agendas do not suit the interests of 
emergent powers.  
 
The scholarship on hybrid peace structures, or hybridity, largely sees it as an outcome 
of the interaction between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’ (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2016; Millar, 2014; Richmond, 2015). In Nepal and Myanmar, it is not 
merely the outcome of an interaction between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’, but 
plural forms of international engagement interacting with one another at one level, and 
both these forms of international engagement subsequently interacting with multiple 
groups of ‘local’ at another level.   
 
Using these three arguments we can begin to interpret the wider debate on the global 
transition away from the liberal world order.  The ‘negotiated co-existence’ of diverse 
conflict-management, or peacebuilding, strategies reflects the interregnum in the 
world order, where manifestations of the liberal world are weakening, whilst other 
forms have not yet been able to completely take over (Kupchan, 2012). The strength 
of the engagement of EPRCM, which shapes the outcomes of peace processes in the 
region, and even constrains the mandate of liberal peacebuilding, also underscores that, 
in their respective regions, emergent powers are already overtaking agents of the 
liberal world order. Further, the illiberal turn of hybrid peace structures is reminiscent 
of the weakening of the liberal order, which has debilitated the ability of peacebuilders 
to force through liberal agendas and, instead, retreat, or only selectively promote 
liberal norms and institutions. Looking bottom-up, from the perspective of conflict-
affected states, like Nepal and Myanmar, this transition of the world order, which has 
led to a ‘co-existence’ of plural forms of international engagement, presents unique 
opportunities for enhancing their autonomy through such strategies as hedging or co-
option.  
 
In outlining the weakness, timidity, and pragmatism of peacebuilding, this thesis 




or  the  ‘end of peacebuilding’ (Chandler, 2017),  as well as a call to move away from 
the concept of peacebuilding, given the panoply of different actors (Zaum, 2012). 
Peacebuilders in Nepal and Myanmar continue to be valorised, not only for the 
financial assistance they bring, or the legitimacy they are able to confer, but for the 
fact that they form a credible counterbalance to the intrusive regional policies of 
emergent powers. The dominant scholarship sees the co-option of liberal 
peacebuilding by elites, as a symbol of its ‘loss of agency’, but the fact that elites are 
bound to co-opt rather than reject peacebuilding projects outright, testifies to the power 
they wield. Additionally, the arguments of scholars, like Zaum, who call for 
abandoning the concept of liberal peacebuilding, given the heterogeneity amongst the 
Western actors involved, ignore the substantial degree of unity that is felt on the 
ground. This is manifested in disparate sets of peacebuilders banding together to form 
consortiums, such as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, and Myanmar’s Joint Peace Fund 
and Peace Support Fund, which have led the peace process agendas.  Similarly, despite 
the scholars outlining the rise of a ‘goal-free’ version of peacebuilding (De Coning, 
2018), Nepal and Myanmar demonstrate that vestiges of liberalism remain in the 
normative consensus on its elements. A continuity of the liberal peace paradigm is 
indicated by the embrace of agendas like inclusion, SSR, and transitional justice, and 
in the icononisation of such values as democracy and equality.  
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
In exploring these arguments, with empirical insights from Nepal and Myanmar, this 
thesis is divided into four parts. Part I, comprising Chapters 1 and 2, focuses on its 
conceptual and methodological elements. Chapter 1 brings together the conceptual 
foundations binding the three questions, through a discussion of Indian and Chinese 
foreign policies, and how they inform their regional engagement in peace processes in 
Nepal and Myanmar. It examines the shifting foundations of liberal peacebuilding, and 
lastly, unpacks the concept of political settlements. Chapter 2 outlines the methods, 






Part II, composed of Chapters 3 and 4, presents the case of Nepal. Chapter 3 focuses 
on the history of the conflict, the nature of the political settlement in Nepal, and the 
peace process, which sought to renegotiate the political settlement, and finally the 
broad contours of international engagement in the peace process. In describing the 
landscape of the peace process, this chapter provides the background to how certain 
steps in the peace process have been conditioned by long-standing legacies.  Chapter 
4 is an empirical examination of the nature, modality and impact of Indian 
engagement, and in part that of China, on the processes and outcomes of Nepal’s 
journey to inclusion, SSR, and transitional justice, through a peace process. In doing 
so, it also outlines areas of divergence and convergence with liberal peacebuilding 
projects, and the impact of these plural forms of international engagement on the 
political settlements of Nepal, which have been defined by a history of exclusion of a 
number of marginalised groups.  
 
Part III, composed of Chapters 5 and 6, presents the case of Myanmar. As in Part II, 
the first part takes a more retrospective approach, looking at the historical patterns of 
conflict, the peace process, and international engagement within in. It also outlines 
how the peace process, owing to historical legacies, has struggled to address the 
exclusive nature of the political settlements in Myanmar. Chapter 6 then deals with a 
detailed examination of Chinese engagement on the three issues of inclusion, SSR, and 
transitional justice. The chapter also discusses how the engagement of China interacts 
with, and impacts upon, liberal peacebuilding projects, and ultimately looks at its 
influence on the political settlements in Myanmar.  
 
Part IV, comprising Chapters 7 and 8, builds on the empirical evidence from Nepal 
and Myanmar, and moves towards conceptualisation. Chapter 7 conceptualises the 
contours of emergent power engagement as EPRCM and posits it as an alternative to 
liberal peacebuilding. It also draws conclusions about the broader International 
Relations question, as to how emergent powers will interact with the liberal world 
order. Chapter 8 discusses what the co-existence of EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding 





Following a summary of the central arguments and findings of this thesis, an agenda 





































Chapter 1: Foreign Policies of Emergent Powers, 
Liberal Peacebuilding, and Political Settlements 
The transition in the world order has heralded a new ‘global marketplace’, where 
countries outside the liberal core, often non-Western ones, are shaping the political 
transitions in conflict-affected states around the world (Carothers and Samet-Marram, 
2015). By design or default, this expanded matrix of those internationally engaged in 
conflict processes (with all their varying motivations, incompatible views, and often 
competing  influences) has a clear impact on domestic processes in post-conflict states 
(Carothers and Samet-Marram, 2015; Cheng et al., 2018; Meehan and Goodhand, 
2018). Liberal peacebuilders, and international development programmes, have sought 
to design external interventions, to promote inclusive, democratic and accountable 
political orders in post-conflict states (Bell, 2015). However, even by default, 
international engagement, through modalities of developmental aid, processes of 
international legitimisation, and broader diplomatic relations, reshapes domestic 
power variables in general (Yanguas, 2017a).  This siting of international engagement, 
as a critical intervening variable in domestic processes, is made even more pertinent 
in peace processes, when conflict-affected states are working to renegotiate the 
political distribution of power between previously warring groups, and even aiming to 
broaden the state-society contract as a whole (Menocal, 2015).   
 
In this context, not only do international actors transcend from being referees to active 
players, who through their action (or inaction), impact the power dynamics of the 
country (De Waal, 2015); but elites, and other contending domestic groups, also seek 
international support to boost their advantage domestically (Khan, 2010). The 
questions that foreground this thesis need to be located within this interplay: between 
the structure of international engagement, with its varied motivations and priorities, 
and the agency of domestic actors to use this international engagement, in the highly-
contested context of peace processes.  
 
In this changing international context, it however becomes difficult to study the 




affected states, given that these states do not have  peacebuilding policies as such (Call 
and De Coning, 2017). A thorough investigation of the nature of India and China’s 
foreign policy priorities, and their regional policies is therefore called for. 
Consequently, this chapter begins by discussing India and China’s prioritisation of 
sovereignty in their foreign policy, which is attributed to be at the root of their 
ambivalence and hesitance, on engaging with ‘peacebuilding’ as discourse and policy 
(Hurrell, 2006; Jiang, 2011). However, it then proceeds to discuss the changing nature 
of their foreign policy, which has negotiated a more lenient understanding of 
sovereignty, as well as to chart the elements of its regional foreign policy, which have 
routinely violated the commitment to state sovereignty. By the same token, in order to 
understand the interaction with, and impact of, emergent powers’ engagement with 
liberal peacebuilding projects in Nepal and Myanmar, the second section maps the 
tumultuous journey of liberal peacebuilding, where both its commitment to liberalism, 
as well as its ability to ‘build peace’, is increasingly constrained. To understand the 
agency of domestic actors, in navigating plural forms of international engagement, the 
third section introduces the concept of political settlements. The fourth section binds 
the three concepts discussed above, through the concept of hybridity or hybrid peace 
structures (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012). 
 
Emergent Powers in Peacebuilding Arena  
The literature on how emergent powers engage on peacebuilding projects is nascent at 
best (Call and de Coning, 2017; Parlar Dal, 2018).  The heterogeneity amongst 
emergent powers, such as India, China, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, with their 
diverse political systems, uneven participation in global governance, varying military 
and economic strengths, as well as the absence of the same degree of solidarity found 
in Western states, makes it difficult to study patterns of their interaction in global 
governance (Cunliffe and Kenkel, 2016; Hopewell, 2015; Kingah and Quiliconi, 2016; 
Mahbubani, 2009; Pant, 2013; Wagner, 2012).  More specifically, for India and China, 
multiple factors confound these efforts, including: unsettled border disputes; the 
historic legacy of the 1962 war; China’s alleged support for Indian rebel groups in the 




UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Blah, 2018; Maxwell, 1999; 
Pant and Passi, 2017).  More contemporary events such as India’s informal emerging 
coalition with Japan, Australia, and the US as a counterbalance to China’s dominacne, 
adds another layer of complexity (Acharya, 2007; Robbani, 2016; Stephen, 2012; 
Wohlforth, 1999). However, in the study of their approaches to conflict-management, 
there are convergences. India and China have been at the margins, in the discursive 
knowledge-building process on peacebuilding, as well as taking a ‘backseat’ in the 
implementation of peacebuilding projects, giving way for Western states and 
institutions to lead, and dictate, the process (Kühn, 2012; Lewis et al., 2018). While 
largely ambivalent to peacebuilding, in some instances these emergent powers have 
even sought to curtail the legal scope of related concepts, such as  Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention, through their activism at the UN 
(Dalmia and Malone, 2012; Kozyrev, 2016; Kulshreshth, 2016; Kurtz, 2014; Zhenmin, 
2009).  
 
Despite a cautious approach by India and China, and the nascent scholarship on their 
‘peacebuilding’ approach, there is an agreement that the role of emergent actors 
deserves far more recognition, than its relatively low profile at multilateral forums, 
such as the  UN’s Peacebuilding Commission, might suggest (Abb, 2018). They also 
merit greater recognition since these countries have lately tended to be critical 
players in several peace processes (Alden and Large, 2015; Cheng et al., 2018; 
Whitfield, 2012).  
 
Indian and Chinese Foreign Policy: Centrality of Sovereignty 
A normative focus on sovereignty is seen to inhibit emergent powers from engaging 
in such liberal interventionist projects like peacebuilding. Buoyed by the post-Cold 
War order, which posited ‘shared sovereignty’ as a way of dealing with international 
threats, mandates for international conflict-management tools like peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding depended on endorsement of external interference (Krasner, 2004; 
Pospisil, 2017). With a focus on re-structuring state institutions, strategies such as 




Lake, 2016; Zaum, 2003). Scholars of Chinese foreign policy concur that China does 
not favour peacebuilding, as it contradicts China’s position on state sovereignty and 
non-intervention, its focus on development, and its aversion to a ‘one-size fits all’ 
approach (Alden and Large, 2015; Lei, 2011). Additionally, China’s focus on social 
order, physical reconstruction, and an uncompromising role of the state in directing 
economic development, stands in contrast to the liberal peacebuilding project’s focus 
on free market economy and democracy (Alden and Large, 2015).  Similar caution is 
observed in India’s stance on peacebuilding, which emphasises national ownership, 
a light footprint approach from external parties, and building national capacities 
(Singh, 2017). Unsurprisingly, speaking on the relevance of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, the Indian representative at the UN cautioned, ‘This Peacebuilding 
Commission is, however, a relatively new body and it would be difficult for us to come 
to the conclusion that its utility stands proven’ (Mukerji, 2014).   
 
A focus on sovereingity is also core to the foreign policy articulations of both India 
and China, despite differences and inherent competition between the two. Their 
foreign polices have historically focused on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence (known as Panchsheel in India). These include: peaceful co-existence, 
equality, mutual interest, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party (Narayanan, 2004). 
Despite changes in external and internal contexts, in general these  norms are routinely 
cited in their foreign policy statements (Xue, 2007; Zhengqing and Xiaoqin, 2015).  
Adherence to sovereignty, and non-intervention, has meant that there are strong 
complementarities between China and India, on such related issues as peacekeeping, 
humanitarian intervention (Sullivan de Estrada and Foot, 2019), climate change and 
global trade negotiation (Pant, 2013). 
 
In their early years, the foreign policies of India and China prioritised these norms, due 
to several factors, such as: a history of colonialism, the prioritisation of autonomy in 
their foreign policies, and their identities as leaders of the post-colonial developing 
world (Choedon, 2015; Patrick and Thaler, 2010; van Ness, 1998).  This support for 




conflicts being internationalised, such as the unrest in Kashmir and in Xinjiang 
(Choedon, 2017; Ganguly and Pardesi, 2009; Hall, 2013; Ogden, 2017; Pillsbury, 
2012; Wang, 1999). This adherence to sovereignty has meant that India and China 
have advanced state sovereignty as sacrosanct (Walder, 2015), and thus advocated for 
countries to have the right to choose their own system of governance and pathways for 
development, without international intrusion (Information Office of the State Council, 
1998). Accordingly, they have overlooked the internal affairs of states, thus 
maintaining friendly relations with all regimes, however rogue or repressive (Narang 
and Staniland, 2012).  
 
This intense focus on sovereignty, not only contradicts the standardised liberal 
internationalist vision, which privileges certain regimes, and pathways for 
development (Carothers 2007), but often even designates liberal internationalism as 
being a facade for Western interference in the domestic issues of weak states (Holslag, 
2011). It is the case that, when liberal internationalists call for democratic reforms 
within countries, emergent powers call for inclusive and democratic international 
order, and which adapts to divergent pluralist values (Hurrell, 2018; Noesselt, 2014; 
Yahuda, 2007). Consequently, emergent powers have sought to undercut proposed 
international action against ‘rogue’  states, as well as constrain the development of 
normative regimes, seeking to dilute the norm of state sovereignty (Andornino, 2012). 
The former is evident in cases such as Rwanda and Cambodia, where China vetoed 
against international action, arguing that it was an ‘internal affair’ (Seymour, 1998; 
Wan, 1999).  The latter is evident in India and China’s successful advocacy for limiting 
the mandate of R2P, making it conditional on the consent and request of the affected 
country, and to be deployed only in specific circumstances, like genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Dalmia and Malone, 2012; Kozyrev, 
2016; Kulshreshth, 2016; Kurtz, 2014; Zhenmin, 2009).   
 
The centrality of sovereignty in Indian and Chinese foreign policy does continue to 
hold, and also impact their interaction with the liberal world order. But to limit the 
study of Indian and Chinese foreign policy, to the discursive toolbox of sovereignty, 




processes in their regions of influence. First, the focus on ‘sovereignty’ obscures the 
evolving character of Indian and Chinese foreign policy, where their increased global 
interactions, as they have risen, have compelled them to renegotiate the norms of 
absolute state sovereignty. India and China have increasingly integrated into, 
socialised with, and cooperated within, different multilateral bodies of the liberal 
order. These actions are seen to be critical to their economic rise and global position 
(Bava, 2017; Johnston, 2003). In this constant negotiation with the world order, largely 
shaped by liberal values and norms, India and China have accepted  some values while 
rejecting others (Noesselt, 2014). Secondly, while India and China have championed 
the sovereignty norm in global forums, in their regional engagement they have 
regularly reneged on their commitment to respect sovereignty, often taking on highly 
interventionist avatars (Mohan, 2007; Womack, 2011). This chapter now turns to a 
brief examination of these disparities.  
 
Evolving Priorities of Indian and Chinese Foreign Policy  
The rise of India and China, their growing interaction with actors and institutions of 
the liberal world order, has left emergent powers with a fundamental tension. They are 
caught in between forging alliances with the Western world, and therefore partly 
championing liberal values, which has been economically beneficial; or continuing as 
flagbearers of the post-colonial developing world, and forming an anti-Western lobby 
(Breslin, 2013; Mohan, 2007). And, while emergent powers are seen to be taking a 
middle ground between these choices, their rise has created both domestic and 
international conditions that necessitate fundamental changes in their foreign policies. 
These changes compromise not only their stance on absolute state sovereignty, but 
also call for increased engagement with elements of the liberal world order.  
 
Firstly, in their pursuit of a continued rise in power, India and China have been 
compelled to forgo the ideological dogmas of their foreign policies, and adapt a 
pragmatic stance in order to further their ambitions. Accordingly, the ideological tone 




global disarmament, non-alignment, and international communism, has waned 
(Bhalla, 2012; Ganguly and Pardesi, 2009; Guha, 2008; Lampton, 2013; Mukherjee 
and Malone, 2011; Pye, 1986; Zhao, 2004a). Indian and Chinese foreign policies now 
prioritise core interests, pragmatically adapting to changing political situations, thus  
bringing variations in foreign policy responses, across time, and across issue areas 
(Miller and De Estrada, 2017).  
 
For China, a ‘pragmatic’ drive has allowed for flexible interpretation of principles like 
‘non-intervention’ (Sørensen, 2019). It has treated political and security issues on a 
‘case by case’ basis, while sticking to the rules of the liberal order on the economic 
front (Sutter, 2012a). This  has allowed Chinese foreign policy to balance between 
international norms, and China’s long-held foreign policy principles, such as 
sovereignty and non-interference, to suit its domestic national interests (Hirono et al., 
2019; Sørensen, 2019; Xiao, 2011). China’s increased peacekeeping contribution and 
provision of combat troops (Alden and Yixiao, 2017; Foot, 2014); its support for the 
American role in Afghanistan, given the complementarities on the War on Terror 
(Lam, 2006) all testify to this pragmatism (Xiao, 2011). China’s concessions and 
reforms on the human rights regime, and the articulation of its own version of human 
rights, which focuses on the right to survival and development, highlight its pragmatic 
inclinations (Foot, 2012; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
UN, 2005). All of this is reaffirmed by the absence of any reference to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 2015 Defence White Papers (Sullivan and 
Erickson, 2015).  
 
In the same way, it has also enabled India to have one foot in the ‘developing world’, 
and another in the world of advanced economic and military powers (Cohen, 2001) 
opening avenues for strategic partnerships with Western states, like the US, while not 
entirely forgoing its tested relationship with the ‘developing world’ (Sridharan, 2017). 
A core feature of this pragmatic turn in India’s policy, is the absence of ‘clear-cut 
statements and categorical stances on important global issues’, which were a feature 





The pragmatic change of direction underlines the ‘ideological deficit’ (Mehta, 2009) 
and the indeterminacy in Indian and Chinese foreign policy. However, it demonstrates 
that, while both India and China still have a more conservative take on norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention than their Western counterparts, their adherence to 
these norms is  increasingly malleable, and is based on their core interests (Foot, 2012; 
Liu and Zhang, 2014):  factors which can open possibilities to engagement on 
international conflict management.  
 
Secondly, while still selective and uneven, there has been an increased integration of 
India and China into different multilateral trade, security, and other global governance 
regimes, opening avenues for greater multilateral engagement on issues of peace and 
security. For India, the history of multilateralism has been cyclical: early years of 
active diplomatic engagement with the world (Basrur, 2010), followed by a retreat, in 
light of the UN’s role in dispute resolution in Kashmir, and the failure of countries of 
the non-aligned movement to condemn China in the Sino-India war (Ganguly and 
Pardesi, 2009; Malone, 2011). However, post-Cold War, while India’s domestic 
economic liberalisation compelled it to engage with the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, to overcome domestic financial crisis, the dissolution of its ally, 
the Soviet Union, obliged India to diversify its partnerships to the West (Stuenkel, 
2013). India, since then, has been a leading voice in such multilateral forums as the 
World Trade Organisation (Chen, 2011; Das et al., 2016; Efstathopoulos and Kelly, 
2014), and the UN, championing issues of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climate 
change and reform of the UN Security Council (Anant, 2015; Economic and Political 
Weekly, 2011).  
 
Similarly, China’s engagement with multilateralism has progressed through various 
stages: from virtual isolation during the Cold War, to a wariness in the early post-Cold 
War years, and then an active involvement since from the  mid-1990s, when its 
membership of international organisations has seen a meteoric increase (Johnston, 
2003; Liqun, 2008). Factors, such as China being represented at the UN by Taiwan 
until 1971, and China being the target of collective security decisions, during the 




UN membership in 1971, and the opening up of the economy, in the late 1970s, 
bolstered China’s integration into the global political economy, providing an impetus 
to multilateralism (Foot, 2014; Sullivan de Estrada and Foot, 2019). The belief that 
China’s growth is connected to high degree of interdependence, and the 
acknowledgement that the new security challenges (terrorism, transnational crimes, 
drugs, and epidemics) need multilateral action, all anchor China’s pursuit of 
multilateralism (Breslin, 2013). Chinese official documents today reaffirm its faith in 
multilateralism, positing the UN as the sole actor for the authorising of collective 
action, on matters of international peace (Information Office of the State Council, 
China, 2015, 2000; Patrick and Thaler, 2010; Roy, 2003).  
 
Highlighting this increased multilateralism however, should not fail to note its uneven 
nature. India’s distrust of the international community (Narlikar, 2006);  its concerns 
about autonomy in decision-making (Mishra and Kumar, 2013; Pande, 2018); and its 
historic identity as a developing country (Choedon, 2010) have hindered further 
multilateral partnerships. Similarly, China’s unilateralist stance on issues of core 
interest (Katzenstein, 2000), its limiting of its multilateral efforts to economic as 
opposed to political matters (Wang, 1999), and its muscular bilateral regional policies, 
have all impeded any further multilateralism (Alden and Yixiao, 2017; Hughes, 2016; 
Jackson, 2016). India is also seen to be relaxed on multilateral engagement on 
counter-terrorism, piracy, and peacekeeping (Chitalkar and Malone, 2015; Hirono et 
al., 2019), but uncomfortable with the discourses of peacebuilding, or humanitarian 
intervention (Aneja, 2014; Mukerji, 2014). This has led scholars to see China to be 
‘both integrating with and differentiating itself from the international community’ at 
the same time (Carlson, 2012).  However, despite the uneven nature, China and India 
have sought to reinforce multilateralism, not only for their economic growth, but also 
as a defence against the US, or Western, unilateralism (Mukherjee and Malone, 2011; 
Roy, 2003).  
 
Thirdly, the push for economic growth and development, has seamlessly linked India 
and China’s domestic priorities with their foreign policies, forcing more cooperation 




Chinese economy in 1978, and the erosion of Marxist ideology, development is 
configured as the source of legitimacy, to compensate for an antiquated political 
system (Shirk, 2007; Wu, 1999; Yahuda, 1995). Similarly, in India, after liberalisation 
in the early 1990s, development, focused on growth, infrastructure, and connectivity, 
is seen as a priority (Jaishankar, 2015). This focus on growth is typified by the current 
Modi government, whose foreign policy has sought to prioritise India’s economic 
interests and national development (Mohan, 2015).  
 
Domestically, the focus on development is seen to be central, not only to their rise, but 
also as a conflict-resolution mechanism: a route to the quelling of violence, and the 
pacification of dissatisfied social groups. Euphemised as ‘developmental peace’, this 
narrative of development and growth is deployed to control and integrate minorities, 
in areas like Tibet and Xinjiang (Cooke, 2003; Fravel, 2005; Paperny, 2008). 
Similarly, conflict-resolution efforts in India’s North-Eastern states and Kashmir, have 
been centred on counter-insurgency and development, in the form of the extraction of 
natural resources, infrastructural development, and the boosting of cross-border trade 
(Fareed, 2018; Mcduie-Ra, 2009). This developmental focus was reinforced by India’s 
representative at the UN, who, in 2012, argued for development to be the ‘central 
pillar’ of human security (Hansel & Möller, 2015, Pg 88).   
 
The focus on development compels Indian and Chinese domestic priorities to become 
interdependent with their foreign policy priorities, further coercing them to engage  
aggressively globally on a variety of issue-areas, and often in conflict-affected settings. 
Continued development demands a stable external environment, providing sustained 
access to external consumers, products and resources (Buzan, 2014). Development has 
also made issues, such as energy security, a high priority in China and India (Sikri, 
2010; Sutter, 2012a). This has required them to venture out for transnational economic 
interests, often in conflict-affected parts of Africa and the Middle East (Breslin, 2013; 
Daojiong and Breslin, 2012). This interdependence, buoyed by their quest for 
development, has connected core security interests of countries, like China, to 
international threats and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters 





In practice, this impetus for development extends the ‘governance frontier’ of 
emergent powers beyond their territories, with an immediate impact on neighbouring 
countries (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). Domestic policies, such as the Great Western 
Development campaign, or China’s drug control strategy, which has focused on 
developing border-provinces like Yunnan has a cross-border impact in such 
neighbouring states as Myanmar, through extension of development aid, subsidies, and 
infrastructure projects (Clarke, 2016; Su, 2013a). Similar increased cross-border flows 
have been faciliated by India’s grant and loan commitments, often centred on 
connectivity and infrastructure (Singh, 2018), of which over 80 per cent are made to 
neighbouring South Asian countries (Roychoudhury et al., 2015).  
 
Fourthly, the rise of India and China, has led to increases in the number of actors in 
the design and delivery of foreign policy, as their matrix of priorities has increased. It 
is now being questioned if Indian and Chinese foreign policies can have a centralised 
or uniform direction, and if, in their implementation by several actors, they conform 
to the original policies designed by Beijing and New Delhi. Growing pluralisation 
means that participants might oppose a more responsible foreign policy, or try to avoid 
the attendant costly restrictions, making it difficult to determine the direction of their 
foreign policy (Daojiong and Breslin, 2012; Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).  
 
In India, foreign policy-making is seen to be centralised, within the individual domain 
of the Prime Minister at Central government level (Menon, 2016). However, several 
factors ensure that its foreign policy implementation, if not its policy-making, is 
increasingly pluralised (Malone and Mukherjee, 2010; Pande, 2018; Sikri, 2014). Not 
least of these factors is India’s monumental bureaucracy, and centre-state relations, 
combined with its democratic polity, which relies on political coalitions of different 
ideological hues, and often with regional parties. Thus, provinces, political parties and 
their ideologies, and bureaucratic institutions have become important variables in 





While the importance of provinces in foreign policy-making is a work in progress, 
Indian border states, such as Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar and 
Punjab, with a shared ethnicity, geography and economic dependence with their 
neighbouring states, have vetoed key foreign policy decisions (Gupta, 2010). India’s 
federal structure provides for issues like water sharing to be a prerogative of the states, 
which makes provinces pivotal in foreign policy issues, that feed into economic, social, 
cultural and environmental spheres (Tharoor, 2016). The growing acknowledgement 
of the role of provinces and states in foreign policy-making, is evidenced by the recent 
creation of the State’s Division within the Ministry of External Affairs (Jacob, 2016). 
Similarly, although India’s diverse political parties have not imposed new arguments 
on to the foreign policy agenda (Ganguly, 2014), nevertheless they have acted to 
overrule legislation in some instances (Narang and Staniland, 2012). The protest of the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), which had supported the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) coalition (2004-2014), against the Indo-US nuclear deal, thus 
threatening to bring down the government, is illustrative of this. Further, trade lobbies, 
civil society and religious groups, all can serve as bottom-up pressure points, as the 
later chapter on Nepal demonstrates.   
 
Similarly, in China, a greater pluralisation in foreign policy has seen government 
control of it subside, in turn creating space for competing financial institutions, energy 
companies, think tanks, media and provincial governments to claim their stakes 
(Jakobson and Knox, 2010; Liqun, 2008). The sheer expansion of the sphere of China’s 
international engagement, covering issues such as energy, arms, and trade, has made 
the process of pluralisation more evident (Jakobson and Knox, 2010).  Growing 
decentralisation has meant that many provinces in practice are left on their own, on 
such salient policy issues as trade, rather than being ruled by the centre (Zheng, 1997). 
Provincial government adopts national rules to suit their local challenges, bringing 
variation into the practice of foreign policy (Antholis, 2013). This variation makes it 
difficult for foreign policy, decided in Beijing, to be implemented by provinces in its 
totality. This tendency is more evident in provinces that border other countries, 
including, Yunnan province, which borders Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos. Given the 




instances where provincial authorities, and other non-state entities, have undercut 
Beijing’s foreign policy. For instance, central government policies have on many 
occasions been flouted by the Yunnan government, when the interests of the two have 
collided (Li and Lye, 2009). This pluralisation of policy-making also arises from the 
narrow interpretation of foreign policy in China, where foreign policy is seen to be 
exclusive to diplomacy, or negotiations led by government bodies, such as  the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and overlooks military and trade issues (Bachman, 1998). 
 
These four factors, have not only compelled Indian and Chinese foreign policy to 
veer away from sovereignty-related concerns, but have injected new variables, all of 
which are pertinent to understanding their engagement on issues of peacebuilding, 
and their interaction with the region.   
 
Regional Foreign Policy: Motivations for Engaging in Conflict 
Management 
Along with the evolving priorities in Indian and Chinese foreign policy, an assessment 
of their identities as ‘regional powers’ is needed in order to understand the nature of 
their engagement in peace processes. India and China have a time-tested identity as 
regional hegemons, determined by geography, history, size, population, as well as their 
asymmetry in levels of economic growth, technological and infrastructural advances, 
in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Breslin, 2013; Padukone, 2014). Regions are also 
central to their historic self-understanding (Hurrell, 2006). Further, with immediate 
security, economic and political considerations at stake in the region, the respect for 
state sovereignty has rarely featured. Examples include China’s efforts to export 
Communist ideology across the region during the Cultural Revolution; its support for 
armed communist insurgencies, and coups against established governments; and 
finally its political manipulation of Chinese nationals living overseas across Southeast 
Asia (Shambaugh, 2004). Similarly, in 1971, India supported the independence 
movement, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, citing it being on ‘humanitarian 
grounds’. Its  absorption of the then independent Kingdom of Sikkim as a part of India 




civil war (Chattopadhyay, 2011; Mansingh, 1984) demonstrate not only a disregard 
for sovereignty but, in the cases of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, also illustrates its usage 
of liberal norms, to infringe the sovereignty of neighbouring states.  
 
Their identity as regional powers strongly influences the pathways they choose to 
exercise their authority, and the diverse strategies they employ to maintain regional 
hegemony (Destradi, 2010a). These strategies have become increasingly critical, as 
there is a recognition of ‘regions’ being both an opportunity and a constraint for their 
rise (Glosny, 2016; Khilnani et al., 2012; Rajagopalan and Sahni, 2008).  
 
India and China as ‘Regional Powers’ 
China’s identity as a contested ‘regional power’, with Asia-Pacific as its ‘backyard’, 
looms large in Chinese strategic thinking (Poh and Li, 2017; Womack, 2011).  Unlike 
India’s presence in South Asia, China’s pursuit of dominance sits uncomfortably 
alongside the entrenched US presence in the region (Whiting, 1997). Historic factors, 
such as the tributary system, where neighbouring states acknowledged the supremacy 
of China’s rulers in return for non-interference (Hevia, 2009; Womack, 2011), and 
support for armed Communist insurgencies, has complicated China’s regional 
engagement (Shambaugh, 2004). Further, contemporary territorial disputes, especially 
in the South China Sea, and economic competition, in addition to  asymmetry in 
military capabilities, have defined China’s regional foreign policy (Sutter, 2012a). 
While Chinese leaders maintain their rise as ‘peaceful’ and non-threatening, China’s 
growing military expansion has made their neighbours wary (Wills, 2011). What thus 
defines China’s regional policy can be read as a two-track policy: growing 
interconnectedness in trade and investment, and an assertive position in contested 
maritime disputes (Dittmer, 2014). 
 
Similarly, there is a broad consensus that India is a regional power (Ayoob, 2000; 
Cohen, 2001; Perkovich, 2003; Robbani, 2016; Sahni, 2007).  This is given its 
insulated compact geography (Padukone, 2014), its historically derived sense of 
centrality, where the British ruled much of the sub-continent from its centre in India 




terms of population, economic growth, and military expenditure (Sahni, 2007). 
Further, the foreign policies of all of its neighbours are orientated towards dealing with 
India (Behuria et al., 2012; Muni, 2003; Sikri, 2014). 
 
Elements of Regional Policy 
To reign in the region as hegemons, and influence the regional context to support their 
interests, the foreign policies of India and China, despite variations, have three 
common elements, which have shaped their regional engagement (Gill, 2005; Mohan, 
2005; Tanham, 1992). 
 
Firstly, combating extra-regional influence in their regions has been core to India and 
China’s regional policies. Extra-regional influence is perceived, not only as a threat to 
their own dominance, and a source of instability, but also as a variable facilitating 
neighbouring states to gain an equal footing, by aligning with an external third party.  
 
In India, foreign policy elites largely view South Asia as one strategic unit (Tanham, 
1992). As a result, India not only hopes to play the role of peacekeeper, but also expects 
to be acknowledged for this role in the region (Tanham, 1992). Extra-regional powers, 
such as the US and China, have been seen to be manipulating neighbouring states, in 
order to destabilise India’s regional dominance (Mansingh, 1984; Muni, 2003). It is 
argued, that an emerging India no longer considers third-party influence in the region 
as detrimental to its interests (Behuria et al., 2012). Nevertheless, there persists a 
certain unease with third party presences, on sensitive issues such as conflicts and 
peace processes (Martin, 2012; Sørbø et al., 2011). Due to this, despite increased 
global multilateralism, India appears to be loath to seek multilateral solutions 
regionally. India has also tended to see regional multilateralism, as a possible 
mechanism for India's smaller neighbours to contain India, and has preferred bilateral 
diplomacy (Menon, 2013; Saran, 2005; Sikri, 2014). Equally, a core reason for India’s 
apprehension about subscribing to different international norms, is due to the 





While China’s rise, along with the decline of the West, is seen to have constrained the 
US role in the region (Xuetong, 2001; Zicheng et al., 2011), there is an articulated 
desire to maintain the region’s autonomy (Goldstein, 2005). This focus, was expressed 
by Chinese President Xi at the 4th Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia Summit in 2014, as ‘it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of 
Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia’ (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2014). Accordingly, since 2001, China has actively promoted Asian 
multilateral forums that exclude the United States (Cheng, 2013; Saunders, 2006), as 
well as worked to make Southeast Asian countries ‘reassess their basic stance on 
relations with the great powers’, albeit with limited success (Haacke, 2002).  
 
A crucial factor, however, is the intra-regional competition between India and China. 
China’s increasing presence in South Asia, and its competition for resources and 
political influence, has defined India-China relationship (Mohan, 2007; Pant and 
Super, 2015). Amid this competition, South Asian countries have invoked China to 
redress their asymmetry, and gain relief from political-economic pressures from India, 
much to India’s alarm (Ayoob, 1991; Bhandari and Jindal, 2018). With China being 
the dominant concern for India, scholars argue that there will be a growing 
convergence between India and the United States (Xavier, 2019). This, however, is 
framed as more of a point of connection with the US, rather than a formal alliance 
(Khilnani et al., 2012).  
 
Secondly, promoting regional stability is highly prioritised in Indian and Chinese 
foreign policy. ‘Region’ is seen both as a source of instability, and a key to stability.  
India’s volatile region is ‘core to its security calculus’ (Gupta, 2018, Pg 18). Concerns 
about instability in neighbouring countries seeping into the Indian borders; the 
collusion between domestic and transnational threats; and extra-regional intervention 
fostered by regional insecurity: all loom large (Malone and Mukherjee, 2010). 
Instances of the flow of refugees from East Pakistan before the 1971 war;  China’s 
support to Naga rebels in North-East India, in their campaign against the Indian state; 
combined with India’s qualms about the issue of the internationalisation of Kashmir, 




as highlighted by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, when she stated during the war 
in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh): ‘what is happening in Bangladesh does have 
many-sided repercussions on our internal affairs….this cannot be considered merely 
as an internal problem of Pakistan’ (Gandhi, 1975). With the focus on India’s growth, 
regional stability and the management of relationships with its South Asian 
neighbours, are seen as pre-requisites for its continued rise (Khilnani et al., 2012). 
 
Likewise, in China, the quest for stability is sacrosanct (Lampton, 2013). Chinese 
history has judged the legitimacy of a regime, by its ability to provide stability and 
prosperity (Gill, 2010; Holslag, 2011). Concerns relating to internal turbulence, with 
ethnic protests in areas like Tibet or Xinjiang, as well as the newer security concerns 
of terrorism, organised crime, drugs, energy, environmental issues, and infectious 
diseases matter a great deal (Buzan, 2014). Further, ethnic unrest like in Xinjiang, 
benefitting from the support from neighbouring countries, makes the concept of 
‘region’ important in Chinese strategic thinking (Zicheng et al., 2011). Bordering 
countries, thus, exert a vital influence on China’s unification and territorial integrity 
(Zicheng et al., 2011). Concerns over stability introduce conflicting patterns of 
interactions. One the one hand, intricate regional disputes like the South China Sea, or 
the disputed islets of Senkaku and Diaoyu, are seen to have made China more assertive 
in its foreign policy towards its regional neighbours. However, on the other hand, there 
has been increased cooperation to combat cross-border threats of regional drug 
production, and trafficking (Haacke, 2002).  
 
Lastly, both India and China have sought to influence policies in neighbouring 
countries to suit their own interests, directly and indirectly. China’s ability, to enhance 
its influence in the region, is strengthened by its dominance in regional trade: where it 
has leveraged increased commerce, trade, and infrastructural links, to serve its broader 
political and economic objectives (Sampson, 2019). Through trade, investment, and 
aid, China has also tried to address the ‘China threat’ narrative, and promoted itself as 
a benign rising power (Suzuki, 2012). For instance, during the Asian economic crisis 
of 1997, when western investors pulled out of East Asia, China held on and supported 




(Jiang, 2011; van Ness, 1998), thus earning the goodwill of these states. Politically, 
China has sought to secure support from regional neighbours for its proposals for 
regional cooperation and global governance reforms, as well as oppose resolutions 
seeking to pressurise China (Glosny, 2016).  
 
India’s influence in the region has been more direct and overt: influencing the domestic 
politics in the region, in a bid to protect its interests. Indeed, to its neighbouring 
countries, India is a domestic constituency, able to influence their domestic political 
equilibrium (Muni, 2003). India has used development aid, concessions, threats, 
political transformation, coercion and military intervention to influence the policies of 
neighbouring states (Wagner, 2005). India is routinely accused of supporting ‘pro-
Indian’ constituencies, and shaping the domestic politics of its neighbours, in a manner 
more conducive to its strategic and political interests, while neglecting comprehensive 
regional cooperation (Sahni, 2016). Not surprisingly, while India insists that it is not a 
threat, its neighbours have not been accepting of this idea (Tanham, 1992), and have 
interacted closely with extra-regional powers, at bilateral or multilateral levels, to 
reduce any dependence on India (Upreti, 2005).  As India rises, it has been focused on 
reassuring its neighbours, that it presents an opportunity for their growth, rather than 
being a threat (Saran, 2005).   
 
In summary, while emergent powers are still influenced by a stricter interpretation of 
sovereignty, an understanding of the evolving patterns in their foreign policies, in 
addition to elements of their regional policies, are both pertinent to understanding the 
engagement of emergent powers on peace processes in neighbouring states. The 
inherent tensions between these varying foreign policy priorities, as well as their 
unpredictability, given their gradual evolution, undergirds the complexity of their 
engagement, in such countries as Nepal and Myanmar.  
 
Liberal Peacebuilding and its Rise and Fall  
In conflict-affected states in South and Southeast Asia, the engagement of India and 




projects are routinely invoked, by domestic elites in these countries, to support peace 
processes. Similar to the policies of emergent powers, liberal peacebuilding as a 
concept has also changed, having mutated in its normative foundation, relevance, and 
effectiveness (Chandler, 2017). Despite its ‘liberal’ prefix, it has had to rely on illiberal 
and coercive means to realise its aim of forming liberal states, as well as having to 
accommodate hybrid forms of peace, embodying both liberal and illiberal features, and 
which have become the most prevalent outcome of peacebuilding projects (Belloni, 
2012; Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012; Richmond and Franks, 2009). 
To understand, how alternative forms of ‘peacebuilding’ such as the engagement of 
India and China, interact with liberal peacebuilding, it becomes important not only to 
understand its normative foundations, but to trace its journey, from its initial 
conceptualisation, to how it materialises in practice today, in its skeletal form as 
‘technocratic projects’ (Pospisil, 2019).  
 
Origins and Expansion of Liberal Peacebuilding 
Contravening the concept of sovereignty, which had dominated the international legal 
system and the UN charter, the end of the Cold War, and the triumph of liberalism in 
the early 1990s, heralded the rise of liberal internationalism (Zhang, 2016). Liberal 
peacebuilding projects evolved as a product of this time, forming a core pathway, 
through which the West, along with the UN and multilateral institutions, supported 
post-war transitions to peace (Mac Ginty, 2011).  
 
The underlying logic of peacebuilding, driving its engagement, is the understanding 
that liberal values are intrinsically peace promoting, as proven by the experience of the 
West. Liberal peacebuilding, thus, is founded on mutually reinforcing nature of 
democratic government and market economy, and their concomitant pacific 
implications for domestic and transnational security (Chandler, 2006; Jahn, 2007; 
Richmond and Franks, 2009; Zaum, 2003). The origins of liberal peacebuilding, as a 
global project, can be traced to the UN’s Agenda for Peace report, which defined 
peacebuilding as: actions to ‘identify and support structures which will tend to 




1992). The report also scoped peacebuilding’s comprehensive mandate to include: 
disarming warring parties, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, the 
repatriation of refugees, election monitoring, protecting human rights, and 
strengthening governmental institutions (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). A supplemental report 
focused on the collapse of state institutions in conflict-affected states, and called for 
prioritising the re-establishment of effective government, bringing the focus on to 
statebuilding (UN General Assembly, 1995).  The reports, with their focus on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, set the stage for international engagement to re-
engineer state institutions, through wide-ranging activities, in order to address the root 
causes of conflict (Barnett and Zürcher, 2008). With this momentum for negotiated 
settlements of conflicts, the international community has engaged in a variety of 
conflict resolution activities, encompassing  both heavy-footprint and multi-mandate 
roles, and often undertaking interim administrations of countries, as well as supplying 
low-footprint peace support (Bell, 2017a).  
 
Since the early 1990s, peacebuilding has been engrained into varied missions, such as: 
the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
the UN Operation in Somalia, the UN mission in Haiti and the UN Protection Force in 
Yugoslavia in 1995, amongst others. This swift adoption of peacebuilding has also 
percolated beyond the confines of the UN, with many multilateral bodies, Western 
states, NGOs, and regional organisations, cultivating peacebuilding into profiles of 
their work (Autesserre, 2009; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Jenkins, 2013; Paris, 2004). 
The rapid uptake of the concept, and the resulting proliferation of operations on the 
ground, did institutionalise peacebuilding, but also led to the concept of peacebuilding 
being over-streched. Peacebuilding ballooned to become so general, that it included 
all forms of international assistance to countries seeking to transition away from 
conflict (Cousens, 2001). 
 
Despite the uptake and the expansion of the concept, its impact has been dwindling at 
best. Taking stock of peacebuilding’s effectiveness, a modest conclusion has emerged: 
peacebuilding projects have helped end conflicts, but have failed to bring ‘peace’, or 




2000). More so, myriad unintended impacts, and shortcomings, of the ‘project 
peacebuilding’ have surfaced, as will be discussed in the next section. Peacebuilding, 
thus, has had a tumultuous journey, marked by an initial decade of euphoria, and 
increased deployment in practice, only to be followed by pessimism, and resistance 
(Chandler, 2017; Pospisil, 2019). 
 
 Away from its ‘Liberal’ Core in Practice  
In the three decades since its conceptualisation, the commitment of liberal 
peacebuilding to liberalism, as well as its effectiveness in building peace, has been 
questioned. Despite its liberal facade, scholars have routinely called out the illiberal 
foundations of peacebuilding.  With roots in Western political thought and experience, 
it is Eurocentric at best, and is further privileged by the western hegemony in 
knowledge production and policy, given the Western domination in the global 
governance architecture (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Jahn, 2005; Kühn, 2012; Lewis, 
2017; Sabaratnam, 2013). Along with questions on the appropriateness of Eurocentric 
prescriptions to non-Western contexts, peacebuilding is said to have created a divide 
between ‘liberal’ and the ‘other’, often marginalising alternative non-liberal sources 
of agency (Kappler and Richmond, 2011; Layne, 1995; Richmond, 2015). The 
marginalisation of other non-liberal forms of governance has come at the cost of 
ideational pluralism (Yaqing, 2015). Beyond the normative critique, the illiberal and 
coercive avatar, that peacebuilding has had to adopt to ‘bring peace’, in places like 
Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to concerns about liberalism’s mutation into illiberal 
forms (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond, 2011).  
 
Further, it is increasingly being recognised that the comprehensive aim of a ‘liberal 
state’ is unlikely to be realised. Empirically, hybrid peace, brought about by the 
interactions between international and local versions of peace, imbibing both liberal 
and illiberal forms, is the most likely outcome, and alternative, to liberal peace (Jarstad 
and Belloni, 2012). However, scholars argue that hybrid forms that ‘compromise’ on 
liberal ideals, and consolidate the status quo, are the most likely outcomes of 




is intrincically compromised, and cannot exist in other ways.  
 
Yet another core operational challenge, for liberal peacebuilding, is the absence of 
coherence and homogeneity, in defining what peacebuilding is (Zaum, 2012). The 
sheer numbers, and wide dispersal, of ‘peacebuilding’ actors, and the various concepts 
peacebuilding seeks to embed, makes it challenging to integrate different dimensions 
of the peacebuilding paradigm, and uniformly apply it in practice (De Coning, 2009).  
For instance, while some peacebuilding actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), privilege ‘stabilisation and peace support’, others like the 
European Union (EU), give credence to ‘civilian crisis management’, and meanwhile 
the African Union prioritises ‘post-conflict reconstruction and development’ (Chetail, 
2009). Similarly, peacebuilding’s prospects are further complicated by the 
contradictory nature of different peacebuilding themes. Witness such examples as: 
elections versus peace, transitional justice versus stability, and stability versus 
inclusivity (United Nations, 2015a). The division of peacebuilding, into opposing 
themes, has also resulted in the various strands of liberalism being at odds, when 
‘peacebuilding’ is being conducted on the ground. For instance, peacebuilding is said 
to have paradoxically displaced older liberal values of welfare, so critical in countries 
overcoming prolonged conflicts, replacing them with ill-suited neo-liberal values 
(Newman et al., 2009).  
 
Another shift has been in the actual motivation that has anchored peacebuilding 
conceptually. The context for understanding conflicts changed radically after the 
attack on the United States on September the 11th, 2001. Discourse on terrorism 
dominated, and subsequently positioned fragile states as global threats, in need of 
international support to enact their statehood (Fukuyama, 2004). The focus was no 
longer centred on building liberal societies, but on strong states and institutions, 
making peacebuilding highly securitised, with much greater attention devoted to 
building up the state’s capacity to monitor, prevent, and respond to security threats 
(Barnett, 2006; Duffield, 2014; Menkhaus, 2014).  While the 1990s hallowed the state, 
with debates on human security, human rights, and peacebuilding, in contrast,  the 




(Chandler, 2006). A minimally-functioning state was seen to be a pre-requisite for any 
form of peacebuilding, thus privileging statebuilding over peacebuilding (Ghani, 
2008). Thus, despite the inherent contradiction between the two, in that  statebuilding 
supports states to monopolise the means of coercion and power; while liberal 
peacebuilding seeks to tame the power of the state, by building strong liberal societies, 
both were seen to be a part of a sequence, and simultaneously deployed (Barnett, 2006; 
Chandler, 2006; Fukuyama, 2005).   
 
A core reason attributed to peacebuilding’s ineffectiveness is its inability to understand 
the context, and respond to contextual needs of conflict-affected states (Barma, 2017; 
Barnett and Zürcher, 2008; Da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2010; Pouligny, 
2006; Richmond, 2015). The Report of the High Level Independent Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations accurately diagnoses that, ‘changes in conflict may be 
outpacing the ability of UN’ to respond (United Nations, 2015b, Pg. VII). This 
inability arises, in part, due to the reliance on a standardised template, of how to bring 
‘peace’, with similar macro-level components applied to varied contexts, instead of 
tailoring interventions to the specific needs of the country (Mac Ginty, 2008). This 
solution-based, pre-determined template is reaffirmed by a set sequence, which 
peacebuilders have put in place. As De Groof, notes, ‘First, mediators achieve a peace 
agreement, ...followed by a limited ‘Transition’ period, often accompanied by 
temporary power-sharing arrangements …(then) a new constitution is drafted and 
adopted. The culmination is the holding of new and democratic elections…’ (De 
Groof, 2019). Similarly, others argue that the inability to address contextual challenges 
is due to the requirements of Western donors’ funding modalities being incompatible 
with the fluidity, and indeterminacy, of post-conflict contexts (Phillips, 2016). A 
related critique attributes the shortcomings of peacebuilding to its inability to take the 
local ‘agency’ of social groups more seriously (Barma, 2017; Barnett and Zürcher, 
2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Concerns about the elites’ capture of the 
benefits of peacebuilding, and the resistance of elites to peacebuilders, in addition to 
peacebuilding being scapegoated for failures of domestic constituencies, all loom large 
(Barma, 2017; De Waal, 2009; Pouligny, 2006). The agency of domestic elites enables 




or compromised outcomes, instead of untainted ‘liberal’ ones (Barnett and Zürcher, 
2008; Mac Ginty, 2011, 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013).   
 
All actors involved, including recipients, have repeatedly raised the pervasiveness of 
such shortcomings and unintended impact. There is a realisation that such institutions 
as the UN are not ‘rising to the peacebuilding challenge’ (United Nations, 2010, Pg. 
9). Further, internal challenges to liberalism with growing populism in the West have 
reduced the penchant for liberal internationalism (Galston, 2018). This awareness of 
their own incapability, and their inability to expend the necessary time and money, has 
led liberal peacebuilders to lower their own ‘liberal’ standards (Wallis, 2018). Liberal 
peacebuilders are said to have relinquished their visions of a perfect ‘liberal peace’, 
and have moved to a‘goal-free approach’, where the focus is on the process, and the 
end-goal is open to context-specific interpretations of peace (De Coning, 2018). Calls 
have been made to renounce the solution-based paradigm of peacebuilding, and adapt 
pragmatically to complexities on the ground (Pospisil, 2019). Some have even argued 
that peacebuilding is in retreat, and with pragmatism, rather than goals of liberal state, 
being the order of the day, ‘peacebuilding is no longer a term on the international 
agenda’ (Chandler, 2017, Pg 6).  Equally, those at the receiving end have now come 
to see international assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy, motivated by 
a desire to intervene, but avoiding the required ‘responsibility’ (Chandler, 2006; 
Duffield, 2010; Dunne and Mcdonald, 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). 
 
In short, the contemporary scholarship on liberal peacebuilding presents it as being 
contested, at both giving and receiving ends, leading to hybrid political orders, rather 
than liberal states. It is evolving to be pragmatic in its approach, to addressing 
contextual challenges (Moe and Stepputat, 2018; Pospisil, 2019; Wallis, 2018).  
 
‘Skeletal’ version of Peacebuilding on ground  
Such an apocalyptic reading of liberal peacebuilding, however, understates the 
immense material, and normative, power, it continues to hold (Mac Ginty and 




use the liberal rhetoric, to justify peace-support interventions (Mac Ginty, 2011).  
Crucially, on the ground, peacebuilders adopt multiple roles as funders, international 
experts in institutional reform, formal adjudicators, managers of key public services, 
and mediators (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). This interpretation of the pragmatic approach 
of peacebuilding also obscures the fact that peacebuilding has been condemned, and 
critiqued, only for it to reinvent itself, and reappear in different guises. Despite a 
conscious admission of failure, by such bodies as the UN, ironically peacebuilders 
have used the ‘failure’ of their interventions to justify the need for prolonged 
international supervision of post-conflict processes, thereby reasserting their 
dominance (Bargués-Pedreny, 2018). In fact, the UN reviews of 2010 and 2015 call 
for not only a rethinking of peacebuilding, given its failure, but also demand increased 
resources, stronger partnerships, and efficient delivery mechanisms (United Nations, 
2015b, 2010). Truly, while comprehensive mandates for peacebuilding might be a 
thing of the past, liberal peacebuilding remains alive in the form of IKEA flat-pack 
type mandates, which have similar projects, despite contextual differences (Mac Ginty, 
2008). These projects on such themes as Inclusion, SSR, and Transtional Justice, are 
further undergirded by such liberal principles as equality, civilian supremacy, rule of 
law, human rights and accountability. As the elements of inclusion, SSR, and 
transitional justice become elements of the wider liberal peacebuilding project; they 
provide windows to an understanding liberal peace in practice. As this thesis focuses 
on the three elements, to account for how emergent powers engage in the 
peacebuilding arena, and their interaction with liberal peacebuilding projects in Nepal 
and Myanmar, the section below briefly recounts their conceptual basis. The brief 
account will be supplemented in the empirical chapters, by looking at how these 
components were defined in the peace accords, and how they evolved in practice.  
 
Inclusion  
Exclusion is often at the heart of most civil wars and, accordingly, post-conflict 
settlements can rarely avoid the question of inclusion. Given the divisions of ethnicity, 
religion, regions, and language, many countries explicitly cite provisions for inclusion 
in peace accords, interim constitutional and other legal arrangements, through some 




management tool, which addresses demands for inclusion put forth by warring groups, 
and also as a long-term project of constitutional accommodation, providing important 
guarantees through different political, territorial and military divisions of power, to 
different social groups (Bell, 2018; Call, 2012).  
 
Power-sharing has been discussed in academic scholarship, as a mechanism for 
governing diverse societies, in a way where all major segments of the society are 
provided with a permanent share of power; in contrast to government versus opposition 
systems (Sisk, 2003). Scholars have focused on different variants of power-sharing. A 
dominant theme has been Consociationalism, focused on four fundamental 
characteristics: government by a grand coalition of political leaders representing all 
significant segments of a plural society; mutual veto to ensure additional protection of 
minority interests; proportionality in political representation (civil service 
appointments and allocation of public funds); and high degrees of autonomy for each 
segment to run its own affairs (Lijphart, 1977). However, in his later writings, Lijphart 
asserted that consociationalism can be defined in terms of two key elements of 
executive power sharing, namely grand coalition and group autonomy, with 
proportionality and mutual veto being ‘secondary characteristics’ that strengthen the 
former two (Lijphart, 2003). Others include Centripetalists, or Integrationists, who 
advocate designing institutions, without specifying forms of group participation, but 
rather based on voluntary inter-ethnic alliances, favouring pre-electoral interethnic 
coalitions (Horowitz, 2014).  
 
Despite the association of power-sharing, as a mechanism for inclusion and stability, 
critics point that it tends to perpetuate ethnic divisions, creating stable ‘elite cartels’, 
further privileging one social divide, such as ethnicity, over many others (Rothchild 
and Roeder, 2005). Power-sharing has also been said to deliver temporary peace, and 
has rarely facilitated effective action on security and broader constitutional issues 
(Cheeseman, 2011). 
 
In the scholarship on conflict studies, different dimensions of power-sharing (political, 




negotiated settlements that end wars (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). International 
agencies, like the UN, have tended to favour certain mechanisms for power-sharing in 
negotiated settlements, such as: consensus or national-unity transitional governments; 
broad coalitions to rule during constitution-making processes; and proportional 
representation in electoral systems (Cheeseman, 2011). 
 
Such neat categories, in the sharing of power amongst conflicting groups, rarely 
manifest themselves in practice. As will be discussed in case studies later, power-
sharing mechanisms, to foster inclusion in Nepal and Myanmar, have largely centred 
on federalism, electoral reform, proportionality of representation, and secularism. 
Such mechanisms occupy a central role in peace processes, as they seek to renegotiate 
how power is distributed. For instance, changes in electoral systems affect political 
parties, often altering their strengths and alignments (Horowitz, 2003).  
Security Sector Reform 
The UN identifies Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a core element of peacebuilding. 
Accordingly, SSR-related provisions have been encoded into different peace 
agreements since the 1990s (Pospisil, 2018). SSR, in its various manifestations, is seen 
to be a requisite for the replacement of ‘dysfunctional’ conflict-ridden societies into 
states, with liberal-democratic polity, economy, and social structures, and thus is 
situated within the liberal peacebuilding narrative (Jackson, 2011). 
 
SSR projects seek to reform the institutional framework of state security by fostering 
civilian oversight of the armed forces, ensuring security forces are reflective of the 
diversity of the state, and refining security-related policies to enshrine norms of human 
rights, accountability, and rule of law (Joshi et al., 2014; Sedra, 2013). SSR-related 
activities, include: international and regional Peace Support Operations; Disarmament 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes; police reform; and human 
rights training for armed and police forces.  
 
Discussions on SSR have gone hand in hand with discussions on DDR, which is seen 
to be a primary step in a peace process. DDR’s components are, firstly: Disarmament, 




civilians. The second component is Demobilisation, involving the disbanding of 
military command structures established by during wars. Finally Re-integration refers 
to integrating former combatants into peacetime economies, by providing alternative 
livelihoods, and employment opportunities (Mil, 2018). DDR has been a key 
component of nearly all large-scale peace operations, whether under the auspices of 
the UN or regional organisations (Berdal and Ucko, 2013). DDR and SSR, with their 
shared objective of strengthening the state’s monopoly of means of violence, and 
upholding the rule of law, are seen to be mutually reinforcing, and in practice DDR is 
often subsumed within wider discussions of SSR (McFate, 2010).  A natural point of 
intersection for DDR and SSR is also the integration of former combatants into the 
state security system, a path many countries, including Nepal, have followed in the 
SSR process (McFate, 2010).   
 
Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice, seeks to address the legacies of mass violence, and human rights 
violations, committed during civil wars or authoritarian periods. It relies on 
institutional mechanisms such as: trials, amnesties, truth commissions, truth-telling, 
criminal prosecutions, reparations, memorialisation, traditional justice, cultural 
interventions, vetting, and institutional reform (Haider, 2016; Hellsten, 2012). 
Described as the ‘first real test for democratic statehood’, it has become a dominant 
theme in political transitions (Bohl, 2006). Transitional justice, as a concept, evolved 
in ‘practice through the belief that certain obligations to investigate, prosecute, and 
rectify gross human rights violations went beyond domestic governments and that 
states were required under international law to take action’ (Roht-Arriaza, 2013, Pg 
82).  
 
As a mechanism that was initiated to address the past, there is invariably a dilemma, 
and often a trade-off, as to the balance between addressing the past versus envisioning 
the future. In this context, some elements to deliver justice are often traded for stability 
and peace, indicating a complex interaction between peacebuilding and transitional 
justice (Sriram et al., 2012).  On the ground, from the experiences of multiple 




hype-no substance’ process.  States have rarely implemented the recommendations set 
forth by Transtional Justice Commissions, trials and conviction rates have been dismal, 
while the expenditure has been sky-high (Fombad, 2008). This has also brought to the 
fore the dilemma between localisation and universalisation, wherein internationals, 
funding transitional justice, have preferred international criminal justice mechanisms, 
while locals have rejected externally defined technical versions, instead advocating for 
a version aligned to cultural specificities (Muvingi, 2016), and promoting the active 
agency of local people (Lundy & Mcgovern, 2008).  
 
International Engagement and Political Settlements 
Conflict Affected States  
As discussed above, several motivations and rationales shape the patterns of 
international engagement in peace processes of conflict-affected states. Such 
motivations range from stabilizing borders for transnational security (Duffield, 2014);  
the spirit of international citizenship (Bellamy, 2009; International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001); competition for influence in strategic 
conflict-affected  states (Cooper et al., 2011; Richmond et al., 2011); and maintaining 
regional influence and stability, amongst others. However, the agency of domestic 
groups in conflict-affected states interacts with these varied international motivations. 
And when such conflict-affected states are seen as embodiments of power relations, 
with different domestic groups contesting for power (Goodhand and Walton, 2009), 
we see that the motivations, of different groups seeking international engagement, are 
not homogeneous either. The motivations range from international legitimacy 
(François and Sud, 2006; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Unsworth, 2010); the promise 
of increased developmental aid and material resources (Pouligny, 2006; Wyeth, 2012); 
avoiding threats of sanctions; to prospects of international mediation and facilitation;  
as well as security guarantees, at a time when warring factions are struggling to build 
trust (Walter, 1997). Here, competing domestic groups seek international actors, and 
their associated agendas and norms, to strengthen their advantage during peace 




international engagement interact with domestic agency, and impact the domestic 
distribution of power, in conflict-affected states, I use the largely under-theorized 
concept of political settlements.  
 
Political Settlements: Conceptual Foundation 
The concept of political settlements owes its contemporary origins to Khan’s seminal 
work on political economy. Khan defines political settlements as relative distribution 
of power and institutions, both formal and informal, between different classes and 
groups, which determines the politics of the state (Khan, 2010).  To Khan this political 
settlement is based on three dimensions: the horizontal distribution of power, the 
vertical distribution of power, and the manner in which a political settlement is 
financed (Khan, 2010). Since his conceptualisation, political settlement has been 
swiftly adopted in international policy circles, in order to study patterns of 
development and governance in conflict-affected states, their recovery from war, and 
finally to understand how the distribution of power can be compatible with the efforts 
to promote reform (Pospisil and Rocha Menocal, 2017).  
 
Ironically, the increased uptake of political settlement, as a concept, has eroded its 
analytical discreteness, with multiple definitions and divides now emerging (Behuria 
et al., 2017). In Khan’s longue durée approach, political settlements emerge when 
multiple interactions between groups, horizontally (between elites); and vertically 
(between elites and their followers), in negotiating formal and informal institutions, 
become compatible with the distribution of powers of these groups. This compatibility 
is not  ‘based on any pact that can be identified ex ante’ (Khan, 2018, Pg 671). The 
second approach sees ‘elite pacts’, or ‘agreements among powerful groups, over a set 
of formal and informal institutions, expected to create opportunities for those groups, 
to secure a distribution of benefits that is acceptable to them’, as fostering a political 
settlement (Bell, 2015; Kelsall, 2018a; Laws and Leftwich, 2014; Putzel and Di John, 
2012). Elite pacts here herald a settlement, which allows a society to solve the 
‘problem of violence’ politically, and transcend the unsettled politics of violent 




approach, in the form of political, economic, and military power sharing among elites 
(Lindemann, 2011). Though focused on ‘elite pacts’, this approach to political 
settlement also sees it relying on a two-level game, involving both intra-elite, and elite-
non-elite, relations (Laws, 2012).  
 
While both approaches see  the state as embodying a set of power relations (Putzel and 
Di John, 2012), the elite pact approach sees agreement between elites as key to the 
making of development, peace, or good governance. Both approaches have their 
critiques.  The elite pact approach has been critiqued for its elite bias, and for 
overlooking the role of several organisations, fundamental to macro-political stability 
(Khan, 2018). Further, its central idea that, some institutions are going to be enforced 
because powerful elites have a ‘pact’ to impose it, is seen to be analytically flawed 
(Khan, 2018). However, Khan’s emphasis, on the reproductive nature of political 
settlements, is seen to obscure the degree of agency needed to change, and to settle the 
terms of the game, in conflict-affected contexts (Kelsall, 2018b).  
 
 




Application in Conflict Studies  
Despite the dividing lines between the longue durée approach of Khan, and the elite 
















located within the wider, historically-determined ‘political settlement’. Elite pacts are 
conditioned by long-term political settlements, with certain political settlements 
triggering and favouring certain types of elite pacts while hampering others. Thus the 
case studies explain the political settlement of Nepal and Myanmar from a longue 
durée historical approach, and locate the elite pacts in the peace process as a part of a 
broader process. However, to ensure analytical clarity, the conceptual sections will use 
and build on Kelsall’s definition, given the focus of this research on peace processes, 
and the centrality of peace accords forged by elites in these processes. For Kelsall, 
‘political settlement’ is:  i) an ongoing, conflict-ending agreement among powerful 
groups, around ii) a set of political institutions and a distribution of power, expected 
to deliver, (iii) an acceptable distribution of benefits (Kelsall, 2018b), as shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
Focusing conceptually on the elite pact approach, firstly helps outline the implication 
of bargains and pacts amongst elite groups on the trajectory of the conflict, and post-
conflict transitions (Dudouet and Lundström, 2016; Fritz and Menocal, 2007).  This is 
salient, as post-conflict transition to peace involves some kind of re-articulation of the 
use and distribution of power among social groups (Menocal, 2015). Peace processes, 
thus, are critical junctures that reshape political settlements (Menocal, 2015), and  
provide a unique window of opportunity, whereby elites can come together to address 
exclusivity, and design mechanisms for inclusivity, and political alliance-building (Di 
John and Putzel, 2009; Evans, 2004).  
 
Secondly, prioritising the agency, power, and role of elites, in shaping post-conflict 
trajectories, helps veer away from the focus on formal institutions, including 
commitments in peace accords, and constitutional solutions, which take a central stage 
in peace processes (Bell, 2015; Hickey, 2013; Leftwich, 2010). Such formal 
institutions, while pertinent, have been malleable, based on the negotiation, and 
compromise among elite groups.  
 
Thirdly, from the perspective of international engagement, elite interests are found to 




opt, even the most extensive international engagement, when it does not suit their 
interests, but they can also shape and control formal governance institutions, policies, 
and the distribution of development assistance, to advance their interests (Parks and 
Cole, 2010).   
 
Lastly, who is included and excluded from these pacts is seen to be critical to stability 
in post-war transitions. Here, ‘inclusive elite bargains’, which include all major 
factions, are seen to maintain political stability, while ‘exclusionary elite bargains’ are 
seen to give rise to civil war (Lindemann, 2011). However, severe conceptual gaps 
persist in this idea of ‘inclusivity’. To begin with, the conceptual boundaries, 
determining who ‘elites’ are, remain fuzzy, which impacts the operationalising of elite 
pacts. More problematically, while the links, between exclusive political settlements 
and conflict, have led to calls for the forging of inclusive political settlements, both at 
the horizontal level (intra-elite), and at the vertical level (between elite actors and 
wider society) (Molloy, 2017); nevertheless the concept has failed to address the 
complex interrelationships, between inclusion among ‘elites’ and broader social 
inclusion vertically (Pospisil and Rocha Menocal, 2017). The gap between the two 
forms, and the challenge of the former to foster the latter, is evident in multiple peace 
processes (Rocha Menocal, 2017).  To ensure that vertical and horizontal dimensions 
to political settlements are fully captured in this thesis, the empirical cases focus on 
three issue areas: inclusion, SSR and transitional justice (Yanguas, 2017b). 
 
Thus, rather than studying conflict-affected states, as coherent homogeneous actors, 
who receive plural forms of international engagement, by using the lens of domestic 
political settlements, we can explore how these varying forms of international 
engagement impact different social groups, and the distribution of power between 
them (Goodhand and Walton, 2009).   
 
Hybrid Peace  
The three sections above have highlighted the concepts, which undergird the 




agency of social groups, in making political settlements in conflict-affected states. To 
conceptually bridge the multiple scales of interactions, between regional engagement 
of emergent powers, liberal peacebuilding projects, and the political settlement in 
conflict-affected states, this thesis uses the concept of hybrid peace.  As its approach 
is inductive, while the thesis does not start with a clearly defined hypothesis, a 
preliminary idea, guiding this research, is that plural forms of international 
engagement in peace processes of countries like Nepal and Myanmar, are likely to spur 
hybrid peace structures.  
 
Hybrid peace, as briefly covered in the section above, can be seen as composite forms 
of practice, norms, and visions, emerging from the interaction, co-existence, and clash, 
of different groups, world views and activities, in post-conflict states (Jarstad and 
Belloni, 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012). Mac Ginty sees hybrid peace outcomes 
to be dependent on four variables: the compliance power of the liberal peace agents; 
the incentivising powers of the liberal peace agents; the ability of local actors to resist, 
ignore or adapt; and finally the ability of local actors, structures and networks to 
present alternative forms of peace (Mac Ginty, 2011). In essence, these structures 
emanate from interactions at multiple levels, and embody a mixture of liberal and 
illiberal characteristics (Kappler and Richmond, 2011). While the concept has been 
used in peace studies to look at the interaction between the ‘international’, which by 
default are Western- backed liberal peace projects, and the ‘local’, the social groups in 
conflict-affected states, this thesis recognises the centrality of ‘regional’ actors, in the 
making of hybrid forms of peace. In this research hybrid peace is used as a concept to 
account for diverse forms of ‘international’ engagement, including non-Western 
sources like India and China. Further, hybridity, as a concept, envisages varying forms 
of hybridity, across both negative and positive scales. A positive hybrid form of peace 
implies that significant legitimacy and agency emerge from the local level, while a 
negative hybrid peace, represents the increased power of the ‘international’ actors 
(Richmond, 2015). Given the inductive nature of the research, I leave the question of 






The literature on how emergent powers engage in conflict management, or peace 
processes, is nascent at best in the academic realm of peace studies. Similarly, while 
extensive, the study of foreign policy, of India and China, has rarely sought to theorise 
its modes of conflict resolution. Conflict-affected states, like Nepal and Myanmar, 
which witness both the engagement of emergent powers, and liberal peacebuilding 
projects, thus occupy a critical space, where the impact of the engagement of emergent 
powers, and their interaction with liberal peacebuilding projects, can be studied. This 
chapter has outlined the literature on Indian and Chinese foreign policy, to draw a 
conceptual foundation, in order to understand their engagement in peace processes in 
their region of influence. In addition, it has charted the evolution of liberal 
peacebuilding projects, and their present-day manifestations in practice.  
 
Apart from its accounting for the structural variables of international engagement, this 
chapter has also outlined the agency of domestic actors, by making use of the concept 
of political settlements. It has posited the role of elites, and elite pacts, as central to 
determining the trajectory of post-conflict transition, as well as shaping international 
engagement in these conflicts.  To bind the three scales of inquiry, the chapter also 
outlined the concept of hybrid peace. This is the preliminary assumption which drives 










Chapter 2: Research Design: Methods, Tools and 
Ethics 
 
This chapter outlines the design, methodology and the ethical considerations that 
underpin this thesis.  In the first section, I explain the key research questions the thesis 
seeks to answer, followed by a short discussion on the key concepts used in the thesis. 
In the second part, I outline the methodological approach of this research, highlighting 
the key methods, data collection tools, and the approach taken to analyse the data. The 
chapter ends with a discussion on the ethical considerations undergirding this research.   
 
Research Questions and Key Concepts 
 
Research Questions 
This thesis focuses on three inter-related questions: 
1. How do emergent powers, India and China, engage in peace processes in 
neighbouring countries within their region of influence, with a specific focus 
on Nepal and Myanmar?  
2. How do engagements of emergent powers interact with, and impact upon, 
liberal peacebuilding projects in Nepal and Myanmar? 
3. How do these plural forms of international engagement, of emergent powers 
and peacebuilding projects, impact political settlements in Nepal and 
Myanmar? 
All three questions are both exploratory and explanatory. The aim is to interrogate and 
unpack, both the norms and practices guiding emergent power involvement in conflict-
affected states in their regions, and the consequences of this for liberal peacebuilding 
projects. It also seeks to understand how the two forms of engagement in peace 
processes interact, and to identify points of convergence and divergence. The third 




focusing on the political settlements in Nepal and Myanmar. Here, Chapters 4 and 6 
help answer Question 1, based on the description of case studies in Chapters 3 and 5. 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, drawing on earlier chapters, help answer Questions 2 and 3 
respectively.  
 
Operationalisation of Key Concepts  
Given the nature of questions, this research engages with several concepts. While the 
broader conceptual framework has been discussed in the preceding chapter, this 
section operationalises some of these terms, in the context of this research.  
 
Emergent Powers 
This thesis takes India and China as emergent powers. As a term, emergent powers 
stands contested, given the heterogeneity amongst the diverse array of countries that 
are classed as emergent powers: India, China, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa 
(Cunliffe and Kenkel, 2016; Hopewell, 2015; Mahbubani, 2009). Of these, some argue 
that only India and China can be said to be emergent powers, as they come close to 
having the levels of influence the US enjoys regionally and globally (Hurrell, 2018). 
Further, both India and China share similar features that define emergence, albeit at 
varying levels. These include: unprecedented economic growth; a history of being a 
civilisational state; recognition as a regional power; experiences of colonialism and 
imperialism; and an identity as leaders of developing countries. Thematically, this 
thesis focuses solely on the regional engagement of these emergent powers. In the 
empirical chapters, India and China are on the whole viewed as regional powers. 
However, in the overall analysis section, this thesis focuses on how this regional 
engagement of India and China might determine, or help us infer, their future 






As outlined in the first chapter, the meaning of liberal peacebuilding in practice has 
undergone a tectonic change. This necessitates delineating what this thesis means by 
liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilders or peacebuilders here are applied as a 
category of actors engaging in internationally supporting peace process, with a 
normative consensus on the promotion, and use, of liberal precepts, to support 
countries undergoing the transition from conflicts to some form of peace.  
 
Secondly, the practice of liberal peacebuilding is spread over a wide area, spanning 
many different arenas, and involving many different actors, thus making it difficult to 
determine what peacebuilding is and who are the peacebuilders. To streamline this, I 
focus on three arenas: inclusion, SSR and transitional justice. In recent years, each of 
the three arenas has attracted a substantial amount of scholarly work. Indeed, they have 
almost evolved as critical sub-disciplines, and scholarship, in themselves. For this 
research, I do not engage with their conceptual foundations, their critique, or their 
application to other post-conflict settings. Instead, I use these three, as ‘arenas of 
engagements’, from which to explore the engagement of emergent powers, and their 
interaction with liberal peacebuilders. Further, to make sense of what these three issues 
mean in practice, I explore how these are covered in the peace agreements in Nepal 
and Myanmar. As described in the previous chapter, these three arenas are not only 
key components of peacebuilding projects but are routinely enshrined in peace 
agreements (Bell et al., 2017). Further, all of these are fundamental to unpacking the 
third question, on the impact of international engagement on the political settlements. 
So, if political settlement, as a concept, helps us see the state, as an ‘embodiment of 
different power relations’ (Meehan and Goodhand, 2018), each of the arenas help us 
view different facets of those power relations.  
 
By the same token, in order to address the diffuse nature of liberal peacebuilding, I 
focus on prominent institutions and consortiums that have managed critical aspects of 
the political process, including, the UN Mission in Nepal, and the UN Peace Trust 




Facility) in Myanmar, in addition to several key peacebuilding donors, such as the 
European Union (EU) and the Department for International Development (DFID), and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to name but a few.   
 
This thesis does not accept liberal peacebuilding, as a wholly ‘Western’ agenda or 
modus operandi, in conflict-affected states. However, it draws a distinction between 
peacebuilding, as a process conflict-affected countries undertake to transition into 
peace, and which witness plural forms of international engagement, and peacebuilders 
or liberal peacebuilders (used interchangeably), as entities largely affiliated to Western 
states, and multilateral bodies, supporting peacebuilding efforts. So, as mentioned in 
the introduction, while this research seeks to investigate how India and China have 
engaged in the realm of peacebuilding, it refrains from calling them peacebuilders. 
 
Political Settlements 
The under-theorised concept of political settlement, and the sheer variation in its use, 
makes its application difficult (Behuria et al., 2017). Borrowing largely from Kelsall, 
I use political settlements, in their simplest form, to look horizontally at the bargains 
and pacts, in re-negotiating the distribution of power between contending groups; and 
vertically, as to how these agreements and bargains assimilate bottom-up mobilisations 
that can bring dividends for the wider society, during a peace process (Kelsall, 2018b). 
Here, I use ‘contending groups’, to define the bargains amongst the traditional elites 
and the marginalised groups, claiming their stakes through the peace process. Elites, 
here, are dominant groups, who have historically held political power, and have 
political organisational capacity. This deviates from the more comprehensive 
definitions of elites, used by Kelsall, Di John and Putzel (Di John and Putzel, 2009; 
Kelsall, 2018b). I eschew such comprehensive definitions of elites, given that a 
comprehensive definition necessitates a comprehensive grasp of economy, culture, 
politics and society, which goes beyond the confines of a single discipline. As this 
research focuses on peace processes and international engagements, I believe a 





Even this simple definition is not as neat in practice. In terms of horizontal pacts, in 
the shifting sands of a peace process, the elite composition might alter radically, 
making it difficult to neatly categorise the elites. Witness the democratic opposition 
party, who came to power in Myanmar crushing six decades of authoritarianism, or 
the Madheshi parties in Nepal, who emerged from being marginal players to becoming 
critical swing forces for change in Nepali politics; both groups have transitioned from 
marginalised players to elites. Secondly, the idea of marginalised groups, or dominant 
groups, largely based on ethnic, or regional, identities, has left little room to discuss 
intersectional identities, and economic exclusion. The latter is evidenced by groups, 
who are not dominant even within marginalised groups: for instance, Dalits and 
Muslims in Nepal, or smaller ethnic groups like the Pa’O and Lahu in Myanmar, as 
the next chapters will identify.  
 
Research Methodology: Method, Tools for Data 
Collection, and Analysis 
The emphasis on explanation and description, which, this thesis requires, calls for its 
design to be qualitative (Hakim, 2000). Given that its purposes are both explanatory 
and exploratory, this research is largely inductive, with elements of abductive and 
deductive approaches. An inductive research strategy helps a research, ‘establish 
limited generalisations about the distribution of, and patterns of association amongst 
observed, or measured, characteristics of individuals and social phenomenon’ (Blaikie, 
2009). To explain the norms and practices, that foreground the engagement of India 
and China, and their interaction with liberal peacebuilding agents, the research will 
employ an inductive approach. Abductive strategy involves constructing theories that 
are, ‘derived from social actors’ language, meanings and accounts in the context of 
everyday activities, and aims to produce understanding rather than explanation, by 
providing reasons rather than causes’ (Blaikie, 2009).  To account for the impact of 
plural forms of international engagement, on the political settlement of Nepal and 




preliminary assumption, that hybridity or hybrid peace is the outcome of plural forms 
of international engagement, it can be seen to include deductive components.  
 
Employing this design, this research primarily seeks to explore the relationship 
between political settlements in Nepal and Myanmar, and the international 
engagement. Here, Question 2 posits ‘liberal peacebuilding projects’ as the dependent 
variable, with ‘engagement of regional powers’ as the independent variable. While in 
Question 3, ‘political settlements’ are the dependent variable and ‘forms of 
international engagement’ (of emergent powers and liberal peacebuilding projects) are 
independent variables.  
 
Multiple Case Studies  
The choice of a qualitative focus for this research is due to its primary reliance on case 
studies, a method which has for long been employed for studies requiring a detailed 
portrait of a particular social phenomenon (Hakim, 2000). ‘Case’, here, can be defined 
as ‘the detailed examination of an aspect of historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events’ (George and Bennett, 
2005, Pg 5). The use of case studies is also promoted as the most suitable research 
method, if a detailed consideration of contextual factors, critical for conceptual 
refinement, is called for. The peace processes of Nepal and Myanmar thus serve as 
episodes whose details will be investigated as ‘cases’. 
 
By moving beyond a single case to include two, (Nepal and Myanmar), this research 
benefits from a ‘multiple case study’ approach. Multiple case studies are seen to 
contribute to bringing out relevant concepts through cross-case comparisons (Bryman, 
2015). They can also yield new insights, including revelations of causal heterogeneity 
(Rueschemeyer, 2014). The use of two cases further helps address the claim by 
methodologists that, for drawing causal propositions that can be generalised, case 
studies would need to move beyond single unit-studies and be more representative 




generating case studies’, which helps develop theoretical generalisations in areas 
where no theory yet exists (Lijphart, 1971).  
 
‘Case studies’ also present a number of challenges. A key challenge here is ‘many 
variables in small number of cases’ (Lijphart, 1971).  Accordingly, this research seeks 
to streamline broad variables like ‘post-conflict political settlements’, by looking at 
issue-specific domains, namely: inclusion, SSR and transitional justice. More 
fundamentally, research based on  ‘case studies’ is faced with the challenge of 
‘selection bias’, where cases are self-selected to represent a truncated sample along the 
dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005).  To tackle selection bias, this research 
has, firstly, specified a frame of comparison, which includes a ‘contrast space’, vis-à-
vis the dependent variable - political settlements in Nepal and Myanmar (Collier and 
Mahoney, 1996). The selection of Nepal and Myanmar peace processes, as cases for 
this research, guarantees the ‘contrast space’. Though both Nepal and Myanmar are 
similar, as they are both conflict-affected states, and the idea of exclusion has been 
central to the patterns of conflict; Nepal and Myanmar are different, in the history of 
their international engagement, with India being dominant in the former country, and 
China in the latter. Further, in order to counter these biases, I undertook a careful case 
selection strategy, as described in the following section.  
 
Case Selection Strategy  
Nepal and Myanmar serve, as pivotal case studies for this thesis, for three core reasons. 
Firstly, each is demonstrably the best choice for the study of India and China’s regional 
foreign policies, respectively. The historic legacy of Indian engagement, in political 
developments in Nepal, to cater to India’s security concerns, and India’s dominance in 
the wider trade, transit, and economy, in addition to the formal and informal channels 
linking the two countries, make Nepal an ideal case (Dabhade and Pant, 2004; 
Thapliyal, 2012). More specifically, in the Nepali peace process, India has been the 
most important external actor (Whitfield, 2012). Similarly, a history of Western 
sanctions, and the entrenchment of Chinese domination, in the wider political economy 
in Myanmar, has ensured that China continues to be central to the peace process 




is reshaping the world, and ‘nowhere else will its impact be felt more strongly than in 
neighbouring Myanmar’ (Myint-U, 2016a), making Myanmar an ideal case for the 
study of China’s engagement. Further, the selection of Nepal and Myanmar helps me 
partially compare the engagement of India and China in both countries.  
 
Secondly, Myanmar and Nepal are both multi-ethnic states, where the root causes of 
conflict are defined as: ‘exclusion’ of a number of social groups in political, social, 
and economic realms. Accordingly, reforming the political settlement has been a key 
theme in the peace processes of both countries.  In Nepal, the 2011 census recorded 
126 caste and ethnic groups, some of which partly overlap. It also reported 123 spoken 
languages, and around 10 religions.  The population is distributed across three primary 
geographic units: the hills, the mountains, and the plains, also known as the Terai or 
Madhesh (Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal, 2012).  Despite the diversity, a narrow 
elite base comprised of Hindu, High Caste community from the hills, often euphemised 
as CHHE (Caste Hill Hindu Elite), who represent 31.25% of the population have 
dominated the political settlements as will be described in Chapter 3 (Lawoti, 2008; 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997).  
 
Similarly, in Myanmar, the primary fault lines of exclusion have tended to be religion 
and ethnicity (Rajah, 1998), with both overlapping only to a degree (Hayward and 
Walton, 2016). Of the 135 official ethnic groups, the Bamars, the dominant ethnic 
group, compromising two-thirds of the population, largely Buddhists, have dominated 
the socio-political and economic spectrum (Callahan, 2017). This dominance has come 
at the cost of the marginalisation of multiple ethnic groups, such as the Kachin, Shan, 
Mon, Chin, and Karen groups, of varying religious faiths, including Christianity. 
Exclusion has meant that multiple armed groups representing different ethnicities have 
raised insurgencies against the state, since Myanmar’s independence. Ethnicity 
remains a contested issue, as demonstrated by the 2014 census. The results of this 
census, held after a gap of 31 years, was withheld (Ferguson, 2015). It was thought 
that the census results could incite ethnic disputes, with ethnic groups contesting the 
absolute and relative statistical representations, viewing other groups’ statistics as 




peace process (Callahan, 2017). However, while up-to-date data on ethnicity is 
missing, the 2014 census computes the Buddhist population at 89.8 % of the total, 
while Christians make up 6.3%, Muslims 2.3%,  and the Hindu population 0.5 % (Tun, 
2017). 
 
Thirdly, in addition to their accommodation of Indian and Chinese engagement in the 
peace process, Nepal and Myanmar were faced with considerable numbers of liberal 
peacebuilding actors (Hellmüller et al., 2015; Oo, 2014; von Einsiede and Salih, 2017). 
This makes the two countries the perfect choice to study also the interactions between, 
and the impact of, emergent power engagement on liberal peacebuilding programmes.  
 
Figure 2: Map showing India, China, Nepal and Myanmar  




In seeking to examine the cases of Nepal and Myanmar, this study focuses on the 
duration of their peace processes.  In Myanmar, I focus on the developments in the 




this thesis, I take 2018 as the cut-off point. In the case of Nepal, I focus on the period 
from 2005-2018. In Nepal, it is difficult to delineate when, and if, the transition has 
ended, especially as issues of transitional justice are still unresolved. However, by 
2018, Nepal had implemented its new constitution, and transitioned into a federal state. 
Thus, this year is generally accepted as the endpoint of the transition. 
 
Tools for Data Collection  
The thesis has primarily relied on document analysis, and elite interviews, as tools for 
data collection.  
 
Document Analysis 
Document analysis is the key method used for this thesis. Documents ‘are treated as 
carriers or vehicles of messages, communicating or reflecting official intentions, 
objectives, commitments, proposals, thinking, ideology, and responses to external 
events’ (Freeman and Maybin, 2011, Pg. 157). To engage with the wide-ranging 
concepts, this thesis relied on a variety of documents: legal and political documents 
(peace agreements, parliamentary reviews, committee reports, government white 
papers, press releases, legislative acts, Constitutions); public documents (media 
reports, speeches at the UN, press releases, voting records); organisational documents 
(reports, guidelines, websites); as well as personal documents (autobiographies, 
blogs). The documents helped me with process tracing, through which I traced causes 
impacting on the three arenas of inclusion, SSR and transitional justice in each of the 
case studies (Beach, 2016). This use of documents for process tracing not only helped 
with systematic analysis of the peace processes, and evaluating explanations discussed 
in prior scholarship, but also helped generate new explanations (Bennett and Elman, 
2006; Collier, 2011). 
 
For different contexts, different types of documents proved to be more useful. For 
instance, in Myanmar, where the peace process is still in progress, documents in the 




very relevant. These documents summarised discussions on various aspects of the 
ongoing peace process, and in a timely manner, unlike journal articles, and other 
sources of reference, which often appeared dated. Similarly, public documents, in the 
form of newspapers, proved helpful in both Nepal and Myanmar. Apart from the 
content, they also helped me remain updated on any changes in peace processes. For 
China, the sheer volume of academic writing, and policy documents, both internal and 
external, helped alleviate my problem of having conducted only a small number of 
interviews in-country.  
 
Documents as ‘vehicles of discourses’, bring their own biases (Freeman and Maybin, 
2011). To navigate the possible bias in these documents, especially government policy 
papers, official state documents, and even newspapers, I took into account the quality 
of documents: thinking through the criteria of accountability, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 1990). I also tried to navigate these biases, by 
effective triangulation of data: by reviewing multiple documents, but also through elite 
interviews. The documents used for the thesis also set the frame of reference for the 
preparation, and refinement, of my interview questions.  
 
Elite Interviews  
Elite interviews are deemed to be highly relevant in case studies, especially for the 
study of political developments at a macro level, as well as mapping perceptions 
(Blakeley, 2012; Tansey, 2007). For this research, elite interviews, in India and China, 
helped establish perceptions on key agendas of the peace processes. These also helped 
triangulate information gathered from Nepal and Myanmar, and from other related 
published sources. The interviews, in addition, supported interpretation of the 
available data (Tansey, 2007). Goldstein (2002) elaborates the importance of elite 
interviews, identifying their three basic goals. The first is to gather information from 
officials to make generalisable claims about their experiences; the second goal is to 
discover a particular piece of information, or acquire a particular document; and, the 
final one is to inform, or direct the work towards alternative data.  All three goals 




international engagement from the perspective of experts, but also to guide me to other 
sources of information. 
 
I conducted elite interviews in New Delhi, India; Yangon, Myanmar; Kathmandu, 
Nepal and Sichuan, China, between April 2017 and December 2018, travelling to the 
region twice in 2017, and once in 2018, for extended periods of time (details in 
Appendix I).  I interviewed key stakeholders: bureaucrats, representatives of political 
parties, academics, journalists, civil society leaders, mediators, negotiators, public 
intellectuals, and peacebuilders representing different International Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and bilateral and multilateral sources. The level 
of access in these countries, as shown in Appendix 1, was different. In Nepal, I was 
able to interview all key stakeholders, often at the highest level of political 
representation, including a former Prime Minister. In Myanmar, I was able to do the 
same, except for meeting military representatives. In China, my interviews and broader 
interaction were limited to academics, while in India I interviewed diplomats, think 
tank representatives, as well as experts.  These interviews were semi-structured, aided 
by an interview guide, based on the main questions with which I sought to engage. The 
use of semi-structured interviews allowed me to ‘ask major questions the same way 
each time, but adjust their sequence and probe for more information’ (Fielding and 
Thomas, 2008, Pg. 282) ; and to clarify the issues raised by respondents (Barriball and 
While, 1994). In addition semi-structured interviews helped me ensure cross-case 
comparability, an important factor in drawing inferences in multiple contexts 
(Bryman, 2015).  
 
To facilitate access to elites, I adopted multiple strategies. These included: making use 
of existing personal and professional contacts; emailing relevant people about my 
research and appealing for their time; contacting experts in the field, already known to 
me, asking them to introduce me to other experts; introducing myself to people at 
various conferences and requesting interviews; and finally requesting help from 
organisations working on peace processes. Broadly, across contexts, I used a snowball 
technique, to reach out to elites for the organising of interviews.  In China, I travelled 




on Myanmar and South and Southeast Asia. My principal purpose was to meet with 
scholars, in order to understand foreign policy discussions in China, especially with 
regards to those neighbouring countries undergoing political transition, rather than 
only seeking interviews. In addition to elite interviews, I was able to conduct a 
roundtable discussion, at the Centre for Myanmar Studies in Sichuan, where I 
presented my research questions, and engaged with the Centre’s scholars on these 
issues.   
 
Table 1: Tools used for data collection, sampling strategy and quantity 
Method Participants Sampling 
strategy 




peacebuilding programme managers, 
journalists, civil society leaders, 
bureaucrats, academics, experts, 
foreign policy analysts 
Snowballing Myanmar (35) 
(4 over Skype) 
Nepal (21) 
diplomats, experts from think tanks, 
academics 
Snowballing India (10) 





reports from different government 
and non-governmental sources 








Some key interviews were also conducted via Skype, which supplemented, and in 
some instances replaced the need for, face-to-face interviews (Deakin and Wakefield, 
2014). Skype interviews were especially critical before arriving in-country. It allowed 
me to speak to elites, and secure details of possible interviewees. Further, Skype 
interviews were significant means of approach for many key international 
representatives, engaged in the peace processes in Nepal and Myanmar, who had either 





I was also cautious of the critiques of elite interviews. Elites could deflect questions, 
it was said, and take control of the agenda. The reliability of their answers was also 
questioned (Köker, 2014). I sought to mitigate these issues, by building up a rapport 
with the interviewees, trying to reframe my question when elites were deflecting them, 
and triangulating information, obtained from elite interviews, by interviewing as many 
people as possible, and corroborating it with document analysis.  
 
Data Analysis 
Upon the competition of my fieldwork, I transcribed all the interviews. Writing field 
notes, and transcribing the interviews that I conducted, allowed me to start analysing 
data during my fieldwork (Gibbs, 2007). For unrecorded interviews, I transcribed them 
the same day, and if that was not possible, at least within the same week.  
 
Following the collection of data, I created a list of all the interviews I carried out, the 
field notes I had written, and the documents I had collected. I analysed the data 
manually. I did not use qualitative data analysis software, mainly because of the 
exploratory nature of the research.  Having collated all the data, I read and re-read all 
of it. My aim was to draw out key themes, triangulate information from different 
sources, and build empirical analysis.  
 
I look a series of steps to analyse the content of the data and triangulate the data. Firstly, 
as is true for content analysis, I compressed the data into a few core categories (Drisko 
and Maschi, 2015). This identification of categories was both an inductive and a 
deductive process (Drisko and Maschi, 2015). I had designed the questions, based on 
thematic categories, and arranged the answers within the same thematic categories. 
For instance, if the question focused on Indian engagement on inclusion, SSR or 
transitional justice, the answers were analysed under their respective themes. 
However, owing to the frequency of a certain concept mentioned in interviews, I also 
inductively identified new categories. These included: civil society; perceptions of 
liberal peacebuilding; perceived differences with liberal peace programme; stability; 




about civil society organisations, or NGOs and INGOs, answers about the engagement 
of emergent powers centred on their absence of engagement with civil society groups, 
which led me to identify civil society as a category. Secondly, having identified core 
categories brought to light in the interviews, these required triangulation and 
validation, in order for statements in interviews to be affirmed. Here, I triangulated the 
statements based on three criteria: i) real time events, or if the statements corresponded 
to events during the peace processes in Nepal and Myanmar, ii) with other published 
sources, or if such statements were covered in other documents, articles, newspapers, 
or interviews, iii) cross-referencing with other interviews to test the validity of the 
argument. While the triangulations helped transform data into inferential claims, this 
thesis also noted that those perceptions, which necessarily could not be triangulated, 
also served as important bases for the understanding of some of the less explored issues 
of Indian and Chinese foreign policy. For instance, the views of Indian diplomats, or 
Chinese scholars, on concepts like democracy, transitional justice, or SSR, provided 
fresh insights into the minds of policymakers.  I have retained these as perceptions 
rather than concrete claims.  
 
Research Ethics 
Research ethics is a central element of social research, and impacts all aspects of 
research practice (Crow et al., 2006). Given that this research comprises interviewing 
and dealing with human subjects, I obtained the required ethical clearance, from the 
School of Social and Political Science, at the University of Edinburgh. I went beyond 
treating ethics as a procedural compliance, to assimilate  ‘ethics in practice’ (Guillemin 
and Gillam, 2004), and regularly reflected on ethical issues during the fieldwork, as 
well as during writing. I confirmed confidentiality and anonymity, avoided undue 
intrusion, obtained the informed consent of research participants, and sought to protect 
the subjects from any harm that could arise, as a result of their participation. I also took 
time in every interview to discuss the aim and scope of the research, the purpose of 
gathering data, and its possible usage, before obtaining subjects’ oral consent. In many 
instances, I sought consent when arranging the details of interviews, by email or 




I also sent out a brief outline of the research, prior to the interview. It also helped that 
I interviewed ‘elites’, who are accustomed to being interviewed, and appeared 
comfortable with the process. Many often took time to question me further about my 
research, and some even gave me advice on good research management. 
 
I took notes for all interviews, whether they were digitally recorded or not. Prior 
consent was taken for recording. When I felt I would get better data without recording, 
I did not record those interviews. The notes were taken in personal notebooks, to which 
only I have access. Similarly, the digitally recorded interviews were saved them on my 
laptop, which is password protected, and I alone have access to it.  
 
The ethical consideration for this thesis also compels me to anonymise the 
interviewees, rather than name them. This is, specifically, due to the recent reduction 
in civic space, in all four countries that this thesis addresses, especially in the light of 
the arrests of journalists and activists in Myanmar and Nepal. To further engage with 
the people, who agreed to give me their valuable time during the research, I plan to 
share any future research outputs related to this research with them.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has chosen a qualitative research method, using case studies of Nepal and 
Myanmar. To support the qualitative focus, it has relied on the analysis of varied forms 
of documents, as well as interviews with elites, or key stakeholders, in the peace 
processes in Nepal and Myanmar, and with foreign policy experts in India and China. 
Given its qualitative focus, due ethical consideration has been given in the planning, 










Part II: Nepal’s Masala Peacebuilding1: Where 
India met the Peacebuilders 
 
In 2005, Nepal sought to end its decade-long civil war by forging a peace agreement 
with the rebel groups, the Maoists. Given that the conflict was premised on issues of 
exclusion, the peace process that followed, between 2005-2018, not only sought to 
mainstream the rebels in the democratic fold, but also comprised an ambitious plan to 
‘restructure the state’ and redefine the political settlements, historically dominated by 
Nepali-speaking high caste groups, from the hilly region, categorised by some analysts 
as Khas Arya or Caste Hill Hindu Elite (CHHE). In taking this leap, the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the Interim Constitution of 2007, committed 
to: a transition from a monarchy to a republican order, from an erstwhile Hindu state 
to a secular one, and from a centralised to a federal state; in addition to commitment 
on human rights, as well as notions of respect of civilian supremacy. After the signing 
of the CPA and the peace process that followed, older political parties, along with the 
Maoists, entered into a relentless bargaining process over the institutional modalities: 
federalism, secularism, transitional justice institutions, and over the management of 
arms and of former Maoist combatants. Into these settlements, they have had to 
accommodate a whole new range of actors, who emerged from identity-based 
mobilisations, subsequent to the CPA being signed.  
 
This transition, while largely, domestic-led, has also engaged with the varying 
opportunities and constraints presented by the engagement of India and that of liberal 
peacebuilders, like United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). This co-existence 
between such plural forms of international engagement has been defined by the 
divergent pathways adopted by India and liberal peacebuilders, with limited space for 
convergence between them. The divergences in international engagement, along with 
a contested domestic terrain, facilitated a constitutional order, in the form of the 
 
1 Masala, in Nepali means a blend of different spices. Teresa Whitfield used the term in her 





 2015 Constitution, which departs significantly from the commitment of the CPA, or 
the Interim Constitution.  Indeed, the 2015 Constitutional has birthed a hybrid peace 
structure, which has created space for marginalised groups relative to the past, but has 
continued to advantage the dominance of the CHHE, regressed on the pledges for 
transitional justice, and compromised on the promise of respect for civilian supremacy 
by the Nepal Army (NA).  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore these arguments. Chapter 3 takes a historical approach to the 
study of the peace process, beginning with the history of the conflict in Nepal, and the 
firm basis it provided for the discussions on exclusion and accountability from such 
state institutions as the NA. It continues by discussing the institutional framework of 
the peace process, and the contested politics that underpinned it. The chapter concludes 






















Chapter 3: Evolution of Nepal’s Peace Process 
 
Brief Political History of the Conflict  
In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (Maoists henceforth) staged an armed 
revolt against the state, an action in complete contrast to Nepal’s image as a peaceful 
‘Shangri-La’. The insurgency began six years after democracy was restored in Nepal, 
thus negating the theoretical premise, that democracy defuses conflicts by opening 
electoral platforms (Lawoti and Pahari, 2010). The conflict was one in a series of 
multiple transitions in Nepal, the country having witnessed a succession of regimes 
and turbulent events, over the last seven decades, as shown in Table 3. A decade of 
fragile experiment with democracy (1950-1960) was followed by an abrogation of the 
democratic framework, with the King taking absolute control under a form of guided 
democracy or the ‘Panchayat’ system (1960-1990). This ended with a restoration of 
multiparty democracy in the 1990 (Whelpton, 2005). However, democracy only served 
to provide a fertile ground for conflict, with political factionalism, frequent changes in 
government, absence of civilian control of the military, and no real transformation on 
the question of inequalities and the exclusion of marginalised groups (Parajulee, 2010). 
In this context, the Maoists’ call to arms was based on forty specific demands, 
comprising questions of land reform, state-backed exclusion, abolition of special 
privileges for the monarchy, and the abrogation of unfavourable treaties with India 
(Whelpton, 2005). These demands gave rise to uncomfortable questions, rooted in the 
very ‘idea’ of the Nepali state.  
 
 
Calls for Inclusion: Questioning the Foundations of Nepal’s 
Exclusionary Political Settlement 
A core problem simmering in Nepal, and which the Maoist movement was able to 




exclusion. In Nepal, exclusion is not only historically rooted, but is also based on 
multiple schisms of language, regional difference, ethnicity, religion, caste and gender.  
 
Table 2: Population distribution of Nepal by major caste and ethnic group 
(Source: National Population and Housing Census 2011) 
Caste/ethnic Categories Total  
Hill Janajati excluding Newar 22.2 
Chhetri 19.2 
Terai Middle Castes 13.8 
Bahun  12.7 
Terai Janajati 8.6 
Hill Dalit 8.1 




As iterated in Chapter 2, Nepal boasts 126 caste and ethnic groups, which can be 
divided into four categories in terms of their political salience (Lawoti, 2016). The first 
is CHHE and includes Bahuns, Chettris, and Sanyasis. Despite accounting for  only 
31.25 % of the population these groups have dominated all elements of the state,and 
all political parties, as well as civil society, as shown in Table 2 (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Nepal, 2012). In the second category are Dalits, designated as untouchables 
according to Hindu norms. Spread across the hills and the southern plains, Terai, they 
face immense cultural discrimination, and are the least mobilised among the 
marginalised groups. The third are the Janajatis, or indigenous nationalities, facing 
religious and linguistic inequalities. They comprise 36.81% of the population, reside 
across the three geographic units, speak different languages, and follow varied 
religions. The Madheshis are in the fourth category who share deep cultural ties with 
people in Northern India, and have been marginalised on grounds on race, region, 
language and citizenship (Lawoti, 2016).  However, the complex matrix of identity 
and exclusion ensures that all forms of categorisation leave gaps. For instance, the 
Newars, who live mostly in the Kathmandu Valley, are dominant economically, 




exclusion. Further, Tharus, a prominent Terai-based Janajati group, have sought a 
separate identity from that of Madheshis (Guneratne, 2010; Pandey, 2017). The 
categorisation also overlooks gender-based exclusion, which has left women on the 
fringes of society, given the deep-seated patriarchy founded on Hinduism (Tamang, 
2011). 
 
Table 3: A timeline of key political developments in Nepal 
(Source: Review of documents by the author) 
Year  Key Political Events 
1768 Prithvi Narayan Shah forms the unified Kingdom of Nepal, which 
becomes the oldest nation-state in South Asia, heralding the rule of Shah 
monarchy in Nepal.  
1846 While the Shah rulers continue to be formal heads of the country, 
hereditary Rana Ministers assume absolute power, and cut off the country 
from the rest of the world.  
1950-
1951 
Anti-Rana political parties operating from India, restore the democracy 
under the framework of Constitutional monarchy.  
1960 The democratic period is cut short with King Mahendra dissolving the 
Parliament, assuming absolute power, and introducing the party-less 
Panchayat system, which lasted until 1990.  
1990-
1991 
A popular people’s movement restores democracy, retaining 
Constitutional monarchy.   
1995 The start of the Maoist People’s war 
2002-
2005  
Under the pretext of the People’s war King Gyanendra, assumes indirect 
power in 2002, and all executive powers in 2005 
2006-
2015 
The start of the peace process, with agreements between the Maoists and 
the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), composed of different non-Maoist 
democratic parties.  
The rise of different identity movements, and the institutionalisation of 
debates on federalism, secularism, security sector reform, and human 
rights 




The conduct of national, provincial and local elections for the first time, 






This process of exclusion has been bolstered by successive regimes, starting from the 
early days of nation building. The Shah Kings, originated from the mid-hills in Nepal, 
and since then high caste Hindus from the hills have been closely aligned with the 
state, and benefitted from an access to power (Whelpton, 1997). Further to this, the 
Shah Kings, who founded the Kingdom, invoked ‘Hinduism’, in their quest for a 
distinctive Nepali identity, in order to appear different from India, which then was 
ruled by Muslim Moghuls (Whelpton, 1997). This quest later took a legal form, with 
the Muluki Ain in 1854, which sanctioned a caste-based social order, where diverse 
castes and ethnic categories were incorporated into a national caste hierarchy, based 
on Hinduism (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997). This ritualistic Hindu order, privileged the 
CHHE, who were at the top of the caste hierarchy, and on whom the state’s economic 
and political power was vested, thus marginalising people of lower castes, or those 
outside the caste hierarchies, such as Dalits and non-Hindu Janajati groups. Social 
exclusion was reinforced economically, through exploitative social relations and 
extractive state policies in the 18th and 19th centuries, compounding the penury of the 
peasantry through forced labour, unequal distribution of land and extraction of rent 
(Regmi, 1976).  
 
Since the 1950s, various regimes and governments have further consolidated this elite 
state control, and none more powerfully than the Panchayat regime (1960-1990). The 
Panchayat years saw King Mahendra attempt to engineer a homogeneous Nepali 
identity, based on a Hindu state, under a Hindu monarchy, alongside the promotion of 
the Nepali language. This was euphemistically described in such  slogans as: ‘one 
nation, one language, and one people’ (Dong, 2016; Onta, 2006; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
1997; Tamang, 2011). The promotion of Nepali, as the state’s official language, 
occurred at the expense of a hundred or so other languages (Dong, 2016; Tamang, 
2011). Further, this brand of Nepali nationalism, which sought to exaggerate the 
differences with India, disadvantaged Madheshis, living in the Southern plains (or 
Terai), given their kin networks across India (Hausner and Sharma, 2013).  
Additionally, Nepal’s Citizenship Act of 1964 introduced residency-related criteria 
and that of proficiency in oral and written skills in Nepali language, aiming to curb 




RCHCO, 2011). Madheshis were seen as ‘India’s agents’, given their cultural-
linguistic semblances, as well as their kinship ties across the border (Burghart, 1994; 
Pokhrael, 2012; Rose, 1973). Alongside these policies on exclusion, development 
projects during the Panchayat era included massive resettlement programmes, 
reinforced by USAID’s malaria eradication programme, settling people from the hills 
in the Southern plains of Madhesh. This resulted in many groups being made landless, 
such as the Tharus, the largest Janajati group scattered across the Southern plains 
(Robertson, 2018). Additionally, state expenditure in this period was much lower in 
the Terai region, than in the rest of the country, despite major industrial centres being 
sited there, and the region accounting for two-thirds of the national industrial output 
(Deysarkar, 2015).  
 
Even after democracy was restored in the 1990, long-standing issues of inequalities 
and exclusion were not addressed (Thapliyal, 2006). During the drafting of the 1990 
Constitution, public recommendations on provisions for secularism, affirmative action 
for marginalised groups, and ethnic, and administrative, autonomy, were disregarded 
as ‘communal issues’ (Bhattachan, 2013).  Although the Constitution of 1990, for the 
first time, recognised Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state, it retained its status 
as a ‘Hindu Kingdom’. Indeed, the Constitution also prohibited the Election 
Commission from recognising ethnic or regional political parties.  Rather than reform, 
this period saw a highly centralised state system, which along with deep-seated 
patrimonialism, strengthened the economic dominance of the CHHE, through their 
employment in the civil service and access to public office and funds. This led to a 
furthering of economic marginalisation, and the under-representation of other groups 
in state agencies (Hangen, 2007; Lawoti, 2008; Whelpton, 1997).  Janajatis, Dalits, 
Women, Poor Peasants and Madheshis continued to lag behind in the composite 
Human Development Index (Gurung, 2010).  The outcome of this lengthy process of 
exclusion has been that a minority group, the CHHE, has effectively marginalised all 
other groups.  
 
With sustained politics of exclusion, the demands for inclusion are not new. Calls to 




in the civil service, began in the 1950s (Mathema, 2011). Movements for recognition, 
representation and inclusion, particularly by Janajatis, were given a new lease of life 
after the restoration of democracy in 1990, with the formation of a consortium of 
Janajati organisations: the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 
(Hangen, 2007). However, demands for inclusion, only obtained a political importance 
with the start of the Maoist conflict, with the Maoists tactically using ethnic grievance 
as a part of their mobilisation strategy. Not only was tackling the issue of exclusion, a 
salient part of their 40-point demands, but the Maoists also extensively recruited from 
marginalised communities into their rank and file (Thapa, 2017). The very 
composition of the political party was illustrative of their prioritisation of the 
‘inclusion’ agenda (Dudouet and Lundström, 2016). Twenty out of the thirty-seven 
members of its central decision-making body were from such marginalised groups as 
Janajatis or Dalits. 
 
Escalation of Conflict and Calls for Human Rights and Accountability 
By 2000, through their mobilising of narratives of exclusion, and their strengthened 
military presence, the Maoists had varying levels of control in rural areas, resulting in 
the state’s withdrawal from the many Maoist-held areas (Basnett, 2009). By mid-2006, 
over two thirds of the approximately four thousand secretaries of Village Development 
Committees, the lowest tier of government in rural areas, had been displaced to district 
headquarters, or areas where the Army had strongholds (Donini and Sharma, 2008). 
The state’s response to addressing the conflict was multi-faceted. Commissions were 
formed to identify the causes of conflict and how best to tackle them. There were 
attempts at dialogue through clandestine talks, in addition to counter-insurgency 
measures, like the Integrated Security Programme, police-led suppression and mass 
arrests (Hachhethu, 2004; Thapa, 2004; Upreti and Sapkota, 2017).  
 
A key factor inhibiting a coherent approach to dealing with the conflict was the 
unwieldy nature of political coalitions and political squabbling between the two main 
parties: Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist 




complications. Despite being only a Constitutional ruler, as the commander of the 
Nepal Army (NA, formerly the Royal Nepal Army), the King decided on critical 
issues, such as deployment of the Army. In 2001, a crisis on civil-military relations 
emerged, when the civilian government’s proposal to deploy the NA to crush the 
Maoist rebellion was thwarted by the King (Whelpton, 2005).  It was only in 2001, 
when King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency, and categorised the Maoists as 
‘terrorists’, that the NA was deployed to fight the war (Davis et al., 2012).  
 
The crisis exposed the issue of civil-military relations in Nepal, a problem that had 
been simmering for some time. For much of its contemporary history, the NA, which 
played a key role in the unification of the country, had been associated with the 
monarchy, and seen as the King’s Army (Interview with researcher, 6 September 2017, 
Kathmandu). During Panchayat rule, the monarchy sought to consolidate the control 
of the military further: taking the role of the supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, cultivating loyalties in senior ranks, and appointing retired army officers to civil 
administration posts (Nepali and Subba, 2005). The restoration of democracy in 1990, 
and its new Constitution, had little bearing on the NA. It placed the NA institutionally 
under the Ministry of Defence, but retained the King as the Supreme Commander, 
leading decisions on its mobilisation (Thapa and Sharma, 2010). The uneasy 
relationship between civilian authorities and military institutions has existed since 
then. The absence of resources, capacity and expertise in the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), further inhibits civilian forces from overseeing the Army properly (Ghimire, 
2017). The MOD has the formal mandate to manage the 96,000-strong Army, but is 
staffed by only 50 civil servants (Pangeni, 2016). The asymmetry in resources between 
civilian and military institutions increased during the war, where the NA not only 
increased in size, from 45,000 to 95,000 between 2001-2006, but also benefitted from 
advanced training and equipment, through international military cooperation with such 
countries as the US, the UK and India (Sharma, 2017). Further, the NA has also 
embodied the exclusive traits of the Nepali state, with traditional leadership largely 
coming from Thakuri and Chettri clans, closely associated with the ruling class, and 
through its abysmal representation of women, as well as Madheshis (Interview with 





The lack of respect for civilian rights and agency was further compounded by the NA’s 
disproportionate use of force, unleashing an unparalleled scale of violence. The 
decade-long civil war is estimated to have cost 17,000 lives, and the disappearance of 
over 1300 people. Both the NA and the Maoists engaged in gross human rights 
violations, including extrajudicial killing, rape, abductions, torture and extortion. 
Marginalised groups, including Janajatis, Dalits, and women, accounted for many of 
these cases, given their significant participation in the Maoist cause. Retaliation on 
these groups by the security forces for being deemed pro-Maoist, resulted in a complex 
interplay of exclusion and injustice (Sharma and Young, 2010). The scale of violence 
led Nepali civil society groups, as well as the international community, to call for 
international monitoring of the human rights situation and a humanitarian response 
(Donini and Sharma, 2014). Accordingly, in 2005, Nepal accepted the presence of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to 
monitor human rights (Martin, 2012). 
 
The underlying issue of exclusion, the crisis in civil-military relations and 
accountability for human rights, which surfaced during the conflict, ensured that there 
was both the demand and the space to discuss inclusion, SSR and transitional justice. 
Consequently, these agendas dominated the peace process, despite the co-option and 
reduced enthusiasm from the political class, as the process continued.  
 
Nepal’s Peace Process 
 
Promise of ‘Peace’ 
Global security concerns in the aftermath of the ‘war on terror’, and the new monarch, 
King Gyanendra taking the helm, brought radical shifts to the response to conflict. 
With the purpose of dealing with the insurgency, the King not only ‘hired and fired’ 




in 2005. He suspended all civil and political rights, and arrested the main leaders and 
other civil society actors (Chalmers, 2007). This was followed by the deployment of 
the NA, escalating the insurgency further.   
 
Non-Maoist democratic parties formed a coalition, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), 
and protested against the King’s authoritarian move (Adhikari, 2014). This coup by 
the King in 2005, however, also catalysed the alliance between the Maoists and the 
SPA, which crystallised in the form of a 12-point agreement, signed in New Delhi. 
The SPA agreed to elect a Constituent Assembly (CA) to write a new Constitution, 
guaranteeing the Maoist demand of ‘restructuring of the state’, based on inclusion and 
republicanism. The Maoists, in turn, agreed to renounce violence and accept multiparty 
democracy (Martin, 2012). This alliance, actively supported by civil society, also 
forced the  King to reinstate democracy (Shah, 2008). Thus, Nepal’s nascent steps to 
mainstream rebel groups through a peace process also catalysed democracy.  
 
The process culminated in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 
November 2006, and the beginning of the peace process. The CPA mainstreamed the 
Maoists as a credible political party, but also committed to carry out ‘an inclusive, 
democratic and progressive restructuring of the state’ to foster inclusion (Bell et al., 
2017). It committed to diverse pathways to address the grievances of marginalised 
groups, including: affirmative action (proportional representation of marginalised 
groups in all organs of the state); changes in the electoral system from First Past the 
Post (FPTP) to a mixed system (with 40% of representatives elected from FPTP, and 
56% elected through Proportional Representation, and 45 nominated by the cabinet); 
transition from a Hindu state to a secular state (a long-standing demand of non-Hindu 
Janajati groups); constitutional recognition of all languages, spoken as mother tongues; 
more gender-friendly citizenship policies; and finally transition from a centralised 
state to a federal one (added in response to the Madheshi movement). The CPA agreed 
to set up a High-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate cases 
of human rights violations, as well as a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission 
(NPRC), and Local Peace Committees to oversee the implementation of the CPA (Bell 




SSR-like process of ‘democratisation’ of the NA, alongside a DDR-like process to 
manage Maoist arms and armies.  
 
The CPA also drew up a rough sequence for the peace process: the promulgation of an 
Interim Constitution in 2007, the formation of an interim parliament, and the election 
of a Constituent Assembly (CA) (Bell et al., 2017). The CPA also sought international 
engagement in the peace process, requesting UN assistance. Responding to Nepal’s 
request, the UN Secretary General at first dispatched Ian Martin as his personal 
representative. A fully-fledged UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) swiftly followed 
sequel, consolidating the presence of peacebuilders in the process. An Agreement on 
the Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies (AMMA) with the UN facilitated 
UNMIN’s leadership in the process of managing of the arms and former Maoist 
combatants, along with monitoring the cease-fire and the human rights situation, and 
supporting the conduct of elections.  
 
Rise of Identity-based Movements 
Several identity-based movements arose immediately after the promulgation of the 
Interim Constitution of 2007, as various marginalised groups sought greater guarantees 
on inclusion. The momentum for identity movements started with that of the 
Madheshis, initiated by the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), on the grounds that 
the Interim Constitution had only committed to an ‘end of unitary state’, without any 
specific commitment on federalism. Their movement centred on questions of regional 
autonomy and rights of self-determination, calling for a single Madhesh province 
across the Southern plains. This movement sparked off others, such as that of the 
Tharus (the Tharuat), in addition to those by NEFIN. All mainstreamed the agenda of 
federalism within the wider discussion of state restructuring.  Together they brought 
an amendment to the Interim Constitution 2007, committing Nepal to ‘federalism’ 
(Bell et al., 2017).  How this commitment to federalism, would be translated into the 
final Constitution, in terms of its institutional modalities, was central to the peace 





A distinguishing factor of the identity movements was that, while all groups 
Madheshis, Janajatis, Dalits sought guarantees on inclusion, their strategies were not 
only different but often contradicted and infringed demands of the other groups.  While 
the Madhesh movement for regional autonomy took a political and often violent form, 
Janajatis focused on cultural rights and self-determination with nominal political 
elements. Meanwhile the women’s movement was about gender equality; and Dalit 
mobilisation centred on the removal of untouchability (Tamang, 2017).  
 
Table 4: Participation of different Madheshi parties in the political coalitions between the 
two Constituent Assemblies (2008-2015) 
(Source: Document review by the author) 
 
Prime Ministers leading 
different coalitions  
Participating Madheshi parties  
Pushpa Kamal Dahal  
(August 2008- May 2009) 
Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party 
Madhav Kumar Nepal 
(May 2009-Feb 2011) 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum (Bijay Kumar 
Gachhadar as Deputy Prime Minister) 
Jhalanath Khanal 
(February 2011- August 2011) 
Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum (under Upendra 
Yadav as Deputy Prime Minister) 
Baburam Bhattarai  
(August 2011-March 2013) 
Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal,  
Tarai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party 
Nepal Sadbhawana Party 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
 
The political mobilisation of the Madhesh movement has been credited for its success, 
relative to the other groups. The sheer number of political parties, formed to represent 
Madheshi interests, evidences the political nature of their activism. Until 2007, the 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party was the only political party supporting Madheshi interests. 
After the 2007 movement, a host of new political parties, including Madheshi 
Janadhikar Forum (MJF), and the Terai Madhesh Loktrantrik Party (TMLP), emerged 
as powerful actors, deciding the fate of coalitions in Kathmandu (Gautam, 2008; Jha, 




in the Terai, along with the commitment to federalism (Miklian, 2009). As the peace 
process proceeded, the proliferation of Madhesh-based parties, with constant splits and 
mergers, and the participation of Madheshi political parties in different coalitions, as 
demonstrated in Table 4, caused schisms within the movement.  
 
The political activism of Madhesh contrasts with Janajati mobilisation, where most 
Janajati political leaders contested the election from within traditional political 
structures (Tamang, 2010). While the Janajati movement started in the 1990s, at the a 
time of a global momentum to recognise indigenous peoples and cultures, the 
movement centred on religious freedom, linguistic equality and the promotion of 
Janajati culture (Onta, 2006; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997; Pradhan, 2002). NEFIN, only 
undertook more political activities, after their participation in the democratic 
movement of 2006 (Hangen, 2007). This political activism became more pronounced 
after the CPA, when ethnic organisations, like NEFIN, protested seeking guarantees 
for a secular state, as well as a comprehensive state restructuring, proportional 
representation for indigenous nationalities, and the right to use ethnic languages in 
education and government offices (Hangen, 2007).  The protests eventually resulted 
in an agreement between the government and NEFIN, promising recognition of other 
local languages as official languages alongside Nepali; instituting a State 
Restructuring Commission to input on the transition to a federal state; and the 
ratification of the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 (ILO-169), on 
the rights of indigenous people (Bell et al., 2017).  
 
Beyond isolated strategies, some of these campaigns further contradicted each other. 
For instance, in 2009, the Tharuhat movement sought to be treated as a separate ethnic 
group, and not subsumed under the Madheshi identity, demanding a Tharuhat 
province, in direct opposition to that of Madheshis to have a single Madhesh province 
(Guneratne, 2010; Pandey, 2017). Movements by the Muslim minority in Nepal, 
especially in the Terai region, to claim recognition of their distinct identity, further 





However, within this broader discussion on inclusion, questions of peasants and the 
poor have not featured in the political debate on inclusion, thus inhibiting any 
intersectional approach. This is despite the historical evidence, which points to a 
systematic marginalisation of peasantry, through unequal land distribution, 
exploitation through free labour and extraction of rent (Blaikie et al., 2002; Sugden et 
al., 2018). This is also regardless of the explicit mention of the question of 
landlessness, the peasantry, and poorer classes, in the 40-point demands of the Maoists.  
 
Trajectory of the Peace Process 
In an effort to incorporate the demands and outcomes of ethnic movements within the 
framework of the peace process, there were incessant negotiations at both a horizontal 
level between contending elite groups: the Maoists, Madheshis, and the traditional 
parties; as well at the vertical level: between the elites and the wider society, 
represented by groups like the Janajatis, and victims groups campaigning for 
addressing the legacy of human rights violations committed during the conflict. After 
the elections for the CA in 2008, the interim power sharing agreement, in place since 
the promulgation of the Interim Constitution, was dissolved. Until 2008, the NC had 
led the government with equal participation of the Maoists and the UML. The surprise 
victory of the Maoists in 2008, and the rise of Madheshi factions, changed the political 
equation. The political sea change was also evident in the very composition of the CA. 
The Maoist win, the solid performance of Madheshi parties, as well as broad 
constitutional guarantees for inclusion, enabled CA(I)2 to emerge as the most diverse 
state institution in the history of Nepal. Women made up 33% of the seats; Janajatis 
36%; the Madheshis 23%; and Dalits 8% (Dudouet and Lundström, 2016). 
 
With these changes the former political forces, of the NC and the UML, felt the threat 
from the new parties: not only the Maoists who had recently mainstreamed into 
democratic politics, but also the different Madheshi factions.  Dissension between the 
 
2 Given that there were two Constituent Assemblies between 2008-2015, with the first having 
failed to promulgate a Constitution, I will use CA (I) for the CA between 2008-2013 and CA (II) 




original elites, represented by the NC and the UML, and the newer competing elites 
ensured that agreements or pacts between them, were central to the implementation of 
the commitments of the CPA. This was more so, as commitments on such issues as 
federalism were left open-ended. For instance, the Interim Constitution left the 
boundaries, number, names and structures, as well as full details of the lists of 
autonomous provinces, and allocation of means, resources and powers to be 
determined by the CA. Similarly, through the AMMA, UNMIN supported components 
of DDR, like cantoning of former Maoist combatants into camps across Nepal, 
facilitating the storage of their weapons and monitoring of the process; it left issues, 
like the integration of former Maoist combatants into the NA, and the number, rank 
and file of those requiring integration, open to negotiation.  
 
Agreements or elite pacts, formal and informal, were critical in ensuring horizontal 
inclusiveness to accommodate contending elites, and vital for fulfilling the 
commitment on issues like federalism and SSR. However, these pacts were also 
detrimental to the negotiations for a more long-term vertical form of inclusion, which 
could widen the contract of state-society relations. The centrality of ‘elite pacts’, 
formal and informal, affected the peace process and its agendas of inclusion, SSR and 
transitional justice, in three distinct and powerful ways (Menocal, 2015). Firstly, these 
horizontal elite pacts brought a divide between the political process and the peace 
process. The political process saw the making and breaking of 7 different coalitions, 
including a technocratic government instated to oversee the second CA elections in 
2013. Given their intense focus on executive power-sharing, the political process was 
prioritised, thus transcending, or even rendering the peace process sub-prime. The 
energies of the political leadership were focused on political negotiations on 
powersharing, leaving the peace process, focused on the CA, as secondary. Political 
leaders rarely invested in CA deliverables (Interview with Civil Society representative, 
16 August 2017, Kathmandu). On average over a third of CA members were regularly 
absent, and prominent senior leaders, who had promoted the peace process rarely 
attended. The former Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, attended the CA 
proceedings only three times (Martin Chautari, 2010). Further, the political leadership 




barely aware of choices made at committee level by CA backbenchers (Adhikari, 
2014).  
 
Secondly, the centrality of elite pacts ensured that the ideological ambition, of 
whichever coalition was in power, dictated the fate of commitments, like inclusion, 
and the peace process vacillated according to the whims of the political process. The 
changes in the debate on federalism confirm this. A pro-federalist stance was adopted 
after the Maoist- Madheshi win in the 2008 elections, which swung round to an anti-
federalist stance in 2013, with the NC and UML’s electoral win.  
 
Lastly, many of the elite pacts contravened the discussions of the CA, or the 
commitment in the CPA (Interview with Member of Parliament, 14 August 2017, 
Kathmandu). These three factors, emanating from the misalignment between the 
political process and the peace process, also impacted the individual trajectories of the 
three arenas on which this thesis focuses: inclusion, SSR and transitional justice.  
 
Regression on the Commitment for Inclusion 
Despite a multi-layered commitment to inclusion in the Interim Constitution, 
encompassing federalism, affirmative action, electoral system, secularism, there were 
swift reversals.  
 
At the heart of the issue of federalism was the sheer difference in the level of 
commitment by the various political actors involved. From the outset, the balance was 
between the ‘reluctant federalist’ (Bogati et al., 2017) characterised by older 
parliamentary parties like the NC  and the UML, who committed to federalism to stem 
the violence in the Madhesh, but were not keen for a systemic overhaul to 
accommodate marginalised groups (Jha, 2016). In the other camp, were the Maoists, 
Janajatis and Madheshis, their differences notwithstanding, who saw in federalism a 
pathway for a genuine transformation of the Nepali state. The ‘reluctant federalists’ 




nation’, and that within federal settings the ‘minorities’ within provinces would be 
second-class citizens (Tamang, 2014).  
 
Opposing groups of the anti-federalist and pro-federalist parties meant that the Maoist-
Madheshi coalition, which came to power in 2008, gave a strong foundation to 
inclusion. This pro-inclusion alignment diminished when Madheshi parties left the 
coalition, resulting in its collapse in 2009. This was triggered by a crisis in civil-
military relations, when Maoists sought to sack the Army Chief, on the grounds that 
the Army had extended the tenure of eight brigadier generals, not sanctioned by the 
Maoist government (Bidwai, 2009).  Instead of calling for a broader overhaul in civil-
military relations, all non-Maoist parties, including the Madheshis, jumped on the 
bandwagon against the Maoists in support of the NA. This led to the Maoist 
government’s collapse, while the Army Chief stayed in post, based on a contentious 
Presidential decision. However, given the inability of the CA (I) to write a constitution 
by 2012, an election of a new Constituent Assembly (CA (II)) was called for in 2013. 
Reversing the electoral outcomes of 2008, the NC and UML won these elections. The 
anti-federalist lobby read their mandate as being against ‘federalism’ (Interview with 
political analyst, 20 August 2017, Kathmandu). The revival of the electoral fortunes 
of the traditional NC and UML, also led the Maoists to reassess their position on 
federalism. This Maoists believed their failure was due to an overwhelming focus on 
ethnicity, without due consideration for poor people within the CHHE category 
(Adhikari and Gellner, 2016). This led them to veer away from the idea of ‘ethnic 
federalism’ which centred on giving prior rights to people of the dominant ethnicity in 
different provinces (Adhikari and Gellner, 2016).  
 
The rise of the NC and the UML, post 2013, also impacted upon the secularism debate. 
Despite the Interim Constitution formalising the transition to secularism, subsequent 
years saw political mobilisations against it. Secularism was seen to have been hurried 
into the Interim Constitution, without substantial discussions at public or political 
levels (Interview with Editor-in-Chief, 7 August 2017, Kathmandu). Politically, only 
the Rastriya Panchayat Party, formerly associated with the royal regime, and with 




in around 2013-2014, bolstered by the return of more conservative parties in the 
government, there were protests by anti-secular Hindu nationalist forces, calling for 
the state’s guarantee on secularism to be revoked (Wagner, 2017). Hindu nationalist 
associations, and some segments of political parties like the NC, opposed secularism, 
arguing that Hinduism was a shared Nepali heritage, and that Hinduism as a religion 
is itself secular (Letizia, 2012). The backlash was further woven into narratives of 
conversion and proselytising, where secularism began to be seen as ‘ peddled’ by 
European donors, to convert Hindus to Christianity through monetary and other 
inducements (Dahal, 2016).  
 
Apart from the political differences between parties on the issue of secularism and 
federalism, elite pacts between these very parties also subverted CA proceedings on 
the debate on federalism. In 2008, the CA tasked the Restructuring of the State and 
Distribution of State Power Committee to recommend principles to determine the 
delineation of federal boundaries, its structure, and the distribution of power between 
levels of government (Constituent Assembly- Nepal, 2010). The Committee report 
proposed the division of Nepal into 14 federal provinces, considering both issues of 
identity (ethnicity, community, language, culture, regional and historical continuity) 
and capacity (availability of natural resources, status of development infrastructures 
and administrative convenience). However, the report failed to please political parties 
of all hues, who submitted counterproposals (Constituent Assembly-Nepal, 2010; 
Thapa, 2017). This led the government, in 2011, to dissolve this Committee and form 
another body: the High-Level State Restructuring Commission, in order to find an 
‘acceptable compromise’ between political parties. This Commission too could not 
agree on a final report, as its members were themselves divided. The majority of 
members backed a proposal for 10 states, while the rest backed a 6- province model. 
The latter model privileged ‘resources and capacity of the provinces’ over ‘identity’ 
and was supported by members of NC and UML (Constituent Assembly- Nepal, 2010).  
 
The division continued, with political parties refuting cross-party mobilisations on 
inclusion in the CA, by proscribing cross-party caucuses of those CA members, 




stance on inclusion. The whips of senior political leaders of different parties compelled 
these caucus members to adhere to the party stance. So negative was their perspective 
on caucuses, that in the CA II, the formation of caucuses was prohibited (Malagodi, 
2014). Apart from abandoning, or subverting, processes in the CA, these elite pacts 
also thwarted the demands of marginalised groups, such as the Janajatis, who were 
advocating for a federalism prioritising ethnic identity, rather it being a mere exercise 
in administrative decentralisation (Hachhethu, 2014).  
 
The final decision on federalism did not come from the CA, or the many campaigns 
by different identity-groups, but was rather, an elite pact between the leaders of four 
major political parties. In 2015, in the aftermath of the national crisis of a massive 
earthquake, in a bid to expedite the Constitution writing process, and in order to 
concentrate on recovery from the earthquake, the leaders agreed to the six-province 
federal model (later amended to 7). Provincial boundaries were gerrymandered to 
retain the dominance of CHHE (Interview with Constitutional lawyer, 12 August 2017, 
Kathmandu). Any commitment to ‘genuine autonomy’ was sabotaged, and the 2015 
Constitution saw further major reversals to other inclusion-related pledges.  
Affirmative action in the Interim Constitution had embraced polices, such as 33% 
female representation in all organs of state, as well as the allocation of 45% of civil 
service seats for marginalised groups. However, the 2015 Constitution further 
weakened this agreement, by adding the already over-represented category of ‘Khas 
Arya’, or CHHE, as one of the ‘communities’ entitled to reservation. The mixed electoral 
system of 40% representation through FPTP, and 56% through PR, was reversed to 40% 
representation from PR and 60% through FPTP. Equal citizenship rights to women were 
also denied, and foreigners married to Nepali women did not qualify for Nepali 
citizenship. Their children were only eligible for naturalised citizenship (Rai, 2018).  
 
Not surprisingly, this 2015 Constitution remains controversial. Its federal delineation 
saw a backlash from many quarters. The first of these was from the Mid-Western Hills, 
where political groups were against the regional division. There followed a series of 
protests and shutdowns by Tharus, Madheshis and Janajatis in different parts of the 




India border in 2015. Primary trade routes were blocked. Their demands included 
proportional and inclusive representation, the delineation of constituencies based on 
population, and changes to the federal demarcation of boundaries, and finally 
citizenship.  
 
Figure 3: Political map of Nepal- distribution of the newly formed provinces 
(Adapted from Map Centre at http://un.org.np/resources/maps) 
 
 
Limited Enactment on Security Sector Reform 
SSR and DDR, as formal terminologies, did not enter the vocabulary of the Nepali 
peace process (Interview with SSR expert, 3 September 2017, Kathmandu). However, 
the Agreement on Management of Arms and Armies (AMMA) committed to 
undertake a DDR-like process, to canton Maoist combatants, disarm and store their 
weapons, verify them, and finally rehabilitate them into society, or integrate them 
within the Armed forces, the latter being the common option for DDR globally. The 
CPA also committed to an SSR-like process of ‘democratising the Nepal Army’. It 
pledged to ascertain the most appropriate numbers for the Army, to provide training 
on values of democracy and human rights, and finally to ensure that the NA was 





The integration of the Maoist Army, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), into the NA 
was a major demand of the Maoists (Nayak, 2009). DDR, without this integration, was 
seen as an attempt to liquidate them, and treat them as a vanquished force. The NA, in 
turn, was unwilling to take on politically tainted soldiers, believing it would 
compromise its ‘professionalism’ (Interview with SC member, 31 August 2017 (b), 
Kathmandu). In essence, the NA was averse to the very premise of CPA and AMMA, 
which equated it with the PLA (Sharma, 2017). It therefore argued against PLA 
integration, as well as pressure to ‘democratise’ or downsize (Interview with 
researcher, 6 September 2017, Kathmandu). All other non-Maoist political parties 
agreed the NA, given its historical monarchist association, needed to be brought under 
civilian control. However, they associated integration with weakening the NA, and 
strengthening the Maoists (Interview with SSR expert, 3 September 2017, 
Kathmandu). The political parties agreed to the removal of the ‘Royal’ prefix, and 
brought the ‘Nepal Army’ under Prime Ministerial governance, to uphold the spirit of 
civilian supremacy. This role became that of the President later. However, the Maoists 
demanded more, stating that the exclusive character of the NA, with its dismal 
representation of Madheshis and women, needed to be made more inclusive, and its 
elite overtones needed to be addressed by integrating the PLA (Jha, 2014).  
 
The traditional forces, of the NC and the UML, largely sided with the NA. In the 
verification process of Maoists arms and armies, 3,475 weapons and 31,000 soldiers 
were submitted, sparking a heated controversy suggesting combatant numbers were 
inflated. The NA and non-Maoist political parties had estimated a total of between 
5,000 and 10,000 (International Crisis Group, 2011a). The NA also wanted to only 
register soldiers who presented with weapons, on an implicit ‘one solider one weapon’ 
basis (Martin, 2012). Convinced that numbers were inflated, non-Maoist parties also 
resented that the state had to fund the arrangements for cantoning an inflated number 
of combatants, since certain percentages of monies went to the Maoist party (Interview 





In 2007, the PLA were brought into UN managed camps, and their weapons collected 
and registered by UNMIN. Combatants, recruited after May 2006, and who were 18 
years old were verified, while minors under 18 were discharged with no further support 
from the state.  It was believed that while Maoists had cantoned new recruits, with the 
promise of lucrative posts in the Army and/or rehabilitation packages, many core 
fighters eschewed the process, to remain in their political wing, the Young Communist 
League (YCL) (Adhikari, 2012).  Further, there were concerns about not all arms being 
kept in UN monitored containers. Additional anxieties surfaced about cantoned PLA 
members leaving the camps to join political activities, in a few instances even resulting 
in violence, as well as the YCL’s continued recourse to intimidation and coercion 
(Nepali Times, 2008).  This led other political parties to question UNMIN’s 
effectiveness in monitoring the PLA and arms. The UN’s verification processes were 
seen to legitimise new recruits, meanwhile choosing to look away from the YCL, 
leading commentators to point fingers at the UNMIN for being ‘pro-Maoist’ in their 
stance (Subedi, 2014). UNMIN scapegoating eventually led non-Maoist political 
parties to campaign for UNMIN’s exit, with India’s support (Adhikari, 2014). As a 
result, it left Nepal before the deliverables under the AMMA agreement were 
complete: something it had been tasked to do. Only after UNMIN’s exit, when the 
Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army 
Combatants (SC) took charge, did the discussion on integration make headway 
(Wagle, 2019) 
 
Amidst such political altercations, technical differences about the management of arms 
and armies hampered the process. The numbers (how many Maoists to be integrated); 
norms (criteria through which integration and rehabilitation of former combatants 
would be proposed); modality (unit integration or individual integration); rank 
(whether there would be rank equalisation between the NA and the PLA), and 
resources for rehabilitation were all contested issues (Interview with member of SC, 
31 August, 2017(b), Kathmandu).  Yet again, as for previous questions of inclusion, 
the resolution of these political and technical differences was in the hands of an elite 
pact of four main political parties. A 7-point agreement forged between the political 




NA directorate, with 65% of personnel representing the NA; a relaxation of one level 
of education; and three years of age for Maoist combatants on NA enlistment (Seven 
Point Agreement, Bell et al., 2017). Two further schemes were decided upon: 
‘voluntary retirement’ where combatants could take cash packages between 800,000 
Rupees to 500,000; or ‘rehabilitation’ where combatants would be offered vocational 
training, in addition to cash settlements. As the process concluded, of the 19,602 
verified combatants, 15,624 chose voluntary retirement; 1,422 ex-combatants were 
integrated into the NA and only six ex-combatants opted for rehabilitation (Wagle, 
2015).  
 
The marginal number choosing integration into the NA, and opting for voluntary 
retirement instead, is attributed to fears of being discriminated against within the NA, 
and an expectation of unrealistic training schemes, as well as the educational 
requirements for entry into the Army (Bogati, 2015). On the SSR side, in 2009, the 
government formed a ‘Committee for the Recommendation for the Formulation of 
the Plan for the Democratisation of the Army and Improvement of the Security 
Apparatus’, convened by the Defence Minister. This committee is said to have 
submitted a detailed plan on democratisation but, since the report has not been 
made public, there has been no national conversation on the same (Sharma, 2017).  
 
Nepal’s experience of DDR went against the global grain, not least as regards the 
option of voluntary retirement, where former combatants would merely receive cash 
and ‘go home’, without any further monitoring. It proved controversial with the liberal 
peacebuilding community, who argued about the dangers of former combatants 
regrouping and becoming troublemakers (Interview with member of SC, 10 August 
2017, Kathmandu). However, there were no instances of former combatant regrouping 
(Interview with members of SC, 10 August; 31 August, 2017, Kathmandu). Uphill 
challenges have been faced by discharged combatants in their social and economic 
integration, given social stigma, absence of opportunities, and lack of education and 
work experience (Simon et al., 2016). Combatants, discharged as minors, have 
demanded compensation, even petitioning the United Nations Office of the High 




scholars arguing that Nepal’s experience significantly lacked reintegration within the 
DDR continuum (Subedi, 2014).  
 
Elite pacts, thus, have led to a partially successful DDR but bereft of political 
agreement on SSR, the agenda has been neglected. As Sharma notes, ‘Since the main 
political parties are not committed to introducing structural reforms, the NA 
remains the most powerful, well-organised and, to some extent, the most 
autonomous institution of the Nepali state (Sharma, 2017, Pg 45).   
 
An Elusive Journey to Transitional Justice 
Any discussion on transitional justice, in its very essence incriminates the most 
powerful brokers of Nepali political settlement. These are the NA; and the NC, which 
oversaw the Army’s mobilisation in the early 2000s, a time of the gravest human 
rights violations; and thirdly the Maoists. Despite its accountability to the CPA, the 
NA insisted the civilian court does not have the authority to look into wartime cases, 
and further, that its own military tribunal had already investigated and taken 
‘departmental action’ against the offenders (Rai, 2018). This reluctance was 
transformed into outright opposition, when the UK arrested a Nepalese army officer, 
Colonel Kumar Lama, on the basis of ‘universal jurisdiction’ in the UK, for his role in 
the torture of Maoist detainees during the war (Interview with Member of Parliament, 
11 December 2018, Kathmandu). The NC party has been in favour of a blanket 
amnesty, not wanting its senior leadership implicated (Interview with SSR expert, 
3 September 2017, Kathmandu). Initially Maoists were reluctant to consider a 
comprehensive form of transitional justice, and instead focussed on raising the issue 
of disappearances carried out by the security forces. Later, as the discussion on 
transitional justice broadened to include violations by the Maoists themselves, they 
tried to water down the agenda (Selim, 2018). The Maoists, while in government, tried 
to amend the TRC law, to transfer cases from the Commission to the regular judicial 
system, articulating that the focus should be on reconciliation (Jha, 2016). Given the 
ability of the issue of transitional justice to unravel political settlements, formal 





The CPA, in a bid to address the legacy of violence, called for various transitional 
justice mechanisms. The provisions included the formation of a high-level Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to: investigate human rights violations in an ‘impartial’ 
way; carry out relief work with, and rehabilitate, people displaced by war; as well as 
‘ensure the rights of the victims of conflict and torture and the family of disappeared 
to obtain relief’ (Bell et al., 2017). In 2007, a Supreme Court judgement ruled that a 
commission of inquiry on conflict-related disappearances be formed, thus adding the 
Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) to the 
transitional justice architecture (Sharma, 2017). 
 
Various consultative processes were undertaken to support the institutions. Based on 
two draft bills, and nineteen rounds of consultations, the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction submitted separate bills, one to establish the TRC, and the other the 
CIEDP. However, during the discussion of both bills in the CA (I), the Government 
arbitrarily withdrew them. It then dismissed the entire process, replacing it with a 
Declaration of the formation of a Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (Sharma, 
2017). Even this mandate, which was much more parochial and unrepresentative of 
any discussion on transitional justice so far, was promoted by a caretaker government 
of technocrats, who had been brought in to oversee the elections in 2013, rather than 
by political parties. The Supreme Court of Nepal ruled that the Declaration 
contravened international human rights, and blocked its implementation. It further 
called on the Government to enact laws that would criminalise gross human rights 
violations, and to seek expert advice on the redrafting of the TRC bill (International 
Commission of Jurists, 2014). The government did form an ‘Expert Task Force’, 
however an elite pact of leaders of major parties, undercut discussions with victims’ 
groups, as well as debate in the CA. Disregarding the input of the Task Force, it passed 
the TRC Act in 2014 (International Commission of Jurists, 2014). The Act reneged on 
the core demands of victims, as well as flouting international laws. For instance, 
Section 26 states that the commission can make recommendations for amnesty to the 
government if found ‘reasonable’ (Government of Nepal, 2014). Additionally, the 




transitional justice debate, an action viewed as compromising its independence 
(International Commission of Jurists, 2014).   
 
This inadequate legislative framework was further damaged by the underfunding and 
under-staffing of these institutions, with government only approving 60% of the 
TRC’s staffing requirement (Ghimire, 2018; The Record, 2018). Concerns about a 
lack of confidentiality, and security threats for victims who made complaints, 
appeared to inhibit the process of registering complaints, in the absence of victim and 
witness protection provisions in the TRC Act (International Commission of Jurists, 
2017). The registration of complaints was through Local Peace Committees, a local 
level dispute resolution mechanism established after the signing of the CPA, and run 
by an all-party coalition. A lack of trust in these Local Peace Committees to register 
complaints further destroyed any public faith in the process (Nepal, 2016).  Despite 
all odds, 50,000 cases were logged at the TRC, while another 3,000 cases were filed 
at the CIEDP.  
 
After the complaints, however, little progressed, apart from preliminary investigations.  
Reparation for victims has been the only deliverable of the transitional justice debate. 
However this reparation has not been about ‘restitution, compensation, rehabilitation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence’, but rather an interim relief measure (UNOHCHR, 
2016). Victims’ demands to revisit amnesty provision remain unfulfilled (Jeffery, 
2019). 
 
Elite pacts have been responsible for truncating the legal framework of transitional 
justice institutions, but some political pacts have gone further to breach the 
commitment to accommodate human rights. In the context of limited political appetites 
for transitional justice among the Maoists, the NC, and the NA, the UML was seen as 
a potential ally for victim groups, as it was not implicated directly. However, in 2016, 
when the Maoists threatened to leave the coalition with UML, the two parties signed 
a 9-point agreement, where they agreed to ‘withdraw or give clemency on insurgency-
era cases and other politically-motivated cases filed on various occasions’, in a bid to 




justice agenda as a lever to threaten the Maoists, and extract political concessions, was 
further consolidated in 2017 with the UML’s merger with the Maoists to form the Left 
Alliance, allegedly with China’s backing (Interview with peace negotiator, 8 August 
2017, Kathmandu). Given the sheer absence of political will, subsequent governments 
have failed to adhere to the Supreme Court’s call to align transitional justice with 
international norms. Instead perpetrators have been rewarded with promotions, 
lucrative postings within the United Nations Peacekeeping forces, and have gone on 
to be Parliamentarians and cabinet members (International Commission of Jurists, 
2017). 
 
Having discussed the impact of elite pacts, and the centrality of the political process 
in the shaping of agendas of the peace process (inclusion, SSR, and transitional 
justice), this chapter turns to the international dimension of the peace process.  
 
Invoking International Engagement in the Peace Process  
 
Broad Contours of International Engagement in the 
Peace Process 
While largely a domestic affair, the peace process and the CPA provided a framework 
for international peacebuilding initiatives to lend support (United Nations Nepal, 2016; 
Whitfield, 2012). Consequently, this period saw a great proliferation of international 
actors. Indian engagement in the process occurred simultaneously with that of liberal 
peacebuilders. The latter comprised a motley collection of actors, such as the UN, 
bilateral aid agencies of Western states, and International NGOs.  
 
In the initial period of the process, after 2005, there was agreement between India and 
the Western international community, about the need to mainstream the Maoists. India 
facilitated the 12-point agreement, signed between the SPA and the Maoists in New 




however the Maoists were placed on the list of ‘terrorists’ by the US. Given this 
categorisation, the US suspended aid when the Maoists entered the interim 
government. Despite these initial apprehensions, the US ultimately supported the 
Indian position on mainstreaming the Maoists with the CPA (The Nepali Times, 2007). 
In the prelude to the process, when the US and the NA were not fully on-board about 
negotiating with the Maoists, India assured them it would stand as the ‘implicit’ 
guarantor (Interview with researcher, 3 October 2018, New Delhi). While there was 
no formal facilitator in the CPA, India played an important role (Martin, 2012).  
 
Similarly, ‘peacebuilders’ had a distinctive place in Nepali polity, even before the 
peace process. For decades they had established their role as development partners or 
aid providers: an issue to be discussed in the next section. During the conflict, 
peacebuilders had unsuccessfully attempted to forge an alliance, between the 
monarchy and the Maoists, as well as between the Maoists and political parties, in 
different phases before the CPA (von Einsiede and Salih, 2017). Before the end of the 
conflict, International NGOs, such as Amnesty International and the International 
Commission of Jurists, had been key in highlighting issues of human rights violations, 
and had provided active support on human rights monitoring (Farasat and Hayner, 
2009; Rawski and Sharma, 2012). There were strong partnerships between 
peacebuilders and domestic civil society, which had further helped create bottom-up 
demands for transitional justice, and inclusion in Nepal (Selim, 2018).  
 
While both India and the peacebuilders agreed on the need for a political pact between 
the Maoist and the SPA, that would end the civil war, there were salient differences. 
Western countries, including the US, vouched for an increased role for the UN and 
other NGOs. India was not comfortable with this (Muni, 2012). This was despite the 
fact that the UN began its work quietly, following the secretary-general’s offer of 
‘good offices’ in 2002. By 2005 Nepal had one of the largest field presences of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), with 
a robust human rights monitoring mechanism (von Einsiede and Salih, 2017). 
However, Girija Koirala, the Prime Minister of the Interim Government, gave credible 




August 2017, Kathmandu). Further he asserted that India would have to take the role 
itself, if it was not willing to let the UN manage the peace process, something Delhi 
was not prepared to do (Muni, 2012). A UN presence was also demanded by Nepali 
civil society groups, who lobbied for a special mandate for a special rapporteur, to 
investigate allegations of human rights violations (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). In 
trying to reconcile Indian concerns, about a UN presence in the region, with Nepali 
demands for a UN mission, a middle path was taken. It was decided not to have a 
peacekeeping mission, with armed troops, but rather a political mission with ‘qualified 
civilian personnel’:  a very different model to that to which the UN was accustomed 
(Martin, 2012). 
 
There were also variations in modalities, with peacebuilders focused on institutions to 
enable a smooth delivery of CPA. By 2007, with the launch of the peace process, 
peacebuilders had established two main mechanisms to aid the peacebuilding process: 
The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal 
(UNPFN). The NPTF, financed by eight Western donors,3 was overseen by the 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and supported CPA-mandated commitments. 
These included: managing cantonments; reintegration of combatants; rehabilitation of 
Internally Displaced Persons; election of the CA, strengthening of law and police 
administration, and the provision of broader support to the peace process (United 
Nations Nepal, 2016). Similarly, the UNPFN  was established to finance projects 
petitioned  from UN organisations (United Nations Nepal, 2016). Despite individual 
variations in priorities, a disparate group of countries funded the UNPFN: the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Canada and Switzerland. Finance also came from the 
global UN Peacebuilding Fund. From 2007 to 2016, UNPFN, endowed with USD 44.5 
million, was the main funder of the UN’s peacebuilding interventions in Nepal, thereby 
contributing to the constitution writing process and supporting the preparation, 
organisation and conduct of the 2007 and 2013 CA elections (United Nations Nepal, 
2016).   
 
 
3 The Fund was supported by Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, 




These varied mechanisms supported the establishment of a number of peace-related 
institutional structures. These ranged from peace organisations directed by the CPA, 
such as the Local Peace Committees (LPCs), to those supporting the implementation 
of CPA requirements, such as the Election Commission, and the National Human 
Rights Commission (NORAD, 2017).  Non-state institutions also aided the process: 
the NPTF; the Nepal Transition to Peace (NTTP) a track 1.5 dialogue process, enabled 
by national facilitators; and the Centre for Constitutional Dialogue supported by the 
UNDP to build the capacity of the CA (Sapkota, 2017). Through these institutions, 
peacebuilders sought to support election monitoring and civil society groups; to 
provide technical expertise and mediation support; and finally to promote a broader 
civil awareness of the whole process (DANIDA, 2013). In contrast to the 
peacebuilders, who favoured an institutional structure for advancing the peace process, 
India and China did not support such proceedings. 
 
The ability of India to stand as a guarantor, or that of peacebuilders to shape institutions 
of the peace process, however needs to acknowledge the historic and geographic 
determinants of international engagement. In Nepal, this history is complicated by 
Nepal’s profound dependence on India, and the subsequent quest of Nepali elites to 
counter-balance this dependence, by strengthening connections with China, and in 
reaching out to the West, to diversify foreign relationships (Rose, 1973).  The next 
section delineates the contours of these historic and geographic determinants.  
 
 ‘India-locked’: India’s Centrality in Nepal 
The threads of history, geography, ecology, economy, and socio-political interactions 
bind Nepal-India relations. Nepal borders five Indian states (Sikkim, West Bengal, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand). Nepal and India share an open border of 1168 
miles, with freedom of movement for citizens of both countries. Given India’s position 
as regional hegemon, its policy on Nepal has prioritised safeguarding its economic and 
security interests. This has been achieved through preventing the use of Nepali 
territory by hostile third parties, and any collusion with cross-border anti-state factions, 




2015). Indian policy has tended to see the Himalayas as a barrier between the Indian 
subcontinent and China (Bhasin, 2005). Nepal’s strategic position as a potential buffer 
between the two powers was heightened after China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950 
(Thapliyal, 2012).  India’s security concerns have led it to forge links with Nepal in 
security, and in political, economic and cultural domains, by trying to instate mutual 
security mechanisms, in the name of their ‘special relationship’. The aim is 
coordination in foreign policy, and for Nepal to be a cooperative regime (Dabhade and 
Pant, 2004; Muni, 2015a). In the economic realm, India’s concerns about water sharing 
and energy security are paramount. The rivers from Nepal contribute 46% of the water 
flowing into the Ganges river, which is a lifeline for the plains of Northern India. In 
addition its rich hydropower potential has ensured Nepal has been central to India’s 
concerns about energy security (Sahu, 2015). Water sharing and discussions on Indian 
investments being used to exploit the hydropower potential, have been core to the 
bilateral relations, albeit some of the most contested (Jha, 2013; Rao and Prasad, 1994; 
Upreti, 2016).   
 
This securitised Indian view of Nepal is further complicated by Nepal’s sheer 
asymmetry vis-à-vis India. As a land-locked country, Nepal relies on India for trade 
and transit. The pegging of Nepali currency to Indian rupees reinforces their 
asymmetric levels of economic development. Further issues are Nepal’s reliance on 
imports and exports from India, the presence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and 
finally a weak infrastructure, preventing more advantageous trade agreements (Nayak, 
2010; Pandey, 2011). Beyond the economy, unparalleled people to people relations, 
facilitated by cross-border ethnic ties, bind Indo-Nepal relations. The open border, 
allowing Nepalis to work in India and the vice versa, is an economic lifeline for many 
in Nepal (Deshpande, 2017). Bilateral relations are further strengthened, not only by 
the relationship between various political parties on both sides of the border, but also 
through military ties, not least the unique tradition, wherein their respective Chiefs 
of Army Staff are appointed as Honorary Generals of the other’s forces. Nepalis 
also are enlisted in the Gurkha regiments of the Indian Army. The special relationship 
is encoded in the form of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the Treaties of 




countries and information sharing on security threats. They restrict Nepal’s imports of 
arms from non-Indian sources without Indian agreement and establish frameworks for 
trade and transit for import and exports (Nayak, 2010; Subedi, 1994).  The 
asymmetrical dependence between the two countries, in addition to India’s effort to 
force through a special security regime, has led to widespread resentment in Nepal 
(Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012).  
 
The most contentious part of Indo-Nepal relations, however, has been the political 
dependence of Nepali elites on India. They have held India in high esteem, in order to 
gain power, often bartering some security-related guarantees. However, when out of 
power they have drummed up ‘anti-India’ sentiments (Interview with Professor 
specialising on South Asia, 13 October 2018, New Delhi). Historically, India has been 
a key broker in all political developments in Nepal. For it was India, in 1951, who 
brokered the agreement between the Rana rulers, the King, and Nepali Congress, 
which ushered in the first wave of democracy to Nepal. The Panchayat regime’s 
survival was due to India withdrawing its support to the democratic parties, who were 
opposed to the King’s authoritarian regime, after the Sino-India war in 1962. In 1990, 
India’s economic blockade of Nepal, in response to its purchasing arms from China, 
bolstered support to the pro-democracy movement, ultimately leading to the 
reinstating of democracy (Khadka, 1997; Mihaly, 1965; Whelpton, 1997). Since 1990, 
India has been a major source of power, investing a great deal of financial and other 
resources, in building a pliant nation, which could be relied on for Indian security and 
trade interests, especially in the hydropower sector in Nepal (Adhikari, 2012).  
 
It is through this prism, of India’s ability to engineer political events in Nepal, that 
India’s engagement with the Maoist conflict, and brokering of nascent steps to the 
peace process, needs to be seen. India’s role in the conflict in Nepal has followed 
multiple, and often shifting, routes. During the civil war it provided moral and material 
support to the Maoists, with many senior Maoist leaders living in India. However, with 
the change in the global security environment, India quickly shifted to brand the 
Maoists as ‘terrorists’ in 2001, and supported the state to end the insurgency (Mishra, 




to push forward its bilateral collaboration with the US, which, along with the rest of 
the international community, also branded Nepal’s Maoists as terrorists (Rasaratnam 
and Malagodi, 2012; Sasikumar, 2010). In dealing with the insurgency, until the 2005 
coup, India’s modus operandi had been to engender an understanding between the 
monarchy and the political parties, or the SPA, to overcome the Maoist threat (Saran, 
2017). It was only in 2005, after the direct takeover of the King, that India revisited its 
twin pillar policy on Nepal: of supporting both constitutional monarchy and multiparty 
democracy (Saran, 2017). Post 2005, India facilitated rapprochement between the 
Maoists and the political parties, in turn rejecting the monarchy. The abandonment of 
its twin pillar policy, and its anger with the Royal regime, was aggravated by the King 
backing China’s inclusion in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) as an observer, and his blocking Afghanistan’s membership, an issue into 
which India had poured diplomatic capital (Jha, 2014). A warming of ties between the 
Maoists and India, was a further reason for the change of heart, including written 
assurances by the Maoists of not harming India’s interests (Muni, 2012). 
 
Two domestic factors also triggered the Indian policy of facilitating an alliance 
between the democratic parties and Maoists. Firstly, India supported the transition of 
the Maoists from a rebel to a political party, in the hope that it would be an example 
to be followed by Indian Maoists,, who were increasingly recognised as India’s biggest 
‘internal threat’ (Adhikari, 2012). Secondly, in 2004, the formation of the Indian 
National Congress led the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which 
included the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPN-M), brought a momentum for 
change. The leader of CPN-M, Sitaram Yechury’s, influence on its foreign policy 
thinking, helped India bring Maoists into the peace talks (Chaturvedy and Malone, 
2012). This speaks to an increasing pluralisation in Indian foreign policy, where new 
actors, such as political parties, determine its patterns. 
 
This pluralisation has made it difficult to detect a distinct Indian foreign policy on 
Nepal. India’s policy decisions and actions are determined by many groups, including 
political parties, bureaucrats and RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), India’s foreign 




part (Sharma, 2019). These actors often operate distinctly, making centralised foreign 
policy-making, and its implementation difficult. For instance, in 2005, during the 
King’s takeover, some influential actors in Delhi, such as the Indian Army, the old 
princely rulers, the Hindu right, and sections of the security establishment, supported 
the royal coup (Jha, 2012); while other members of India’s foreign policy 
establishment called for a policy change, to reprimand King Gyanendra for his 
violation of India’s twin-pillar policy. Similarly, in the economic domain, under the 
Gujral Doctrine, while India offered preferential trade concessions to neighbouring 
countries like Nepal, imposing zero tariffs on certain goods, lobbying by Indian 
manufacturers led to a withdrawal of the policies (Roy and Khan, 2017) 
 
Relationship with China  
Unlike the multi-faceted relations with India, China’s relationship with Nepal has been 
mainly premised on security vis-à-vis Tibet, which borders Nepal. China seeks to 
obtain Nepal's active cooperation, in support of its ‘One-China’ policy, by not letting 
Tibetan rebels and external powers use Nepali territory for anti-China activities 
(Khadka, 1999). Such concerns about possible extra-regional involvement against 
Tibet emanating from Nepal are not far-fetched. Throughout the 1960s, the US 
supported the Khampa rebellion, where Tibetan groups from their base, in the Northern 
borderland of Nepal, attacked Chinese forces. Such activities ended in 1974, when the 
US support was withdrawn, and the NA was mobilised to counter the movement 
(Bauer, 2004; Thapa and Sharma, 2010). Apart from the Tibet question, Sino-Indian 
relations have been an intervening variable in Nepal-China relations. India’s position 
on Tibet, as well as concerns over India’s alliance with one of the two superpowers to 
threaten China’s frontiers, was a dominant concern, at least until the normalisation of 
relations between the two countries in 1976 (Khadka, 1999). 
 
With the Himalayas forming a formidable border, transport, trade, and movement of 
people has been limited, thus inhibiting a more rooted bilateral relationship.  However, 
in the minds of Nepali elites, China is critical in counter-balancing the dependence on 




Mahendra sought to revisit the ‘special relationship’ with India, by seeking closer ties 
with China, especially after the border settlement in 1961 (Whelpton, 1997). The King 
took full advantage of the India-China war of 1962, ‘winning new highways, bridges, 
and hydropower plants for his nation’, despite Indian concerns (Dixit, 2013). Nepal’s 
balancing act was bolstered by China’s alleged inflaming of anti-India sentiments in 
Nepal, in the aftermath of India’s absorption of Sikkim in 1974, until China’s support 
waned after 1978, when moderates, like Deng Xiaoping, took over China’s leadership 
(Ghoble, 1992; Khadka, 1999). 
 
China’s engagement in Nepal, however, has been largely state-to-state, with Beijing 
backing the monarchy. During the Maoist uprising, China was embarrassed by the use 
of the ‘Mao’ brand, in a movement it knew little about and whose principal ties were 
with India (Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012). When the rest of the international 
community, including India, agreed to support the alliance between the Maoists and 
the SPA, China continued to view the developments as ‘business as usual’, labelling it 
an ‘internal affair of Nepal’ (Thapliyal, 2006). The abolition of the monarchy post-
2006 compelled China to rethink its Nepal policy. Throughout the duration of the 
peace process, China has sought to diversify its engagement at all levels, including  
different state agencies and political parties, in a bid to cultivate loyalties that could 
guarantee its security concerns (Adhikari, 2017). China’s increased investment in 
Nepal has, in turn, led the Indian security calculus to focus on this growing engagement 
from Beijing (Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012). 
 
Western Engagement: From Development Donors to Peacebuilders 
Western states, have fitted neatly into the quest of Nepal’s successive regimes, for a 
diversification of its foreign relations to balance dependence on India. Diversification 
began with cooperation on development aid from the US, with the strategic aim of 
countering communism through development and modernisation programmes, rather 
than through diplomatic avenues. US aid was followed by aid from the UK, Germany, 
Switzerland and the USSR (Sharma and Harper, 2018). Aid became the medium for 




expansion of diplomatic missions in Kathmandu increased from 27 missions in 1960 
to 50 in 1972, during the Panchayat period (Khadka, 1997). 
 
Over the years, development aid has granted Nepal’s development partners, largely 
Western states like the US, the UK and European states, a significant policy role, if 
not a directly political one, in shaping Nepal’s future (Sharma and Harper, 2018). The 
pertinence of aid gave Nepali elites the dividends to consolidate their power. 
Inadvertently, the Western-funded development projects, the primary vehicle of 
legitimacy for the Panchayat regime, served to bolster the regime (Croes, 2006; 
Sharma and Harper, 2018). Further, the Kathmandu elite not only established 
themselves as brokers between donors and Nepali society, but influential businesses 
and bureaucrats also benefitted through foreign aid programmes (Dixit, 1997; Khadka, 
1997). Involvement of western donor governments, and NGOs, was given new life 
after 1990 with a widening of democratic space.  Reflecting the global surge of liberal 
internationalism, Western development agencies seamlessly shifted their focus to 
human rights, democracy, and civil society in the post-1990 period (Sharma and 
Harper, 2018). This was complemented by a proliferation of NGOs, with the number 
of INGOs, funded by bilateral and multilateral sources, increasing from 193 to 33,000 
between 1990 and 2006 (Shah, 2008).  
 
During the Maoist conflict, as the state retreated from large parts of the country, 
Western development partners continued to work, committing to Basic Operating 
Guidelines, which allowed them to impartially continue their operations (Donini and 
Sharma, 2014). Despite their established presence in Nepal, Western donors in Nepal, 
until the 2000s, refused to accept the political nature of the conflict as grounded on 
exclusion, or recognise that aid had become intrinsically tied to the Nepali state, 
facilitating the elite capture of foreign aid (Frieden, 2012). It was only post-2002 that 
the more aware and informed development agencies, recognised the Maoist conflict as 
an issue of social justice, rather than law and order (Interview with Indian Army 





Shifting, diverse, and often conflicting strategies, by different Western countries, came 
to the fore during the conflict. The 9/11 attacks, and the ‘war on terror’, led countries, 
like the US to brand the Maoists as terrorists, and the wider international community, 
including the US, the UK, and India, to support the government to end the insurgency 
(Muni, 2012; Rasaratnam and Malagodi, 2012). This also led the western donors, 
initially, to mediate between the King and the political parties, in a bid to unify forces 
to negotiate with the Maoists (Pandey, 2011). In 2002, agencies, such as DFID, UNDP, 
and organisations like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, began efforts to facilitate 
dialogue between the King’s government and the Maoists (von Einsiede and Salih, 
2017). Some development actors, like the World Bank, even deemed that the 
monarchy provided a more conducive environment for economic growth (Pandey, 
2011). The 2005 coup, by the King, led the international community and India, to agree 
on and revisit their position, proclaiming the King’s actions undemocratic, and 
suspending vital military assistance (Whitfield, 2012). Western donors stopped 
supporting the regime, and coerced the Royal Regime to accept the OHCHR’s 
presence to monitor human rights, in addition to raising it as a crisis of human rights 
and democracy in various global forums (Frieden, 2012; Martin, 2012).  
 
The presence of aid donors in Nepal, and their organisational networks in different 
areas of development, meant that Western states could transform swiftly from donors 
of development to ‘peacebuilders’, and build on their legacy of development work.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the history of Nepal’s conflict, and the demands for 
inclusion, accountability for human rights violations, and some form of security sector 
reform it embedded. It has detailed the rise and fall of these ambitious agendas of 
inclusion, transitional justice, and SSR, which attempted to reform the political 
settlement in the face of elite backlash. The chapter also detailed the paradoxical role 
of elite pacts: the part it plays in pushing through horizontal forms of inclusion, while 
also inhibiting a broad-based vertical inclusion for all segments of the society. The 




in the peace process, noting the centrality of India but also the preserved space for 
peacebuilders, leading to a co-existence of these plural forms of international 
engagement.  Further, this chapter has called for an acknowledgement of the historic 
and geographic determinants of international engagement, thereby addressing Selby’s 









Chapter 4: International Engagement in 
Peacebuilding: Dynamics and Impact on Political 
Settlements in Nepal  
 
Building on the contextual insights from Chapter 3, the thesis now turns to look at the 
three research questions, empirically, in relation to the case of Nepal. This chapter’s 
first section seeks to explore India’s role in the peace process, focusing particularly on 
inclusion, SSR, and transitional justice. The second section looks at the interaction, 
and assesses the impact, of Indian engagement on liberal peacebuilding. The final 
section outlines how these plural forms of international engagement have influenced 
the political settlements in Nepal.  
 
India and China in the Peacebuilding Arena 
While both India and China have influenced the peace process in Nepal, directly and 
indirectly, this chapter focuses largely on India. This is largely due to its dominant role 
in the process, but also given the availability of data that could be gleaned, from 
documents and elite interviews.  
 
India’s Role in Empowering the Federal Agenda 
India was generally ambivalent about normative ideas of inclusion, though its wider 
engagement in the political process impacted the debates on federalism and secularism 
(Interviews, August- September, 2017, Kathmandu). Within India’s engagement on 
federalism, its role is associated with facilitating the rise of Madeshi parties in 
Southern Nepal, primary proponents of the federal agenda in Nepal. However, its 
involvement, on the issue of the Terai, the Southern plains adjoining India, predates 




violence spilled over from the hill to the Terai region. This became more critical, with 
the establishment of the Madheshi Front of the Maoist Party, who, like the Maoists, 
saw India as the enemy (Sharma, 2019). The promulgation of the Interim Constitution, 
following the CPA, and the resulting violence unleashed by the Madhesh movement, 
made the fallout even more threatening. This coincided with the deterioration of 
relations between the Maoists and India, a process which had started off well during 
the 12-point agreement, but had worsened after the rise of the identity movements.  
 
India’s anti-Maoist stance post-CPA, emanated from the Maoist government 
cultivating Chinese politicians and diplomats, and lobbying for freedom of movement 
along the Northern border, as well as their calls for abrogation of the 1950 Treaty with 
India (Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012; Jha, 2014). The Maoists, in turn, saw the 
Madheshi movement, as having been orchestrated by India, to divide the strength of 
their movement in the Southern plains (Sharma, 2019).  With an open border, cross-
border kinship links, concerns about violence advancing across the border, collusion 
between the Maoists and Indian Naxals across the open border, and possible Chinese 
engagement across the border, Indian interests in the developments in the Terai were 
increasingly tied to its security interests (International Crisis Group, 2007).   
 
Consequently, in the peace process, India sought to influence, control, and use the 
Madhesh movement, and the political parties associated with it. It encouraged numbers 
of Madheshi leaders to quit such established political parties as the NC, the UML, or 
the Maoists, and form new Madheshi political parties, which India then funded during 
the elections (Jha, 2014). All of this helped them emerge as a credible political force, 
as well as bolstering their campaign for federalism. India also provided moral support, 
by mediating between Madheshi leaders and traditional political forces. India also 
legitimised Madheshi demands, by advising, cautioning, and even threatening 
traditional parties, and frequently lobbying for acknowledgement of the Madheshi 
demand for inclusion.  This was witnessed in India’s warning Nepal’s political elites, 
during the 2015 Constitution writing process, to take ‘disgruntled’ Madheshi factions 
on board (Interview with scholar- diplomat, 2 October 2018, New Delhi). The Indian 




unites, and, ‘be one in which all sections of Nepali society feel that it is a bouquet 
where one flower represents them’ (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2014). 
Similarly, in a rather unprecedented manner, after the 2015 promulgation of the 
Constitution, India raised the issue of ethnic discrimination and violence in Nepal, at 
the UN Human Rights Council in November of that year, in Geneva (Hindustan Times, 
2015). In its most sinister form, the Indian drive for inclusion came in the form of 
support to the Madheshi forces blockading the Indo-Nepal border, on the grounds that 
federal boundaries, delineated by the Constitution, were gerrymandered, in the 
aftermath of the declaration of the Constitution in 2015. India’s support of an economic 
blockade, severely constricting, and damaging, the landlocked economy of Nepal, just 
as it was reeling from the humanitarian impact of the 2015 Earthquake, was seen as a 
tool to penalise Nepali elites, for having overlooked India’s demands.  
 
Domestic electoral calculations, in the elections in Bihar, an Indian state bordering 
Nepal, were further drivers for India’s support of Madheshis. With kin groups spread 
across Bihar, any violence in Nepal, and concern over India’s position on Madheshi 
rights in Nepal, was seen to affect the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory prospects 
in Bihar, thus allowing the BJP-led government to maintain a stringent approach 
(Ganguly and Miliate, 2015).  With multiple issues at stake, India’s Foreign Secretary, 
Jaishankar, who had made urgent visit to Kathmandu, prior to the promulgation, 
counselled the political parties against the new Constitutional declaration, and made it 
clear that: ‘India would not support the new Constitution…and support from the rest 
of the world would have no meaning’ (Sharma, 2019. Pg. 411). Consequently, India, 
only ‘noted’, and did not welcome, the Constitution, given its exclusionary provisions, 
while countries like China, the US, and blocs, like the EU, welcomed it, albeit 
identifying a few deficiencies. Indian support for the blockade pressurised the elites to 
agree on amending the Constitution, granting greater guarantees to the Madheshis. 
 
Deploying moral, and material, incentives, to drive through inclusion, did bear 
dividends, as evidenced by the rise of Madheshi political parties, as well as by Nepal’s 
transition to federalism. However, while these actions advanced the momentum for 




movement, some Madheshi parties, such as the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum, became 
too strong for India to manage, and often opposed Indian demands. India’ response 
was to divide the party, and form alternative Madheshi forces: the Tarai-Madhesh 
Loktantrik Party (TMLP). This was seen as an an attempt to divide Madheshi 
mobilisation in order to control it more easily (Adhikari, 2017). India also used 
Madheshi groups to exert control on the government in Kathmandu, so India could 
pursue its own interests. For instance, when Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were 
repeatedly postponed in 2007, India supported a new Madheshi front, with the hope 
that it would pressurise the Kathmandu politicians to either announce election dates or 
face greater loss in the Tarai (Jha, 2007a). Perhaps the clearest instance of India’s 
propensity to use the Madheshi forces as ‘currencies’, to promote its interests, came in 
2008, during a clash between the Maoists and the NA (Singh, 2011). To ensure that 
the NA emerged victorious in this dispute, India pressurised those Madheshi parties, 
who were members of the coalition with the Maoists, to withdraw their support, and 
join another anti-Maoist coalition, formed of traditional conservative parties. This led 
Madheshi parties to join hands with traditional Nepali parties, such as the NC and the 
UML, who were not committed to their agenda on inclusion, thereby dampening the 
momentum for inclusion, created by the Madheshi-Maoist alliance after the CA 
elections in 2008.  
 
The entrenched nature of Indian engagement on the Madheshi issue firstly 
undermined, and eroded, the legitimacy and the agendas of Madheshi parties (Singh, 
2011). The Indian tendency, to compel Madheshi parties to back Indian priorities in 
Nepal, in return for their support, weakened the legitimacy of Madheshi forces. It also 
led the entire ‘inclusion’ agenda to be condemned and ridiculed as ‘India’s doing’, 
creating fertile grounds for a backlash from the elites, who viewed this through the 
prism of Nepali nationalism. It was commonplace to attribute the Madheshi movement 
as perpetrated by India. For instance, after the Madhesh movement, the former prime 
minister G.P. Koirala, hinting at India’s role in the Terai crisis, stated: ‘The ongoing 
Madhesh crisis can be solved within a minute if Nepal and India jointly work together 
for it.’ (Nayak, 2011).. While all political parties have, at some point, benefitted from 




Madheshis being ‘India’s proxies’, and further bolstered the trend in Nepal, to look at 
the issue of Madhesh through the prism of bilateral relations with India, exacerbating 
the deep-seated discrimination against Madheshis (Interview with Member of 
Parliament, 14 August 2017, Kathmandu). 
 
India’s wariness of any international presence in Madhesh, also meant that 
international bodies, integral to the peace process, such as UNMIN, could not have an 
on-ground presence, and engage with the identity movements across the Southern 
plains (Jha, 2014; Sharma, 2019). In fact, India’s aversion to UN agencies, including 
UNMIN, working in, or having an organisational presence in the Terai borderlands, 
became a point of tension with India, and one of the reasons for UNMIN’s untimely 
exit from Nepal. India’s suspicion of UN in general, also meant that OHCHR’s term 
extension was agreed only after it agreed to close its office in the Terai (Interview with 
Editor- in-Chief, 7 August 2017, Kathmandu).  
 
India’s role in the Madhesh movement also became a source of discontent in the 
bilateral relations, between Nepal and India, and was controversial even within some 
Madheshi parties. Thus, while some mainstream parties blamed India for instigating 
the Madhesh movement, some Madhesh-based parties have, in turn, blamed India for 
using them as a ‘bargaining chip’, with which to discipline the Kathmandu-centric 
political establishment (Interview with activist, 12 August 2017, Kathmandu). Some 
Madheshi leaders have also viewed any Indian involvement, as a conspiracy of the 
Nepal government against Madheshis (Miklian, 2009). 
 
This paradoxical form of Indian support, where it has both supported and constrained 
the Madheshi movement for inclusion, can be attributed to the fact that Indian 
engagement did not emanate out of any consideration for the exclusion of Madheshi 
people. Rather, it stemmed from concerns over stability, maintaining influence, and 
outbidding other external actors in Nepal. The stability-centred lens meant that the 
support to Madheshi parties was geared towards weakening the Maoist party, rather 
than promoting inclusion, after the steady deterioration of relations between India and 




we have no business in the constitutional process in Nepal but having a surly 
disenchanted population right at our borders is a security concern’ (Interview with 
diplomat, 7 October 2018, New Delhi).  
 
India’s role in the Madhesh movement needs to be seen from the context of a pragmatic 
Indian foreign policy, which has sought to match its engagement in line with the 
shifting political developments in Nepal, and at home.  Questions of stability further 
led it to micro-manage events in the Madhesh, in ways that favoured Indian interests 
rather than focused on ‘inclusion’.  
 
Indian Engagement on Secularism  
Outside the parameters of federalism, India’s stance on secularism also proved 
significant. Nepali groups, opposing Nepal’s transition to secularism, and who had 
called for the restoration of Nepal as a Hindu state, found allies across the border. 
India’s interest in secularism in Nepal stems from its being a Hindu majority state and, 
until 2006, the only ‘Hindu’ state, the seat of some sacred Hindu sites, as well as a 
dense network of religious organisations, such as the World Hindu Federation, across 
both countries. Thus, secularism in Nepal has been a matter of domestic debate in India 
(Interview with Professor specialising on South Asia, October 13, 2018, New Delhi). 
Right-wing Hindu groups in India have advocated for the preservation of ‘pure’ 
Hinduism, free from Muslim or Christian influence or infiltration: an argument 
bolstering the stance of the CHHE in Nepal (International Crisis Group, 2007). 
 
On the debate on secularism in Nepal, the footprint of the BJP and its absolute 
parliamentary majority in India since 2014 is a critical juncture. Until 2014, secular 
parties such as the Indian Congress being at the Centre, supported by Leftist partners 
who had vehemently supported the transformative agenda of the Maoists, ensured that 
religion in Nepal was not an overwhelming issue in Indian foreign policy calculus.  
The rise of the BJP, and the weakening of Indian National Congress, has meant that 
anti-secular elements in Nepal have received both moral, and material, support from 




Kathmandu). More critical has been the election of powerful religious leaders, namely 
Yogi Adityanath, as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, an Indian state bordering Nepal. 
As the head of the powerful temple of Gorakhnath, notably the patron deity of the Shah 
dynasty in Nepal, Adityanath is closely associated with the monarchy, and has publicly 
spoken in favour of ‘Hindutva’ and monarchy in Nepal (Nepali Times, 2017). The 
work of organisations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) a volunteer 
paramilitary organisation, and the parent organisation of the BJP, with its fiercely 
Hindu nationalist agenda, is said to have increased in Nepal (Interviews, August 2017, 
Kathmandu; October 2018, New Delhi). Sections of the Rastriya Pajatantra Party, the 
only party lobbying for Nepal to return to a Hindu state, is openly sympathetic to the 
BJP’s ideology (Roy and Khan, 2017). Elements of the ruling BJP have also 
pressurised Nepali leaders to renounce secularism (Muni, 2015b). Prominent BJP 
leaders, such as Rajnath Singh, and Ram Madhav, have repeatedly advised their Nepali 
counterparts that Nepal should revert to a ‘Hindu state’ (Karat, 2015). Further some 
Nepali leaders, for instance the Chairman of the NC, are said to have assured Indian 
authorities that they would remove the word ‘secular’ from the Constitution (Ghimire, 
2018). 
 
Diplomats, interviewed in India, clarified that, the Government in India had no 
reservations about Nepal’s transition to secularism, but noted ‘elements’ within 
India, including the ruling party wanted to preserve Nepal’s Hindu identity 
(Interview with Diplomat, 7 October, 2018, New Delhi). The debate on secularism 
also confirms to the increasing pluralisation of foreign policy actors in India, where 
political parties, provinces and multiple entities are making their mark on foreign 
policy issues. In fact, so crucial was the element of secularism, that some senior Nepali 
politicians have noted that the mention of ‘secularism’ in the 2015 Constitution, 
thereby breaching private assurances given to Indian authorities, was one of the factors 
leading to India’s support of the economic blockade of that year (Baral, 2019).  
 
In trying to balance India’s preservation of a Hindu state, and the bottom-up campaigns 
for secularism, by Janajati groups as well peacebuilders, the Constitution of 2015 




continues to assure the dominance of Hindus. The Constitution, while identifying 
Nepal as secular, defines secularism conservatively, as ‘religious and cultural 
freedom’ and ‘protection of religion and culture being practised since ancient times’- 
which in Nepal privileges Hinduism. Further, religious freedom is made conditional 
by a clause: ‘..no person shall… convert a person of one religion to another religion 
….’ (PAX, Bell et al., 2017). The Constitution also continues to use Hindu cultural 
symbols as national emblems: a Hindu symbol in its flag; crimson, which is the colour 
of victory in Hindu culture; and finally the Sanskrit language is used in the coat of 
arms (OHCHR, 2018). Moreover, the cow, regarded sacred in Hinduism, is cited as 
being Nepal’s national animal and its slaughter is deemed illegal.  
 
The paradoxical stance of India, in its campaign for the inclusion of Madheshis, but its 
renunciation of secularism, notably impacted upon the momentum for inclusion. 
Firstly, it prevented the formation of a broad-based vertical inclusion that would have 
widened the contract between the state and all members of society. This version of 
‘inclusion’ failed to acknowledge the multiple layers of exclusion in Nepal, which is 
based not only on ethnicity but also on religion, with the two overlapping only to a 
degree. Secondly, in paying lip-service to ‘inclusion’, while only supporting Madhesh-
based entities, and lobbying exclusively on Madheshi grievances, and not of other 
groups like janajatis, it ensured that even in this its support for inclusion was parochial, 
subject to Indian anxieties on security, rather than the norm of inclusion. This is at 
variance with India’s own quest to embody the diversity of the plural-national state in 
its institutional design (Swenden, 2018). Further, by supporting and condemning, 
Madhesh-based forces, at different times, India has demonstrated that liberal norms of 
equality, democracy, and justice, that foreground the very idea of democracy, are very 
low-ranking Indian priorities in the region.  
 
China’s Engagement on Inclusion  
In the context of ‘inclusion’ debate, different events have led China to engage 
indirectly in the debate, advocating against federalism, the lynchpin of Nepal’s quest 




on the heels of the Beijing Olympic games, compelled China to be concerned about 
the Nepali government’s ability to address its security concerns. China not only 
attributed anti-China activities to such foreign forces as the US and India (News Front, 
2008), but also called for all expeditions to Mount Everest and other peaks to be 
suspended, to curb possible unrest (Ghimire, 2008).  
 
In addition, China has seen the attempt to establish a Madhesh province, that could be 
controlled by Delhi, as part of a New Delhi strategy against China (Sharma, 2019). 
The meeting of six members of the CA, who were Madheshi party representatives, 
with the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India, the headquarters of the Tibetan cabinet in 
exile, had offended the Chinese, not least for their remarks linking the Madheshi quest 
for autonomy to Tibetan independence (Sharma, 2019). The Chinese Ambassador in 
Nepal, in 2009, called upon the Nepali government, to clarify its position on this 
meeting (Roy, 2009).  
 
With multiple events in Nepal, now linking Tibetan security to political developments 
in Nepal, China denounced federalism, and identity-based federalism in particular 
(Shakya, 2014). China cautioned the Maoist Supremo, Prachanda, to rethink patterns 
of centre-state relations in a federal system, and factor in the possible disintegration, 
and chaos, federalism could herald (Ghimire, 2013). Beijing is said to have lobbied for 
having fewer provinces across its border in Northern Nepal, concerned that newly-
formed provinces in Nepal would not be able to curb instability in border areas 
(Bhattarai, 2014). China, thus, is seen to want a unitary state, or least a state that is 
only administratively and not ethnically federal, viewing a unitary Nepal as one that 
would serve its security interests better (Interview with Political Analyst, 20 August 
2017, Kathmandu). Scholars attribute China’s welcoming of the disputed Constitution 
of 2015, to the modification and dilution of identity aspects of federalism. For China 
was satisfied that its concerns, to avoid an identity-based federal structure, had been 





Locating Indian and Chinese engagement on SSR 
In the DDR process, India was interested in supervising the process of cantoning the 
Maoist combatants. However, both the Maoists, as well as the Prime Minister of the 
interim government formed in 2007, believed that it would be better to involve 
UNMIN instead (Sharma, 2019). Any Indian leadership in the process would have 
made it more controversial, and in fact de-legitimised it, given the history of India’s 
intrusion into Nepali politics (Interview with political commentator, 4 August, 2017, 
2017, Kathmandu). India’s role was limited, in contrast to that of the peacebuilders, 
who were invested in the design of the DDR/ SSR process, involving technical experts 
from other countries for comparative learning, and advising the government on the 
best forms of DDR. Meanwhile India provided the ‘hardware’ that underwrote the 
process: tents for the cantonments; and containers for the storage of Maoist weapons. 
Former Nepali soldiers from the Indian Gorkha regiments, supervised the process 
(Sharma, 2019) 
 
Regional actors, such as India and China, have not taken part in debates on security 
sector reform, but their direct engagement with the security sector, specifically the NA, 
has been the most critical determinant of the negotiations.  India’s concerns about SSR 
were centred principally on protecting the inviolability of the NA, rather than being 
about reforming the security sector, or the rehabilitation of the former People’s 
Liberation Army Maoist (PLA/ Maoist) combatants. Issues such as the open border, 
and the fraternal bonds between the Indian Army and the NA, combined with growing 
traditional, and non-traditional, security threats across the border, led India to invest 
in Nepal’s security sector in general, and the NA in particular. India’s security 
concerns led to enhanced defence cooperation, weapons supply, and training for the 
NA, making security cooperation the most integral component of state-state relations 
between the two countries (Jha, 2014). India has provided the NA with a form of 
political patronage by selling arms at concessional rates, offering training, and being 
the largest contributor of international assistance (Ghimire, 2018). Enhanced security 
cooperation is exemplified by assistance during disasters, periodic joint military 
exercises, training courses and high-level bilateral visits of military personnel 




2006, with India seeing the NA as the only state institution to remain intact, with all 
other institutions dismantled or delegitimised (Jha, 2014). Further, with the rise of 
Maoist power, especially with their electoral win in 2008, India also saw the NA as 
the only force that could curb Maoist expansionism (Adhikari, 2012). 
 
India’s concern over perceived Maoist misconduct grew after this dispute between the 
Maoists and the Army. India, on this occasion, lent its total support to the NA (Bidwai, 
2009), engineering a 20-party coalition against the Maoists in 2008, leading to the 
collapse of the Maoist government. India also succeeded in persuading the President 
to revoke the government order for the NA Chief’s dismissal, thereby ensuring he 
remained in post (Adhikari, 2014; Jha, 2014). The criticality of the NA in the narrative, 
is proven by the fact that the NA-Maoist dispute produced a rare moment of policy 
convergence, across Indian agencies working in Nepal, when all major Indian 
institutions, such as the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence , the 
Indian Army, and the political leadership, decided that they had to save the NA 
(Navlakha, 2009). 
 
Similar to India, China’s engagement has largely focused on strengthening the security 
agencies. The expanding matrix of the military cooperation has included, training, 
equipment supply, joint exercises, scholarships for Nepali military personnel in 
Chinese military universities, and high-profile visits (Bogati and Strasheim, 2019; 
Solanki, 2018). Other than the NA, China has also invested in infrastructural support, 
by building the Academy of the Nepal Armed Police Force. Instituted in 2001, to 
combat Maoist insurgents, the Armed Police Force is deployed along the Northern and 
Southern borders of Nepal. Its presence is said to have controlled the flow of Tibetans 
to Nepal, and their activities in Nepal (Sharma, 2009).  
 
The crucial part played by regional actors, like India and China, in the SSR debate, 
distinguishes Nepal’s experience from that of others. In Nepal it is not only 
peacebuilders and local political groups, who determine the trajectory of the process. 
Instead outcomes are determined by tripartite negotiations: between national elites, 




part Chinese, engagement, has been on strengthening the NA, with a subsequent 
impact upon the SSR debate, and in at least five ways.  Firstly, by placing the onus of 
Nepali security, and their own, on the NA, and ensuring extraordinary levels of moral 
and material support to strengthen it, India has strengthened the position of the NA 
vis-à-vis its civilian counterparts. This exacerbates the imbalance in Nepal’s civil-
military relations, diluting discussions on any ‘democratisation’ of the Army, a critical 
SSR-related component, enshrined in the CPA. This has left its mark, as regards wider 
civil-military relations. The NA has indirectly exerted pressure on political actors, 
calling for non-interference in its functioning, through debates like ‘democratisation’ 
(Upreti and Vanhoutte, 2009).  
 
Secondly, the strengthening of the NA has also threatened to weaken the DDR 
component, especially as regards the integration of combatants into the NA. India’s 
view of the NA, as the ultimate bulwark to its security, had caused it to believe that no 
action should be taken, which could undermine that institution’s cohesion and morale 
(Adhikari, 2012). This view is corroborated by a former Indian Army Chief, who 
argued that any integration of PLA ex-combatants into the Army would dilute its 
professional credentials, and compromise its institutional integrity (Jha, 2014). Such 
views reinforced the NA’s reservations about the integration of former PLA soldiers, 
and not only impacted elite bargains on the issue, but also prolonged the process.  
 
Thirdly, the NA and India were equally sceptical of UNMIN, the NA being especially 
annoyed by UNMIN’s reminders of the CPA’s commitment to the NA’s 
democratisation (Martin, 2012).  In addition to its support for the NA, in its stance 
against UNMIN, India also mobilised all non-Maoist political parties to join the anti-
UNMIN cause. These were factions with long-harboured deep resentments against 
UNMIN, for a perceived bias towards the Maoists (Adhikari, 2012). India persuaded 
the US, and the UK, to lobby for UNMIN’s closure (The Economist, 2011). This was 
perceived as an endorsement of the NA, and its chief of staff, who was alleged to be 
lobbying with political parties for UNMIN’s exit (International Crisis Group, 2011b). 
The campaign against UNMIN led India to view it as ineffective, but also as having 




diplomat who noted, ‘From 2007-2013, when UNMIN was present, cantonments 
weren’t disbanding, leading the Maoists to further line their pockets, and delay the 
political transition. The fulfilment of the Agreement on Monitoring of Arms and 
Armies (AMAA) was UN’s responsibility and it was not effective. Groups of soldiers 
came out of cantonment with weapons, and lawlessness and violence increased under 
UNMIN’s watch. UNMIN also did nothing when videotapes of Maoist leader, 
Prachanda, came out, asserting he had inflated numbers of cadres to UNMIN. All this 
further delayed the socialisation of the Maoists to democratic functioning’ (Interview, 
14 October 2018, New Delhi). 
 
Fourthly, the availability of regional actors, not only made institutions like the NA less 
dependent on civilian institutions, but also reduced any reliance on traditional Western 
donors and peacebuilders, decreasing the latter’s leverage on the security forces 
(Bogati and Strasheim, 2019). The substantial involvement of countries, such as India, 
in the political process, also meant that regional powers could use political leverage, 
to subdue SSR to suit their interests, which often undercut the efforts of the 
peacebuilders, like UNMIN.  
 
Finally, Nepali elites were disincentivised from cultivating a comprehensive SSR, due 
to the ambivalence of regional powers on any debates of SSR- DDR, and their focus 
on strengthening state institutions. This inhibited the spirit of the CPA, and its 
commitment to ensuring civilian supremacy, and making the NA accountable. The 
cumulative effect of this regional ambivalence, along with factors like the absence of 
elite commitment, and the untimely exit of UNMIN, ensured that, apart from 
delivering on AMAA, the commitment to transform the governance of the security 
sector has not materialised (Sharma, 2017).  
 
Indian and Chinese Response to Transitional Justice   
Contrasting with that of peacebuilders, regional engagement on transitional justice 
needs to be located, not only by its direct engagement on the debate, but also through 




their direct role, ‘disengagement’, rather than engagement, would be the appropriate 
parlance. The only time India engaged on a discussion on transitional justice, was at 
the universal periodic review at the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2015, when 
it recommended: ‘ensuring effective functioning of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and full implementation of its recommendations, including prosecution 
of those responsible for violent insurgency’, and ‘ensure the independence and 
financial autonomy of the National Human Rights Commission’(Ministry of External 
Affairs, India, 2015a). Nepali actors, however, read this as an Indian ploy, to pressurise 
the Maoists to leave the UML led coalition, perceived as anti-Indian, rather than 
driven by concerns for victims (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 
2017 (b), Kathmandu). A prominent paper in India read ‘with a more India-friendly 
government in place in Kathmandu, India is also unlikely to again raise the issue of 
war crimes at international forums’ (Baral, 2016). No such direct statements, and 
engagement have been available through Chinese sources.  
 
There are, however, significant indirect implications. By supporting security 
institutions, like the NA, and arming and abetting them, despite their dismal record on 
transitional justice, India has conveyed to the security forces that they will be 
supported, regardless of their actions. It also allows for the NA to limit the call by 
peacebuilders, on issues of accountability. However, this absolute disengagement from 
the debate also signals that regional powers speak a different vernacular of peace, 
which does not include transitional justice. In interviews in India, top Indian diplomats 
expressed the undesirability, as well as the infeasibility, of implementing such 
prescriptive norms as transitional justice. A diplomat stated: ‘We are hesitant at getting 
drawn into these prescriptive Western imports. UN and Western groups talk of 
transitional justice with examples from South Africa in mind. But South African model 
had Nelson Mandela who singularly was able to stop communal riot. But, Nepal does 
not have leaders of that stature’ (Interview, 14 October 2018, New Delhi). Yet another 
diplomat, said, we have, ‘Little patience with text book ethos, like transitional justice’ 
(Interview, 8 October 2018, New Delhi). Another diplomat-scholar, labelled 
transitional justice as: ‘European nonsense, which has been reduced to a political tool 




in these conversations, that compensating victims is important, but in its punitive legal 
form, it cannot be applied in contexts like Nepal (Interviews, October 2018, New 
Delhi).  
 
Yet another indirect impact has been the consolidation of the left coalition in Nepal. 
The Left Alliance, which won the 2017 elections in Nepal, includes Maoists and the 
UML. The alliance is generally seen as endorsed by China (Bell, 2017). This marriage 
of convenience was premised on UML guaranteeing to the Maoists that they will not 
be prosecuted for transitional justice, if they support the UML-led coalition. Thus 
Chinese support for the Left has facilitated the process for the UML, the only party not 
directly implicated in the transitional justice debate, to use it merely as a bargaining 
chip (Baral, 2016). This has, albeit indirectly, squandered the little gains made by the 
victim groups, in their call for addressing of the legacy of violence during the war.  
 
Interaction with Liberal Peacebuilding Projects: 
Differences in Modalities of Support 
 
In looking at how Indian engagement has interacted with key liberal peacebuilding 
projects, we find differences in the modalities, which have not only led these plural 
approaches to diverge, but also fostered limited avenues of cooperation.  
 
Normative versus Norm-free  
A core difference in modality is the usage of norms in their articulation by 
peacebuilders, in direct contrast with the value- free approach of emergent powers. For 
India and China did not see such an issue as human rights, ‘as a topic worth 
discussing’, while the liberal peacebuilders collectively raised their voices on issues 
of transitional justice and inclusion (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). While India did use 
the norm of inclusion strategically to promote its own agenda, on the occasions it was 
deployed, it was a generally inconsistent and selective exercise. The ambivalence on 




the concepts as ‘half baked’, unrealistic, and infeasible (Interviews, October 2018, 
New Delhi).   
 
The normative approach also led peacebuilders to persuade Nepali elites to insert 
normative commitments, on issues like transitional justice and SSR, in the CPA. They 
encouraged a commitment to the formation of institutions, such as Local Peace 
Committees, in addition to the Commission on Disappearances, and the TRC about 
which there was little knowledge or support domestically (Farasat and Hayner, 2009) 
(Selim, 2018). Peacebuilders also supported civil society organisations, to lobby for 
the government’s commitment to international legal frameworks, which mirrored 
these norms. Since the start of the peace process, Nepal has committed to a raft of 
conventions and resolutions, including the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, signed in 2010; the National Action Plan on United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820; as well as the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Interview with former 
minister, 4 September, 2017). These legal instruments have in turn been the source of 
ethical principles, and a stimulus for political mobilisation for movements, such as that 
of Janajatis in Nepal (Tamang, 2010).  
 
The normative disposition of peacebuilders was also evident, in their legitimising and 
endorsing of policies, based on their commitment to such liberal values as inclusion. 
For instance, the European Union’s Election Observation Mission’s report, released in 
2018, proposed the removal of the 31% reservation in the proportional representation 
category for the dominant CHHE group, which they believed was contrary to the spirit 
of inclusion (EU- Election Observation Mission, 2018). Similarly, in writing about 
religious rights, a former British ambassador, called upon CA members to ensure the 
right of people to convert (Pagnamenta, 2014). This legitimisation was more 
prominent in the case of transitional justice, where peacebuilders scrutinised, and later 
delegitimised, different versions of the TRC Act. Peacebuilders, mostly working on 
human rights, have pointed to several deficiencies in the TRC Act, including the 
provision of amnesty, and called upon the government to criminalise enforced 




international laws (Amnesty International, 2007; UNOHCHR, 2014). So insistent was 
the normative commitment, that when the Nepali government took no legislative or 
administrative action, to make the transitional justice mechanism compliant with 
international law, the UN declared it was unable to support these institutions, leaving 
the Nepali state to bear the expenses (UNOHCHR, 2016).  
 
Further, to create space for norms to translate into concrete policies, in agendas like 
inclusion, peacebuilders framed the entire narrative on inclusion, by defining who was 
included and excluded (Interview with civil society representative, 16 August 2017, 
Kathmandu). While this categorisation complemented the movements in Nepal to a 
large extent, there were salient omissions. An influential report, Unequal Citizens, 
sourced by the World Bank, with the Department for International Development 
(DFID)’s support, identified the categories of exclusion as: gender, caste, ethnicity, 
language, religion and region. Throughout the peace process, such categories were 
reinforced, often being adopted into Government policy areas (Interview with civil 
society representative, 16 August 2017, Kathmandu). This categorisation focused on 
horizontal inequalities, but neglected other excluded groups like the poor, and landless, 
thus rendering everyday socio-economic issues peripheral to the peace process.   
 
Despite the uneven commitment of peacebuilders to these norms, which waned as the 
peace process dragged on, its articulation and framing was founded on liberal norms 
and values.  Nepal’s case thus goes against the grain of recent assessments by scholars, 
who argue that peacebuilders have tended to relinquish liberal norms, and embody a 
‘norm-free’ approach (De Coning, 2018).  
 
Formal Policy Processes versus Informal Political Pacts  
Another salient dividing line, between Indian engagement and the peacebuilders, was 
the dominance of the former in the informal political process, while the latter prevailed 
in the formal policy domains of the peace process. Accordingly, Indian engagement 
has focused on the political process, engineering the rise and fall of political coalitions, 




engagement was centred on the peace process, and on the CA and the Constitution 
writing process.  
 
With their focus fixed on the CA as the main avenue for the peace process, 
peacebuilders supported different committees within the CA, providing technical 
assistance in the drafting of articles, and expert guidance on the preparation of 
Committee reports, in addition to supporting cross-party caucuses of such 
marginalised groups in the CA as the Dalit, Women and Janajatis (International IDEA, 
2015). The support to the caucuses, through capacity building workshops and 
seminars, to help raise their awareness on such thematic issues as electoral design, 
federal design, and gender-friendly policies, is seen to have indeed elevated the 
understanding of CA members from marginalised groups (Tamang, 2011). Alongside 
support for the CA, peacebuilders have lent their assistance to government agencies, 
to deliver the CPA’s agendas. These agencies include: the National Planning 
Commission, the Public Service Commission, the Election Commission, and the 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. For instance, the Enabling State Programme, a 
key peacebuilding project on inclusion, worked with the National Planning 
Commission to disaggregate poverty data, based on gender, caste and ethnicity, in 
order to help planning processes become more inclusive (Enabling State Programme, 
2013).  
 
India, on the other hand, was devoting itself to informal political deal making, which 
saw the rise and fall of several coalitions. It was behind the fall of the Maoist 
government, in the aftermath of the Maoist dispute with the Army Chief in 2009 (Jha, 
2014). India was again active in engineering a coalition led by Madhav Kumar Nepal. 
It invested resources into controlling those governments it considered detrimental to 
its interests, while promoting those it perceived as tractable (Adhikari, 2014). While 
China was not as entrenched, or invested, as India, in 2010 a tape of a conversation 
between a Chinese contact and a senior Maoist leader emerged. In it the Maoist leader 
is heard asking for 500 million rupees to bribe Parliamentarians to form a Maoist-led 
government, leading Nepalis to conclude that the China was supporting the Maoist 




politically motivated, serving as game-changers in regime formation. The involvement 
of regional powers generates an immediate impact, due to their macro level and direct 
political engagement, whereas the social engineering of peacebuilders takes much 
longer. 
 
Diverse Engagement versus Macro Political Engagement  
Relatedly, another notable point of contrast was that, while Indian engagement was 
limited to key political negotiations, including the 12-point agreement, the 
peacebuilders’ approach was much more diversified. In terms of their approach to the 
peace process, the engagement of India and China was detached from the content and 
commitment of the CPA, leaving peacebuilders to lead on the ‘everyday’ aspect of 
delivering on the peace process (Interview with Editor-in-Chief, 10 August 2017, 
Kathmandu).  
 
The peacebuilders’ approach ranged from diplomatic engagement with political 
stakeholders, to mediation and facilitation, in addition to programmes on core 
peacebuilding issues, such as the management of arms and armies, and electoral 
reform. For instance, on DDR, peacebuilders supported the registration and 
verification of former combatants, and promoted rehabilitation efforts through 
provisions of vocational skill training opportunities, implemented by UNDP, under 
UNMIN’s direction (Crozier and Watson, 2009). They also invested in the physical 
reconstruction of police stations destroyed in the conflict (Interview with former 
minister, 4 September, 2017, Kathmandu).  
 
The diversity of modality was matched by the diversity of actors involved. There was 
a wide variety as to how peacebuilder’s support was channelled: via multilateral bodies 
like the UN; through several of their own bilateral aid agencies, namely USAID, DFID, 
NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation); and through civil 
society groups, INGOs, and NGOs; in addition to governmental channels, notably the 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, as well as the Election Commission of Nepal. 




layered approach.  For example, on the issue of SSR, peacebuilders sought to invest at 
multiple levels, including: the commissioning of research and papers on SSR; projects 
on community policing and rule of law; technical assistance to revamp the Nepal 
Police in a federalised Nepal; the drafting of security-related provisions of the 
constitution; as well as the formation of an informal donor working group on SSR 
(Crozier and Watson, 2009; Upreti and Vanhoutte, 2009). Such endeavours were 
geared to enhance the accountability and responsiveness of the security sector.  
 
In comparable fashion, building on the legacy of their work on human rights 
monitoring during the conflict-era, peacebuilders informed the policy-making, 
delivery, and monitoring, on the issue of transitional justice. They also supported 
national bodies, such as the National Human Rights Commission, on forensic 
investigations, and supported investigation teams on disappearances, in addition to 
providing financial support on interim relief packages (Dixit, 2014). The interim relief 
programme was administered by the government’s Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction (Rausch, 2017). 
 
This diversified portfolio differs from Indian engagement, characterised by its lack of 
commitment to supporting the implementation of the CPA. One exception has been 
India’s support in the 2008 elections, where India trained Nepalese election observers, 
provided computers, voting machines, and vehicles to the government of Nepal 
(Destradi, 2010b). Based on its own experience, India provided technical assistance 
for such issues as determining distances from the electoral booth to the electorate, and 
the mobility of voters (Interview with diplomat, 14 October, New Delhi). This narrow 
focus of India, limited to forging elite pacts, rather than offering more extensive 
support to the peace process, is in stark contrast to its contribution outside the peace 
process. For beyond the limits of the peace process, India’s engagement is multi-





Broad-base, Civil Society Oriented versus Political Elite Approach  
Given differences in the modus operandi of their engagement, India and China have 
focused on the narrow elite base of Nepal in the peace process, whereas the focus of 
peacebuilders has been in general diversified, and has included civil society groups. 
This broad-based engagement sought to target political leaders, marginalised groups, 
civil society, and the population in general.  
 
Outside such formal agencies of the state as the CA, and the different Ministries, 
peacebuilders have focused on working with marginalised communities, by funding 
civil society groups working for the rights of marginalised groups, or in more extensive 
projects with a social inclusion focus. Through their support, peacebuilders sought to 
enhance people’s awareness of their political and social rights, and generate grassroots 
demands for inclusive policies (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 2017 
(b), Kathmandu). A key example here is NEFIN. Since 2004, donors, such as DFID 
and the EU, had funded NEFIN for different projects on awareness-raising and 
empowerment, provided fellowships and media training, as well as sought to improve 
the livelihoods of marginalised communities, through promotion of the political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of Janajati groups (Nordic Foundation for 
Development and Ecology, 2012). Such funding to groups, like NEFIN, succeeded in 
bringing a Janajati perspective to national issues, as well as challenging the CHHE 
dominance in a ‘significant manner’(Onta, 2006). The funding from donors, such as 
DFID, was later withdrawn in 2011, due to NEFIN’s participation in strikes (Sharma, 
2012).  
 
At a more local level, peacebuilders were also committed to several civic awareness 
programmes, to disseminate information, and seek contributions from people on 
different aspects of the constitution writing process. For instance, the UNDP supported 
the formation of 14 Constitution Information Centres across Nepal, to further 





Avenues of Cooperation and Contestation  
Despite both operating within the domain of the Nepali peace process, given the sheer 
differences in the very modality of engagement, there were limited avenues of 
cooperation. Further, given the dispersal of peacebuilding actors, as well as their 
diversified areas of work, coordination, even among peacebuilders themselves, has 
been a challenge. However, on the ground, the impetus, to better coordinate 
‘peacebuilding’ efforts, has led these diverse peacebuilders to form such centralised 
bodies as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, and other donor consortiums. Further, they have 
tended to co-fund the same issues or similar organisations. For instance, bilateral 
donors like DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency), DFID, and the EU 
have funded issues of inclusion through NEFIN. Similarly, a host of peacebuilders, 
including UNDP, UNMIN, as well as such consortiums as NPTF, have funded various 
elements of the DDR process (Crozier and Watson, 2009). However, as India and 
China were not a part of the NPTF, there has been no institutional space for regional 
powers to coordinate with peacebuilders (Interview with former minister, 4 September 
2017, Kathmandu). Apart from their non-membership of the NPTF, India and China 
did not attend donor forums, on different aspects of the peace and development process 
(Wagle, 2016). India and China only attended forums, if convened by the government, 
or when invited by such state bodies as the Ministry of Finance (Interview with former 
minister, 4 September 2017, Kathmandu). 
 
The limited avenues of convergence became active contestation between India and 
peacebuilders like UNMIN in certain instances. A fundamental difference between 
India and Western countries, including the US, was regarding the role of the UN in the 
Nepali peace process, something with which India was not comfortable, given its 
experience of UN mediation in Kashmir (Muni, 2012). In turn, peacebuilders sought 
to resolve how to relate to India, and a conscious effort was made by Western states, 
to bring Delhi into their confidence (Whitfield, 2012). While the efforts of Nepali 
actors did lead to India’s reluctantly agreeing to a UN presence in Nepal, India 
nevertheless severely restricted the very mandate of UNMIN. Nepali political actors 
hoped for more direct involvement of third party facilitation, but feared India would 




on the ground’, armed peacekeeping mission, but rather a political mission with 
‘qualified civilian personnel’ in the form of UNMIN (Martin, 2012). China shared 
India’s apprehensions about an international presence in Nepal, concerned as it was 
about the role of the UN in a country neighbouring Tibet (Suhrke, 2011). 
 
Apart from the fear of the UNMIN hijacking the process, distrust of it became more 
pronounced in key instances. Both India and the UNMIN endorsed the principle of 
elections, but differed on how swiftly they should be announced. The UNMIN 
subscribed to a more cautious approach, in view of the Madhesh uprising, and the fact 
that electoral laws were not yet finalised. India however favoured fast-tracking an 
election (Adhikari, 2012), in the belief this would serve to lock the Maoists into the 
mainstream, and would also limit the role of the internationals, especially the UN (Jha, 
2007b). Their misgivings about the UNMIN sprung also from perceiving it to be 
increasingly ‘angling for a political role in the Terai, and even goading Madheshi 
groups to ask for international mediation’ (Jha, 2007b). On the issue of SSR, India saw 
the UNMIN as championing the Maoists, and trying to dilute the role of the NA. This 
led India to direct the NA, and all non-Maoist political parties, to oppose the UNMIN, 
implicating the UN, and culminating in its untimely exit (Sharma, 2019).  
 
Despite its contestation with the UNMIN, India was also keen to have the international 
community, like the US, on its side. This was angled towards strengthening the 
gradually improving US-India relationships, after President Clinton’s visit to India in 
2000 (Muni, 2012). As a consequence, India has sought the engagement of such 
Western states and regional bodies, as the UK and the EU. Despite being limited to 
joint policy pronouncements, their close association is exemplified by the India-UK 
joint communiqué, and the statement of the Joint EU-India Summit. Both statements 
refer to their shared understanding of the need to expedite Nepal’s constitution drafting 
process (EU-India Summit, 2016). Such statements legitimise the centrality of India 
as the regional hegemon, in determining developments in such countries as Nepal. In 
Nepal, the statements were viewed as part of the process of Western countries ceding 
the policy lead to India. This ‘outsourcing of Nepal policy’ to India is believed to have 




countries, due to factors such as access to Indian markets, and the rise of the Indian 
diaspora in the West, and finally to the rise of China (Interview with Editor-in- Chief, 
7 August, 2017, Kathmandu). 
 
Limitations of Peacebuilding Projects 
Superficially, the regional stance appears hostile to the norms promoted by 
peacebuilding on issues of inclusion, SSR and transitional justice. Further, India’s 
stake in the process, and the intensity of its engagement, also meant that it could limit 
the very scope of peacebuilders like UNMIN. The asymmetrical dependency of  Nepali 
elites on India, also ensured that, compared to peacebuilders, India had multiple levers 
from which to choose, including regime change, in order to bolster its engagement 
(Dabhade and Pant, 2004). While the engagement of emergent powers has, to some 
degree, cut down the capacity of liberal peacebuilders, their effectiveness has also been 
beset by their own operational deficiencies. The lack of conceptual clarity on various 
issues, coupled with over-reliance on norms, their focus on formal institutions, and 
finally the inability to withstand an elite backlash, are some of the factors that have 
impacted on the issues of SSR, inclusion, and transitional justice, as will be discussed    
 
Conceptual Deficiencies  
The conceptual inconsistencies of norms and concepts being promoted by 
peacebuilders have made their deployment difficult in practice. For instance, SSR as a 
concept seeks to incorporate wide-ranging norms of the rule of law, human rights, 
accountability, and civilian supremacy, thus compromising its clarity, and making it 
difficult for domestic parties to own, and deliver on. Firstly, the normative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
bias of the concept led to such powerful factions, as the NA, being convinced they 
would rather oppose any discussion of the issue, than enter into it (Interview with SSR 
expert, 3 September, 2017). The NA, and traditional political parties, judged the 
discourse of SSR as having an underlying agenda to ‘downsize’ the Army, thereby 
weakening it. Further, their idea, to integrate the PLA into the NA, was seen as a device 




Nepal Armed Police, and the intelligence services; had been thoroughly politicised, 
due to the infiltration of party cadres. This coupled with politically motivated transfers 
and promotions and, in extreme cases, police officers being used for intimidation 
during elections, ensured that any discussion on the politicisation of the NA, was 
readily received (Pandey, 2009). The lack of concision also meant that different parties 
could use one component, over others, based on their institutional convenience. For 
instance, as the debate on SSR began in Nepal, political parties had one definition of 
it, the Army had another, and the Maoists yet another (Interview with SSR expert, 3 
September, 2017).  
 
Similar conceptual inconsistencies marred the transitional justice debate, dividing civil 
society groups. With some civil society members favouring reconciliation, while 
others focused on criminal accountability, the two groups seemed incompatible 
(Farasat and Hayner, 2009). The total number and range of peacebuilders in the field, 
compounded the conceptual deficiencies. Their lack of coordination and cooperation 
complicated, rather than transformed, the debate. It was widely felt, for example, that 
the UN, signally failed to use its leverage over the Army, in its long-held role as a 
major peacekeeping troop contributor, to demand Maoist integration, as well as 
promote the NA’s accountability (von Einsiede and Salih, 2017). While the UNMIN 
was campaigning for the management of armies, and the OHCHR was publicly 
advocating for accountability; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN 
Secretary General were commending the NA for their role in peacekeeping 
deployments (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). This was clear evidence of the utter 
incoordination, amongst UN bodies themselves, to launch and bring to fruition peace 
process agendas.  
 
Prioritisation of Norms and Institutions Rather than Needs 
A prioritisation of pre-determined solutions, based on ‘best practice’, and 
peacebuilders’ templates has both enabled the co-option of institutions, as well as 





In the first place, peacebuilders were focused on supporting formal institutions, often 
ignoring informal ones, and failing to take into account the politics underpinning these 
formal institutions. Despite the academic and policy reflection, that technocratic and 
institutional solutions fail, if not aligned with elite interests (Khan, 2018), 
peacebuilders continued to focus on institutional solutions. In the peace process in 
Nepal, they were invested in supporting the CA, and crafting legislations and policies, 
in accordance with international legal frameworks. Though the peacebuilders focused 
largely on the CA, and its processes, to institutionalise such agendas as inclusion, the 
fate of these agendas was decided by elite pacts, between political leaders outside the 
CA. Further, senior leaders of different political parties barely participated in such 
prominent initiatives of liberal peacebuilders, as constitutional dialogue workshops, or 
even in CA proceedings themselves (Tamang, 2014).   
 
Additionally, the focus on institutions meant that they could be adopted formally, but 
not be allowed to function, or be withdrawn, as demonstrated by the changes in the 
institutional commitments to inclusion, transitional justice, or SSR, between 2008 and 
2015. Nepal’s peace process shows that institutions matter, but also that are malleable, 
and easy to co-opt. The radical difference on inclusion provisions in the Interim 
Constitution of 2007, compared to the Constitution of 2015, as well as the ‘born to 
fail’ mandates of the Commission on Disappearances, and the TRC, all are illustrative 
of this trend. Further, it was largely felt that these transitional justice provisions were 
merely added to circumvent international prescriptions, and reduce the risk of 
international prosecutions and criticism (Gill, 2019). This ‘performative’ transitional 
justice process has been co-opted, to circumvent other countries exercising universal 
jurisdiction over Nepali perpetrators (Selim, 2018).  
 
Similar to the intensity of their focus on institutions, peacebuilders overwhelmingly 
concentrated on liberal norms, to ensure that Nepali elites created policies, in 
accordance with international legal mechanisms.  Peacebuilding organisations used 
transitional justice provisions, as a reason to bring people, and organisations, into line 
in instances of non-compliance. Statements such as, ‘If Nepal’s transitional justice 




as torture, and crimes against humanity, will remain vulnerable to prosecution abroad 
under universal jurisdiction’ by peacebuilders have been fairly frequent (Human 
Rights Watch, 2019). Such narrow legalism, framed around universal jurisdiction, led 
the political class to equate transitional justice with prosecution and universal 
jurisdiction, leading to its reproach.  
 
Prioritisation of norms also marginalised the needs of the victims. For instance, a 
needs-based assessment, conducted by the International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ), identified the priorities of victims to be: compensation, education, basic needs 
such as food, housing and clothing, health and medical facilities, and employment 
(International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2008). However, though the needs 
assessment by victims’ groups identified basic economic and social rights as their 
priority, the transitional justice agenda fiercely promoted by peacebuilders, was 
centred on political rights (Robins, 2012). This centrality of political rights, within the 
framework of liberal peacebuilding, which further focused overwhelmingly on the 
prosecution of perpetrators, risked marginalising such concerns as basic needs, and 
diverted resources of all types to the judicial agenda (Robins, 2012).  
 
By the same token, in the management of arms and armies, Nepal opted for a process, 
where combatants would be given initial seed money, and could then retire voluntarily, 
with no state monitoring of the process thereafter. The Nepali proposal of ‘voluntary 
retirement’ was resisted by peacebuilders, who expressed the view, that case studies 
from Africa demonstrated the need for a long-term rehabilitation process (Interview 
with member of SC, 10 August 2017, Kathmandu). As the ‘voluntary retirement’ 
process went against the grain of liberal peacebuilding models, peacebuilders would 
not finance the process, leaving the Nepali state to bear the entire cost of the ‘voluntary 
retirement scheme’ (Interview with member of SC, 10 August 2017, Kathmandu). 
Instead, peacebuilders were insistent that former combatants had to have opportunities 
for rehabilitation, including skills development training sessions. However, although 
fully financed by the peacebuilders, these sessions did not appeal to the combatants, 






Recoiling in the Face of an Elite Backlash  
Their failure to resist an elite backlash has been one of the peacebuilders’ greatest 
problems. In Nepal, the initial enthusiasm, and the role carved for peacebuilders, 
suffered a swift decline. In the early days of the peace process, political parties, ‘witch-
hunted’ by the royal authorities in the mid-2000s, had supported the role of 
international monitoring (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). After the overthrow of the 
monarchy, when peacebuilders started to incriminate such political parties as the 
Maoists and NC, in the debate on transitional justice, issues of human rights and 
accountability became very contested (Sharma, 2017). A similar aversion to the role 
of peacebuilders was felt on the issue of inclusion. Political elites objected to 
peacebuilders’ funding of political issues, such as ‘social cohesion’, framing it as 
meddling in national affairs (Drucza, 2017).  
 
This increased hostility to peacebuilders was demonstrated, in several instances, as the 
peace process limped along. A British Ambassador’s article, in a Nepali newspaper, 
arguing for the right to convert to a different religion, led people to view secularism as 
a western agenda, whose aim was the proselytisation of Hindus (The Nepali Times, 
2015). Similarly, the EU Election Observation mission’s recommendations, on 
Nepal’s reservation policy, incurred the wrath of political leaders, including the Prime 
Minister, who labelled it as an infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
(The Kathmandu Post, 2018). In yet another instance, a report entitled, ‘Forging Equal 
Citizenship in a Multicultural Nepal’, funded by DFID and the Asian Development 
Bank, was shelved, after pressure from CHHE (Drucza, 2017).  By the same token, the 
Nepali government is alleged to have diluted the inclusion-related content of the UN 
Development Assistance Framework, which guides the work of the UN in Nepal 
(Drucza, 2017).   
 
Peacebuilders were seen to have exceeded their limits, in engineering Nepal through 
their ‘power of the purse’ (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August, 2017 (b), 
Kathmandu), and in controlling important elements of the state, including, ‘media, 




Kathmandu). The peacebuilders’ response here, was becoming less progressive about 
condemning policies, thus leaving the concerns of marginalised groups, and their 
partial successes so far in the process, in limbo (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). As the 
backlash escalated, and given the contextual complexity, peacebuilders capitulated, 
through sheer pragmatism. In one instance, in 2011, DFID latterly withdrew its 
funding due to NEFIN’s participation in strikes, held in order to pressurise the 
Constitutional Committee to expedite the process of writing the constitution, and 
uphold agreements signed with the government (Sanyahumbi, 2011). In its 
renunciation, of the promotion of inclusion, mid-way through the process, it bolstered 
the elite narrative, of inclusion being an agenda fabricated by donors (Neelakantan et 
al., 2016).  
 
In having raised the difficult question of inclusion, only to discontinue it a few years 
later, peacebuilders were criticised not only by the elites, but also by marginalised 
groups, leading them to deplore the fact, that peacebuilders’ support only served to 
reinforce Nepal’s exclusionary political settlement. Further, the deleterious impact of 
international funding, for civil society groups associated with Madheshis or Janajatis, 
has been much debated, even within the Janajati movement (Bhattachan 2001). 
Concerns were raised, over the priorities of Janajati organisations changing in 
accordance with the funding schemes of peacebuilders, and about political agendas of 
inclusion being subverted to technical fixes (Hangen, 2007). Further, the very modality 
of funding, through which different NGOs receive funding for specific issues, such as 
‘women’s rights’, or Janajati rights’, are seen to limit their potential to parochial silos, 
inhibiting a broad-based united front (Tamang, 2014). Additionally, the focus on legal 
provisions for inclusion by peacebuilders, also generated the feeling amongst elites, 
that marginalised groups would benefit at their expense immediately, while the actual 
transformation will take generations, if it is implemented at all (Rai and Shneiderman, 
2019).   
 
In the debate on SSR, a similar elite backlash, and the retreat of peacebuilders is 
evident. Instances such as UNMIN’s drawing attention to the issue of human rights 




Colonel in London on grounds of universal jurisdiction, made the relationship between 
peacebuilders and the NA an uneasy one. UNMIN was seen as abetting the Maoists, 
and the NA and the entire political class objected to UNMIN’s monitoring of the NA. 
In one instance, after the fall of the Maoist government, when the UN Secretary-
General’s report to the Security Council on Nepal highlighted the need for consensus 
among political parties, the government was quick to frame it as the UN’s support to 
the Maoist government (Nepali Times, 2009). As the process became mired in 
controversy, attempted projects by the peacebuilding community, with the Ministry of 
Home Affairs for the Nepal Police and the Ministry of Defence, fell through, given the 
resistance to external involvement in sensitive issues like the security sector (Interview 
with SSR expert, 3 September, 2017). In the face of such a backlash, peacebuilders 
focused on less sensitive areas, such as the management of arms and armies, leaving 
questions of ‘democratisation’, and the accountability of the NA, untouched, and 
unanswered (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 2017 (b), Kathmandu).   
 
The pragmatic move away from professed ‘liberalism’ is most evident in the issue of 
transitional justice in Nepal. In the initial period of the peace process, the focus of civil 
society demands was on holding individuals to account for human rights abuses, and 
on calling the government to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Farasat and Hayner, 2009).  The collective efforts of international and national 
actors, on transitional justice, led to partial successes. In one instance, as referred to 
above, a Nepali Colonel, Kumar Lama, was arrested in London under Section 134 of 
the UK’s 1988 Criminal Justice Act 1988, which allows for the arrest and prosecution 
of people accused of human rights violations, under universal jurisdiction (TRIAL 
International, 2016). In a further instance, NA personnel, charged with human rights 
violations, were repatriated from UN Peacekeeping missions. However, such swift 
actions were vehemently opposed by elites. Successive governments lobbied against 
the UK, in the case of Lama, describing his arrest rather as, ‘an infringement of Nepal’s 
sovereignty’(Spotlight, 2013). Given the protracted nature of the transition, the 
international community shifted their priorities to issues of federalism and governance, 
and have refrained from speaking out against human rights violations during the war. 




from the UN, or the OHCHR, either through any statements, or their visits to victims 
groups as the process became drawn out (Dixit, 2014; Nepali Times, 2014). 
 
In an examination of the response to the elite backlash in Nepal, it is not the ‘loss of 
agency’ or ‘crisis’ of peacebuilding, as Western peacebuilding scholars have argued it 
to be (Chandler, 2017; Pospisil, 2019). Instead it is a selective renunciation of agency, 
on points at which it needs to move on, resulting in drastic variations of the agency, in 
different phases of the peace process. As inclusion, SSR, and transitional justice, 
became controversial issues, peacebuilders either reduced their involvement in, or 
overlooked, contentious issues, allegedly carrying on the business of ‘development’ as 
usual (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). 
 
Impact of International Engagement on Political 
Settlements 
 
Multiple Stresses and Conditionality on the Political Settlements 
Plural forms of engagement in the peace process, from India, China, and liberal 
peacebuilders, have brought multiple stresses, pressures and conditionality: all of 
which directly and indirectly impact the political settlements in Nepal. Such external 
conditionality and stresses are more pronounced during peace processes, where 
different social groups are drawing on different forms of international support, to 
strengthen their position in the discussions on changing an erstwhile exclusive political 
settlement to an inclusive one (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).   
 
In Nepal, the CHHE elites, as well as contending elites, like the Maoists and the 
Madheshis, at various points have either supported, or resisted, the normative and 
institutional endpoints proposed by peacebuilders, or the pressures introduced by 
Indian engagement. Normative and institutional endpoints, such as ratifying the ILO-
169 Convention, and signing up to the implementation of the United Nations Security 




at issues of gender, and the rights of indigenous people (International Labour 
Organisation, 2007; Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 2011). Similarly, the 
peacebuilders’ drive to add institutions, like Local Peace Committees, and TRC, and 
their professed commitment to human rights and accountability, has led the Nepali 
state to pledge efforts, often beyond its ability or interest. As for Indian engagement, 
there have been a series of pressures: to preserve the Hindu state, against the national 
mandate on secularism; to keep the NA free from any proposed ‘democratisation of 
the Army; as well as to agree to integrate the demands of the Madheshi groups (Jha, 
2014; Karat, 2015; Muni, 2017). This has compelled the CHHE elites to accommodate 
Madheshi groups, vouch for unconditional support of the NA, as well as renounce 
previous commitments to secularism.  
 
The varied forms of international engagement often coalesce with competing domestic 
demands, in a contested political environment. This can be horizontally: between 
contending elites, such as traditional political parties, like the NC, and the UML, 
representing CHHE interests, and Madheshis, and the Maoists, representing forces for 
inclusion; and vertically by different groups, namely Janajati groups, and victims’ 
groups, demanding commitment from the state on inclusion, and transitional justice. 
Other groups, for example former PLA combatants, who were not entitled to the same 
benefits as former full-time PLA combatants, given their ages, or for because they 
were late recruits, have also been seeking due recognition and benefits from the state 
(IRIN, Nepal, 2012). In the horizontal agreement, Madheshi political parties have 
drawn support from India, as well as embracing the narrative of inclusion supported 
by peacebuilders. Similarly, Janajati groups have used international forums, and 
international legal instruments, to justify and frame their demands for basic inclusive 
state policies (OHCHR, 2018; Tamang, 2010). Janajati groups have also benefitted 
from the material support of peacebuilders, to build their organisational capacity 
(Onta, 2006; Tamang, 2014). By the same token, victims of human rights violations 
have used the normative framework of transitional justice and accountability (Rawski 
and Sharma, 2012), while former combatants have sought to demand compensation, 





The multiple pressures have been aggravated by the fact that stresses and pressures, 
brought about by international engagement, evolve and shift, as they conform to the 
local context at grassroots level, or change their priorities, based on their domestic 
circumstances. In the case of Nepal, the rise of the BJP in India, with Hindutva as its 
ideological foundation, combined with elections in the neighbouring provinces of 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, has resulted in shifts in their engagement. Similarly, the 
engagement of peacebuilders has been shaped by evolving debates on the war on 
terror, the narrative on inclusive political settlements as the source for post-conflict 
strategy, as well as their changes of heart, in the face of an elite backlash. These 
shifting patterns of international engagement highlight that no form of international 
engagement translates neatly from policy to practice.  
 
Further, as international engagement has shifted, so has its acceptance. Between 2005-
2015, the perception of peacebuilding, and all forms of international engagement it 
involved radically shifted ground. While the UN role in the management of arms and 
armies was welcomed in 2007, as was the Indian role in the facilitation of the 12- point 
agreement, the response was a completely different one, as the peace process changed 
direction (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). In the later stages, concerns of sovereignty, or 
international engagement in contentious social issues, resulted in an extreme form of 
elite backlash (Drucza, 2017).   
 
 
Transforming Pressures to Opportunities: Co-option and Hedging 
While plural forms of international engagement do bring added stress to the political 
settlements, with differences in the modalities of engagement between India and 
peacebuilders, and an almost complete absence of convergence between them, 
domestic political settlements witness two distinct effects. Firstly, the absence of an 
integrated international approach dilutes the international influence, and disincentives 
political elites to reform. Here, it is worth noting that regional actors like India, unlike 
peacebuilders, are not interested in tailoring their support, in order to negotiate an 




interested in a ‘controlled’ form of change, and not an overhaul of the political 
settlement (Sharma, 2019). It sought an inclusive Constitution, that embedded the 
demands of the Madheshis, and which would foster stability across the border, but not 
a form of inclusion that would guarantee rights for non-Hindus. Similarly, the NA, 
Nepal’s strongest institution, has remained untouched by the processes of transition, 
largely due to Indian influences.  
 
Due to the changing priorites and forms of Indian engagement, its impact political 
settlements, have been mixed, resulting in a reduction in the motivation of CHHE to 
adopt a transformative approach to political settlements. In fact, the differences in the 
modalities of engagement, with peacebuilders invested in the formal peace process, 
centred on the CA, and delivering on the commitments of the CPA; and India focused 
on political pacts, has enabled them to travel as parallel processes, rather than as an 
integrated process. In essence, the separation of the two processes has rendered the 
peace process subprime, and often even undercut existing commitments made in the 
CA.  
 
Conversely, when a diverse range of international actors are concerted in their 
approach, there is a domino effect on national responses to political settlements. This 
is evident in the concerted efforts of all international actors, including India, who 
worked to forge a pact between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance, resulting in 
the formation of the CPA, and triggering the peace process. Further, robust outcomes 
of concerted efforts are also evident in the success of the Madheshi parties, who 
benefitted from the support of India, and also through the institutional and normative 
architecture on inclusion, as supported by the peacebuilders. Not surprisingly, as 
shown in Figure 4, the results of the provincial elections in 2017, demonstrate that 
apart from CHHE, Madheshis remain the only group over-represented relative to their 








Figure 4: Ethnic distribution of MPs in provincial elections 2017 




Secondly, the difference in approaches has opened up opportunities for Nepali elites 
to autonomously take decisions, to increase their dominance, though their benefitting 
from, or even appropriating and co-opting, both forms of international engagement, or 
by ‘hedging their bets’ between the two. The very existence of plural forms of 
engagement means that elites in Nepal have multiple sources, to materially benefit 
from, with each bringing distinct dividends. For instance, every political party in Nepal 
has sought Indian support to remain in power, albeit then accusing India of political 
intrusion when out of power (Adhikari, 2014). Political leaders have sought Indian 
assistance, not only to appoint them to power directly, but also for development 
projects in their constituencies in order to legitimise their rule  (Sharma, 2019). Here, 




during crises in bilateral relations with India. By the same token, peacebuilders have 
not only brought material dividends, but also ensured the legitimacy of the overall 
process (Interview with peace negotiator, 6 August 2017, Kathmandu). Between 2006 
and 2011, Official Development Assistance during the peace process totalled nearly 
USD 4.4 billion, annually accounting for 5-6% of Nepal’s gross national income, and 
a quarter of the national budget (DANIDA, 2013). The UNMIN and other 
peacebuilding organisations have also been involved as ‘neutral’ third parties, who 
through supporting components of the peace process, such as monitoring elections, as 
well as managing the process of disarming and demobilising combatants, have 
validated them, and protected the elites from pressures from different marginalised 
groups, as well as from international pressures (Interview with peace negotiator, 8 
August 2017, Kathmandu).   
 
Nepali elites have been able to co-opt these multiple forms of international 
engagement. For instance, Nepali elites are seen to have reassured India’s ruling party, 
the BJP, that their concerns, about the mention of secularism in the Constitution would 
be addressed, and in addition proffered their commitment to India that Madheshi 
demands would be taken on board, during the writing of the new Constitution (Muni, 
2015b; Sharma, 2019). However, their alleged commitment to India concealed their 
true intent. In the same way, while the elites in Nepal asserted their commitment to the 
CPA, which established an institutional and normative framework, reflecting liberal 
aims of inclusion, human rights and accountability, and the strengthening of 
democracy, these commitments were either watered down in later stages, or never 
implemented, or saw major reversals (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). In yet another form 
of co-option, in order to balance the contrasting prescriptions of peacebuilders and 
India, and the opposing domestic mobilisations for and against secularism, political 
elites in Nepal have also merged opposing prescriptions. This has enabled a hybrid 
version of secularism to emerge, one that avers secularism, but continues to privilege 
Hinduism.  
 
Plural forms also provide opportunities to ‘hedge’, by balancing between multiple 




dominance, through diversification of Nepal’s foreign policy, or in being on good 
terms with China, has historically been a conscious strategy in Nepali foreign policy 
(Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012). In the peace process, the legacy has continued. The 
NA found support in India, when faced with pressures from the UNMIN, to integrate 
Maoist combatants and adapt to the spirit of the democratisation of the NA (Jha, 2014). 
The differences between UNMIN and Indian approaches, as regards the role of the NA 
in the peace process, have enabled the hedging process. This has allowed the NA not 
only to circumvent UNMIN’s ordinances, but also to divert commitment in the CPA 
to ‘democratise’. Conversely, in trying to rid themselves of Indian dominance, Nepali 
elites sought UNMIN involvement, despite India’s professed interest in leading the 
process of supervision of Maoist combatants (Sharma, 2019).  Here, the legacy of 
Indian political intrusion, and the fear of Indian dominance in the process, which could 
delegitimise the role of Nepali political actors, is thought to have played its part 
(Interview with political commentator, 4 August 2017, Kathmandu). In the peace 
process, UNMIN fulfilled the role of a largely neutral third party, which could form a 
useful counterweight to Indian dominance in the peace process.  
 
In yet another instance, as alluded to earlier, during the promulgation of the 
Constitution in 2015, India sent a cold response, only ‘noting’ the Constitution, given 
its disapproval of the Constitution in its failure to address Indian concerns about 
Madheshis and secularism. The Indian response read, ‘We note the promulgation in 
Nepal today of a Constitution. We are concerned that the situation in several parts of 
the country bordering India continues to be violent’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 
India, 2015b). This noting of the promulgation of India, backed later by an economic 
blockade, was seen by Nepali elites as an infringement of its sovereign rights. Nepal 
sought to balance the pressure from India, by relying on China’s ‘noted with pleasure’ 
endorsement of the promulgation of the new Constitution, as well as the UN and the 
US having hailed it as a milestone, despite some deficiencies (United Nations, 2015c). 
The political leadership, amidst such a divided international response, sought 
legitimacy by seeking support from the ‘international community’, against India’s 
displeasure (Economic Times, 2015). The hedging was further enabled by ongoing 




resolve the differences of opinion on the Constitution without ‘outside interference’, a 
veiled reference to India (Bhattacherjee, 2015). 
 
Given the dividends of co-option and hedging, Nepali elites are said to have 
themselves promoted the ‘treatment in isolation’ of different international actors 
(Interview with former minister, 4 September, 2017). Political leaders were reported 
as having met Indian representatives and the ‘international Western community’ quite 
separately (Interview with former minister, 4 September, 2017). Additionally, to be 
able to hedge, and co-opt, Nepali elites have continued to diversify their matrix of 
international engagement, by invoking all forms of it, thus spreading the risk of 
international coercion. Despite the elite backlash against peacebuilders, they continued 
to engage with them within the peace process, and do so currently, in different 
developmental and governance related issues. Similarly, notwithstanding the long 
history of a perceived Indian interference, Indian engagement and involvement has 
been sought continually (Mohan, 2012).  
 
Within this response of hedging and co-option, hedging away from India has limited 
impact, given the scale of dependence outside the confines of the peace process. 
However, hedging away from peacebuilders has a profound impact on the fate of 
peacebuilding agendas, including the democratisation of the NA, and transitional 
justice. Hedging away from peacebuilders, on the one hand, has diluted these agendas, 
but it has also safeguarded their space within the wider transition, as elites have needed 
peacebuilders to counter-balance India. Thus, Nepali elites have continued to engage 
with and co-opt liberal prescripts by ‘performing’ a commitment to liberal peace, 
rather than rejecting them outright (Selim, 2018).  
 
Emergence of Hybrid Peace Structures 
The very process of co-option and hedging has necessitated the adoption of some 
Indian directives, and those of peacebuilders, but has largely allowed Nepali elites to 
be autonomous, and defend their dominance, by selectively assimilating limited 




in enlarging the scope for the autonomy and choice of Nepali elites, they have directed 
the discussion on political settlements to the status quo, while bringing limited gains 
for marginalised groups. It has left groups, such as Madheshis, Janajatis, Dalits, and 
victims of human rights violations, at the mercy of a utilitarian and insular Indian 
engagement, and the fluctuating avatar of liberal peacebuilders, in their tendency to 
distance themselves from controversial agendas, as the peace process progressed. 
 
This negligible change has been enabled by hybrid peace structures, which began with 
bold and ambitious commitments, but became mired in the processes of an elite 
backlash, various reversals, as well as co-opting and hedging international 
engagement.  Here, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, institutional commitments 
to affirmative action were diluted by the addition of the already over-represented ‘Khas 
Arya’ or High caste groups to the list of ‘communities’ entitled to reservation. The 
electoral system privileging a PR system, so critical to marginalised groups, was 
reversed to a FPTP system. Finally, discussions on a federalism based on ‘genuine 
autonomy’, were countermanded by the assignation of politically motivated and 
manipulated boundaries, with the power to preserve CHHE dominance (Interview with 
Constitutional lawyer, 12 August 2017, Kathmandu).  Similarly, the promise of a bold 
version of SSR was reduced to a process, where only a basic skeletal form of DDR 
emerged. Here, 1422 ex-combatants were integrated into the NA, while minor 
combatants were left without compensation or rehabilitation packages. More 
importantly, bold pledges, on the ‘democratisation of the Nepal Army’, stand 
forgotten. Tragically, victims’ groups still wait for justice, despite the CPA’s 
commitment, and the crucial international support for the formation of such institutions 
as the CIEDP and TRC. Apart from temporary relief, little has materialised.  Perhaps 
the only success story of the Nepali transition is the emergence of Madheshi parties, 
and the prioritisation of Madheshi communities by the government, as its logical 
corollary. The Madheshi are seen to attribute their success to the initial support from 
India (Sharma, 2019), as well as to the ‘inclusion’ momentum supported by 
peacebuilders. Added to this is their ability to politically organise, at both national and 
regional levels (Tamang, 2017), which has helped them make significant gains from 





The fact that Madheshis and Maoists have proved themselves to be credible political 
forces, able to decisively influence discourse in Nepal today, is testament to the 
transformation. However, this transformation in the political settlement has co-opted 
contending elites, rendering the political settlement at the horizontal level more 
inclusive, while the settlement at the vertical level, between the elite actors and wider 
society, has not lived up to the commitments of the peace process. Non-dominant 
minorities, the poor, the landless, and Dalits have been largely left out of the dividends 
of the state restructuring agenda in Nepal. For instance, the provincial election results 
of 2017 evidence that, of the 7 provinces, with the exceptions of Province 1, where 
Janajatis constitute 48 % of the MPs, and Province 2, with its Madheshi majority of 
72%, the CHHE has continued to dominate in all other provinces (Paswan, 2018). 
Moreover, Dalits, Janajatis and women continue to be underrepresented. It is to be 
observed, that both the most powerful, and the least powerful, sections of Nepali 
society continue in their erstwhile positions. Victims groups are generally unorganised 
and, despite calling for justice for the last 15 years, they remain at the margins. In 
contrast, the most powerful institution in Nepal, the NA, has only been further 
strengthened subsequent to the peace process (Sharma, 2017). This unevenness, 
despite a promising start, is evidence that Nepal’s peace process has led to negligible 
gains.  
 
In this context, the weak nature of liberal peacebuilding is seen to have implications 
for marginalised groups.  When looking at inclusion, marginalised communities 
sought to use the norms and forms of engagement of liberal peacebuilders, by 
referencing international human rights treaties to articulate their rights, and through 
the use of international forums, like the Human Rights Council, to internationalise 
their issues, and to build their organisations through funding by peacebuilders 
(Tamang, 2010).  Marginalised groups have also deployed the endorsement, and 
legitimisation, of peacebuilders to articulate their standpoints. For instance, while the 
report by the EU’s Election Observation Mission, on excluding dominant groups from 
the reservation policy, faced a backlash from the dominant group, it was welcomed by 




of liberal peacebuilders, in this context, empowered the marginalised groups, giving 
them the normative space and resources. However, abandoning marginalised groups, 
in the face of an elite backlash, decimated any gains. By the same token, as the least 
successful aspect of the peace process, the declining international interest of 
peacebuilders on transitional justice has served to worsen its lamentable state, beset as 
it is by a limited legal mandate, a toothless institution, and a sheer absence of political 
will (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 2017 (b), Kathmandu).  
 
In summary, international engagement, through multiple pressures and conditionality, 
has imposed marginal changes on the political settlement. However, plural forms of 
international engagement, operating at different levels, with varied modality, in turn 
have created space for elites to circumvent these pressures, through strategies such as 
hedging, and co-option, thereby increasing their choices, and allowing them to 
reinforce their status quo.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has empirically engaged with the central research questions of this thesis, 
in order to explore how India has engaged in the peace process in Nepal, and how its 
engagement has differed from, and interacted with, peacebuilding projects. The 
chapter outlined India’s paradoxical stance on the issue of inclusion, where it has 
supported inclusion while resisting secularism. It has also outlined how India’s 
obsession with stability and security across its borders has positioned the NA as a 
beacon of stability, and thwarted debates on SSR and transitional justice. More 
broadly, this chapter has sketched the differences in modality between India and the 
peacebuilders, where the former has promoted a narrow, elite-focused engagement, 
centred on the political process, while the peacebuilders have engaged at multiple 
levels, and supported the deliverables of the CPA. In its outlining of these 
dissimilarities, it has pointed to India’s aversion to any endorsement of norms, and its 
limited macro political engagement, mainly emanating from its own priorities, rather 
than the deliverables of a peace accord. The differences in approach, as this chapter 




openings, where elites have been able to operate autonomously, free from such 
pressures, through their co-option, and hedging of different international directives. 
The processes, however, have led to hybrid forms of peace, which have not lived up 
to the spirit of the CPA, but have reinforced the status quo, bringing only marginal 





Part III: Myanmar’s Unending Transition: Where 
China Meets the Peacebuilders 
 
Since 2011, Myanmar has been going through twin transitions: a transition from 
military rule to democracy, and a further transition from insurgencies in ethnic regions 
to a form of negoitated settlement through a peace process. The implementation of 
these twin processes has however been largely unsuccessful. At the heart of the peace 
process has been a quest for inclusion, by various Ethnic Armed Organisations 
(EAOs), who have for decades taken up arms against an exclusive political settlement: 
defined by the dominance of the Bamar majority and the marginalisation of ethnic 
groups like the Kachin, Shan, and Chin groups, who comprise one third of the 
population from the social, political and economic domains of the state.  The peace 
process, and peace agreements, such as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), 
signed in 2015, has sought to foster inclusion, through some form of territorial 
powersharing by committing to federalism; and a form of ‘security-reintegration’, with 
components of SSR and DDR to address the dominance of the military (the 
Tatmadaw), in all sectors of the state, including politics.  
 
Since 2011, tri-partite bargains between the Tatmadaw; and over a dozen EAOs, many 
of whom have yet to sign the NCA; and the democratic opposition, led by political 
parties, like the National League of Democracy (NLD), have debated the modalities 
of federalism, and the feasibility of SSR/ DDR. Given the Tatmadaw’s reluctance, and 
the minimal agreement amongst the various EAOs, as well as between the EAOs and 
the democratic opposition, little has moved forward in the peace process.  With 
nominal democracy in place, Aung Saan Suu Kyi, the global face of democracy, has 
been the de-facto head of the government since 2016, but the military continues to 
dominate politics, and form the base of the power pyramid, supported by the 
institutional prerogatives of the Constitution of 2008 (Bhatia, 2015). Similarly, despite 
the seemingly well-institutionalised peace process, a host of EAOs and the Tatmadaw 




based on the NCA dominates the Southern part. Ten years into the peace process, 
EAOs are still debating the NCA: the first of the seven steps of the peace process.  
 
While, largely, a domestic-led process, the centrality of China and the liberal 
peacebuilders, who had been called on by domestic elites to support the transition, 
cannot be overlooked. This co-existence of China and the liberal peacebuilders in 
Myanmar’s peace process has been an uneasy one, with limited convergence, and even 
active contestation. Within this co-existence, the relative frailty of liberal 
peacebuilders, and the pragmatic, unpredictable, often contradictory nature of China’s 
approach to the peace process, in addition to the sheer number of competing domestic 
groups, have all inhibited a momentum for change, in the political settlement set out 
by the peace process. Instead, it has resulted in reinforcing the status quo. Today 
Myanmar represents a hybrid order, best described as, partial peace and limited 
democracy (Bunte, 2011). 
 
In Part III, which comprises Chapters 5 and 6, all facets of these arguments will be 
explored. Chapter 5 therefore begins with the history of the conflict in Myanmar, and 
how it gave birth to demands for inclusion and SSR, which have become central to the 
peace process. It continues by discussing the peace process, and the negotiations over 
the changes in political settlement. Finally, the chapter sketches a broad contour of 
international engagement in Myanmar’s peace process, along with the history of 
international engagement that preceded that process, to depict how elements in the 


















Chapter 5: Evolution of Myanmar’s Peace Process 
 
Brief Political History of the Conflict  
Since the earliest days of its independence Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) has 
witnessed multiple insurgencies, waged by various Ethnic Armed Organisations 
(EAOs). These insurgencies are rooted in the exclusive political settlement in 
Myanmar, where the Bamar majority has dominated in all facets of the state, at the 
expense of different ethnic groups. These wide-ranging ethnic insurgencies, have 
demanded the capacity to influence the political decision-making processes, and 
sought economic and social development in their territories, in addition to the 
prioritisation of cultural rights and religious freedoms (Kramer, 2012). The primary 
vectors of exclusion in Myanmar have been ethnic identity, namely Bamar versus the 
varied ethnic groups of Chin, Kachin, and Karen; and also religion, with a Buddhist 
majority versus Christian, Hindu and Muslim minorities. There is only a degree of  
overlap between ethnic identity and religion (Hayward and Walton, 2016).  
 
Ethnic accommodation, for a diverse country like Myanmar, with 135 ethnic groups, 
categorised under eight major ethnic communities (Kachin, Karen, Karreni, Chin, 
Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Bamar), is unquestionably arduous. However, colonial legacy, 
as well as failure to institute mechanisms to accommodate this diversity through some 
form of power-sharing, has exacerbated exclusion and perpetuated the conflicts. 
 
A Perpetual Quest for Inclusion 
A turbulent colonial history, where Myanmar was governed by the British between 
1885 and 1948, interceded by a brief period of Japanese occupation (1942-1945), 
aggravated existing ethnic divides. For one, colonial Myanmar was never governed as 
a coherent whole. Lower Myanmar (populated by Burmans, Mon and Rakhine), was 




enjoyed varying levels of autonomy (Taylor, 2007a; Than, 2013; Walton, 2008).  
Colonial policies, including preferential recruitment of ethnic groups from frontier 
areas by the British, and Japanese support to the Burma Independence Army (BIA), 
which was largely Buddhist and Bamar, not only exacerbated ethnic tensions, but also 
weakened the interdependence of different ethnic and religious groups (Selth, 1986; 
Taylor, 2007b; Walton, 2013, 2008).  
 
Issues of ethnic accommodation were central even before independence. In the lead 
upto the independence, Aung San, the leader of the independence movement, made a 
pact with ethnic groups such as the Kachin, Chin and Shan, in the form of the Panglong 
Agreement of 1948. In an attempt to rally the frontier areas to support independence, 
Aung San promised the ethnic groups full autonomy in internal administration of the 
frontier areas, in exchange for their acceptance of the new Union of Burma (Smith, 
1991; South, 2009). This guaranteeing of a federal system, along with the right of 
secession for the Karenni and Shan groups, as enshrined in the 1947 Constitution, 
became the basis for ethnic accommodation, as an independent Burma was being 
conceived (South, 2009). The exclusion of many groups, such as the Naga, Wa, 
Palaung, Rakhine, and Karen, from the Panglong agreement, in addition to the lack of 
clarity on such political concepts as ‘federal’ and ‘Union, which were mentioned in 
the Agreement, meant that by the time Myanmar was independent, groups like the 
Karen National Union (KNU), as well as Arakanese, Karenni and Mon ethnic 
nationalists, had already taken up arms (Gravers, 2007; South, 2009; Walton, 2008).  
 
Post-independence policies, made by both the short-lived democratic government in 
the 1950s, and the military one, from 1962 to 2010, have curbed any attempt to foster 
inclusion. Policies including: attempts to make Buddhism the state religion; the 
creation of a unitary state, despite calls for federalism; prioritising the use of a single 
language; and finally the development of a national culture based on Bamar values and 
symbols, have prevented any possibilities of ethnic accommodation (Rajah, 1998; 
Silverstein, 1998). In 1958, on grounds of instability, unleashed by the insurgencies, 




regime and take over fully in 1962. Since then, and until 2010, Myanmar has been 
governed by the military, under the different leaderships, as shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: A timeline of regime shifts in Myanmar 
(Source: Review of documents by the author) 
Year  Regimes 
1948- 1962 Democratic rule under Prime Minister U Nu (interrupted in 1958). 
1962-1988 Military rule under Gen. Ne Win, overthrowing the elected civilian 
government under U Nu. 
1988-1992 General Saw Maung retains power under the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) banner. 
1992-2010 General Than Shwe, the former military commander, takes over as 
President. In 1997, the military government changes its name from 
SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).  
2010-2015 Thein Shein takes over as the President.  
2015 
onwards 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) wins the election, and Aung 
Saan Suu Kyi leads Myanmar as the de facto leader, ushering in a nominal 
form of democracy 
 
With the authoritarian shift, in 1960s Myanmar retreated politically into a one-party 
state. The ‘Burmese way to Socialism’ ideology, as espoused by the military rulers, 
negatively impacted upon the economic potential of this resource-rich state. Further, 
the policy of isolation impeded its integration with the rest of the region (Smith, 1991). 
The military failed to deliver the autonomy, promised by the Panglong Agreement, 
and its tendency to centralise the state, also perpetuated the dominance of a Bamar 
majority in virtually all organs of the state. This tendency towards centralisation led to 
the Kachin and Shan groups, who had been included in the Panglong Agreement, 
resorting to armed violence. In the 1960s the Kachin had formed the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO),  and the Shans, the Shan State Army (SSA) 
(Gravers, 2007; Walton, 2008).  
 
As these insurgencies gained momentum, many EAOs have proliferated, and enjoyed 




commanded large territories; set up parallel governance systems, that include taxation 
and conscription, in return for basic health and education services; and acquired a 
greater degree of legitimacy than the governing state in these areas (Brenner, 2017a; 
Callahan, 2007; Farrelly, 2015). 
 
Rapid developments in the latter years of the 1980s brought new attempts to defuse 
the insurgencies, but did not address the core issue of exclusion.  Domestically, in 
1988, a mass protest against the Ne Win government led to its collapse, compelling 
the succeeding military government to promise elections in 1990. The elections held 
in that year, saw the emergence of the NLD, led by Aung Saan Suu Kyi, the daughter 
of Aung San, as the winner. However, the military regime not only refused to transfer 
power, but made any transfer of power conditional on the writing of a new Constitution 
(Smith, 1991; Taylor, 2012). In order to write this Constitution, the military ordered a 
National Convention, which began work between 1993 and 1996, resuming its task in 
2003. This period coincided with the Communist Parties of Burma (CPB) uprising of 
1988, when the rank and file, comprising largely of ethnic groups, rebelled against a 
predominant Bamar leadership of the party. The dissolution of the Communist Party 
into ethnic fronts led to the formation of new EAOs, such as the United Wa State Army 
(UWSP) (Smith, 1991). The repression of the pro-democracy protests of 1988, as well 
as the Tatmadaw’s refusal to transfer power to the NLD after the 1990 elections, 
provoked international condemnations, culminating in the imposition of wide-ranging 
sanctions by Wesern states on Myanmar by the mid-1990s. In the face of Western 
ostracisation, pressures from the democracy movement led by the NLD, and finally 
widespread insurgencies by different EAOs, the military government’s principal focus 
was to quell all uprisings. The attempt to neutralise the EAOs came in the form of 
ceasefire agreements, including those forged with well-armed EAOs, namely the KIO, 
the UWSA, and the New Mon State Party (NMSP).  
 
Ceasefire accords granted a number of dispensations to EAOs, in return for a cessation 
of violence and restricting the recruitment of troops. EAOs had the right to remain 
armed, the right to administer their demarcated territory, and the right to conduct cross-




The ceasefires served to appease EAOs, and to open up lucrative business 
opportunities, especially in natural resource extraction industries, such as jade mines, 
mineral extraction and logging (Oo, 2014; Yawngwhe, 2014).  ‘Ceasefire capitalism’ 
was unleashed, with an informal economic powersharing between EAOs, military 
forces, and businessmen from across the border in China, who sought to exploit 
Myanmar’s resource-laden terrains and divide the revenue (Smith, 2007; Woods, 
2011). The ceasefires did end the violence, bringing a degree of stability, and 
facilitated state control of many areas, especially those with economic potential for 
investment, without incurring the costs of counter-insurgency. However they failed to 
tackle the political issues, which underpinned ethnic grievances (Brenner, 2015; 
Cooper, 2012; Woods, 2016).  All these factors further discredited the leadership of 
such EAOs as the KIO, who were increasingly seen as corrupt and disengaged from 
everyday concerns of the Kachin people (Brenner, 2015). The absence of political 
dialogue also aroused the resentment of ethnic communities, for not addressing such 
important political questions as health, education, and policing. They were also 
strongly opposed to the process of ‘Burmanisation’ in ceasefire areas, where the 
Burmese language was being taught in schools, and public celebrations of Buddhist 
ceremonies were promoted (Laoutides and Ware, 2016). 
 
The ceasefires and the process of the National Convention also consolidated the 
Tatmadaw’s hold on the political settlement, by inhibiting any possibilities of alliance 
between the multiple EAOs, as well as between EAOs and the democratic opposition. 
Despite some alliances between EAOs in the early 1990s, individual EAOs formed 
their own strategies. Some larger EAOs, like the Karen National Union (KNU), 
decided to work with pro-democracy groups in the Myanmar- Thailand borderlands, 
while the KIO signed a ceasefire with the military, and took part in the National 
Convention process (Smith, 2016). There were differences too in their manifestos, 
even amongst those EAOs who agreed to the ceasefire. While groups, like the UWSA, 
petitioned for regions to be autonomous, others sought a federal Union (Smith, 2010). 
Thus, as Callahan suggests, the Tatmadaw survived ‘not because it faces no criticism, 





Some of these ceasefires broke down in the late 2000s, when the military government 
pressurised the ceasefire groups to disarm, and enlist as the Border Guard Force 
(BGF), or become militia forces under Tatmadaw command. While smaller groups 
transformed themselves into the government-controlled BGF, or became the People’s 
Militia Force (PMF), many, like the UWSA and the KIO, rejected the Tatmadaw’s 
plan of action. The proposals to disarm came as the Tatmadaw was preparing for the 
election in 2010, based on a directive of the 2008 Constitution, written by the National 
Convention. The Constitution became controversial, as it was put to the vote by a 
referendum only a week after Cyclone Nargis, a humanitarian disaster of unparalleled 
proportions for Myanmar (James, 2006). Further, the Constitution allocated 25% of 
seats in the national Parliament to the military, in addition to their retention of such 
key ministries as Home Affairs, Border Affairs, and Defence (Turnell, 2012). Such 
developments on the Constitutional front coincided with the breakdown of ceasefires 
after two decades, and the resumption of military attacks in the Kokang region near 
the Chinese border (Khen and Nyoi, 2014).  
 
With the NLD having boycotted the polls, Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government won 
the 2010 elections, and reached out to ethnic groups to engage on a peace process. 
However, he had to do more than call for ceasefires, the failure of which had 
characterised Myanmar’s previous attempts to attain peace. Thein Sein revoked the 
previous requirement that EAOs should enlist in the BGF, and he also promised 
political dialogue on pertinent political questions such as federalism rather than 
limiting the process to a ceasefire (Oo, 2014).  
 
Calls for Rethinking Security Sector and Accountability for Human 
Rights 
Due to the many territorial threats from ethnic and Communist uprisings, the 
Tatmadaw from its early years prioritised the achievement of institutional strength, 
through the expansion and modernisation of the armed forces (Callahan, 2005; 
Nakanishi, 2013; Selth, 2001; Taylor, 2013). Not only had the Army increased in 




weapons systems (Callahan, 2009). The Tatmadaw ensured a high degree of cohesion, 
given its predominantly Bamar and Buddhist composition, and its deeply-entrenched 
patronage networks catering to its rank and file, by providing high-status roles for 
them, not only in the military, but also in government and business (Farrelly, 2013; 
Nakanishi, 2013; Taylor, 1998; Turnell, 2011). The expanding economic role of the 
Tatmadaw, including such financial assets as the Union of Myanmar Economic 
Holding Limited, and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which invested in sectors 
such as steel, jade, gems and tourism, has further helped the generation of patronage-
related revenue (Bunte, 2011). Equally, the Tatmadaw has ruthlessly repressed 
opponents, with strategies like the ‘four cuts’, targeted to deprive the population of 
four forms of support: food, funds, intelligence and recruits, with the sole aim of 
increasing its hold (Myoe, 2009).  
 
By the same token, in order to defend and govern their territory, and fight the 
Tatmadaw, EAOs have continued to recruit, and to organise themselves professionally 
into regions, divisions, and battalions, and in addition sought to source sophisticated 
arms (Jolliffe, 2017). The matrix of EAOs has also grown over the years, with 53 
recorded armed groups of varying sizes today (Nyein, 2019).  The strengthening of 
both the EAOs, and the Tatmadaw, has created a deadlock in the political settlement, 
where the Tatmadaw, albeit the most powerful and established actor, has failed to 
impose a political solution across different parts of the country, and continues to be 
challenged by a range of opposition groups (David and Holliday, 2006). The growth 
of the Tatmadaw and the EAOs, has led to large numbers of armies and militias, and a 
proliferation of arms and mines. As the country transitions into peace however, the 
feasibility of continued employment for combatants is thrown into doubt. 
 
The uninterrupted nature of the insurgencies on multiple fronts has also left a legacy 
of human rights abuses. The Tatmadaw, and to a lesser degree the EAOs, have been 
charged with grave human rights violations: abduction, arbitrary detention, forced 
labour, extortion, land grabs, and torture and ill-treatment in detention (Amnesty 




200,000 people being internally displaced, in addition to around 100,000 taking shelter 
in camps in Thailand (Nyein, 2019). 
 
At the launch of the peace process in 2011, questions were posed as to what would 
happen to the EAO armies on entering peace talks. Further issues raised were regarding 
how the Tatmadaw would adapt to demands of civilian supremacy, or indeed respond 
to its accountability for decades of human rights violations. Today all of these issues 
remain central to the peace process, embedded within discussions of inclusion, SSR, 
and human rights, despite the absence of the term transitional justice. 
 
Myanmar’s Peace Process  
 
Building the Institutions of the Peace Process 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, having won the elections in 2010, President 
Thein Sein went on to facilitate two distinct transitions in the following year: from 
civil war to a peace process, and from authoritarianism to a degree of democratic 
accountability. The peace process enabled the balancing of international and domestic 
pressures for democratisation and ethnic accommodation.  
 
Deviating significantly from Myanmar’s prior attempts, Thein Sein invited 
international support. The peace process not only promised comprehensive dialogue 
on political questions, a core demand of EAOs, but also established an elaborate 
institutional structure to aid the process (Oo, 2014). The NCA of 2015 put in place two 
critically important bodies: the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), and the Union 
Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), both of which are overseen by the NCA 
Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). The JMC is responsible for 
maintaining the ceasefire, and for drafting, as well as enforcing, the code of conduct, 
while the UPDJC is responsible for overseeing the process of the political dialogue. 
All decisions made by the Committees are submitted to the Union Panglong 
Conference and, once agreed, are signed as an Accord, and finally tabled in Parliament 




Centre (MPC), was sanctioned to act as a ‘one-stop shop’, to coordinate all peace 
initiatives, and for all stakeholders, including donors, NGOs, and INGOs (Myanmar 
Peace Monitor, n.d.). It was set up as a semi-autonomous body, in agreement with the 
Norway-led Peace Support Donor Group.  
 
Until 2015, the framework of the peace process revolved around ceasefires at state 
level and at Union level (Kipgen, 2015). Following the agreement on the content of 
the NCA in 2014, the NCA, as a single-text to be signed by all EAOs, came into force. 
A single-text document was a core demand of the EAOs, who were concerned about 
the Tatmadaw’s divide and rule policy. The NCA is an open agreement, and the 
government has continued to encourage the EAOs to sign it. It is also more 
comprehensive than the bilateral agreements signed with individual EAOs, and sets 
out a 7-stage process as shown below.  
 
Figure 6: Stages of the peace process proposed in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 





The content of the NCA in itself promised to engender significant changes to the 
political settlement in Myanmar. On inclusion, it committed to: ‘Establish a union 
based on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes 
of political dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong…’ (Bell et al., 2017). Similarly, it 
affirmed its faith in secularism, by explicitly pledging to: ‘Establish a secular state 













































based on the principle of the separation of religion and state in order to avoid abuse of 
religion for political interests’. Similarly, on the question of the SSR, the NCA also 
committed to: ‘negotiating security reintegration matters and undertaking other 
necessary tasks that both parties agree can be carried out in advance’ (Bell et al., 2017).  
It further stated, it would: ‘Discuss matters concerning a Tatmadaw, composed of all 
ethnic nationalities during political dialogue’(Bell et al., 2017). More boldly, Article 
22 of the NCA, offered assurances that decisions made by the Union Peace Conference 
‘shall be the basis for amending, repealing and adding provisions to the Constitution 
and laws’ (Bell et al., 2017): a Constitution that  privileges the Tatmadaw. Such 
commitments promised a fundamental change in the political settlement. Pledges of 
territorial powersharing, in the form of federalism, sought to devolve power away from 
the centre to ethnic regions. Meanwhile calls for ‘security reintegration’ echoed to 
demands of broader security sector reform (SSR), seeking to modify and reduce the 
centrality of the Tatmadaw.  The reform process of 2011 also opened limited space to 
discuss issues of human rights and accountability.  
 
The peace process, initiated by Thein Sein, achieved some significant gains. Eight 
EAOs signed the NCA, while seven refused to do so, and a further six were prohibited 
from signing. Of the six, three important groups: the Ta’ang National Liberation Army 
(TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the 
Arakan Army (AA) were barred; as they did not emerge as serious actors, until after 
the start of the peace process. Since the victory of the NLD, in 2015, State Counsellor 
Aung Saan Suu Kyi has directed the peace process, introducing several modifications. 
Institutionally, the single biggest change was to transform the semi-autonomous MPC 
into a governmental body, the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). Suu 
Kyi also formed the Joint Coordinating Body for Peace Process Funding (JCB) to 
promote accountability, and effectively allocate the foreign aid budget to critical 
sectors of the peace process (Myanmar News Agency, 2016). Further, peace support 
institutions, such as the JMC and the UPDJC, were to have political representatives 
only from parties that won seats in the last elections, and finally, a 21st century 
Panglong conference, in place of the Union Peace Conference, would be organised 





Challenges to ‘Peace’  
The peace process has been challenged by two core realities. First, the elaborate edifice 
of the peace process, at the national level, is at variance with some of the heaviest 
fighting for decades, in the North of the country. This underlines the dual reality in 
Myanmar: a formalised peace process at the centre, with islands of ‘war’ in different 
parts of the periphery. Since 2011, while ceasefires with groups like KNU have 
brought some respite from strife in Southeast Myanmar, fighting has persisted in 
Northern areas, where the Tatmadaw have fought such groups as the KIO, causing 
large-scale displacement. Further, new groups, such as the AA, have emerged and 
formed alliances with other Northern forces, spiralling the conflict trajectory.  
 
In fact, due to the contrast between local and national levels in the peace process, EAOs 
can be categorised into three groups: signatories to the NCA, including the KNU a 
non-signatory of the ceasefire earlier in the 1990s; and two groups of non-signatories 
who have disputed the ceasefire, and are now challenging the ‘ceasefire first and 
political dialogue later’ approach of the NCA (Meehan, 2016). Of the signatories, only 
three are credible armed groups, while the rest might be ‘best described as NGOs’ 
(Lintner, 2017). More catastrophically, in October 2018, two of the main signatories, 
the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State, withdrew from the process, citing 
its failure to meaningfully implement the agreement. Of the two groups of non-
signatories of the NCA, one was affiliated to the United Nationalities Federal Council 
(UNFC), formed after the 2010 elections. The UNFC’s demands encompassed: the all-
inclusive participation of EAOs in the peace process; a guarantee of federalism; direct 
talks with ethnic armed groups collectively instead of individually; and a tripartite 
dialogue mechanism, to include the EAOs, political parties (including ethnic parties), 
and the military (Mang, 2016). With many UNFC members signing the NCA, and 
some, like the KIO, leaving the bloc, it has for all intents and purposes disintegrated 
(Wansai, 2018a). The second group of non-signatories forms the Federal Political 
Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). The FPNCC includes groups 




UWSA. Accounting for more than 80% of the country’s armed rebels (Lintner, 2017), 
the FPNCC, with such powerful members as the UWSA and the KIO, has stated it will 
not sign the NCA, but will pursue political dialogue independently of it. Four members 
of the FPNCC: the KIO, the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the AA are further grouped as 
the Northern Alliance, and have continued to clash with the military during the peace 
process.  
 
Table 6: The position of different EAOs with regards to the NCA 
(Source: Review of documents by the author) 
Position of EAOs 
with regards to the 
NCA 
Ethnic Armed Organisations 
Signatories  All Burma Students Democratic Front 
Arakan Liberation Party  
Chin National Front  
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army – Brigade 5 
Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council 
Karen National Union (KNU) 
Pa-O National Liberation Organization  
Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA-South) 
New Mon State Party 
Lahu Democratic Union 
Non-signatories  UNFC Karenni National Progressive Party  
New Mon State Party (NMSP) 
Arakan National Council  
Lahu Democratic Union  
Shan State Progress Party (SSPP/SSA-North) 
 FPNCC United Wa State Party (UWSP) 
National Democratic Alliance Army  
Shan State Progress Party (SSPP/SSA-North) 
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) 





This split stance of EAOs, with regards to the NCA, has meant that the country is 
divided between areas where a fragile ceasefire prevails, governed through ‘interim 
provisions’ classified in the NCA, while active combat continues in some Northern 
parts. Additionally, even where there are pockets of peace in the North, such as the Wa 
Hills, there may be a ceasefire but the Myanmar state has a limited presence there, as 
the area identifies more with China than with Myanmar (Fiskesjö, 2010).  As it stands 
the government is working with a two-pronged action plan: political dialogue with 
signatories of the NCA, and getting the non-signatories to sign the NCA.  
 
Secondly, unlike Nepal, where grassroots movements triggered a change in the 
political settlements, the top-down nature of Myanmar’s transition, led by a quasi-
civilian government, has meant that the scale of change, proposed in the peace process, 
had to accommodate the military (Myint-U, 2020). This has been made more difficult, 
as the political settlement post-2011, but more so after the 2015 electoral victory of 
the NLD, has had to accommodate the NLD, who head the government.  The attempt 
to accommodate tri-partite interests of the EAOs, the democratic opposition, and the 
Tatmadaw, with little coherence, either within or between them, has inhibited the 
formation of elite pacts, which could have given definition to the peace process 
agendas (Adhikari and Htoi, 2017).  Instead, a diarchy has been brought into being. 
For, from 2016, the NLD, as the party in power, has formally managed the peace 
process; while the military, with its control of the portfolios of Defence, Home Affairs, 
and Border Security, has determined the fate of conflicts on the ground, often 
undercutting NLD’s authority in the peace process (Interview with UN representative, 
25 July, 2017, Yangon).  
 
Since the NLD assumed power in 2016, EAOs have had to negotiate not only with the 
Tatmadaw but also the civilian government. The EAOs have expressed the difficulties 
they have encountered with a new and less-experienced negotiating team. Led by the 
NLD, the process has become increasingly formulaic and bureaucratic (Burma News 
International, 2017). This diarchy has also left the NLD, despite its willingness to make 




2017).   Further, despite the democratic credentials of the NLD, insiders have stated 
that Aung Saan Suu Kyi’s tenure has caused the peace process to regress. For she has 
been balancing a tightrope between the military and the EAOs, often becoming a mere 
bystander in the process (Interview with journalist, 11 July, 2017, Yangon). Some have 
even questioned the NLD’s willingness to address EAOs’ grievances, noting that the 
NLD had prioritised reconciliation with the military, above any alignment with the 
EAOs to campaign for a broader accommodation on questions of inclusion (Interview 
with activist, 16 November, 2018, Yangon).  
 
This diarchy has also meant that there has been a disconnect between the Parliamentary 
process, which the NLD is prioritising, and the peace process, where the EAOs see 
their role. The issue of constitutional amendment was viewed as likely to bring the two 
factions together, as the NCA stated that all decisions adopted by the Union Peace 
Conference should be the basis for amending, repealing and adding provisions to the 
Constitution (Bell et al., 2017). Accordingly, the NLD-led government had viewed the 
peace process as a route to reform the Constitution, where it could press for democratic 
change, along with changes in federalism or security integration, to be agreed through 
the peace process (International Crisis Group, 2019). However, with imminent 2020 
elections, and the stagnation of the peace process, in order to maintain its electoral 
pledge, the NLD decided to take an alternative route to constitutional amendment in 
2019. It formed a joint committee to recommend amendments to the constitution 
(International Crisis Group, 2019). However, despite agreeing to the NCA, and its 
pledge for Constitutional amendment, in accordance with the decisions of the peace 
process, the Tatmadaw has performed a U-turn, on the extent of any amendment to the 
Constitution, it is willing to accept. The current Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung 
Hlaing, has repeatedly remarked that the Tatmadaw is opposed to any amendment that 
would result in the armed forces losing their special prerogatives (Myint, 2019; 
Wansai, 2018b).This brings into question if decisions agreed by stakeholders in the 
peace process, which has progressed as an extra-constitutional process, can be 
transformed  into constitutional commitments (Interview with peacebuilding funder, 





Such tensions have led to fundamental disagreements between the EAOs, the 
government, and the Tatmadaw, on fundamental issues as of SSR/DDR, and 
federalism, in addition to the nascent discussions on transitional justice. These three 
sectors are of course the focus of this thesis, and will be discussed below.  
 
Ongoing Discussions on Inclusion  
Despite multiple vectors of exclusion, peace process discussions are centred largely 
on ethnicity, given decades of ethnic insurgencies rooted in ideas of autonomy and 
identity (Lall, 2009).  Accordingly, demands for federalism have been at the heart of 
the peace process, and are seen as principal routes for inclusion.  
 
Other means of inclusion, such as changes in the electoral systems, from a First Past 
the Post (FPTP) system to a Proportional Representation (PR), or a mixed system were 
also discussed (Dukalskis and Raymond, 2018; Lemargie et al., 2015; Lochery, 2014). 
However, given the NLD’s opposition to a change in the system, and the military-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) making an about turn on the 
issue, discussions on PR were largely shelved. However, in the lead-up to the 2020 
elections, some ethnic parties were beginning to raise their voices against a FPTP’s 
‘winner takes it all’ approach (The Irrawaddy, 2019). Similarly, there were discussions 
on quotas for women’s participation in the election. With the discussion yet to be 
confirmed as a policy, the number of women contesting elections remained below 30% 
(European Union Election Follow-up Mission, 2019). While of utmost importance, the 
peace process has also largely overlooked the criticality of religion. It only came to the 
fore in the aftermath of the Rohingya crisis. The sectarian violence between Buddhists 
and Muslims in Rakhine state in 2012 has, over the years, led to a massive exodus of 
Rohingya Muslims across the border to Bangladesh. The Rohingyas are not recognised 
as one of the 135 national races, and do not have rights as citizens (International Center 
for Transitional Justice, 2017).  As Rohingyas had no army of their own, they were not 
party to the peace talks. This also has resulted in the peace process focusing on 
horizontal inclusion, where the Tatmadaw seeks to accommodate contending ethnic 






The debate on federalism has come a long way in Myanmar. The 2008 Constitution in 
Myanmar introduced some form of decentralisation, with seven regions and seven 
states divided on the basis of ethnicity. However, the EAOs have argued that this 
administrative decentralisation does not conform to long-standing demands for 
political autonomy and fair distribution of resources (Batcheler, 2018). In the peace 
process, different EAOs have institutionalised these demands, by categorising 
‘genuine federalism’ as one of the 11 common points uniting their individual struggles 
(Bell et al., 2017). The Tatmadaw, in contrast, has tended to see federalism as a 
‘slippery slope’ to secession and disintegration of the country (Interview with 
journalist, 13 July 2017 (b), Yangon). It was only three years after the start of the peace 
process, that the Tatmadaw agreed to initiate discussions on federalism (Aung, 2016). 
 
Today, while there exists agreement on the need for federalism, the position of the 
different parties varies. While the Tatmadaw grudgingly accepted federalism, it has 
made it conditional on EAOs’ acceptance of a ‘non-secession’ clause. In addition it 
has often changed its mind on the extent of compromises on federalism it is willing to 
make, at times even stating that Myanmar is already federal (Jolliffe, 2017). This 
hesitancy is complemented by the Tatmadaw, and the government, wanting the issue 
of federalism to be dealt with after the signing of the NCA peace accord, and as an 
internal Parliamentary issue, within the framework of the 2008 constitution drafted 
by the military (Buscemi, 2019). However EAOs affirm that any genuine dialogue on 
federalism, necessitates a sea-change in the Constitution and thus, the 2008 
Constitution cannot be the reference point (Wansai, 2018b).  
 
Signatory EAOs, in turn, do not want a discussion on non-secession. Further, against 
the background of a decades-long civil war, some EAOs feel that the option of self-
determination should be retained as a last resort (Brenner, 2017b). Further, for non-
signatory EAOs, affiliated to the FPNCC, the issue concerns the sequencing between 
the NCA and federal guarantees. They seek to ascertain the terms of the political 
settlement, especially on federal guarantees, before signing the ceasefire.  This is in 




ceasefire (Interview with political analyst, 19 July 2017, Yangon).  
 
The NLD, in turn, has repeatedly committed to federalism in principle, and has 
pronounced federalism as being key to peace in Myanmar (Interview with Member of 
Parliament, 18 November 2018, Yangon). However, the NLD-led government has not 
come forward with its own position on federalism, and instead has only occupied itself 
in listening to debates around the issue (Interview with Member of Parliament, 18 
November, 2018, Yangon). Since 2019, the NLD started sloganeering for the 2020 
elections, leaving such debates as federalism further down the list of priorities 
(Interview with NGO representative, 12 November 2018, Yangon). Additionally, in 
the last four years of their rule, the NLD’s commitment to federalism in practice has 
been questioned. The NLD appointed its own party members, as Chief Ministers in the 
Rakhine and Shan Assemblies in 2016, despite ethnic parties winning the majority of 
seats. Similarly, it tried to use the Union Parliament to control the state and regional 
assemblies, through the enactment of the Myanmar Hluttaw Committee Bill.  The NLD 
also named a bridge in Mon state after Aung San, who is a Bamar, against the wishes 
of local people who wanted it to be named after a Mon (Myint, 2017). This has led 
some to believe that if the NLD is re-elected in 2020 but cannot initiate federalism, the 
distance between the NLD and ethnic peoples will increase (The Irrawaddy, 2019).  
 
The position on federalism is complicated by the absence of details on its specifics, 
including: the number of federal states/provinces; the choice between asymmetric and 
symmetric federalism; the state of sub-national minorities in ethnic provinces; as well 
as provisions for power-sharing between the Centre and other states. The discussions 
on modalities are still at an infant stage and considerably abstract, seemingly because 
the peace process itself is at an early stage (Interview with peacebuilding consultant, 
10 July 2017(b), Yangon). The firmest proposal so far, which emerged after a meeting 
of 17 EAOs, is to change the delineation of states. This proposal seeks to change the  
‘7 states and 7 regions’ model of devolution into one where the Bamar dominated 
seven regions is converted into one state, which is equal to the other seven ethnic states 





The endeavour to bring about a uniform proposal on federalism is hindered further by 
the difference between dominant and non-dominant EAOs. There are fundamental 
tensions between ethnic groups and their associated EAOs and political parties ‘that 
envision federalism as being primarily about increasing powers held by Myanmar’s 
existing seven states, (such as the Kachin and Shan), and those that wish to see 
significant powers granted to lower levels of government or for additional states to be 
created (such as the Pa-O, Red Shan, Ta’ang, and Wa)’ (Minoletti and Sandi, 2018, Pg 
5). This form of devolution, centred on dominant ethnic groups, has alarmed sub-
minorities who fear that political control by dominant ethnic groups, at state level, will 
replace domination by the Centre, especially as regards such groups as the Wa, Ta’ang 
and Pa-O, who currently have their own self-administered areas (International Crisis 
Group, 2016). Further, agreement on the type of federalism is hamstrung by various 
levels of autonomy, currently enjoyed by different groups and their visions of 
federalism.  
 
In addition, given the extra-constitutional nature of the peace process, parliamentary 
discussions on federalism have been conducted simultaneously with discussions on 
decentralisation. A further decentralisation is deemed crucial as Myanmar federalises 
(Batcheler, 2018). The formal peace process involves the Parliament only marginally, 
through the representation of political parties in the political dialogue. This sets 
discussions in Parliament on decentralisation apart from discussions on the formal 
peace process (Interview with researcher, 21 November 2018 (c), Yangon). 
 
Given the elementary level of discussion on the form and scope of federalism, my 
discussions on federalism in Yangon were centred on what are likely to be the most 
pertinent themes that will define the form and scope of federalism. While many themes 
were covered, namely: the promotion of culture and identity through the use and 
teaching of mother tongues; regional boundaries; and education and health policies, 
the most pressing issue was about resource sharing, of hydropower, timber, and such 
natural resources as oil, gas, and minerals, amongst others (Interviews, July, 2017; 
November, 2018, Yangon). Economic issues centred on resource sharing have become 




of the areas formerly controlled by EAOs, thus opening these former battlegrounds to 
formal trade and investment. The easing of sanctions through the peace process has 
further opened up these areas to swathes of foreign investments. These investment 
opportunities are likely to prove a double-edged sword. On one hand, a ‘long-term 
peace deal and political settlement, which places the control of revenues from 
extractive resources in the hands of local governments run by ethnic minority officials, 
may eliminate some of the most powerful motivations for the continuation of conflict’ 
(Benson, 2015).   On the other hand, valuable extractive resources can have negative 
impacts on peace, providing incentives for the formation, and maintenance, of non-
state armed groups (Interview with peace negotiator, 15 November 2018, Yangon). 
Moreover, the flow of investment in ethnic areas, when the terms of the federalism and 
resource sharing are yet to be finalised, is likely to exacerbate existing tensions 
surrounding the peace process. In the ceasefire areas in Karen state, the people are 
already wary of the untrammeled access of business and industries, leading to land 
confiscation and environmental concerns. This has led the locals in ceasefire areas to 
declare that while ‘We Used to Fear Bullets, we Now Fear Bulldozers’(Tarkapaw 
Youth Group et al., 2015). 
 
Bargains Underpinning Security Sector Reform 
With decades of insurgency and military rule, and the resulting proliferation of arms 
and armies, it is natural that SSR and DDR should become central to peace process 
discussions.   
 
A core stumbling block, inhibiting the progress of debate on DDR, is the history of 
disarmament and demobilisation in Myanmar. Since the 1960s, a standard method of 
dealing with local ethnic resistance has been to persuade them to convert into state-
sanctioned militias, as a form of integrating rebels into the security forces (Jolliffe, 
2017). In the late 2000s, many small armed groups were reshaped and came under 
Tatmadaw command, in 24 Border Guard Forces and 15 Paramilitary Divisions, while 
such forces as the KIO refused to convert, leading to a ceasefire breakdown (Jolliffe, 
2017). In fact, in 2011, in acknowledging how controversial DDR-type processes 




‘disarmament’, in the initial rounds of the peace process. It was thought that any 
conversation on DDR would disincentivise the EAOs to partake in peace talks, and 
derail the process. DDR was planned to be carried out at the end of the peace process, 
in accordance with international standards (Oo, 2014). 
 
Additional and multiple differences between EAOs and the Tatmadaw on the process, 
have hindered the pace of negotiation on SSR/DDR. Firstly, while Tatmadaw wants 
EAOs to disarm, as part of the implementation of the NCA within the current security 
sector structure, the EAOs are against disarming before a comprehensive political 
settlement comes about on questions like federalism (Buscemi, 2019; Oo, 2014).   
 
Secondly, the Tatmadaw has prioritised DDR for the EAOs, while EAOs view 
unilateral DDR, without a comprehensive SSR, as a means for neutralising them, both 
politically and militarily (Mil, 2018). Statements from the Tatmadaw’s Senior General, 
Min Aung Hlaing, on the need for EAOs to ‘undergo DDR for peace’ and  ‘Ethnic 
armed groups (being) welcome if they wish to join the Tatmadaw in defence of the 
Union,’(Lynn, 2016) indicate the Tatmadaw’s focus on DDR.  The EAO see 
Tatmadaw’s push for DDR as a ploy to divert attention from a comprehensive SSR, 
and to make the Tatmadaw’s composition more ethnically diverse (Wansai, 2016). 
However this begs the question as to whether EAOs want to be integrated into the 
existing security structures, or would like the entire security structure to be holistically 
reformed to an inclusive one (Mil, 2018). Despite the wide variation in discussions on 
the nature of the Army, all proposals calling for reform of the security sector focus on 
the very identity and composition of the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw is largely Bamar 
and Buddhist, with a limited number of Buddhist senior officers from minority ethnic 
groups (Selth, 2001). This has led minorities to see the Tatmadaw as a manifestation 
of ethnic Burman and Buddhist hegemony (Steinberg, 2018). The Tatmadaw, in turn, 
has insisted change in composition is not necessary, as it already has people from all 
ethnicities (Interview with SSR expert, 21 July 2017 (a), Yangon).  
 
Even though the focus has been on DDR, the emphasis has been so much on 




overlooked. Any reintegration process will need to include broader questions of: the 
disarming and demobilising of command structures; the absorption of demobilised 
combatants into local economies; and the curtailment of the economic base, built on 
extra-legal taxation and other means (Anderson, 2017). 
 
Thirdly, the military insists that there should be a single army, or one national army, 
under the new federal government. However, the common perspective of EAOs, has 
been to endorse the ‘Formation of Union Armed Forces’ (Bell et al., 2017). There are 
differences on what constitutes this formation of ‘Union Armed Forces’. Some EAOs 
see it as retaining their respective armed forces under a Union Federal Army (Kipgen, 
2018), while others seek a more diverse and ethnically inclusive National Army. There 
have been further propsals too of a two-tier security sector, which would, on one level, 
have a Federal Union Tatmadaw composed of representatives from all states, 
functioning under the civilian government, and, on another level, have state armed 
forces under the state government (Jolliffe, 2017; Wansai, 2016).   
 
Fourthly, SSR is a comprehensive set of reforms, which involves not only reframing 
the security apparatus of the country, but ensuring democratic oversight of the security 
and justice system, and strengthening the delivery of security and justice-related 
services (Jackson, 2011). Any SSR-related reform will need a discussion on civilian 
oversight of the military, and require revisiting the constitutional prerogatives of the 
military, enshrined in the 2008 Constitution. The Tatmadaw does not accept this 
vision, and is averse to an overhaul of the structure and composition of the Tatmadaw 
(Interview with SSR expert, 21 July 2017(a), Yangon). In the ongoing process of 
Constitutional amendment, initiated by the NLD in Parliament, the unelected military 
MPs, and lawmakers from the military-backed USDP, have opposed calls for charter 
reform, specifically in areas seeking to limit the Army’s political role (Myint, 2020).  
 
Instead, the Tatmadaw has flouted any attempt at civilian oversight, and sought to 
further centralise decision-making in security affairs, making the security sector the 
sole preserve of the Tatmadaw. Security-related matters are rarely transparent, or 




people in Myanmar are unable to access even such basic information, as the country’s 
annual military expenditure, is a case in point (Interview with activist, 16 November 
2018, Yangon). Even within the peace process, the Union Peace Conference’s 
technical committee, tasked to discuss the security sector, has been manned solely by 
military professionals, and does not even have domestic advisors (Interview with SSR 
expert, 21 July 2017(a), Yangon). 
 
Given the differences in stance between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw, and the 
structural factors that impede an overhaul of the security sector, a ‘Localised SSR’, 
focused on DDR activities, and adapted for areas with ongoing conflict, is likely to 
be a final compromise (Thiha, 2017).  
 
Relative Silence on Transitional Justice 
Despite the legacy of violence, the issue of transitional justice has been largely absent 
in the peace process (South, 2017). It has not been integrated into the peace process, 
or formally acknowledged in the NCA, and has not been prioritised by political actors. 
Although political prisoners have been released as a form of accountability for human 
rights, it would appear that institutional mechanisms designed to engage in transitional 
justice are not yet on the agenda. Ideally these would include such mechanisms as 
criminal prosecution, truth seeking, and reparation, including restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation. However all seem distant possibilities (ND-Burma, 
2018).  
 
The lack of recognition of transitional justice mechanisms is rooted in disinterest by 
the parties involved, and the top-down nature of the transition. The EAOs and the 
Tatmadaw have both been responsible for human rights violations, and are not 
expected to raise the issue of accountability. More so, the military are unlikely to 
negotiate real political reform, without receiving credible assurances of immunity from 
punishment for past crimes (David & Holliday, 2006). It was anticipated that a party 
like the NLD, composed of political prisoners, would prioritise some form of 
transitional justice. However, the opposition has chosen reconciliation as its central 




would derail democracy, the NLD has stressed it would not pursue retribution for the 
military, or initiate trials, but rather focus on reconciliation (Mann, 2015; Phipps and 
Weaver, 2015).  
 
Further, grassroots pressures on transitional justice are only just emerging, and are 
marked either by viewing the concept as largely implausible and too ambitious for 
Myanmar’s current political climate, or as an agenda that could derail even the little 
gains Myanmar has made (Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 
July 2017 (a), Yangon). Surveys also reveal that there is limited demand for retributive 
measures, while clear support exists for revelatory measures, including truth 
commissions, documentation and memorialisation (David and Holliday, 2018).  
 
This is not to say that there has been no desire, or efforts expended, for transitional 
justice. Amongst former political prisoners and those in exile, there is a desire for some 
form of transitional justice, largely at the local level (Interview with researcher, 14 
July 2017, Yangon). In contrast to the global experience, transitional justice in 
Myanmar has been limited to localised efforts, led by smaller civil society efforts, and 
has not involved legal processes (Fischer, 2011). Such local efforts have focused on 
assisting victims to document human rights violations, through unofficial truth-telling 
events, exhibitions, commemorations, and advocacy, and have been supported by non-
governmental organisations (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013).  
 
Some successes in the country’s overall commitment to human rights have given some 
hope of a larger transitional justice story. For instance, seven soldiers, guilty of the 
extrajudicial killing of five civilians in Lashio, were sentenced and stripped of their 
positions in 2018. In addition, Burmese expatriates have had their citizenship 
reinstated, after having lost it due to having taken foreign citizenship or residency (ND-
Burma, 2018). Further, the government investigated the matter of land seized by 
former government officials in 2017, and compensated the complainants (ND-Burma, 
2018). Equally, the inclusion of Myanmar National Human Rights Commission in the 
government’s prison reform process, is illustrative of several changes related to 




legacy of past violence, the larger focus has been on ‘reconciliation’. It, thus, remains 
unclear what forms of transitional justice, if any, will materialise in Myanmar (Manley, 
2017). However, respondents have also cited that, as the reform process progresses, 
the demand for transitional justice is likely to be more pivotal (Interview with activist, 
16 November 2018, Yangon).  
 
Status of the Peace Process 
Given the intractability of the debates on inclusion, SSR, and transitional Justice, as 
documented above, combined with the ongoing fighting in many areas, and the 
resulting stagnation in the peace process, it can be questioned if Myanmar has a peace 
process at all. Due to the above-mentioned factors, many EAOs are struggling to even 
agree on the NCA, the first of the seven stages.  The outcome in the 9 years, since the 
start of the peace process, has been that 10 EAOs have signed the NCA. Further, three 
Union Peace Conferences entitled the ‘21st Century Panglong Conference’  have 
been hosted, in 2016, 2017 and 2018, leading to agreements on a total of 51 points. 
Although the 51 points signed into the Union Accord, make some critical 
commitments on gender mainstreaming and regional development, they neglect the 
most contentious issues: resource-sharing; federal delineation; DDR and SSR; and 
broader democratic reform (State Counsellor Office, Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar, 2017).  
 
Perhaps the most troubling development however has been the inability to uphold the 
commitment of the NCA, which has seriously damaged the level of trust in the process. 
Fighting and instability in certain areas have been used by the Tatmadaw to curtail 
national dialogue process between different signatory EAOs and their communities in 
some instances: one of the seven steps of the peace process. Prominent signatories, 
like the KNU, have cited the Tatmadaw as not only failing to honour its proposed 
Codes of Conduct for Troops, but also for going on to build more military outposts 
(Sein, 2016). The government has been accused of a dual-track policy of both engaging 
in talks with the insurgents, and fighting to annihilate them. Other critics have 




of the military. The cycles of violence, and the absence of trust, have also led to EAOs 
continuing to recruit even after signing the NCA, with groups like the RCSS/SSA-
South increasing from 6500 in 2015 to 12000 today, and the SSPP/SSA-N increasing 
from 4000 to 7000 (Oo, 2019).  
 
The absence of any demarcation of ‘control areas’ has made it more difficult to 
implement the NCA (Eisenman, 2018). The NCA sets out that signatory EAOs, would 
be responsible for such issues as security and development, health, education, socio-
economic development, environmental conservation, and the promotion of ethnic 
culture and language in their respective areas, until a finalisation of the political 
dialogue (Bell et al., 2017). However, in the absence of clearly defined ‘control areas’, 
there have been small-scale conflicts, between the EAOs themselves, and EAOs and 
the military, over territory and natural resources (South et al., 2018). Further, the 
Tatmadaw has sought to restrict the rights of the EAOs to coordinate foreign aid, as 
well as to deliver services in areas of ‘mixed control’, both of which were agreed in 
the NCA. This has angered groups like the KNU, who have enjoyed de facto statehood 
and legitimacy for a long time (South et al., 2018).  
 
A Sudden Shift in International Engagement: Invoking 
the Liberal Peacebuilders  
 
Broad Contours of International Engagement in the Peace Process 
While largely domestically led, international engagement in the peace process and its 
influence on such agendas as inclusion and SSR cannot be overlooked. Within this 
realm of international engagement in the peace process, China has emerged as the pre-
eminent actor. With most non-signatories of the NCA living along the Chinese border, 
and given the occasional cross-border spill-over of violence, China has a direct stake 
and interest in the peace process (Han, 2016; Li and Lye, 2009). However, reversing 
the patterns of Myanmar’s international relations, the peace process opened up avenues 





Prior to the start of the peace process, and the accompanying reforms in 2011, Western 
engagement in Myanmar was defined by a history of sanctions. Consequently, 
Myanmar viewed its neighbouring China as its principal diplomatic ally and economic 
patron. This resulted in Myanmar’s asymmetric dependence on China, and China’s 
dominance in the broader political economy of Myanmar. By 2011, there was a 
realisation that dependence on China had created a national emergency which needed 
to be addressed, by restoring relations with Western states, and resolving their 
concerns over democracy and human rights violations in Myanmar (Lintner, 2016a). 
The reforms associated with the peace process, and the summoning of Western actors 
to support that process, was intended to normalise the relationship with the West 
(Lintner, 2016a). The speed, of Myanmar’s reaching out to the West, is said to have 
caught China by surprise (Zin and Joseph, 2012). The process of invoking 
peacebuilders as a medium to re-engage with Western states, began with the Thein 
Sein government’s request, in 2011, to the Norwegian Foreign Minister to help 
facilitate and coordinate international support to the emerging peace process (South, 
2014). 
 
The opening up of Myanmar to peacebuilding expertise led to a ‘gold rush’ of 
international actors supporting the peace process establishing a presence in the 
country. These actors range from such bilateral donors as USAID, UKAID, and 
AusAID, to multilateral institutions like the UN, the World Bank, the EU, as well as 
INGOs (Bächtold et al., 2014).  However, the existence of deeply-entrenched bilateral 
relations, the ongoing conflict at local levels across the Myanmar-China border, and 
China’s time-tested relationship with many EAOs, ensured that the presence of liberal 
peacebuilders could not entirely reverse China’s dominance. Subsequently, 
Myanmar’s peace process has witnessed a co-existence between the liberal 
peacebuilders and China, albeit with varying strengths, interests, and motivations.  
 
In this co-existence, China’s most important role has been one of mediation, and the 
facilitation of meetings, between the EAOs and the government, in an attempt to forge 




(Ganesan, 2017). China also remains the only actor able to bring all sides to the peace 
talks, something the Myanmar government has been unable to do (Interview with JMC 
representative, 13 November 2018, Yangon). For instance, since 2013, China has 
facilitated rounds of talks, between the KIO and the government and, in tandem with 
the UN, has been an observer to these bilateral talks (United States Institute of Peace, 
2018). China also arranged for all EAOs based on the Northern Myanmar- China 
border, to fly from Yunnan province in China to attend the 21st Century Panglong 
Conference in 2017 (The Irrawaddy, 2017).  Many EAO representatives confirmed 
that they attended the conference solely due to China’s bidding (Tha, 2018). China’s 
ability to influence all factions in Myanmar has been a predictor of its success in 
inviting EAOs to attend the peace talks. It has also managed to convince the Tatmadaw 
to allow such groups as MNDAA, AA, TNLA to come to the peace talks, something 
the military had not agreed to in the past (The Irrawaddy, 2017). Yet another pertinent 
Chinese role has been to shield the Myanmar government’s action in international 
forums, especially after the Rohingya crisis when Western condemnation began to 
escalate. In a rather novel step, China has pledged support to peace institutions. 
Between 2017 and 2020, it pledged a total of $3 million to such peace institutions as 
the NRPC, and the JMC; and in 2017 also donated vehicles to the JMC (Htwe, 2019).  
 
Peacebuilders, in turn have pledged support for the process, through: technical 
assistance for capacity building; development aid to deliver various aspects of 
ceasefire monitoring and the peace process; and finally humanitarian assistance in 
conflict-affected regions. The most common modality of technical assistance has 
focused on giving policy advice on various issues, such as designing the architecture 
of the peace process; proposing institutional reform; as well as supporting institutions 
embedded within the NCA, like the JMC. Under the Thein Sein government, such 
donors as the EU particularly focused on strengthening institutions that underpinned 
the peace process.  Funding the MPC to steer the peace process, as well as the capacity 
building of institutions, like the Election Commission, are but two examples (NORAD, 
n.d). Peacebuilders have also prioritised the capacity building of different parties in 
the peace process, through organising exposure visits to other countries undergoing 




different themes of the peace process, and sharing international best practice 
(Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 July 2017 (a), Yangon).  
While capacity building has largely focused on EAOs and civil society groups, there 
have been some workshops for armed forces on issues like SSR (Interview with 
peacebuilding funder, 12 July 2017, Yangon). The focus on EAOs stems from the 
realisation among peacebuilders that the peace process is not a level playing field, and 
the military has the resource, capacity, and the power, to dominate the process 
(Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 July 2017 (a), Yangon). Civil 
society groups also confirm that capacity building efforts have been useful in building 
knowledge bases on different issues such as federalism, decentralisation, and minority 
rights (Interview with SSR expert, 21 July 2017 (a), Yangon).  
 
Core to the work of peacebuilders has been the focus on civil society. ‘Civil society’ 
was a key priority, either as a means of delivery for the liberal peace agenda, where 
NGOs were funded to undertake programmes under different themes of peacebuilding, 
or as ‘civil society strengthening’ itself as a deliverable, to strengthen prospects of 
peace and democracy (Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 July 
2017 (a), Yangon). The promotion of civil society by peacebuilders has enabled them 
to play a key role in the peace process, adopting various roles, including brokering 
negotiations in some instances. For instance, the Shalom Foundation was instrumental 
in fostering talks between the military and the KIO (Petrie and South, 2013). In 
addition, peacebuilders have been crucial to the provision of humanitarian support to 
Burmese refugees, both in conflict areas at home, as well as across the border in 
Thailand (Interview with UN representative, July 25 2017, Yangon).  
 
Support from peacebuilders is delivered through diverse channels. These include: 
bilateral donors; multilateral forums, such as the World Bank and the UN; as well as 
international and local non-government organisations, such as Asia Foundation, 
Saferworld, Nyein (Shalom) Foundation, and the Metta Foundation. Two consortiums, 
the Joint Peace Fund (JPF) and the Peace Support Fund (PSF), funded by 
miscellaneous peacebuilding supporters, have been prominent donors. The JPF, 




Union, amongst others, has helped organise dialogue between different groups. It has 
also supported trainings and meetings, the conduct of research, the promotion of the 
engagement of young people and women, and the monitoring of ceasefires (Joint Peace 
Fund, n.d.). Similarly, the PSF works to ‘enhance social cohesion in Myanmar by 
supporting locally driven initiatives’(Paung Sie Facility, n.d.). Further, pooled funds, 
like the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund, have helped to strengthen social services in ethnic 
areas, and sought to foster collaboration between state and non-state actors. It has also 
worked with the Tatmadaw on the discharge of child soldiers (United Nations, 2014). 
 
Convergences and Divergences 
In this ‘co-existence’ between peacebuilders and China, a key factor in their 
convergence is their role as witnesses in the NCA process, as well as their support to 
peace institutions.  China has served as a formal witness to the signing of the NCA, in 
company with the UN, the EU, Thailand, China, India, and Japan (Institute for Security 
and Development Policy, 2015). Beyond their coming together to support the NCA, 
both forms of engagement have had to adapt to the changing context of the transition 
in Myanmar, and also adapt to the engagement of the ‘other’.  
 
The opening up of Myanmar to Western forces eroded the Chinese monopoly, which 
grew during the years of Western sanctions, thereby increasing a strategic competition 
for influence from actors, including the US and Japan amongst others(Sun, 2012b). 
The end of sanctions also opened up competition for Chinese companies, thus 
changing the terms and scale of trade with China (Sun, 2012b; The Transnational 
Institute, 2016). The reform period, since 2011, has been accompanied by local 
protests on large-scale Chinese investment, leading to the cancellation of prominent 
projects like the $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project in Kachin state. Added to this were 
the demonstrations around the Chinese-funded Latpadaung Copper Mine, and Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ). China has seen these protests as a by-product of the reform 
process, and of Western engagement in the process (Li and Lye, 2009; Shihong, 2014). 
In response to the changing landscape in Myanmar, Chinese engagement in the process 




the NCA, in order to stabilise its borders, while on the other, due to its anxiety over a 
possible loss of influence in Myanmar’s affairs, it has continued to support armed 
groups (Kumbun, 2019a; United States Institute of Peace, 2018).  
 
In a similar fashion, while welcomed initially under Thein Sein’s government, the 
acceptance of peacebuilders saw a rapid decline under Suu Kyi’s government, which, 
unlike Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government, did not need international legitimacy 
(Interview with activist, 16 November 2018, Yangon). It significantly decreased in 
2017, in the aftermath of the military’s intensified response to the simmering Rohingya 
crisis. In the same year, there were attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 
(ARSA), a newly formed Rohingya armed group, with links to foreign extremist 
groups, on Myanmar’s security forces, as well as on Hindu minorities in Rakhine. 
ARSA’s attacks were followed by the Myanmar military’s ethnic cleansing campaign, 
marked by killings, torture, forced starvation, the burning of villages, rape and other 
sexual violence against the Rohingya population as a whole (Amnesty International, 
2018). The wide-spread operation against the Rohingyas by the Tatmadaw, and the 
silence of Aung Sann Suu Kyi, led to a tirade of condemnation by Western states and 
organisations, who called for an international investigation by the International 
Criminal Court (Eisenman, 2018). Given the Western denunciation of Suu Kyi’s 
regime, in the aftermath of the crisis, the role of peacebuilding agents and donors was 
reduced even further (Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 July 
2017 (a), Yangon). 
 
The crisis also led to another shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy. While the Thein Sein 
government had sought to wean Myanmar away from Chinese influence, the barrage 
of Western condemnation led the Suu Kyi government to turn towards China. This was 
a significant change in direction as, due to Suu Kyi’s democratic credentials, her 
government had been hailed as pro-Western. Beijing in turn has used the opportunity 
to make up for the thaw in their relations since 2011. China has shielded the Myanmar 
government at UN forums, thereby gaining popularity, given pervasive anti-Rohingya 
sentiments in Myanmar (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). China has also offered 





While engagement in the peace process is new for both China and the peacebuilders, 
it has been strongly influenced by a larger history, and by Myanmar’s geography. 
Historic and geographic determinants have fostered Chinese dominance, but the 
perpetual quest among elites in Myanmar to diversify its international engagement 
beyond China, has led Myanmar to court other regional partners, such as India and 
ASEAN, even during the period of Western sanctions (Storey, 2011). This quest for 
autonomy has been succinctly expressed in the long-hailed foreign policy principle of  
‘neutrality’ (Malik, 1998). This autonomy also kept Myanmar afloat: when Western 
sanctions made it difficult for Myanmar to engage globally, economic transformations 
in Asia facilitated greater regional and continued political engagement, with countries 
such as China, India, and Thailand leading the way (Taylor, 1998). It is to the history 
of the varied trajectories of China’s engagement, and that of Western states, that this 
chapter now turns.  
 
Historical and Geographical Determinants to 
International Engagement in Myanmar 
 
China’s Influence in Myanmar 
As a neighbour with 1,357 miles of a shared border, China’s priorities in Myanmar 
include: border stability; access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar; obtaining 
alternative routes for the supply of oil and gas; protecting its trade and investment; and 
finally limiting the role of external powers like the US (Yhome, 2019). The quest for 
stability is seen to be more urgent, as fighting in Myanmar has not only sent waves of 
refugees across the border, but has also led to occasional bombings and deaths on the 
Chinese side. Further, non-traditional security concerns, such as trafficking, diseases, 
and drugs, have also led China to support such initiatives as the opium substitution 
programmes, a scheme through which China provides subsidies and tax waivers to 
Chinese agro-enterprises, to develop viable alternatives to opium cultivation in 




is crucial to freeing China from its dependence on the Pacific Ocean for trade. 
Accordingly, China has invested in infrastructural investments in Myanmar, which 
would connect Yunnan in China to the Indian ocean through Myanmar (Storey, 2011; 
Sun, 2012a). Routes to the sea are significant for impoverished landlocked provinces 
such as Yunnan, especially as concerns over the disparity between China’s coastal 
states, and its inland states, is a major policy occupation in China (Steinberg and Fan, 
2012). Additionally, to address the over-dependence on supply from Middle East and 
Africa, and seek alternative routes to transport oil and gas, China has also invested in 
critical oil and gas infrastructures in Rakhine State in Myanmar (Jiangtao, 2016). 
Finally Myanmar serves as an uncontested market for cheap Chinese consumer goods 
(Rajah, 1998). 
 
All these priorities have resulted in Myanmar being integrated into many of China’s 
internal development strategies. These include, 'Prosper the borders to Enrich Local 
peoples', of 1999; the 'Go Global' strategy of that same year; and the 'Western 
Development Strategy', also in 1999 (Steinberg, 2011). With the announcement of the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) 
integral to it, the drive to enhance infrastructure and connectivity has escalated. Road, 
rail, and pipelines, linking the two countries have been developed, and economic 
interests furthered by building special economic zones, seaports, and border trade 
zones (Transnational Institute, 2019). 
 
This increased sense of China’s priorities vis-a vis Myanmar, however, works in the 
context of contested and shifting patterns of historic relations. The trajectory of Sino-
Myanmar relations has wavered, from initial years of suspicion to Pauk Phaw (or 
fraternal) phase from 1955-1966, which saw the border dispute settled. 1967 saw a 
massive deterioration of relationships, with China’s export of the Cultural Revolution 
to Myanmar, and the resulting anti-China riots in Myanmar. A period of thaw followed 
from 1971 to 1988, since when their relationship has gradually evolved, albeit not 
always smoothly (Steinberg and Fan, 2012). A core irritant in the bilateral relationship 
has been China’s role in the multiple insurgencies and threats of war in Myanmar. 




Army, and the Kuomintang (or Chinese Nationalists), to launch their attacks. China’s 
provision of moral and material support to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 
which, until 1989, was in active combat with the Tatmadaw, led to significant distrust 
(Seekins, 1997; Than, 2003). And while the CPB collapsed, due to an internal mutiny 
in 1989, and fragmenting into several ethnic fronts, such fronts, as the UWSA, have 
continued to have strong links with China for access to markets, arms and safe havens 
(Interview with peace negotiator, 15 November 2018, Yangon). In the more 
contemporary landscape, EAOs north of the border not only have deep historical and 
cultural linkages with groups across the Chinese border, but economically have relied 
on the taxation of imported products, the cross-border trade of raw materials, and 
Chinese investment in mining, to survive (Smith, 2007). This formal and informal 
collusion between EAOs and provincial actors in Yunnan, have undermined Myanmar 
government’s attempts at statebuilding on the Sino-Myanmar border, and has scarred 
bilateral relations (Clapp, 2015; Haacke, 2010).  
 
Despite past resentments, from 1988 onwards, the relationship altered, achieving a 
measure of interdependence, albeit one beset by Myanmar’s heightened dependence 
on China. The two became closer with the disintegration of the CPB, an historical 
source of irritation in the relationship, and also through their shared experience of 
Western sanctions, which occurred after the Tiananmen Square incident in China, and 
the pro-democracy movement of 1988 (Sutter, 2012b). Further, with the imposition of 
Western sanctions, Myanmar looked to China for trade and investment. The partial 
opening up of the Myanmar economy, and the opening of the China- Myanmar border 
in 1989, also boosted bilateral relations (Seekins, 1997). Formal trading complemented 
the complex, underground, informal version, which had been flourishing since the days 
of a closed economy in Myanmar (Chang, 2013). Additionally, the ceasefires, 
conducted with such Northern-based groups as the UWSA, KIO, MNDAA in the 
1990s, consolidated the territorial presence of the state in the North, and facilitated 
transnational Chinese investments in these areas, often centred on resource 





Such cumulative changes ensured that, between 1989 and 2008, China emerged as a 
top investor, with an over 8-fold increase in bilateral trade (Han, 2016). Equally, China 
was pivotal for defence sales and assistance (Haacke, 2002; Selth, 2001). Myanmar 
also relied on China’s diplomatic support in global forums, especially having become 
an item on the UN Security Council agenda by the early 2000s. China vetoed against 
a draft Security Council resolution calling for the Myanmar government to: release all 
political prisoners, commence dialogue, and end military attacks and human rights 
abuses against ethnic minorities (United Nations, 2007). To avoid the possible 
domestic compromises that an overreliance on China would engender, the Myanmar 
government cultivated, and ‘rewarded’ Beijing, by consenting to economic and 
infrastructure projects (Haacke, 2011). 
 
The deeply entrenched nature of Chinese engagement, however, has resulted in 
multiple unintended consequences. Firstly, its litany of priorities has caused China to 
foster a dual form of engagement. On one hand, formal and informal networks in China 
continue to sustain the EAOs, while on the other China protects the army 
internationally, and economically aids and engages with them, thus strengthening both 
sides of the conflict. Whether China supports the EAOs in Myanmar, as a conscious 
strategy crafted in Beijing, or whether it is an unintended consequence of the 
pluralisation of Chinese foreign policy, is much debated in Myanmar. Notwithstanding 
any debates, it is a reality (Interview with peace negotiator, 15 November 2018, 
Yangon). This is also viewed in Myanmar as the product of a highly pluralised foreign 
policy framework where, until recently, Yunnan controlled engagement with 
Myanmar (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). Those of a different persuasion have 
questioned if China can be an honest broker to the peace process in Myanmar 
(Kumbun, 2019a).  This complex and multi-faceted engagement is mirrored in the 
contrasting views, within China, on relations with Myanmar. One policy faction within 
China seeks to cooperate with the military government, to realise national unity and 
bring border stability; the second, favours the existence of EAOs in the North as useful 
buffers, while the last advocates a ‘hands-off’ policy in the conflicts (Li and Lye, 
2009). The first two views are concurrently deployed in Myanmar, and are a 




of not providing political, military and economic support to the EAOs, but allowed the 
EAOs to be regarded as temporary local authorities, and conduct general business 
based on the situation on the ground (Li and Lye, 2009).  
 
Relatedly, China-Myanmar engagement has moved beyond the confines of formal 
political and economic interactions, and has involved private, and often illicit, actors 
from China operating in Myanmar, and dealing in drugs, logging, wildlife, and jade: 
all of which fuel the political economy (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). Such 
investments have had a paradoxical impact on the governance systems in Myanmar’s 
borderlands. On one hand, the scale of Chinese investments, after the ceasefires in the 
1990s, have enabled the Tatmadaw to establish itself as the most powerful military, 
political, and economic actor in Myanmar’s border areas (Brenner and Schulman, 
2019). On the other hand however, the scale of cross-border aid and trade has ensured 
that regions commanded by the EAOs, such as the Wa, Mong La, and Kokang regions, 
are better connected to Yunnan, given the roads and economic activity, than they are 
to Myanmar itself (Fuller, 2007). For instance, the principal language of many of these 
Northern regions is Chinese, and trade is conducted using Chinese currency (Clapp, 
2015). 
 
Thirdly, closer bilateral relations have led to an increase in Chinese migration, the 
purchase of real estate, and the establishment of Chinese businesses. However Chinese 
companies are acquiring a reputation for land grabbing, and also violations of labour 
rights and environmental degradation (Transnational Institute, 2019). The resulting 
displacement and instances of abuse of local people has provoked intense anti-Chinese 
sentiments at a local level (Zin, 2012). In addition, civil society groups, using the space 
afforded by the reform process, have questioned the environmental standards, financial 
procedures, as well as the impact on the economic rights of local people, of Chinese 
investments (Xinbo, 2016). This phenomenon has increased in tandem with the rise of 
China, and its increased appetite for all possible commodities from Myanmar, such as 
jade, opium, and timber, and its expanding of the cross border trade matrix in both 





Shifts in Indian Engagement  
Along with China, regional neighbours like Thailand and India have also been critical 
players to the war and peace in Myanmar. With regards to Indian engagement, the 
1990s saw a rapid reappraisal of India’s long-standing foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Myanmar. With similar colonial experience and a close relationship between their 
political elites, India and Myanmar enjoyed a special relationship post-independence. 
Subsequent decades of isolation under Ne Win inhibited any extended cooperation 
with India, and even impeded involvement in South Asian regional groupings, such as 
the SAARC, to which India had invited Myanmar (Bhatia, 2015). In the aftermath of 
the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, the Indian government 
was one of the most vocal opponents of the military junta, providing moral and 
material support to the pro-democracy activists (Myint-U, 2012). The Indian Embassy 
in Yangon provided medical aid to protestors, set up special camps in Manipur and 
Mizoram, as well as sanctioning a special Burmese language programme on the All 
India Radio channel (Myint-U, 2012). A policy reversal, in 1993, resulted in India 
being back in partnership with the military, although a large number of Indian civil 
society activists, as well as political leaders, remained sympathetic to the cause of 
democracy in Myanmar. Several factors, account for this shift. The realisation in India 
that the former policy had failed, and the military was there to stay, dominated Indian 
policy circles (Saran, 2011). Further, India’s own insurgency movements across its 
Northeastern frontiers, with some rebel groups using Myanmar territory as a base, 
required military support from Myanmar. In addition, India’s economic liberalisation, 
and the ‘Look East’ policy, which sought to enhance economic ties with Southeast 
Asia through Myanmar, as the only ASEAN country whose land borders with India, 
fuelled its re-engagement (Graham, 2012; Haacke, 2006). Factors such as gaining 
access to Myanmar's gas fields, and containing the growing Chinese influence in 
Myanmar, increased the momentum to establish connections again (Haacke, 2006). 
Today, Indian trade, investment, and military aid have been on the rise, with 
agreements on infrastructure, energy, banking, the establishment of Industrial Training 
Centres, and the conservation of heritage sites, in addition to those on developing land 





Legacy of Western Engagement 
During the Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the junta’s ‘trampling’ of 
democracy, Washington provided training to the Tatmadaw, and welcomed the 
generals to the US, while China denounced the military as ‘fascists,’ and sponsored a 
Communist insurgency in Myanmar (Myint-U, 2012).  The trend reversed in the 1990s 
with the rise of the liberal world order, endorsing the values of democracy and human 
rights (Liddell, 2001). 
 
The movement for democracy in Myanmar in 1988 coincided with this period, giving 
the democratic movement, and the NLD, an immediate global salience and 
international legitimacy (Taylor, 1998).  When the military did not transfer power to 
the NLD in 1990, Western states, including the US, the EU, and Canada, imposed a 
range of sanctions. These included, import bans, visa bans, the withholding of US 
contributions to international agencies working on Myanmar, a ban on the sale, or 
transfer, of arms, and finally suspension of all bilateral aid, other than humanitarian 
assistance (Martin, 2012). The sanctions were so focused on penalising the military 
regime, that the needs of the millions of Burmese, who would have benefitted from 
the development of the country’s industrial capacity, were simply ignored (Farrelly, 
2009). Action by Western states was complemented by campaign groups and NGOs, 
often supported by exiled Burmese students living abroad, who urged their 
governments to demand accountability in Myanmar (Dosch and Sidhu, 2015). Many 
governments and campaign groups in the West adopted a two-pronged strategy: 
maintaining economic sanctions against the military government inside Myanmar, 
while providing humanitarian funds for refugees, as well as support for 
democratisation outside the country (Smith, 2007). Due to sanctions, aid from the West 
was very little and totally insufficient for Myanmar’s vast humanitarian needs (Myint, 
2006). Further Western pressure inhibited multilateral lending, and aid agencies from 
catering to Myanmar's developmental needs (Than, 2003).  
 
In this process of limited Western engagement, the UN continued to engage, albeit 
with a parochial mandate through experts and Special Rapporteurs. It worked on three 




political life of Myanmar; and human rights and humanitarian issues (Magnusson and 
Pedersen, 2012). With little success at mediating between the NLD and the military, 
and the overwhelming negative press and public perception, it failed to demonstrate 
its real commitment (Magnusson and Pedersen, 2012). 
 
The sanctions by the West and the limited engagement of the UN had little effect. The 
Tatmadaw saw any Western support focused on democratisation and national 
reconciliation, as ‘anti-state’ and viewed EAOs and the opposition as  ‘anti-national’ 
(Steinberg, 2016; Taylor, 1998). More normatively, the Western stance on democracy 
and human rights, consolidated the international and internal legitimacy of the 
opposition, while eroding the military’s, deepening the junta's siege mentality and its 
hostility towards pro-democracy opposition (Pedersen, 2006).  Further, the net effect 
of sanctions on the Tatmadaw was largely limited (Farrelly, 2009).  Transnational 
business networks with China, as well as engagement with countries like Israel, 
Pakistan, Singapore, including that regarding defence sales and assistance, ensured 
that even the most targeted sanctions had little effect (Egreteau, 2015; Selth, 2000). 
The preoccupation with democracy also meant that it took Western countries a decade 
to factor in the ethnic insurgencies, and recognise the diverse opposition to the military 
regime, and call for a tripartite dialogue between the NLD, the Tatmadaw and the 
EAOs (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2001).  
 
Having earlier ‘outsourced their policy to Aung San Suu Kyi’(Bhatia, 2015, Pg 40), it 
was only in early 2011, after the 2010 reforms, that countries such as the US, revisited 
the sanctions policy. The US initiated a two- track policy: engagement, with dialogue 
alongside sanctions (Kipgen, 2013). Similar patterns can be seen in Myanmar relations 
with other states and groupings, such as the EU, where sanctions were gradually 
moderated, and then terminated after 2011 (Bunte and Portela, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
Myanmar’s peace process has for the first time in history facilitated a discussion on 




as transitional justice, it did introduce some discussion on human rights and 
accountability. However, 10 years into the process, discussions on such critical 
agendas as federalism and SSR are still in their infancy. The pattern of its ‘top-down’ 
transition, and the links between the twin transitions of democratisation and peace, has 
impacted upon the pace of this transition.  Within this transition, the role of Chinese 
engagement and that of liberal peacebuilders has been pertinent, not only for the peace 
process, but also for Myanmar’s foreign policy options. This chapter has outlined the 
contours of these discussions. It has also called for recognition of the historical and 





Chapter 6: International Engagement in 
Peacebuilding: Dynamics and Impact on Political 
Settlements in Myanmar  
 
Building on the insights from Chapter 5, this chapter empirically examines the three 
research questions this thesis seeks to answer, in relation to the case of Myanmar. 
Given the limited role of India in the Myanmar peace process, the focus is on China. 
The first section explores China’s role in the peacebuilding arena, namely how it 
engages in the peace process, and specifically on the issue-arenas of inclusion, SSR, 
and transitional justice. The second section looks at the interaction and impact of 
Chinese engagement on liberal peacebuilding projects. The final section sketches how 
these plural forms of international engagement have influenced the political 
settlements in Myanmar.  
 
China in the Peacebuilding arena 
China’s absence from any discussion on the institutional design of inclusion, and its 
various pathways, is significant. It has also failed to give due consideration to the 
different modalities of SSR, and to concerns about human rights, or transitional justice.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, China’s role has been pragmatic, centred on 
forging elite pacts, and when it suits Chinese interests. However, while absent from 
normative and institutional debates, China’s broader engagement outside the peace 
process has impacted the three issue-arenas.  
 
Locating China’s Role in the Debate on Inclusion 
China has supported the inclusion of all EAOs in the dialogue process, and facilitated 
their participation in peace negotiations. Chinese authorities have argued that the 
inclusion of all EAOs in the dialogue process, with no party left out, especially non-




commitment to inclusion is limited to the participation in the dialogue process, in an 
attempt to forge an elite pact between the government and the EAOs. China has not 
contributed to the debate on inclusion through such powersharing mechanisms as 
federalism: a dominant theme in the peace process discussions. Despite Chinese 
ambivalence on shaping the federalism debate, its broader engagement in the wider 
political economy has had a salient impact.   
 
Firstly, China’s ambivalence on the political dialogue process, and its inconsistent 
position on the NCA, has impacted the discussion on federalism. While China has been 
vested in the NCA process, it has been ambivalent about the ensuing political dialogue 
process, which would have discussed such issues as federalism. China’s role in the 
NCA process has been indeed paradoxical. Although China clearly played a crucial 
role in ensuring the attendance of different groups of EAOs based in the North in the 
NCA process, often despite their initial hesitancy. In other instance, in 2015, China is 
said to have covertly dissuaded groups, like the UWSA and the KIO, from signing the 
NCA (Slodkowski, 2015). This is seen to stem from China’s decision to penalise the 
Thein Sein regime for their cancelling of such Chinese investments as the Myitsone 
dam project, so that the regime would not be accorded credit for any success in the 
peace process. A further reason, it is said, lay in its not wanting to surrender its 
dominance in the peace process, gained through its leverage on Northern EAOs. This 
was particularly the case after 2011, when China faced strategic competition from 
American and Japanese engagement in the peace process (Lintner, 2014; Myoe, 2015; 
Myint-U, 2016).This paradoxical position on the NCA inhibited the progress of the 
peace process from its first stage, of signing the NCA, to the second, where political 
dialogue on such issues as federalism would take place.  
   
More pragmatically, its often contradictory stance emerges from Beijing’s recognition 
that it needs both the EAOs, who command territories in the borderlands, and the 
government, to serve its interests, especially as the political dialogue is still ongoing, 
and no one party has emerged strong enough to command the entire territory of 
Myanmar. China, thus, is likely to advocate stability, which is in its interests, rather 




Myanmar (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). Not surprisingly, China’s focus has 
been on stability in the border areas, rather than a comprehensive dialogue, thus 
endangering such critical agenda as federalism (Interview with researcher, 13 July 
2017 (a), Yangon). This approach of ‘signing the NCA but not engaging on the 
political dialogue process’ differs from the major demands of EAOs, who have 
demanded a comprehensive political dialogue and not a mere ceasefire (Interview with 
civil society representative, 20 July 2017 (a), Yangon).  
 
It needs to be iterated that Beijing’s influence on EAOs is uneven, and some scholars 
attest that its impact on political settlement is often overstated (Interview with 
researcher, 23 November 2018, Yangon). Some EAOs, such as the KIO, have found 
Chinese dominance in the talks overbearing, despite their close association (Han, 
2017). Further the attacks by some rebel groups, affiliated to the FPNCC, and 
supported by the China-backed UWSA, in August 2019, call into question Chinese 
influence on the EAOs (Zaw, 2019a). As can be seen China certainly has the power to 
encourage EAOs to attend the peace talks, but perhaps not to influence the dialogue 
that determines the political settlement entirely (Interview with researcher, 23 
November 2018, Yangon). 
 
The second critical factor influencing the discussion of federalism is the scale of 
Chinese investment in various sectors including extractive industries, agriculture and 
plantations, and its infrastructure, which has impacted upon existing agreements 
between the EAOs and the government. Here, it is important to remember that 
equitable resource sharing, between ethnic states and the Centre, is one of the most 
salient issues within the debate on federalism. Much Chinese investment passes 
through contested areas, which may have ongoing fighting, or be governed by EAOs, 
or may be under interim arrangements (in the case of areas with a ceasefire). In this 
context, investment intersects with, and alters, the discussion on equitable resource 
sharing in at least three ways.  
 
In the first place, since Chinese investments have preceded agreements on federalism 




lost ownership, control and management of crucial natural resources (Interview with 
think-tank representative, 15 November, 2018, Yangon).  Discussions on equitable 
distribution of natural resources are still ongoing, and so far the principles, agreed for 
the Union Accord, do not contain clauses on natural resources management. 
Investments, therefore, are currently guided by clauses in the 2008 Constitution, and 
by the Constitutional amendments of 2015. This latter legislation made nascent 
attempts to devolve the responsibility for natural resource management, by giving the 
rights for licensing and revenue collection, from artisanal and small-scale extractive 
industries, to the regions and states (Bauer et al., 2018). However these are seen to be 
inadequate to the demands for greater control of natural resources (Bauer et al., 2018). 
 
Given all of the above, the current discussions on resource sharing seem futile. Fears 
of an impasse have also led civil society to demand that all large-scale development 
projects in ethnic states and border regions should be suspended, until the political 
dialogue has advanced and a sustainable peace is negotiated (Pyidaungsu Institute, 
2017).  
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Chinese investment projects across various regions and states 







Beyond the EAOs’ loss of ownership of natural resources, such investments also erode 
trust in political dialogue on federalism, and even contravene the commitment in the 
NCA. As shown in Figure 7, conflict-affected areas, such as Kachin and Shan states, 
continue to host extensive Chinese investments, including those embedded within the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) 
(Lwin, 2019a). Despite their prevalence in ethnic regions, Chinese investments such 
as these are formally agreed with Myanmar’s government, mostly with companies 
linked to the Tatmadaw. Bypassing the EAOs’ established decision-making system, 
has angered them (Donowitz, 2018; South et al., 2018). Such patterns of investments 
have also led to local frustration about the peace process, and the absence of peace 
dividends on the ground. Historically investments like these have been conducted in 
partnership with companies who have military links, militias in the borderlands, and 
ethnic armed groups. While they have benefited all sorts of elite groups, they have left 
the local population poor, often dispossessed of their land, and having to combat the 
effects of environmentally unsustainable investments (Hammond et al., 2019; Woods 
and Kramer, 2012). For instance, China’s development assistance on drug eradication, 
through subsidies to Chinese agro-enterprises to invest in opium substitution 
agricultural schemes in Northern Myanmar, has altered patterns of land ownership, 
and livelihoods, in Myanmar’s borderlands (Su, 2013b).  These subsidies have allowed 
Chinese businessmen to acquire tracts of land, and to convert them into private 
agricultural estates, all of which has had little impact on drug eradication, but has 
allowed the state to profit, to the detriment of the local people and the EAOs (Woods, 
2018). Further, some investment schemes have overlooked the cultural significance 
for local ethnic people. The Myitsone dam area, the planned site of the now-cancelled 
Myitsone dam, is the source of the Irrawaddy River and is seen as the birthplace of the 
Kachin people. Its construction would not only have had a disastrous environmental 
impact, but it would also have shown that the government could disregard the cultural 
symbol of the Kachin people (Zaw, 2019b). 
 
Chinese investments like these, which often lacked the necessary environmental 
safeguards, and assessment of the possible impact on local livelihoods, also contravene 




transfer of land from local populations’, ‘environmental conservation’, and 
‘consultation with local people on planning of projects in accordance with the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’ (Bell et al., 2017), and clearly the 
modalities of Chinese investments  do not meet these commitments. 
 
Yet another impact of such investments, usually deployed under the guise of 
‘development’, has been increased violence, and the militarisation of ethnic areas. In 
a bid to protect the areas where there are investments, armed troops are tasked with 
their security. Such actions have inhibited trust, with many EAOs and ethnic 
nationalities concluding that the military is using the peace process to consolidate its 
hold on areas with abundant natural resources, and expanding its control (Woods, 
2011). For instance, the KIO asserts that the most significant offensive by the 
Tatmadaw in 2018 occurred in areas where BRI-CMEC initiatives were being 
undertaken (Bu, 2018).  The KIO further stresses that the primary motive for this is to 
secure areas hosting Chinese investments (Bu, 2018).  
 
China, in contrast to the views held by many ethnic groups, views ‘developmental 
projects’ and economic incentives as a means of leading rebel groups to forgo their 
arms, pacify the borders, and ‘bring’ peace. Top sources within the peace process cite 
the views of Chinese officials, who are confident that Myanmar will be more peaceful 
after being a part of the BRI (Interview with JMC representative. 13 November, 2018, 
November). CMEC is designated as a vehicle to provide opportunities for EAOs to 
partake in developmental activities, thus weaning them away from violence. In this 
reading, considerations about the exclusion of ethnic nationalities, which have been at 
the heart of the conflict, are overlooked and an ‘apolitical’ form of development is 
advanced as a panacea.  
 
Finally, in addition to its ambivalence on the political dialogue on federalism, and its 
history of investment, China has also been an indirect inspiration for institutional 
design on federalism, alongside India. Rather than only being limited to such examples 
of federalism as the Canadian and Swiss models, which have been dominant in 




seen, by different groups, as sources of influence. Groups, such as the Wa, have 
advocated for an autonomous state, resembling that of China (Interview with think-
tank representative, 15 November, 2018, Yangon). Similarly, as Kin-minorities, the 
Kachin people have looked to China’s use of the minority Jinghpo language, in 
Dehong Dai and Jinpo Autonomous Prefecture, as a model for the promotion of 
minority culture (Han, 2016). It should be noted that some Western peacebuilding 
organisations have even organised visits of the EAOs, who are NCA signatories, to 
study India’s federal design (Interview with NGO representative, 12 November 2018, 
Yangon).  
 
China’s ambivalence towards federalism stands in contrast to its approach in Nepal, 
where it had an explicit anti-federal preference. Chinese ambivalence can be read 
through the prism of its pragmatic foreign policy engagement. Historically, China’s 
engagement, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, has been twin-fold. It has 
simultaneously dealt with such EAOs, as the Wa and the Kachin, in the periphery or 
the Northern borderlands, as well as with the military government in Yangon/ 
Naypyidaw at the centre (Li and Lye, 2009).  So for all practical purposes, China was 
and is already dealing with a federal type system, which has served its interests well. 
Thus, having built relationships with both factions, China sees no threat in debating 
federalism, nor does it view itself as having a stake in such debates. Further, this two-
pronged approach, of having a hold on the military as well as the EAOs, has also 
allowed China to be indispensable to the discussions on the political settlement.  
 
Locating Chinese Engagement on SSR 
Unlike peacebuilders, who have created the space for, and supported, the dialogue 
process to discuss different frameworks for SSR and DDR, China has not openly 
engaged on any SSR specific discussion, or put forward any preference. However, 
China’s entrenched engagement with both the Tatmadaw and EAOs, especially in the 
Northern borderlands, has a monumental impact on the debate on SSR.  
 




Tatmadaw to become a more professional force, and thus emerge more coherent and 
politically stronger, in comparison to the EAOs. As table 7 shows, China, Russia, and 
India, despite Western arms embargoes, have continued to export arms and equipment 
to the Tatmadaw between 2011and 2017 (SIPRI, n.d.). The table also points to the 
asymmetry in levels of defence engagement, between China and the rest of the world. 
The transfer of arms has included a vast array of weapons, including: aircraft, air 
defence systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, naval weapons, 
sensors, and ships.  
 
Table 7: International arms transfers to Myanmar since the peace process 
(Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database) 
 
Trend-indicator value (TIV) of arms exports to Myanmar, 2011-20184  
expressed in millions 
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China 277 254 190 64 184 169 8 105 1250 
France 
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16 
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11 11 22 
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Russia 380 144 55 28 12 
 
60 73 753 
Ukraine 7 
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Total 667 398 251 100 248 237 96 192 2188 
  
 
The series of defence deals have strengthened the capacity of the Tatmadaw to become 
more politically important in the conflict dynamics on the ground, at a time when 
 
4 SIPRI has developed a unique system to measure the volume of international transfers of 




discussions on SSR, as well as the Constitutional amendment process, have sought to 
limit the political role of the military (Myint, 2020). The cooperation on defence, with 
countries like China, also comes in a context where the military budget exceeds that 
for health, education and welfare combined, and the Tatmadaw continues to dominate 
the political architecture, inhibiting all prospects of democracy (Nakanishi, 2013). 
Through an increasing number of defence deals, China and India have contributed to 
Tatmadaw’s strengthening of itself (The Irrawaddy, 2018).   
 
Secondly, with the Rakhine Crisis, when the condemnation by Western countries 
escalated after 2017, calling for such measure as visa bans and arms embargoes, 
regional governments in India and China continued to roll out the red carpet, thus 
according the Tatmadaw continued regional legitimacy. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
therefore, at a time when the US was considering sanctions, and peacebuilders were 
discussing taking the Myanmar case to the International Criminal Court, Tatmadaw 
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation, with the 
Ministry of Defence in India, which sought to strengthen maritime security, medical 
cooperation, and jointly develop new infrastructures (Lwin, 2019b). China too not only 
accorded the Tatmadaw Chief Commander a guard-of-honour welcome, but also 
called for a strengthening of the China-Myanmar comprehensive strategic partnership 
(Xinhua, 2019). Regional legitimacy has not only helped balance the ostracisation by 
peacebuilding organisations, and the Western states in general, but also hedge on the 
peacebuilding community’s calls for accountability, on the violence in Rakhine. Not 
surprisingly, the Tatmadaw has thanked China ‘for its correct stance and standing 
against the international community over the Rakhine state issue’ (Tiezzi, 2019).  
 
By strengthening and conferring legitimacy to the Tatmadaw, China’s engagement in 
Myanmar is seen to have strengthened such state institutions as the military, and thus 
reinforced the centrality of state, an often cited argument on Chinese foreign policy 
(Alden and Large, 2015). However, the case of Myanmar also points to a selective use 
of this state-centric approach. China’s covert engagement, through formal and 
informal channels with EAOs in the Northern borderlands, contradicts its reputation 





China is seen to have ‘hedged its bets’, by not only supporting the Tatmadaw by 
military means, but also endorsing different armed groups, such as the UWSA, who 
control territories in Northern Myanmar. The UWSA has acquired sophisticated arms 
and machinery, including air defence systems, and manufacturing hubs for rifles, from 
China (Haacke, 2011). While the Tatmadaw has not been in active combat with the 
UWSA since the ceasefire in 1989, the military support provided by UWSA to other 
EAOs, such as the Arakan Army (AA), has led the arms race against the state to spiral.  
 
China has refuted reports of its selling weapons to the UWSA, citing that it has 
consistently, and strictly, adhered to ‘military equipment export policy that benefits 
the recipient country’s present defence needs, does not harm regional or world peace, 
security and stability, and that does not interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient 
country’ (Boehler, 2013a). However, credible evidence suggest that the UWSA bought 
military trucks and light weapons from China, in addition to it having supplied other 
ethnic militias in Shan and Kachin states with the same armaments (Slodkowski and 
Lee, 2016). Quite apart from the UWSA, other EAOs too have continued to rely on 
China, not only for weapons, but for their very existence, through networks of cross-
border trade, rations, medical care, and even safe havens (Interview with peace 
negotiator, 15 November 2018, Yangon).  
 
Such accusations have brought the focus on Beijing’s policy being undercut by formal 
and informal actors in Yunnan, who have compromised broader Chinese interests, 
especially in the context of the recently announced BRI, and have led China to revisit 
its Myanmar policy. It is believed to have led Beijing to tighten the control of its 
foreign policy, rather than delegate it to Yunnan (United States Institute of Peace, 
2018). However, given the fluidity of boundaries, as well as the pluralisation of foreign 
policy actors in China, private actors, both within and outside official channels, have 
continued to contribute to the conflict through arms exports, as well as mercenary 





Crucially, the diverse aims of China’s foreign policy complicate any genuine dialogue 
on SSR. China needs stability for its economic investments, and for border affairs. 
Consequently, any form of DDR exercise that could unite EAOs, and heal a 
fragmented political landscape, would help this endeavour. However, as any 
settlement of the conflict remains a distant hope for now, and EAOs continue to 
command large swathes of Northern borders, this very quest for stability demands a 
two-tiered engagement, both with the EAOs and with the military, in order to protect 
its interests, thus inhibiting any momentum for SSR. This contrasting form of 
engagement, where China, ‘plays with fire on one hand, and water on the other’ leads, 
to Myanmar taking one step forward in the debate on SSR and DDR, and two steps 
back (Interview with researcher, 23 November 2018, Yangon).  
 
Constraining International Mandate on Transitional Justice 
China has been largely silent on domestic debates and endeavours on human rights 
and accountability in Myanmar, but yet has had a significant impact in the international 
undertaking on the issue. Firstly, by funding all sides of the conflict, it has given all 
parties the means of violence, thereby contributing to the escalation of human rights 
violations. Further, through the enormity of its investments, in sectors like plantations, 
it has contributed to the large-scale dispossession of local people, and aggravated their 
human rights situation (Woods and Kramer, 2012).  
 
China’s most critical role however has been in blocking the possibility of any 
international body being able to elicit a commitment to accountability from the 
Tatmadaw. Even before the peace process, China shielded the Tatmadaw through 
vetoes at the UN. When Myanmar was called out for its human rights abuses, China’s 
defended the issue as an ‘internal affair’ of Myanmar (United Nations, 2007). 
Similarly, in August 2012, UN Special Rapporteur Quintana called for the 
establishment of a truth commission, to investigate Myanmar's human rights abuses as 
it undergoes political and economic reform. However, when the United States, and 
many other countries, backed the creation of a UN inquiry into Myanmar's violations 




the move, citing it as counterproductive (Tan, 2012).  
 
China’s shielding of the Tatmadaw from international attention continued in the 
aftermath of the Rakhine crisis. China’s statements at the UN, on the various 
discussions on Rakhine, are indicative of its engagement issues on transitional justice. 
In 2017, at the Security Council, in the discussion on Myanmar’s response to the 
Rakhine crisis, the Chinese Ambassador expressed condemnation of the violent attacks 
by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ASRA), and noted China’s ‘support for 
Myanmar’s efforts to maintain stability’ (Haitao, 2017).  Further, it attributed ‘poverty’ 
to be the source of turmoil, and called the international community to view ‘the 
difficulties and challenges facing the Government of Myanmar objectively, remain 
patient and provide support and help’ (Haitao, 2017). In 2018, when the Security 
Council met to hear from the independent international fact-finding mission on 
Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council, China was firstly opposed to the 
meeting itself, on the grounds that it was outside the mandate of the Security Council. 
Here, Ambassador Ma Zhaoxu remarked to the Security Council, ‘The primary 
responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. 
It should not get involved with country specific human rights issues’ (Zhaoxu, 2018).  
Through its statements, it has sought to prevent the internationalisation of the scale of 
human rights violations in Myanmar, as well as to deflect attention from the military’s 
abuses, in order to frame it as an issue of ‘poverty’.   
 
India has been in broad agreement with China on the Rakhine issue. India, too, has 
highlighted the terrorist attack by the ARSA, while choosing to ignore the military’s 
large-scale human rights violations. India’s focus on the ARSA is seen to derive from 
its close links to international terrorist networks, such as Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
which New Delhi holds responsible for the 2008 terror attacks on Mumbai.  By 
focusing on these issues, India has obscured the excessive force in the Tatmadaw’s 
actions (Bhaumik, 2017).  
 
The Indian and Chinese approaches, while distinct to those of the peacebuilders, as 




for a legacy of past violence, through transitional justice mechanisms. In Myanmar, 
peacebuilders find themselves, and their level of investment in the peace process, to 
be too marginal to exert any influence for promoting such a contentious agenda as 
transitional justice, which directly implicates the military. Interviews with 
peacebuilders revealed that discussions on transitional justice are ‘a non-starter’ in 
Myanmar (Interviews, July 2017, November 2018, Yangon). On the domestic front, 
Myanmar representatives of peace institutions are aware of the shortcomings of the 
transitional justice regime, and its poor rate of success internationally. They cite the 
dismal performance of transitional justice internationally, as being the reason why 
there is no desire to pursue it domestically (Interview with peace negotiator, 15 
November 2018, Yangon). 
 
Patterns of Interaction with Liberal Peacebuilding 
Projects: Differences in Modalities of Support 
China has united with peacebuilders in encouraging groups to sign the NCA, and in 
the joint funding of some peace institutions. However, their respective approaches 
have been distinct, apart from in these select areas. There are differences in modalities 
of engagement, as well as in the strength of their support in the process. The very 
modalities of Chinese engagement leave little space for any convergence with 
peacebuilders, and rather create spaces for active contestation, which are discussed in 
the section below.  
 
No Prescriptions versus Prescriptive Norms and Institutions  
A distinctive aspect of Chinese engagement has been the absence of details, 
conditionality, and prescriptions attached to its support. Despite its unwarranted 
influence and unparalleled position in the mediation and facilitation process, between 
EAOs and the government, China’s only concern has been to bring parties to the table 
and then let them do the talking (Interview with JMC representative, 13 November 
2018, Yangon). It wants some form of stability in the border areas, and has encouraged 




not specify anything beyond this. As a senior mediator in the peace process remarked, 
‘China does not specify any detail on issues, they encourage all parties to sign the 
ceasefire, facilitate travel but do not propose solutions’ (Interview with JMC 
representative, 13 November 2018, Yangon). He further added, ‘China does not get 
involved in everyday aspects of the peace process’. China has largely refrained from 
prescribing on ‘how to do things’. 
 
This contrasts with a solution-based normative approach, adopted by liberal 
peacebuilders, which supports embedding international law, and good global practice 
to different elements of the peace process. This template-based, prescriptive approach 
is deployed in the form of technical assistance on policies, and the design of 
institutions. Peacebuilders have advised on normative content in the NCA.  Guided by 
the norm of inclusion as a pathway for stability, peacebuilders have supported training 
and workshops on federalism; supported the publication of policy briefs, and reports, 
to discuss issues such as human rights, and minority rights; in addition to assisting 
civil society organisations to discuss issues related to the peace process (Interview with 
NGO representative, 12 November, 2018, Yangon). Peacebuilders have also 
advocated for the government to sign different international accords and legal 
instruments, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, or Ottawa Convention 
(Interview with peacebuilding funder, 12 July 2017, Yangon). Donors, such as the EU, 
have also focused on strengthening such institutions as the Myanmar Peace Centre 
(MPC), which coordinated different aspects of the peace process, alongside building 
the capacity of such institutions as the Election Commission (NORAD, n.d).  
 
In addition, peacebuilders have relied on liberal norms to endorse, or delegitimise, 
developments in the peace process. For instance, in the aftermath of the crisis in 
Rakhine, the UN, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and some NGOs, pressed for 
‘amending citizenship law, and granting more human rights concessions’ (Interview 
with Member of Parliament, 18 November 2018, Yangon). Further, in their support 
for interim arrangements governing ceasefire areas, there have been calls by 
peacebuilding actors, to merge the government system with that of EAOs on issues of 




decentralisation agenda being discussed in the Parliament, to the federalism agenda 
being discussed in the peace process, to ensure greater gains for the latter (Interview 
with researcher, 21 November 2018 (c), Yangon). Peacebuilders are also said to have 
severely restricted the scope of their engagement, in the aftermath of the Rakhine 
crisis, given their normative consideration of human rights violations (Interview with 
political analyst, 20 July 2017 (b), Yangon). 
 
Contrastingly, China has not condemned, or critiqued, the Myanmar government’s 
decision on specifics of the peace process. Comparing the two approaches, a senior 
mediator in the process remarked, ‘when the Chinese give money, they don’t ask for 
receipt or want to see the money again. When the Westers states give a dime, they 
want a range of normative commitments to be added, ranging from minority rights, to 
gender norms like Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)’ (Interview with JMC representative, 13 November 2018, 
Yangon). The absence of prescription is also related to China wanting to appear 
distinct. In discussing the non-prescriptive nature of Chinese assistance, the Chinese 
Ambassador to Myanmar, noted, ‘China’s financial aid would be very different from 
the aid offered by other states. There will be no strings attached for the aid-political or 
otherwise’ (Soe, 2017). 
 
Prioritisation of Conflict Actors and State Institutions 
Chinese engagement, unlike the multi-faceted engagement of peacebuilders, is focused 
on formal and informal engagement with EAOs in the North, and the Government at 
the Centre.  So, apart from its engagement with Northern EAOs, China concentrates 
on dealing with state representatives and government directly (Interview with peace 
negotiator, 15 November 2018, Yangon). Even amongst the EAOs, Chinese 
engagement is largely uneven and divided, with stronger interactions with EAOs 
across the Northern border, and limited interactions with EAOs in other parts of the 
country (Interview with researcher, 23 November 2018, Yangon). The government-
centred approach of Chinese engagement is said to make it more formal, in contrast to 




process. In its formalised approach, centred on conflict actors and the government, it 
is symbolic that the Chinese embassy is based in Naypyidaw, the new capital of 
Myanmar, while all other Western embassies and organisations continue to be based 
in Yangon.5 Though there have been efforts to diversify its engagement, across civil 
society organisations (CSOs), opposition groups, and the media (Li and Lye, 2009c), 
it has not yet percolated to the domain of the peace process.  
 
Unlike China, whose funding has been limited to governmental peace institutions, such 
as the JMC and the NRPC; liberal peacebuilders have relied on layers of 
intermediaries, ranging from bilateral aid agencies and multilateral channels, to 
international and local NGOs in the country. Apart from its relations with EAOs, 
China’s engagement is through formal governmental routes. In contrast, peacebuilders 
have been categorically opposed to disbursing aid through government channels, in 
light of the undemocratic nature of its governance. A DFID review noted, ‘None of 
our aid will be provided directly through central government, instead through United 
Nations organisations, trusted international and local NGOs’ (DFID, 2015).  The 
expanded and dispersed matrix of liberal peacebuilding agents, ranging from donors 
and international NGOs to political foundations, have been able to engage with and 
build the critical mass for peace in Myanmar, including exiles who have studied abroad 
and returned, and the educated citizens in urban areas. Further, given the priority of 
peacebuilders on ‘civil society as a key pillar of development and peace building 
programs’, they have been able to engage, fund, and support civil society groups across 
the country, and at various levels (Paung Sie Facility, 2018, Pg. 69).  
 
 
5 In 2005, the military government decided to suddenly move the capital from Yangon to 
Naypyidaw leaving observers to debate the rationale for the move. Large numbers of 
Western embassies, and organisations were based in Yangon during my fieldwork, though 
the NLD government has been actively encouraging foreign embassies and multilateral 




Pragmatic and Evolving versus Rigid and Template-based Approach 
The nature of Chinese engagement has been pragmatic: designed to address its core 
interests in the changing context of Myanmar. This sense of pragmatism has also 
ensured that Chinese engagement has evolved and fluctuated.  
 
China’s approach has been so pragmatic that, as Sinologists in Myanmar point out, 
before the breakdown of the ceasefires in the Northern areas in late 2000s, leading to 
conflict spilling over the border, China was not interested in the war or in attempts to 
make peace in Myanmar (Interview with researcher, 23 November 2018, Yangon). 
Interest in the war, and the need for some form of peace, only came to China’s attention 
when its own stability was at stake. China itself has linked the centrality of the peace 
process to its own stability. A Chinese Ambassador in Myanmar remarked, ‘Peace 
process is not just a grave concern of Myanmar but also a grave concern of China, 
because in the past years, China suffered a lot from the conflicts in the northern part 
of Myanmar…When the conflicts broke out bullets and shells flew from the Myanmar 
side to the Chinese side on many occasions. Many Chinese lost their lives or were 
injured. We are very concerned about that.’ (Liang, 2017). Further, the engagement in 
the peace process is said to have only intensified after the reform period in 2011 
(Interview with researchers, 23 November 2018; 13 July 2017(a), Yangon). This is 
attributed to China’s preoccupation with a possible loss of dominance in Myanmar, 
given the latter’s rapid engagement with the West, and its opening its doors to a 
multitude of peacebuilders. It is also seen to stem from the period, when a large number 
of substantial Chinese investments, thought to be central to China’s foreign policy, 
such as the BRI-CMEC, made forays into Myanmar (Interview with researchers, 23 
November 2018; 13 July 2017(a), Yangon). 
 
China’s pragmatic approach is also evident in the changes it has introduced to engage 
better in the rapidly changing context of Myanmar. Aware of the loss of monopoly in 
Myanmar, post 2011, China has sought to strengthen its engagement. China nominated 
a senior diplomat as its Asian Affairs representative, in addition to encouraging direct 
communication with local populations, as testified by the Chinese Embassy in 




engagement has focused on the military (Chenyang and Char, 2016; Lu and Jin, 2016). 
To combat the backlash against Chinese investment projects, it has promoted drafting 
‘environmental’ standards guidelines for outward investing companies, and made it a 
requirement that Chinese enterprises in Myanmar must have been approved by the 
relevant provincial or city commercial department (Chenyang & Char, 2016). 
Additionally, it has strengthened relations with Myanmar’s opposition, and reached 
out to civil society groups (Chenyang & Char, 2016). This diversification of relations 
with other actors is seen to be a necessity, at a time when political power has devolved 
away from the military, but a political settlement remains far. Similarly, there have 
been frank appraisals about local backlashes against Chinese investments in the past, 
as the former Chinese ambassador Yang Houlan to Myanmar admitted, ‘We are not so 
experienced on how to communicate with local people, how to make more feasibility 
studies on the environment and issues connected with local peoples’ welfare'. He 
further added that Chinese firms could learn from how Western companies approach 
foreign investment (Mclaughin, 2013). Such pragmatism, and the readiness to re-
strategise in the face of failure, is also noted in the peace process, where China, despite 
its democratic inclination, has engaged with the Aung San Suu Kyi government post 
2015, with the same enthusiasm as it did with the Tatmadaw-led governments until 
2010.  
 
Liberal peacebuilding, in contrast, seems to be unable to adapt, or take alternative 
forms of doing things into account, and continues with a standardised ‘ IKEA flat-
pack- like’ type of peace design, with the same projects and components despite 
differences in contexts (Mac Ginty, 2008). Similar modes of support are evident in 
Nepal and Myanmar, albeit in varying intensity, despite the difference in contexts. This 
mode of support has relied on the familiar staples of: technical and financial assistance; 
the endorsement and legitimisation of particular policies; support to interim structures; 
the improvement of knowledge bases on the issues; and finally building normative 
space to discuss issues that fit within the ‘liberal’ way of doing things (Interviews, July 
2017; November 2018, Yangon). While peacebuilders do acknowledge the unique 
context of Myanmar, the level of innovation and pragmatism that this ‘contextual’ 





Further, strong ideological positions on issues and actors inhibit a pragmatic 
undertaking, which is a pre-requisite for tailored and contextual support to the peace 
processes. For instance, peacebuilders wearing their democracy and human rights 
‘hat’, found it difficult to engage with the military, especially in light of the Rakhine 
crisis. However, the top-down nature of the transition in Myanmar demands the 
military to be engaged, and necessitates that ‘outdated preconceptions, particularly 
about the military, have to be abandoned’(Oo, 2015). Not surprisingly, despite their 
distrust of the Tatmadaw, in general the peace process in Myanmar flourished, during 
the tenure of Thein Sein’s quasi-military government, while is said to in ‘hibernation’ 
during the tenure of that of Suu Kyi, despite the latter’s democratic credentials 
(Dunant, 2019). Further, the peacebuilders solely focusing on Suu Kyi (until 2017) is 
seen to have promoted ‘one-party democracy rather than multi-party democracy’ 
(Interview with activist, 16 November 2018, Yangon).  
 
Development versus Human Rights and other Liberal Norms as 
Pathways to Peace 
Contrary to the peacebuilders who, like the EAOs, have seen exclusion as the driving 
force behind the conflict, China has consistently framed the problems in Myanmar as 
‘developmental’. The grievances of EAOs are seen to emanate from a ‘lack of 
development’, rather than underlying political issues of exclusion (Donowitz, 2018). 
This has also helped justify increased Chinese investments in ethnic areas.  BRI, thus, 
is pitched by Chinese sources, as a solution, which will herald peace in the region, by 
incentivising EAOs to give up arms, and join the fold of economic development 
(Interview with JMC representative, 13 November 2018, Yangon). The Chinese vision 
of development, has complemented the Burmese regime’s justification of its 
counterinsurgency in border areas, as  ‘development-for-peace ’ (Woods, 2011). This 
version of development is ‘anti-political’ in its foundation (Kiik, 2016). It further 
obscures the underlying political intent of insurgencies, but also contrasts with the 
ethno-national demands of EAOs, who seek to finalise the discussion on resource 




to the fore.  In fact, even in areas under a ceasefire, such developmental activities have 
not only been flashpoints of low-scale conflict, but also have led EAOs to accuse the 
government of prioritising ‘development over peace’ (Mathieson, 2020).  
 
This ‘developmental’ focus contrasts with the peacebuilders’ approach, where such 
groups as the EU see the primary challenge in Myanmar to be: ‘consolidating 
democracy, promoting ethnic peace and reconciliation, advancing constitutional 
reforms, institution building and security sector reform, and promoting the rule of law 
and human rights’ (European Commission, 2016). Similarly, the JPF, a leading 
peacebuilding consortium, sees peace as being reached through a holistic endeavour: 
‘through agreements and strengthened stakeholders, institutions, and processes’ (Joint 
Peace Fund, 2016). Such different framing of the conflict has also impacted 
approaches to its resolution, with China focusing on development while the 
peacebuilders focus on policy reform and institution building to accommodate the 
issue of exclusion. Groups, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
have also supported developmental endeavours by funding infrastructure projects in 
ceasefire areas, but their support, which is largely in the form of loans, is miniscule in 
comparison to China’s.   
 
Differences in the Strength of International Engagement  
A clear core difference in Myanmar is the level of access and influence. Building on 
the legacy of sanctions, the leverage of peacebuilders is hampered by their absence of 
contextual understanding, as well as their having to build new partnerships on the 
ground, despite domestic groups calling for a greater involvement of peacebuilders 
(Kumbun, 2019b).    
 
This contrasts with the Chinese approach, where its formal and informal links across 
the country with all the power brokers, make it indispensable to the peace process. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, even when the Myanmar government was 
unsuccessful in persuading such groups as the UWSA to join the NCA talks, China 




change its decision, and allow the AA, the TNLA and the MNDAA to attend the peace 
talks (The Irrawaddy, 2017). In fact, the military is seen to abide by Chinese 
involvement, because of China’s ability to put pressure on Northern groups to join the 
NCA (Vrieze, 2017).  In turn, China has also been able to use these Northern-based 
groups, to influence the peace process in ways that limit the engagement of 
peacebuilders, and Western states in general. For instance, Northern-based EAOs have 
expressed concern over the undue involvement of the US, the UK, the EU, and Japan 
in the peace process, despite other EAOs calling for greater Western engagement 
(Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2015).  
 
This contrasts with the abysmal levels of influence and access of peacebuilders to 
conflict actors, such as senior Tatmadaw officers, and the Northern EAOs. Thus the 
engagement of peacebuilders has largely been in ceasefire areas with those EAOs who 
have signed the NCA (Interview with peacebuilding consultant, 10 July 2017 (b), 
Yangon). Peacebuilders have engaged military representatives in the NCA process to 
a small degree, with trainings and study trips for some members of the Tatmadaw, on 
DDR/ SSR related themes (Thiha, 2017). However, the level of access and influence 
of peacebuilding organisations on senior members of the Tatmadaw is said to be 
extremely limited. Similarly, unlike Nepal, where peacebuilders dominated the 
‘policy’ realm of peacebuilding, there has been resistance to the deeper participation 
of peacebuilders within government and policy systems. As an insider to the peace 
process pointed out, ‘there were calls by the international community to imbed 
international experts within some peace infrastructure like the JMC, which were 
refused by the government’ (Interview, 13 November 2018, Yangon). Finally, while 
groups, such as the KIO, are seen to engage better with peacebuilders, and the West 
generally, peacebuilders are seen to have limited access to other Northern groups like 
the UWSA.  China, in turn, is least interested in EAOs on the Southern borders, many 






Avenues of Contestation 
Given the differences in modalities, and the non-involvement of China in shaping, and 
engaging with the agenda of the peace process on an everyday level, there are limited 
avenues for joint engagement. Further, China does not attend the joint forums or donor 
consortiums on the peace process, which has limited even basic avenues of discussion. 
When Chinese representatives do attend a few donor forums, they are ‘reluctant 
engagers- taking rather than giving information’ (Interview with peacebuilding funder, 
12 July 2017, Yangon). Thus, as mentioned before, the only forum that sees China and 
peacebuilders unite is the mediation and facilitation of processes that have led to an 
elite pact in the form of the NCA. Here, China, along with other Western countries 
supporting peacebuilding programmes, have all been formal witnesses in the processes 
(Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2015).  
 
These limited avenues of engagement have, in instances, led to active contestation 
between China and the peacebuilders, and more generally the Western states 
supporting the political transition. This contestation, firstly, is said to emerge out of 
China’s guardedness about the increased international presence in Myanmar since the 
peace process. Several Chinese sources have tended to see the diversified matrix of 
international presence in Myanmar to be detrimental to its bilateral relations. Li 
Zuocheng, a member of China’s Central Military Commission, stated: ‘The border 
security and peace and stability in northern border of Myanmar are crucial for both 
countries. Acts of any organisation that can negatively impact on bilateral relations 
between the two countries, will not be accepted.’ (Jiayao, 2019). Similarly, China’s 
President Xi remarked that,  ‘Sino-Burmese friendship should not ‘be disturbed by 
external forces,’ reflecting China’s growing concern over Western influence in 
Myanmar (Boehler, 2013b). In fact, one of the factors, determining the low level of 
engagement of the US in the political transition in Myanmar, is said to be China’s 
opposition to a greater role (United States Institute of Peace, 2018).  
 
In the peace process, China has sought to veto processes which call for wider 
international participation (Chow and Easley, 2015). When different EAOs proposed 




Norway, China only supported for the UN and itself to be formal witnesses (Sein, 
2016). While maintaining uneasy relations with the Western states, China with its 
power of veto at the Security Council, appears to be more comfortable in engaging 
with the UN than with individual Western countries, or regional blocs (Alexandra and 
Lanteigne, 2017). More pertinently, it has been critical about peacebuilders, and 
peacebuilding projects, in Northern border areas, as well as in areas of large 
investments, such as Rakhine state (Interview with peacebuilding funder, 12 July 2017, 
Yangon). China has advised its Myanmar counterparts that they did not want to see 
‘white faces’ in border areas, and advised some Northern EAOs not to maintain links 
with the West (Interview with activist, 13 November 2018, Yangon). In fact, 
relationships with the West, and the various peacebuilding organisations supported by 
the West, has also been an important variable in how China relates to different EAOs 
in Northern Myanmar. For instance, although they are one of the largest Northern 
based EAOs, China has taken exception to the predominantly Christian Kachin, who 
are seen as pro-Western, given that they have sought engagement with the 
peacebuilders (Sun, 2012b).  
 
Yet another point of contestation has been the role of civil society organisations, which 
have used the space, which opened up after the reform in 2011, to raise their voices 
against Chinese investments. Since 2011, civil society groups have protested over 
large-scale Chinese investment for land grabs, violation of labour rights, 
environmental damage, and insufficient compensation (Mark and Zhang, 2017). While 
the Myitsone dam is the highest-profile case, resulting in the project being shelved by 
the Thein Sein government, there have been local backlashes against many other 
Chinese-funded projects, such as the Letpadaung Copper Mine. China has viewed the 
response in Myanmar as influenced by Western-backed NGOs (Interview with 
professor, 22 December 2017 (a), Sichuan). The Chinese media, in turn, credits the US 
with the suspension of the Myitsone dam construction (Steinberg, 2016). Further, 
Chinese scholars have routinely attributed this averseness to Chinese investments to 
Western states, and those civil society groups funded by them, in order to eliminate 
China’s economic advantage in Southeast Asia. They argue that: ‘the US and some 




Chinese investment in Myanmar as a plunder of natural resources, claimed non-
performance of social responsibility, caused environmental destruction and created no 
benefit for the people…Affected by these opinions, some Burmese treat Chinese 
investments with an extremely idealistic attitude... ‘ (Shihong, 2014, Pg 181).  
 
Limitations of Liberal Peacebuilding Projects 
While undercut by the role of China, as well as by the nature of transition, the impact 
of liberal peacebuilders in Myanmar needs to be evaluated against their own portfolios 
of work and effectiveness. Despite starting almost anew, there have been areas where 
peacebuilders have made their impact felt, while in other areas, their operational 
deficiencies, including the diffused nature of peacebuilding projects, encompassing 
myriad issue areas, have hindered their ability to influence processes. 
 
Limits of Capacity Building 
Peacebuilding assistance in Myanmar appears to be much more valued, in comparison 
to Nepal, because it is viewed as devoid of external political interference, generous, 
and reasonably well targeted (Wilson, 2017). In interviews, respondents discussed how 
technical assistance, through creating evidence bases on peace process issues; bringing 
comparative examples from post-conflict states; and deploying experts on issues such 
as federalism and SSR; have all been helpful to the EAOs, and civil society groups, in 
articulating their own narrative on such issues as exclusion. Examples of EAO leaders, 
referencing their knowledge of the federal experiences of South Africa, Nepal, South 
Sudan, and Northern Ireland, to frame their demands, shows that technical support 
from peacebuilders has some impact (Gasser et al., 2016). Through international 
experience, trainings, and expertise, peacebuilders have been able to build a normative 
space for citizens, at all levels, to socialise with norms of inclusion and powersharing, 
as well as civilian supremacy and human rights amongst others. The significance of 
these methods was testified to, as many respondents tended to reference reports by 




SSR.  Those cited included the International Crisis Group, the Asia Foundation, and 
Saferworld. 
 
However, peacebuilders are seen to focus mainly on EAOs, leading some to view 
liberal peacebuilders as ‘opposition centric’ (Interview with peace negotiator, 15 
November 2018, Yangon). This has, in turn, led many people to see the demands and 
agendas made by the EAOs, as driven more by the peacebuilders, than by domestic 
conditions in Myanmar. As a think tank leader remarked, ‘When we attend conferences 
like Panglong, some distinctive and infeasible ideas are floated by EAOs on the role 
of the Army or the modalities of federalism, and we know these to be the result of 
‘technical advice’ by Western NGOs and experts’ (Interview, 21 November 2018 (a), 
Yangon).  This tendency to view peacebuilding support, as being solely to the 
advantage of EAOs, not only deepens the schisms between the dominant Bamar groups 
and the EAOs, but also leads to peacebuilding itself being seen as biased, potentially 
leading to an elite backlash. 
 
Further, capacity building in itself has also been seen as a double-edged sword. While 
beneficial in itself, it has resulted in endless foreign trips and workshops for people, 
who should be focused on meeting their own constituencies, and taking up their issues 
(Interview with NGO representative, 12 November 2018, Yangon). A more 
fundamental problem has also been that, while the support of liberal peacebuilders to 
the EAOs angers the elites, the marginal nature of the support provided is not sufficient 
to significantly change the political settlements in favor of marginalized groups. 
 
Technical Fixes on Institutions and Norms 
Peacebuilders have continued to valorise technical aspects of building institutions, and 
the ensuring of legal compliance to norms, overlooking the incompatibility between 
these institutions and the power held by such groups as the Tatmadaw (Khan, 2010). 
Further, these interventions have been designed based on the logic that capacity 
building on issues like SSR/ DDR, federalism, and human rights, will lead to their 
adoption as institutions. The incompatibility, between the institutions supported and 





For instance, peacebuilders have funded projects on police reform, promoting the rule 
of law, access to justice, in addition to educational courses for the Tatmadaw on 
civilian oversight, and human rights amongst others (Interview with SSR expert, 21 
July 2017 (a), Yangon). Owing partly to the engagement of peacebuilders, the 
Tatmadaw today, increasingly references, and uses, the terminology of SSR/ DDR. At 
the 2016 Union Peace Conference, the Senior General of the Tatmadaw indicated, ‘We 
will have to practise DDR and SSR in line with the expectation of the international 
community’ (Jolliffe, 2017). However, how much of this socialisation to different 
concepts translates into a definite uptake of SSR remains debatable, especially as the 
Tatmadaw has been against any action that could weaken its political role (Myint, 
2020). The compromise for liberal peacebuilders is then, to support less contentious 
issues, such as the support of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, in preventing and 
controlling the use of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw, by identifying, verifying, 
discharging and reintegrating them (United Nations, 2014).  As SSR is deeply 
entrenched into the political settlement of Myanmar, without an unravelling of the 
political settlement SSR might just be a ‘technical fix’.  
 
The focus on technical fixes, based on norms and the prioritisation of institutions, is 
seen to have ignored the ‘needs on the ground’. The support by liberal peacebuilders 
is seen to be completely inadequate, when compared to the normative and procedural 
compliance required. For instance, civil society groups complain that the bureaucratic 
measures of, writing lengthy funding applications; conforming to funding priorities; 
and partnerships with international NGOs, all make the support of peacebuilders rigid, 
and unable to respond to the evolving needs on ground (Interview with activist, 13 
November 2018, Yangon). Even the value of such institutions, overwhelmingly 
supported by peacebuilders, is beginning to be questioned by donors themselves. For 
instance, encouraged by donors, the JMC had been expanding its organisation, through 
strengthening its bureaucratic system and building offices at different local levels, to 
be able to effectively monitor the peace process. However, over the years, donors have 
been frustrated by the fact that, despite these institutions on the ground, the JMC has, 




representative, 12 November 2018, Yangon).   
 
Self-appraisal of Marginality  
There is a self-realisation of their marginality and timidity amongst peacebuilders. For 
one, the crisis in Rakhine, and the subsequent discussion of sanctions for Myanmar in 
Western capitals, has dissuaded liberal peacebuilders from continuing to engage, with 
the same level of interest. The Rakhine crisis has also furthered the mistrust between 
the government and the peacebuilders, which has made their engagement more 
marginal. This is complemented by the lack of welcome accorded to peacebuilders 
after 2015, when Suu Kyi came to power. Additionally, with little interaction with 
powerful factions in the process, such as the EAOs in the North as well as the military, 
the focus of peacebuilders is largely only on ceasefire areas and groups. Moreover, 
peacebuilders see themselves as bringing little financial support to the process, thus 
reducing their scope of engagement. A statement from the head of a peacebuilding 
consortium reinforces this marginality, ‘We give approximate 120 million to the peace 
process. However, if one legalises the jade industry in Myanmar, it will be able to 
generate much more than the 120 million. So the Myanmar government does not really 
need the money’ (Interview, 10 July 2017(a), Yangon). Unlike Nepal, the monetary 
aspect is largely seen as too little, which emboldens the government, subverting any 
undue pressure to adopt the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ paradigm wholeheartedly. The 
absence of a comprehensive contextual understanding of Myanmar is a further barrier. 
Given the history of sanctions, any useful knowledge about the situation only really 
began to be acquired after 2011.  
 
This has impacted on the ability of peacebuilders to promote such contentious issues 
as transitional justice. When questioned, as to why it had not received an equal level 
of prioritisation as in other contexts, a representative of a key donor organisation, 
stated that their ‘funding the monitoring of the ceasefire’ could be seen as a form of 
transitional justice (Interview, 12 July 2017, Yangon). This stretching of the concept 
of transitional justice to suit their marginality, has forced peacebuilders to make peace 
with a ‘good-enough transitional justice’, which, as cited by the representative 




peacebuilders at their weakest, in classifying ‘monitoring’ as a form of 
‘accountability’. With the limited role of western actors, it can be seen that difficult 
questions such as accountability or confronting the past, would not be asked.  
 
Impact of International Engagement in Myanmar’s 
Political Settlement 
The differences in modalities of engagement between China and liberal peacebuilders, 
as well as the vested interest of Chinese engagement, has brought stresses to the 
political settlement but also opened up routes to autonomy. The peace process allowed 
the Tatmadaw to neutralise the diverse forms of internal opposition: the democratic 
opposition, as well as the opposition of a host of EAOs. It also opened the doors for 
Western engagement. In doing so, the peace process has further addressed the 
Tatmadaw’s core concern about dependence on China, and allowed for the 
management of Chinese influence, through strategic diversification (Goh and 
Steinberg, 2016). Today, as Myanmar’s generally stagnant peace process approaches 
its tenth year, it is seen as a case of ‘authoritarian resilience’, where the top-down 
process of liberalisation by the Tatmadaw has also allowed for limiting and containing 
the scope of the transition (Cassani et al., 2019). Given that the impact of plural forms 
of engagement, on issues of inclusion, SSR, and transitional justice, all of which are 
central to the political settlement, have yet to be finalised, this section documents how 
the Tatmadaw has harnessed plural forms of international engagement to its advantage, 
in the process of re-negotiating the political settlements.   
 
Transforming Conditionality on Political Settlements to Opportunities 
Plural forms of international engagement have undoubtedly brought stresses to the 
political settlement. The engagement of peacebuilders has brought pressure to bear for 
a degree of political liberalisation, leading to initiating a comprehensive dialogue with 
the EAOs, and for the first time, a compromise on demands such as federalism (Aung, 
2016). This has brought a limited change in the political settlement, both at a horizontal 




of executive powersharing; as well as at the vertical level, where the contract between 
state and the wider society has been reformed.  The political freedom, evident in forms 
of political mobilisation, freedom of press, increased space for civil society groups, 
evidences this limited change, relative to the situation pre-2011. In that sense, there 
has been an element of distribution of power away from the Tatmadaw.  
 
Similar stresses have been brought by Chinese engagement. The very essence of Sino-
Myanmar relations has been premised on a ‘marriage of convenience’, where China 
has sheltered Myanmar from international scrutiny, amid calls for an international 
investigation  of human rights violations, and Myanmar has responded with favourable 
treatment of Chinese security and business interests (International Crisis Group, 2009). 
In the peace process, despite overwhelmingly negative views of Chinese investments, 
and although the government in Naypyidaw has shelved some projects funded by 
China, nevertheless it has continued to court Chinese investments. Unsurprisingly, 
China continues to be the largest investor in Myanmar (Zhang and Yao, 2018). Further, 
despite distrust of China as regards its relationship with EAOs, Myanmar governments 
have been bound to accept Chinese facilitation and mediation, which in turn places 
China as the most dominant player in the peace process.  
 
However, the co-existence of plural forms of international engagement, that lack any 
point of agreement and are even in opposition to each other in some areas, has 
presented Myanmar’s elites with unprecedented opportunities. Firstly, plural forms of 
engagement have allowed them to benefit from both. Myanmar has benefitted from 
the international legitimacy and support brought by liberal peacebuilders, which also 
has helped to bolster its domestic legitimacy. However, it has also continued to benefit 
through investments, grants, as well as military cooperation from China. While 
benefitting from multiple international participants, the Tatmadaw, and the 
government in general, have also protected themselves from international pressures by 
co-opting these international actors.  
 
Here, co-opting liberal peacebuilders has been facilitated by their marginality, along 




committed to liberal values, including democracy and inclusion, as evident in the NCA 
(Bell et al., 2017). The Tatmadaw speaks the language of Security Sector Reform, and 
has constructed an elaborate peace process edifice for Myanmar, involving the 
UPDJC, the JMC, and the MPC (now the NRPC) (Petrie and South, 2013).  However, 
despite institutional commitments, the Tatmadaw continues to dominate formally, 
through Constitutional guarantees that sustain its dominance, and informally, through 
its entrenchment in the wider economy.  
 
This co-option of international engagement in Myanmar is facilitated by two critical 
factors: Myanmar’s geostrategic location, and its reservoir of multiple resources. Amid 
China’s rise, and the resulting competition of the U.S. and China for influence in 
Southeast Asia, countries in the West have facilitated greater engagement in countries 
such as Myanmar (Han, 2018). The peace process thus provided a perfect pretext to 
again initiate engagement with Myanmar. Similarly, as the peace process continued, 
the UN’s concerns about Myanmar retreating into isolation and reversing the 
democratic process, led peacebuilders not only to ‘rock the boat’ too much, but also 
tolerate some level of co-option (Interview with UN representative, July 25 2017, 
Yangon). This geo-strategic importance has been even more pertinent for China. 
Myanmar’s centrality to BRI, as well as a broader quest for access to the Indian ocean, 
has recently changed the previous asymmetry between China and Myanmar (Sun, 
2012b). Further, despite its negligible role in the peace process, Myanmar’s strategic 
location also allows it to invoke external actors, like India, to diversify its foreign 
relations. For instance, Myanmar is central to two of India’s foreign policy priorities, 
the ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies, and serves as the only land bridge 
to connect India with Southeast Asia (Atmakuri and Izzuddin, 2020; Kumar, 2019).  
 
Similarly, as a resource rich country, Myanmar has been able to use opportunities to 
invest in critical sectors to gain international support. For instance, Myanmar 
cultivated and ‘rewarded’ Beijing, by consenting to economic and infrastructure 
projects, in lieu of diplomatic support in international forums (Haacke, 2011). 




retaining the majority of them, private business actors in the US, keen to exploit 
resource-rich Myanmar, have lobbied against it (Dyer and Peel, 2016).  
 
Along with co-option, the very differences and contestations between Chinese and 
peacebuilding engagement, has also allowed Myanmar elites to ‘hedge’ between the 
two, when international pressures prove restrictive. The very start of the peace process 
was an attempt to hedge against entrenched Chinese domination, built up through years 
of Western sanctions (Lintner, 2016a).  The peace process, and the opening of its 
borders to the West thereafter, has altered Myanmar’s strategic options in political and 
economic terms, especially its asymmetry with China. The peace process, in turn, 
became a springboard for aid, partnerships, high-level visits, the lifting of sanctions, 
bilateral trade and investment agreements, as well as debt relief and other forms of 
assistance from Western states, who flocked in to support the peace process (Gill et 
al., 2016).  This option was reversed after 2015, when Myanmar hedged against the 
calls for accountability by the West, by turning to China. In the aftermath of the 
Rakhine crisis, as the peacebuilders attacked the Government and the Tatmadaw for 
their human rights violations, Myanmar was back in China’s arms. China protected 
the Tatmadaw at the UN and defused the pressure to internationalise the Rakhine crisis, 
which would have implicated Myanmar elites, both the Tatmadaw and the NLD-led 
government, in the process (Myint-U, 2020). Hedging, thus, has facilitated the 
relieving of pressures and neutralised them by bandwagoning with China. This 
hedging, against the West and towards China, is facilitated by the fact that elites in 
Myanmar understand that the Chinese approach is not based on normative 
assumptions, on governing systems or human rights, but based on interests (Interview 
with former diplomat, 24 July, 2017 (a), Yangon). This hedging has empowered the 
elites to circumvent Western condemnation, and yet continue to engage with West on 
the lines of the peace process, albeit in limited ways.  
 
Emergence of Illiberal and Co-opted Hybrid Forms of Peace 
The avenues for co-option and hedging fostered by plural forms of engagement, and 




more autonomous. Co-option and hedging has meant that elites in Myanmar, including 
the NLD since 2015, have committed to a certain degree of liberal values, without fully 
committing to it, which has helped appease the West and accommodate some bottom-
up pressures, while still benefitting from China. Thus, hedging and co-option to 
international engagement has brought forth a hybrid form of peace, which commits to 
federalism, secularism, and semblances of SSR; as well as liberty, equality and justice 
institutionally, through provisions in the NCA. However, these commitments prove to 
be unworkable in practice. The hybrid peace that has emerged is largely illiberal, as it 
continues to bolster the dominance of the Tatmadaw. With the NCA being the first 
step in the peace process, and since concrete peace structures are yet to emerge, it 
might be premature to presume the type of peace structures that will emerge. Yet, with 
ten years into the peace process, some inferences can be made.  
 
For instance, the NCA at its heart, commits to ‘principles of democracy and federalism 
in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong’, 
but makes it conditional to ‘principles of non-disintegration of the union, non-
disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of national sovereignty’.  
Concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity have always been the narrative 
through which the Tatmadaw has legitimised its role in politics (Nakanishi, 2013; 
Selth, 2001). The Tatmadaw, theoretically agrees to federalism, but in practice 
continues to use the 2008 Constitution as its reference point, thus stifling any 
meaningful discussion on federalism (Wansai, 2018b). Similarly, while SSR, in the 
form of ‘security re-integration,’ has been committed to in the NCA, any basic SSR 
type of reform requires a change in the Constitution, and a reduced role of the military. 
The military has continually rejected any loss of their political role (Myint, 2020). 
Thus, any semblance of SSR is unlikely to materialise in the short term. On the issue 
of transitional justice, the power of the Tatmadaw, within the political settlements, 
means that voices for more rooted transitional justice measures are still restrained.  
More so, having transferred power to the NLD through elections, and redeemed 
themselves in Western eyes, the military today, under the façade of democracy, has 
been less inclined to accommodate EAO demands, and has often  ‘trimmed the sails’ 





Events in Myanmar demonstrate how domestic groups use their agency, through co-
option and hedging, to decide when, how, and to what extent, they will engage with 
the international community to consolidate their interests. This space for opportunities 
for elites to push through their agendas, has, in turn, reduced that of marginalised 
groups. And this reduced space and the false promise of the peace process has led to 
disenchantment, even amongst signatory EAOs, like the KNU, and resulted in a 
stagnation of the peace process (Interview with representative of Signatory EAOs, 14 
November 2018, Yangon).  
 
In this stagnant form of peace process, and the political settlements it has been unable 
to rouse, the plural forms of international engagement, as well as the strength of their 
leverage, has been evident. Peacebuilders, while providing valuable support, have 
minimal resources, nominal impact, and since 2015 have had a limited role, 
overpowered as they have been by regional actors. Peacebuilders have created the 
space to discuss federalism, human rights, democracy, and SSR, with their narratives 
on inclusion, which has aided EAOs. However, they have not been able to promote 
incentives for the Tatmadaw to change, and instead peacebuilders have been co-opted 
at best. Tatmadaw’s commitment to the peace process, despite its inherent co-option, 
has saved them from international isolation, and granted them legitimacy. For instance, 
in trying to engage the Tatmadaw on debates about SSR and federalism, peacebuilders 
facilitated the entry of the Tatmadaw to Western capitals, through study visits, and in 
turn normalised their relations with the West (Thiha, 2017). Chinese engagement, 
ambivalent to the character of the political settlements in Myanmar, and limited to 
prioritising its national interests, has promoted the status quo in supporting some form 
of elite pact that guarantees stability, but not going beyond that. Further, the 
pluralisation of China’s foreign policy and its pragmatic approach has meant that all 
sides in Myanmar’s conflict have gained from China’s engagement, thus furthering the 
status quo. What is likely to progress the political settlements in Myanmar is a change 
in the constitutional prerogative that privileges the military, and an introduction of 




of power. However, while Western countries are too marginal to promote this 
adequately, China benefits with the status–quo, promoting stability rather than peace.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the pragmatic nature of Chinese engagement, where its 
engagement has been ambivalent about debates on SSR, federalism, and human rights, 
and limited to areas of its own interests. China’s vast investment portfolio in the 
economy and its contradictory position on the peace process has resulted in complex 
consequences for negotiations on SSR and federalism. For it can be seen to be aiding 
and abetting several EAOs spread across the border, through formal and informal 
channels, while still supporting the Tatmadaw in its quest to build a professional 
military force. This chapter has also outlined how the peacebuilders have been 
hampered by their operational deficiencies and China’s aversion to expanded third 
party engagement in its periphery. Liberal peacebuilders are viewed as weak and 
marginal players, yet critical as they continue to form a credible counter-weight to the 
dominance of China.  
 
A pragmatic Chinese engagement, combined with a frail peacebuilding, and the sheer 
number of competing domestic groups, have all inhibited a momentum for change in 
the political settlement. Instead, owing to the co-existence of plural forms of 
engagement, and the differences in these forms of engagement, this chapter has shown 
that elites in Myanmar have been able to enhance their autonomy, by availing 
themselves of the strategies of co-option and hedging. As a result of such strategies, 
the Tatmadaw has maintained its role as the base of the power pyramid (Bhatia, 2015) 





Part IV: Conceptualising Emergent Power 
Engagement in Peacebuilding Arena and its Impact 
on Political Settlements 
 
Drawing on inferences from the empirical chapters on Nepal and Myanmar, both 
chapters in Part IV of this thesis, seek to conceptualise Indian and Chinese engagement 
in the peacebuilding arena, and the impact of plural forms of engagement in political 
settlements in conflict-affected states.  
 
Chapter 7 proposes an alternative framework of peacebuilding, which deviates from, 
and contrasts with ‘liberal peacebuilding’, despite taking into account the radical 
changes there have been in liberal peacebuilding practice. Conceptualised as the 
‘Emergent Power Regional Conflict Management’ (EPRCM), this chapter sketches the 
features of this approach, and its points of departure from liberal peacebuilding 
projects. In doing so, this chapter argues that the competing power of the EPRCM can, 
on the one hand, undercut the influence of liberal peacebuilders. However, 
paradoxically, it also creates a guaranteed space for peacebuilders, to work in conflict-
affected states, as elites continually invoke their presence, to counter-balance the 
intrusive engagement of India and China in political transitions.  
 
In a similar way, Chapter 8 traces how the centrality of the EPRCM, and its co-
existence with the engagement of liberal peacebuilders, in Nepal and Myanmar, has 
brought pressures but also unprecedented opportunities. It argues that the elites have 
been able to harness the opportunities brought about by these plural forms of 
international engagement, by co-opting both sources, but also hedging between the 
two; in turn maximising their own autonomy and range of options. In choosing this 
type of engagement, elites in Nepal and Myanmar have to respond to the measures 
recommended by the EPRCM and liberal peacebuilders, in tandem with meeting 
domestic grassroots demands. This leads to hybrid forms of peace, where liberal and 
illiberal visions of peace are interwoven. However, the opportunities for co-option and 




maintaining the status quo, rather than embracing the significant changes promised by 
the peace process.  
 
Chapter 7 begins by outlining where EPRCM as an approach can be located, within a 
growing body of scholarship, that engage with alternative frameworks of 
peacebuilding. After outlining the features of EPRCM, it goes on to describe the limits 
of this framework.  The second section of the chapter, examines how the EPRCM 
interacts with, and impacts on, liberal peacebuilding. Having identified their 
relationship as ‘negotiated co-existence’, it seeks to interpret the engagement of 
emergent powers with the liberal world order, in the context of a broader debate on 
International Relations. Lastly, the chapter focuses on the inferences that can be drawn 
from empirical insights from Nepal and Myanmar on the state of ‘liberal 


















Chapter 7: Emergent Power Regional Conflict 
Management and the Space for Liberal 
Peacebuilding 
 
Recognition of Emergent Power Regional Conflict 
Management 
A core inference, which emerges in tracing the engagement of India and China in the 
peace processes of Nepal and Myanmar, is that India and China speak a distinct 
language of peace. This dialect is separate from, and in complete contrast to, that of 
liberal peacebuilding. Given then, that a ‘liberal peacebuilding’ framework seems an 
inappropriate route to an understanding of Indian and Chinese interventions in their 
regional peace processes (Cunliffe, 2019), this chapter proposes the alternative 
conceptualisation of: ‘Emergent Power Regional Conflict Management’ (EPRCM). 
EPRCM is not a conscious strategy, but binds together a set of priorities with 
contradictory elements, and can be interpreted as an approach for engaging with 
conflict-affected states in the region. Liberal peacebuilding, even in its most skeletal 
form, is defined by a normative commitment to human rights, democracy, rule of law, 
justice, and inclusion (Paris, 2010). However, the building blocks of EPRCM are 
conditional state-centricity; stability; development; as well as the rejection of the 
universality of liberal solutions in post-conflict states; the prioritisation of regional 
actors in peace processes; and finally the dismissal of policy- based templates, in 
favour of pragmatic context-dependent forms of engagement.  The first three tenets of 
EPRCM: state-centricity, stability, and commitment to development, have been long 
acclaimed by many scholars of Indian and Chinese foreign policy, in their different 
terms (Abb, 2018; Alden and Large, 2015; Aneja, 2014; Choedon, 2017; Li and Lye, 
2009; Sørbø et al., 2011). However, what EPRCM adds to these three elements is its 
uneven application in the region. The remaining three principles are new, drawn from 
empirical engagement in Nepal and Myanmar. Before the chapter discusses these 




which has sought to veer away from a focus on ‘liberal peacebuilding’, and 
conceptualise alternative forms of peacebuilding emerging on the ground.  
 
Space for EPRCM: An Alternative to ‘Liberal Peacebuilding’ 
The relentless criticism and scrutiny of liberal peacebuilding, and the attendant 
scholarship, has, ironically, perpetuated the discursive hegemony of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016). However, in response to the 
discursive dominance of ‘liberal peacebuilding’, three alternatives have been 
proposed.  
 
Firstly, there has been a call for ‘post-liberal peace’. This requires prioritising the 
‘everyday’ dynamics of peace, and a factoring of the agency of local actors into the 
debate of peacebuilding, who can own, claim, and follow, indigenous ways of making 
peace, either detached from liberal peacebuilding mandates, or in parallel to them 
(Boege, 2016). Their agency in conflict-affected states can circumvent the design and 
vision of ‘liberal peace’, and move towards hybrid forms of peace, combining both 
liberal and illiberal elements (Richmond, 2010). Despite acknowledging the potential 
of local actors to adapt ‘liberal’ peace into hybrid forms of peace, the ‘post-liberal’ 
approach continues to privilege liberal peacebuilding. Scholarship on hybridity views 
it as emanating from the multi-layered interaction between different local and 
‘international’ actors (Mac Ginty, 2011, 2010). The reference to ‘international’ in this 
context, however, has been drawn from empirical examples, where the UN and/or 
Western states have been the primary actors in the peacebuilding arena.  
 
Secondly, the successes of illiberal conflict management strategies to deliver stability, 
has led to an acknowledgement that peace in fragile contexts can be realised with 
illiberal, authoritarian, and neo-patrimonial policies (De Waal, 2010; Smith, 2014).  
This has led scholars to conceptualise ‘illiberal peace’ (de Oliveira, 2011; Piccolino, 
2015; Smith, 2014) drawing on insights from such countries as Angola, Rwanda and 
Sri Lanka. While distinctions remain between scholars, illiberal peace is defined by 




clientelism, cronyism, and corruption instead of economic neo-liberalism, and 
emphasis on illiberal norms of inequality and order’ (Smith et al., 2020, Pg 4).  
 
Lastly, going beyond ‘illiberal’ peacebuilding, to account for cases that are ‘neither 
liberal nor hybrid but unashamedly authoritarian’, scholars have conceptualised the 
Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) framework (Lewis et al., 2018, Pg 488). 
ACM questions the hegemony of West-led liberal approaches, which give undue 
‘focus on the archetypal liberal interventions of the 1990s—Bosnia- Herzegovina, East 
Timor or Kosovo,’ while obscuring ‘highly destructive wars where Western powers 
were not the primary actors, such as Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Ukraine or Syria’ (Lewis, 
2017, Pg 28). ACM is seen to rely on information control and knowledge production; 
spatial control through patrols, occupation, and resettlement; and economic control by 
denying rebel groups economic and financial resources, while supporting favourable 
local groups (Lewis, 2017; Lewis et al., 2018).  
 
These alternatives, especially the latter two, although they have extended their thinking 
beyond ‘liberal peace’, and heeded calls for alternatives to liberal peacebuilding, 
nevertheless they do not account for Indian and Chinese engagement in countries 
within the region, or EPRCM, as this thesis proposes. The illiberal peacebuilding and 
ACM frameworks, both focus on ‘domestic regimes’ as the primary actors in the 
conflict processes of conflict-affected states (Lewis, 2017; Lewis et al., 2018; Smith, 
2014). This discounts the presence of ‘other’ international actors, like India and China, 
in the context of conflict-affected states, such as Nepal and Myanmar. Similarly, Nepal 
and Myanmar cannot be said to be cases of ‘hard’ authoritarianism, given their 
transitions (or attempted transition in the case of Myanmar) through negotiated 
settlements. EPRCM thus attempts to introduce a fourth alternative to the existing 
alternative models to peacebuilding.  
 
EPRCM, however, does not claim to capture the entirety of how India China engage 
with conflicts, but rather limits it to their engagement within their region of influence. 
Instead, in referencing Nepal and Myanmar, it begins with an initial attempt to decode 




relying on their statements at the UN, or their foreign policy articulations alone. In 
doing so, it not only furthers an understanding of the conflict management strategies 
of emergent powers regionally, but can also draw inferences as to how they might 
engage with the different manifestations of the liberal world order, which has been 
core to contemporary debates in International Relations (Hurrell, 2006; Ikenberry, 
2011; Johnston, 2007; Kupchan, 2012).  
 
In framing EPRCM, there is a conscious attempt to depart from the use of the term 
‘peacebuilding’. This is reflective of Indian and Chinese engagement in the peace 
process in Nepal and Myanmar. Lofty goals of ‘peace’ have neither been articulated 
by these emergent powers, nor are they evident in practice. Rather, given their 
continuous involvement in these countries’ conflicts, Indian and Chinese engagement 
in peace processes is clearly framed by different considerations: their time-tested 
identities as regional hegemons; their changing foreign policy patterns as they have 
risen and adjusted their foreign policies based on domestic priorities; and lastly the 
evolving context in political transitions in Nepal and Myanmar. These considerations 
underpin the features of EPRCM to which this chapter now turns.  
 
Features of EPRCM 
Defining the characteristics of EPRCM is an arduous exercise. As mentioned above, I 
argue that it comprises six core features: state-centricity (albeit inconsistent); stability; 
development; as well as the rejection of the universality of liberal solutions in post-
conflict states; the prioritisation of regional actors in peace processes; and finally the 
dismissal of policy- based templates, in favour of pragmatic context-dependent forms 
of engagement.  However, on closer examination, these very categories appear at odds 
with each other. For instance, how can such features as stability and development, 
which seem like fixed priorities, be reconciled with such a feature as pragmatism, 
which demands dynamism and change? These elements thus need to be viewed as 
priorities or features, which, given their underlying pragmatic orientation, are 
unevenly applied, not only between the two emergent powers, but also across different 






EPRCM confirms in part the state-centricity, which is seen to be at the base of Indian 
and Chinese engagement in their foreign affairs. This state-centricity is viewed as 
emanating from their adherence to older pluralist norms of sovereignty, and to non-
intervention (Hurrell, 2006). But more fundamentally, in China it has emerged from a 
Chinese perspective of state as a moral agent, whose authority must be strengthened: 
a much more positive view of state than that in the West (Hirono, 2013; Zhao, 2004b).  
 
This state-centricity is evident in Indian and Chinese stances on such issues as: 
humanitarian interventions, R2P, and development assistance; as well as in their 
domestic policies (Choedon, 2017; Foot, 2012; Walder, 2015). India sees the state as 
the rightful guarantor of rights, which must be fully respected, and consequently 
provides aid through bilateral channels directly to the government (Aneja, 2014). 
Similarly, in its development assistance in Africa, India has sought to avoid the use of 
NGOs, with which it has an uneasy relationship, to deliver any overseas function, or 
be a channel for development funding and assistance (Mawdsley, 2010). 
 
In the peacebuilding realm, this state-centricity is evident in India and China’s reliance 
on state agencies to channel any engagement, and their evident aversion of civil society 
groups, notably NGOs. Strengthening of civil society is seen to undermine state 
sovereignty, a concept central to states like India and China (Lewis et al., 2018). State-
centricity here manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, both India and China have engaged 
in the peace process through their diplomatic channels, in the form of mediation and 
facilitation, or in supporting government-run peace institutions or such state agencies 
as the Election Commission. India and China have not devolved responsibility to 
national NGOs, or relied on NGOs or INGOs in Nepal and Myanmar, although they 
have supported local civil society groups on developmental initiatives in these states. 
As a scholar-diplomat in India remarked, ‘We don’t prefer national or international 
NGOs and don’t work with them. We recognise that one who pays for the piper plays 
the tune’ (Interview, 2 October 2018, New Delhi). Similar sentiments were echoed by 




Cambodia or Laos, have largely been ineffective in their developmental outcomes. In 
fact, they have only created trouble and contributed nothing’ (Interview, 22 December 
2017 (a), Sichuan).  
 
Secondly, capacity building of state institutions has been prioritised. For instance, 
India supported Nepal’s Election Commission, on the conduct of elections in 2008 
(Destradi, 2012). Similarly, despite difference in modality of aid, China funded, and 
donated, vehicles to such governmental peace institutions as the JMC, in Myanmar. A 
core aspect of supporting state institutions has been strengthening the state’s security 
sector. Both China and India have continued to provide defence-related assistance to 
the Tatmadaw, ranging from arms to trainings and exchanges. Similarly, India and 
China have been central to aiding the Nepal Armed Police Force and the Nepal Army 
(NA), as well as supporting their administrative infrastructures (Bogati and Strasheim, 
2019; Ghimire, 2018) 
 
What is new, in terms of state-centricity in the peacebuilding realm, is that the very 
modality of engagement by India and China leaves little space for their engagement 
with non-state or civil society spaces, including, NGOs. As detailed in the previous 
empirical chapters, India’s engagement has largely focused on the political process, 
where it has been central to the survival of regimes. Further its limited engagement on 
the deliverables of CPA, apart from elections and facilitating for peace accords, means 
that such macro political engagement limits the space for an involvement of civil 
society.  In Myanmar, China’s focus on mediation, and facilitation, between the EAOs 
and the government, has meant that the delivery function of Chinese engagement can 
hardly be devolved to NGOs. Further, China has limited engagement in peace 
institutions, apart from funding them. It chooses not to be drawn into details of the 
NCA, or its deliverables.  
 
In its state-centric nature of engagement, there is a point of normative difference 
between liberal peacebuilders and emergent powers. For instance, on the involvement 
of civil society, EPRCM differs from the very premise of liberal peacebuilding.  




provides a genuine democratic counterweight to the state, and presents an alternative 
to a dysfunctional, or even a ‘failed,’ state (Pouligny, 2005). UN reviews place the 
capacity building of civil society, in conflict-affected states, as crucial to the success 
of peacebuilding (United Nations, 2015b, 2015a). Civil society involvement in peace 
processes is also seen to legitimise the process, and ensure the durability of peace 
(European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2013; Fahey, 2009; Nilsson, 2012). 
Accordingly, liberal peacebuilders have used ‘civil society’, not only as a normative 
commitment that ‘needs to be promoted’, but also as a vehicle to deliver the liberal 
commitments of the peace process.  
 
More pertinently, it is often this contrast, which makes ‘civil society’ a point of 
contestation between EPRCM and liberal peacebuilders, especially when the work of 
civil society is seen to be detrimental to Indian and Chinese interests. China’s blaming 
of civil society protests against its developmental projects, like the Myitsone dam and 
the Letpadaung Copper Mine in Myanmar, is a case in point (Li and Lye, 2009; 
Shihong, 2014). Such views were further corroborated by a Parliamentarian in 
Myanmar who stated, ‘West mobilises some civil society groups against China and 
Chinese investment, like the strikes against Myitsone. China similarly uses armed 
groups to water down West’s efforts’ (Interview, 18 November 2018, Yangon).  
 
While EPRCM acknowledges this state-centric approach, with its prioritisation of state 
institutions and aversion to such civil society bodies as NGOs, it cautions that it is 
uneven at many levels. Firstly, when it comes to immediate interests, both China and 
India have supported anti-state activities and forces. Witness China’s support to EAOs 
in the North. India’s support to Madheshi groups, to discipline mainstream political 
forces, also points to the trend.  Secondly, there is a contradiction in India’s 
highlighting of civil society, at least in formal statements, in engaging in Africa, while 
shying away from doing so in Nepal, or rather more broadly in South Asia. In India-
Africa Forum Summits, India has routinely called for greater civil society engagement, 
through increased interaction between such institutions of parliamentary democracy as 
media organisations (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2011); a call which is seen to 




emphasis on civil society barely surfaces, and joint statements between Nepal and 
India focus on ‘politically punctuated’ bilateral issues (Sridharan, 2020) along with 
issues of development and connectivity rather than civil society exchanges (Ministry 
of External Affairs, India, 2018c).  
 
This state-centric engagement within the domain of the peace process, also contrasts 
with wider bilateral relations, outside the realm of the peace process. Exchanges 
between media personnel, artists, and students have been at unprecedented levels, 
between Myanmar and China, as well as between Nepal and both of its neighbours. 
Chinese scholars have also pointed out that its experience in countries, like Myanmar 
and Pakistan, has led China to gradually start engaging such non-governmental actors 
as the media, NGOs and people to people engagement (Interview with professor, 4 
January 2018, Sichuan). 
 
Stability 
EPRCM confirms the centrality of stability, highlighted in the wide-ranging 
scholarship on Indian and Chinese foreign policy (Ayoob, 2000; Gill, 2005; Lampton, 
2013; Mohan, 2005; Sahni, 2007; Shirk, 2007; Wan, 1999; Zhang, 2012). Stability has 
always been a priority for India, in both its domestic and in its foreign policy, given 
unsettled borders with Pakistan and China, and different types of internal conflicts in 
Kashmir, and in North East and Central India, in addition to occasional outburst of 
communalism that have sought to tear apart the secular fabric of the country (Ayoob, 
2000; Mohan, 2005; Sahni, 2007). Similar circumstances have led China to accord top 
priority to stability (Gill, 2005; Lampton, 2013; Shirk, 2007; Wan, 1999; Zhang, 
2012). The domestic experiences of India and China reveal that such quests for 
‘stability’ can come both through negotiated settlements with rebel groups, and 
constitutional accommodation of minorities, but also through military victory, control, 
or intimidation (Han, 2016; Kabzung, 2015; Misra, 2001; Sinha, 2017). The quest for 
stability, in conflict-affected parts of North-Eastern states, has led India to tolerate an 
erosion of democracy, by allowing local autocratic leaders to repress violence through 





The EPRCM tends to merge these domestic and regional considerations of stability. 
EPRCM recognises the possible spillover of, security threats from conflict-affected 
states like Nepal and Myanmar, as manifested in the tide of refugees, the dropping of 
bombs, or cross-border collusion between anti-state factions. EPRCM also recognises 
how instability in neighbouring areas can lead to the presence of external third parties 
in the region (Li and Lye, 2009; Mansingh, 1984; Muni, 2012). The stability-centred 
discourse of EPRCM has a multi-layered impact on the peace process. 
 
Firstly, China and India justify their, often intrusive, engagement in the region, on 
grounds of their concerns about regional stability. Indian sources continually link the 
inclusion debate in Nepal vis-à-vis Madheshis, to India’s core stability (Interviews, 
October 2018, New Delhi).  Similarly, China has routinely cited instances of conflict 
spillover, such as that in the Kachin and Kokang regions, where bombs landed on the 
Chinese side, causing casualties on a few occasions, in order to justify its interest and 
engagement in the conflict (Han, 2017). As a Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, 
commented, ‘So the peace process is not just at the price for Myanmar people, but also 
at the price for Chinese people’ (Liang, 2017). 
 
Secondly, their focus on stability-centred engagement has meant that China and India 
have tended to avoid engaging on any issues of the peace process seeking structural 
transformation, which in the short term, might generate some form of instability 
(Ramsbotham, 2000).  They therefore eschew prolonged discussions on aspects of 
inclusion, rights and justice. This is evident in India’s silence on transitional justice, 
its support for the NA, and it disenchantment with the Maoists, as the peace process 
progressed. As a diplomat in India remarked: when wars end through dialogue, one 
cannot talk of redressal through such measures as transitional justice, and the 
‘protection’ of elites is the price for stability (Interview, 7 October 2018, New Delhi). 
Similarly, despite having played a key role in mainstreaming the Maoists, when the 
Maoists were engaged in conflict with the NA, India supported the NA, believing it to 
be the only vanguard of stability (Jha, 2014). In Myanmar, sources acknowledge the 




peace, China is interested in building stability’ (Interview with researcher, 23 
November 2018, Yangon). 
 
Thirdly, the stability-centred reading on peace processes not only sustains state-
centricity, but also violates it.  As mentioned above, India and China have contributed 
to strengthening state security systems, through entrenched defence cooperation 
(Saferworld, 2011). Conversely, any concerns over cross-border stability, can lead 
them to support such groups, as the EAOs in the north of Myanmar, or the Madheshis. 
Their support is driven by a consideration that, as political settlements between groups 
are not finalised, and groups in the borderlands remain ‘too strong to surrender but too 
weak to defeat the state’, India and China need these borderland groups, to guarantee 
their stability-centric interests. 
 
Equally, a stability-centric approach distinguishes EPRCM from liberal peacebuilding.  
At least in policy and rhetoric, ‘liberal peace’ is about much more than stability, but 
rather about protecting freedom, democracy, equality, justice, and human rights. Into 
the gap between both approaches, the stability-focused approach also introduces a 
normative dimension. It weakens any holistic sense of peace, and limits the purpose of 
peace process to some form of stability, marked by absence of violence.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, peacebuilding is increasingly geared towards 
statebuilding, despite an inherent contradiction between them (Richmond and Franks, 
2009). Statebuilding, with its focus on creating institutions that have a monopoly of 
violence, legitimates the state’s power and capacity to enforce rules throughout its 
territory, and therefore resembles Indian and Chinese views of what constitutes a 
‘strong’ capable state (Fukuyama, 2005; Zhao, 2004). As peacebuilding takes a more 
explicit change of course towards statebuilding, there is the opportunity for some 
collaboration between emergent powers and peacebuilders. Ironically, therefore, the 
EPRCM finds common ground with liberal peacebuilding, only once the latter has 
weakened, and veered towards statebuilding: a phenomenon noted by scholars to have 





Development for Peace 
Development is seen as a ‘norm’ or an ideology, a source of legitimacy domestically 
in India and China (Interview with academic, January 4, 2018 Sichuan; Interview with 
researcher, October 3, 2018, New Delhi). This ideology of development has also 
adopted a conflict-resolution function domestically, framing it as ‘developmental 
peace’, to pacify the margins in Tibet, Xinjiang, and the North-Eastern states in India 
(Kabzung, 2015; Mcduie-Ra, 2009; Paperny, 2008; Sarmah, 2016). Development, has 
been core to Indian state’s counter-insurgency strategy (Baruah, 2007), despite the 
persistent failure of the narrative. This ‘developmental peace’, prioritises physical 
development and economic wellbeing in unstable areas rather than political reform, 
and thus, strengthens the power of the state, while weakening the power of rebelling 
social forces (Xuejun et al., 2017).  
 
This ‘developmental peace’ has also permeated into EPRCM in multiple ways. Firstly, 
China has explicitly described its provision of infrastructure and developmental aid to 
Myanmar, as a contribution to the peace process (Alexandra and Lanteigne, 2017). 
Further, Chinese sources have consistently argued schemes as the BRI, would bring 
much needed investments in conflict-affected regions in Myanmar, creating incentives 
for rebel groups to relinquish violence and thus, lead to a cessation of Myanmar’s 
decade-long conflicts (Interview with a representative of JMC, 13 November 2018, 
Yangon). CMEC, as part of China’s signature BRI, and the BRI itself, epitomises the 
height of this ‘developmental peace’ doctrine in action.  
 
Secondly, developmental peace depoliticises both conflict and development. It 
undermines the political nature of demands by EAOs, or those of any other group by 
framing it as an issue of underdevelopment. Not surprisingly, while this ‘peace through 
development’ has been viewed as a new phenomenon (Sun, 2019), Myanmar 
represents the first setting in which it has failed. Long before the current peace process, 
when the KIO in the 1990s signed a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw, the political 




in the form of road infrastructure, increased trade and investments (largely from 
China), to, allegedly, improve livelihoods (Woods, 2011). After 17 years of 
experiment, this ‘developmental peace’ broke down.  While the people benefitted from 
a growing local economy, their resentment persisted, due to the lack of addressing of 
such political issues as health, education, policing, and not least, the question of 
exclusion, as well as concerns about detrimental impact of ‘development’ on the 
environment and communities (Farrelly, 2015). Thus, any reintroduction of this 
‘developmental model’ is likely to be viewed as an attempt to divert attention from 
critical issues such as inclusion and power sharing, and has the potential to discredit 
the peace process as a whole (Interview with a think tank representative, 15 November, 
2018, Yangon). Further, in practice this developmentalism is also at odds with ‘holistic 
development’, which prioritises social well-being, a feature which China itself aims to 
incorporate into its domestic policies (Wang, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, ideas of development during peace processes are enmeshed with relevant 
debates on federalism, which are centred on natural resource sharing and ownership of 
land. Investment decisions that seek to foster ‘developmental peace’ can distort these 
debates. As mentioned in the case of Myanmar, while discussions on federalism and 
equitable sharing of resources are yet to firm up in the peace process, the Government 
in Myanmar has been issuing licences to Chinese companies to invest in extractive 
industries, plantations, and dams amongst others. There is, therefore, some concern 
from ethnic communities who wants investment decisions to be postponed until 
discussions on equitable distribution natural resource firm up in the peace process 
(Pyidaungsu Institute, 2017).  
 
Fourthly, in its impact on the peace process itself, ‘developmental peace’ presents a 
mixed picture. BRI has made regional stability a pre-requisite for its success, making 
it difficult for ethnic armed groups to continue fighting across the border (Glauert, 
2018). On the other hand, there is also cause for concern, for as the massive 
infrastructure, promised by the BRI, makes it easier for transport of drugs, and illegal 
weapons, and oils the war economy (Interview with peace negotiator, 15 November 




trade, the drug economy, and the question of environmental degradation, are all 
connected to the dimensions of war and peace in Myanmar (Myint-U, 2020). 
 
‘Developmental peace’, can be analysed as being in direct contrast to peacebuilding. 
Rather than viewing liberal vehicles of democratisation, the rule of law, or inclusion 
as pathways to peace, it sees ‘development’ as a route to peace. Peacebuilding, in turn, 
is seen as ineffective in furthering social protection, economic development, and the 
reduction of poverty (Pugh, 2002). Noting liberal peacebuilding’s lack of focus on 
developmental gains, the UN, itself, has underlined the ‘urgency of prioritising 
development and ensuring its full integration into peacebuilding efforts’ (United 
Nations, 2010). This analysis is echoed by an evaluation of the situation on the ground, 
where Western states, more broadly, have overlooked the economic desperation of the 
poor, in favour of political questions premised on liberalism. In fact, in 2007, when 
Myanmar’s monks rose up in protest against the state, the West enthusiastically framed 
it as a pro-democracy protest. Named the ‘ Saffron Revolution’, it quickly acquired a 
democratic framing, though it ignored the socio-economic desperation of the poor: a 
crucial dimension of the protest (Myint-U, 2020). Further, instead of supporting the 
industrial capacity of the state, which would have benefitted a huge swathe of 
impoverished people, sanctions were imposed to address liberal considerations of 
democracy and human rights (Farrelly, 2009). While India and China claim not to 
export their national approaches to the peace process, such models, centred on 
developmentalism, can have a normative attraction for conflict-affected states 
frustrated by a Western bias on human rights and democracy (Cabestan, 2012; I. 
Taylor, 2012). 
  
EPRCM confirms the developmental focus in Chinese engagement in Myanmar, 
though not its avowed originality, but discards it in the case of Indian engagement in 
Nepal. A few interviewees in India tended to differentiate liberal peacebuilding from 
the Indian model, stating ‘we are more focused on developmental outcomes’ 
(Interviews, October 2018, New Delhi).  Further, India’s development cooperation, 
during and after the peace process, has focused on the implementation of infrastructure 




stability in the region (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2017a).  This focus, 
however, is neither new, nor is its peacebuilding function evident. Since the 1950s, 
India has consistently been a core development partner in Nepal (Sridharan, 2020). 
However, development, as a form of conflict resolution, rarely featured in interviews 
in Nepal, and has not been written about. Rather, as two former Indian ambassadors to 
Nepal noted, India’s ineffectiveness in the delivery of development projects, was seen 
to be a core priority for redress in bilateral relations. This invisibility, of the 
‘developmental’ side of Indian engagement, can also be attributed to India’s 
profound involvement in the political process, which has shaped the outcomes of the 
peace process, and has tended to eclipse its considerable developmental support 
outside the peace process.  
 
Rejection of the Purported Universality of ‘Liberal’ Solutions 
Through the distinctness of its engagement, its hesitancy to cooperate with liberal 
peacebuilders, as well as an ambivalence towards the various concepts that bind liberal 
peacebuilding projects, such as SSR or inclusion, EPRCM denies the ‘universality’ of 
liberal peace, or the idea that it can be a universally applied as a solution to rebuild 
conflict-torn societies. In rejecting the universality of the ‘liberal peace’ proposition, 
EPRCM validates the continued embrace of ideas of independence and autonomy, 
which have dominated the scholarship on Indian and Chinese foreign policy (Gill, 
2010; Hall, 2013; Khilnani et al., 2012; Wang, 2011). Even in their engagement on 
international crises, emergent powers are seen to prioritise preserving their own 
interests and autonomy (Parlar Dal, 2018). 
 
This rejection of the universality of liberal peace, based on considerations of 
autonomy, has been repeatedly highlighted in statements and policy pronouncements 
by Indian and Chinese authorities. For instance, the former Indian Minister for 
External Affairs categorically stated: ‘Every country has to evolve its own model of 
governance and development. No one model is perfect and fits everyone. Nor can it be 
transplanted into another matrix’ (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2008). Similarly, 
the White Papers on China’s National Security, emphasised: ‘Each country has the 




country should interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way or under 
any pretext’ (Information Office of the State Council, 1998). Scholars have drawn 
similar conclusions on India’s stance on the international promotion of democracy, 
where, despite its rich democratic heritage, India has been cautious about endorsing 
democracy (Choedon, 2015). A scholar-diplomat in India remarked, ‘India, based on 
its own experience, firmly believes that stability comes from democracy. Given this 
belief in democracy India has been hesitant to supporting authoritarian regimes, but 
even then we have not proselytised democracy, as there is no universal way of doing 
things’ (Interview, 2 October 2018, New Delhi).  The same can be said of China, albeit 
in a different manner. An analyst in Myanmar stated: ‘Despite being the biggest 
Communist country in the world, China did not inhibit democratic transition in 2011. 
Rather it swiftly adapted and engaged the democratic forces once NLD came to power’ 
(Interview with former diplomat, 19 July 2017, Yangon).  
 
In the realm of peacebuilding, this rejection of the superiority and universality of 
‘liberal peace’ manifests itself in India and China not engaging with liberal 
peacebuilders, or promoting any of the central tenets of liberal peacebuilding. Witness 
their aversion to using the language of norms such as inclusion, SSR, or human rights 
and transitional justice, as well as their dislike of recommendations on such technical 
aspects as policy reform, or the content of peace accords. Any prescriptions, from India 
and China, have, in turn, been on such core issues as cross-border stability.  
 
In exploring the reasons for this rejection, apart from both countries’ normative 
inclination towards independence and respect for sovereignty, interviewees in India 
and China pointed to the ‘impracticality’, and ‘unsuitability’, of liberal precepts for 
countries in transition. EPRCM questions the promotion of a ‘liberal’ ideology, 
stemming from the experience of the West, which seeks to cohere and homogenise 
countries, through an acceptance of liberal values. In discussions around the suitability 
or otherwise of liberal precepts, the norms of human rights and the concept of 
transitional justice were routinely raised in conversations in India and China. 
Discussing human rights, a Chinese academic remarked, ‘For developing countries, 




sufficient.  If a country develops to middle-income level, then they can start talking of 
human rights. It is easy for the Western countries to preach human rights as they are 
materially sufficient’ (Interview, 22 December 2017(a), Sichuan). Reflecting similar 
sentiments, an Indian scholar-diplomat marvelled about how the entire concept of 
transitional justice was, in his view, misplaced. He outlined, ‘why arrest a soldier for 
human rights abuses when you cannot arrest the political leadership who gave the 
command’ (Interview, 2 October 2018, New Delhi). The lacklustre performance of 
transitional justice globally, makes it a common target of criticism in such discussions.  
 
The focus on the unsuitability of liberal peace, interestingly complements the critiques 
of liberal peacebuilding. It resonates with the reflections of peacebuilding scholars, 
who note that democracy, human rights, and the idea of the state, are not necessarily 
universal values, or appropriate in conflict-affected societies (Newman and Richmond, 
2006). Similar sentiments are shared on such issue- specific areas, as inclusion or 
transitional justice. It is argued that the logic that undergirds peacebuilding 
programmes, of inclusive processes leading to inclusive outcomes, has been proved 
false (Castillejo, 2014). Likewise, the monumental expenditure on transitional justice 
processes has been critiqued for not producing outcomes, in terms of any 
implementation of recommendations from Transitional Justice Commissions, or the 
rate of trials and conviction rates (Fombad, 2008).  
 
Pragmatism and Dismissal of Templates  
A core assertion of EPRCM is an absolute form of pragmatism that rejects solution-
based technocratic approaches to peacebuilding built on standardised templates. 
Pragmatism necessitates that their engagement in peace process evolves and shifts, in 
accordance with domestic priorities, as well as with the fast-changing political 
landscape in conflict-affected states. Further, the immediate stakes such countries, as 
Nepal and Myanmar, have, in Indian and Chinese domestic security and economy has 
meant that their engagement must adapt quickly, and cannot afford to rely on policy 
paradigms. EPRCM thus confirms the ‘pragmatic turn’, routinely iterated in the 
scholarship on Indian and Chinese foreign policy, where India and China are seen to 




2012; Ganguly and Pardesi, 2009; Lampton, 2013; Miller and De Estrada, 2017; 
Mukherjee and Malone, 2011; Narang and Staniland, 2012; Shirk, 2007; Stenslie, 
2014) 
 
EPRCM adds conceptual flesh to the debate, identifying the processes and reasoning 
behind the pragmatic turn in engagement in conflict-affected states. On the ground, 
this template-free, pragmatic approach is visible in the shifting stances of Indian and 
Chinese engagement. Despite decades of support to the Tatmadaw, including shielding 
it from international condemnation, China was quick to engage with the opposition, 
the NLD, even before the 2015 elections, and even when the NLD was seen to be close 
to the West (Li and Lye, 2009; United States Institute of Peace, 2018).  Similarly, India 
moved swiftly from branding the Maoists as terrorists, to mainstreaming them through 
a peace process, to then ‘trimming their sails’ after they were thought to be detrimental 
to the interests of the NA (Adhikari, 2014; Jha, 2014).  
 
In the regional peacebuilding realm, given the multiple interests and multiple levels of 
engagement of India and China, a ‘policy’ paradigm can be more of a liability than an 
asset. Writing on the Indian position on the Maldives, a former Foreign Secretary of 
India affirms, ‘India has never taken an evangelical position in championing the cause 
of democracy abroad when this comes into conflict with its perceived strategic 
interests. On the whole, this has served the nation well’ (Srinivasan, 2016). This 
pragmatism also allowed India not to be involved in discourses of human rights, 
inclusion, or transitional justice, but rather to use it to suit its interests. Similarly, the 
absence of coherent and principled policies on conflict-affected states, has allowed 
Chinese business interest to flourish in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Sudan 
(Alden & Large, 2015).  
 
The conclusions, gained from interviews in India and China, highlight that templates 
and rigid policies for peace inherently overlook the contextual challenges, and are not 
amenable to post-conflict states, which are rapidly changing. Reinforcing China’s 
stance on policies and templates, a Chinese academic remarked, China ‘does not have 




case-by-case basis’ (Interview, 27 December 2017, Sichuan). Similarly, in challenging 
the UN’s approach in Nepal, India’s former diplomat to Nepal remarked, ‘UN always 
has a formula. They are not negative in their meaning but have little idea about local 
realities. Models brought about from other countries do not work’ (Interview, October 
8 2018, New Delhi). More practically, policies and templates need an institutionalised 
approach, which requires uniting different interests, and priorities, at various levels 
(Parlar Dal, 2018). The sheer pluralisation of foreign policy in India and China 
impinges on the upholding of any kind of institutionalised single strategy. The absolute 
number of cross-border ties and provincial players such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in 
India, or Yunnan in China, as well as political parties like the BJP, make a coherent 
policy campaign almost impossible.  
 
This aversion to templates is at variance with the scholarly focus on emergent powers’ 
‘peacebuilding policies’. Many scholars lament that none of the emergent powers have 
peacebuilding policies (Call and de Coning, 2017). Yet others highlight, ‘China is 
expected to weigh in constructively to global problems but it lacks any such post-
conflict and fragile state policy’ (Alden & Large, 2015, Pg. 124). This fixation on 
templates is illustrated by a procession of ‘policies’ and strategies, formulated by 
peacebuilders: the Fragile States Strategy from the US, the Framework for working in 
fragile and conflict-affected states from Australia, States of Fragility Reports of the 
OECD, to name but a few (AusAid, 2011; OECD, 2018; USAID, 2005). While both 
academics and the Western policy community await the emergence of a policy 
paradigm on peacebuilding, they overlook the pragmatic dimensions of Indian and 
Chinese foreign policy, which needs it to be ‘unrestrained by policies’.  
 
Seeing peacebuilding as ‘template-based’, and hence at odds with EPRCM, can be 
debated. For one, these policies, premised on liberal values, have been compelled in 
practice to adopt illiberal and hybrid forms (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2010; 
Richmond, 2015). Further, scholars also argue that peacebuilders have adopted a ‘goal-
free’ version where the aim is no longer on creating liberal states (De Coning, 2018). 
However, where EPRCM differs, even from the ‘goal-free variant’ of peacebuilding, 




‘liberal or illiberal dichotomies’, nor the policy space they occupy, have a place in 
EPRCM. The only rationale guiding their engagement is an unbridled and unashamed 
pragmatism.  
 
However, with no policy or template to guide Indian and Chinese regional engagement 
there have been calls to establish a national approach. These calls might lead to some 
form of policy emerging in due course, but perhaps not in the immediate or short term 
(Interview with foreign policy analyst, 1 October, 2018, New Delhi).  
 
Prioritisation of Regional Stakeholders  
Emergent powers have tended to focus, at the regional level, on issues of conflict 
management (Parlar Dal, 2018). With this focus, EPRCM seeks to differentiate 
regional hegemons, such as India and China, with immediate stakes in the region, from 
the ‘wider peacebuilding community’. Stemming from their core identity as ‘regional 
powers’, the regional dimension ‘matters quite significantly for both China and India, 
not least because they share a contested region and are competing within it’ (Narlikar, 
2019, Pg 22). Given the depth of their interests, they do not see liberal peacebuilders 
as core ‘stakeholders’ in the dynamics of war and peace. This is clear in their words 
and their actions. As a researcher in India confirmed, ‘India is a stakeholder and that 
all that was at stake for peacebuilders was a success story’ (Interview, 3 October 2018, 
New Delhi). Seeing peacebuilders as external third-parties rather than stakeholders, 
India and China do not attend multilateral donor forums on peacebuilding, or even co-
fund similar issues (Wagle, 2016). By the same token, Chinese sources defend this 
sense of exclusivity through such statements as, ‘it is all but natural for China to 
exclude others actors in their region. Would the US involve China on issues pertaining 
to US-Mexico bilateral relations?’ (Interview with a researcher, 13 July 2017(a), 
Yangon).  
 
This purported distinction between ‘regional stakeholders’ and peacebuilders also 
stems from their confidence in having greater knowledge of regional realities, and 




conflict in Nepal, based on its in-depth understanding of the situation, an Indian 
scholar remarked: ‘India knew the pulse of the conflict in Nepal. For the West, the 
conflict was due to marginalisation and state oppression but for India, it was not only 
a problem of exclusive state, but a power struggle. The leadership of the Maoist were 
based in India for nine out of the ten years of the civil war and we knew their agendas’ 
(Interview with researcher, 3 October 2018, New Delhi).  This approach places liberal 
peacebuilders as outsiders, detached and unaware of contextual urgencies. 
 
Equally, emergent powers understand that conflict-affected societies themselves know 
how to restructure their societies best, and can do it by themselves, rather than calling 
on liberal peacebuilders to propose solutions. An Indian diplomat, formerly posted in 
Nepal, stated: ‘I was asked by the UN if India has any Constitutional experts. We said 
No. Nepal already had five prior constitutions, so we believed Nepal had sufficient 
experience as well as a host of constitutional experts to do the job’ (Interview, 14 
October2018, New Delhi).  Similarly, on Nepal’s journey to SSR, another diplomat 
remarked: ‘Nepal did not follow any template provided by others. Its attempt to 
manage arms and armies at the end depended on the comfort between the other parties 
and the Maoists, based on the practical wisdom. And Nepal did have a largely 
successful process’ (Interview, 8 October 2018, New Delhi).  
 
In locating peacebuilders as outsiders, in many instances, EPRCM have constrained 
the engagement of liberal peacebuilders, when they see them as detrimental to regional 
interests. India’s role in limiting the mandate of UNMIN, as well as campaigning for 
its early exit from the Nepali peace process, testifies to this trend (Jha, 2014).  Further, 
when EAOs have asked such international actors as the US, and the UK, to participate 
in the peace process as formal witnesses, China has not only resisted this, but also 
incited EAOs, in the Northern border, to protest vehemently against undue Western 
influence in the peace process (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2015). 
In this dispute, the engagement of peacebuilders in the borderlands has been a 
particularly thorny issue. India registered its protest to both UNMIN and OHCHR 




resented a Western presence in the Kachin borderlands of Northern Myanmar (Myint-
U, 2016b; United States Institute of Peace, 2018).  
 
EPRCM thus confirms the uneven nature of multilateralism of India and China, where 
at the global level there has been an increased engagement with states, organisations 
and entities of the liberal world order; but in the region, it is governed by bilateralism 
(Cartwright, 2009; Hughes, 2016; Jackson, 2016; Wagner, 2012; Yahuda, 2007).  
Empirically, this multilateralism has also been noted outside the region, where China 
has demonstrated its readiness to undertake experimental trilateral cooperation, with 
traditional donors such as the US, the UK, and Australia in third countries (Zhang, 
2020). EPRCM, however, adds to the debate on uneven multilateralism, or the 
penchant for bilateralism in the region, by arguing that, regionally, emergent powers, 
rather than engaging multilaterally, actively contest multilateral or third party efforts. 
However, exceptions to regional multilateral engagement are those complex contexts, 
where India and China might not have any experience, or capacity. Discussing Chinese 
engagement in Afghanistan, a Chinese academic stated that ‘China does not have 
confidence in dealing with some new and emerging patterns of conflicts.  China prefers 
multilateral cooperation in such situation. But when it comes to traditional security 
concerns, China prefers bilateral cooperation’ (Interview, January 5, 2018(a), 
Sichuan). A comparable interpretation can be made of India’s engagement in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Limits of EPRCM: The Distinctions between India and China 
While EPRCM connects the approaches of India and China in the region, it cannot 
obscure their differences. This adds yet another layer of complexity to discussions of 
the similarities and differences between emergent powers and liberal peacebuilders. 
Countries, like Nepal and Myanmar, have walked a tightrope, balancing peacebuilders 
and emergent powers. They have had to balance India and China too. As regards the 
peace process, Nepal has more of a balancing act than Myanmar, for India has played 






Differences Between India and China in their Approaches of Engagement 
Some notable distinctions emerge between Indian and Chinese approaches to the peace 
processes of Nepal and Myanmar. Firstly, despite the engagement of both major 
powers, at national and macro-level political processes during transitions, differences 
surface in the forms of their political engagement. Within this macro-political 
engagement, India has invested in internal political developments, including regime 
change, on the pretext of ‘security implications’, or in order to offset the target 
country’s unfriendly strategic choices, thereby angering  neighbouring states and 
increasing anti-India sentiments regionally (Jacob, 2016). So involved is India in the 
seating and unseating of governments, as well as other national political changes, that 
politicians in Nepal have regarded India as the supreme source of their power, or their 
demise (Adhikari, 2014). Prime Minister Prachanda publicly accused India of the 
collapse of his government, after India engineered an anti-Maoist coalition to protect 
the NA in 2009 (Deccan Herald, 2009). Similarly, Prime Minister KP Oli blamed India 
for being behind the Maoist withdrawal of support to his government in 2016, leading 
to its collapse (First Post, 2016). This differs from the engagement of China, which 
has no history of directly supporting regime change in their dealings with any 
government in power in Naypyidaw to date. 
 
Given the varied approach to political engagements, countries in South Asia have used 
China to balance Indian interference, and have been appreciative of China’s non-
interventionist policies. However, this is not to say that China has not interfered 
directly in domestic politics. China’s aid to the Communist Party of Burma, as well as 
its links with various EAOs can be seen as forms of interference. In Nepal too, China 
is seen to have become more interventionist, in terms of regime support during the 
peace process. Witness its support for the Maoists to bribe Members of Parliament in 
2010, in order to strengthen the regime, and its further support, of the UML and the 
Maoists in their formation of the Left Alliance in 2017 (Sharma, 2019). This however 
does not compare to the degree and history of Indian intervention. The distinction 
between Indian and Chinese approaches to macro-level political engagement is 




countries are shy of identifying themselves with India, not only because they would 
have to pay a political price for doing so, but also because they are not confident that 
India would put in its best effort to bail them out when they need India’s support. ……. 
Contrast it with the Chinese style of cultivating leaders and political groups on a 
sustained basis, not only through financial and political support, but also through 
personal relations across parties and leaders’ (Muni, 2003, Pg. 190). This distinction 
also points to the differences in the ‘coercive capacity’ of India to ‘get things done’; a 
capacity which is stronger than that of countries within its regional influence, but weak 
when compared to that of China (Ganguly, 2017). Further, unlike China’s one-party 
state, India’s democratic framework ensures that Indian policies are likely to change 
with different governments.  
 
Secondly, India’s and China’s own development successes have been examples for 
developing countries in Africa and Asia (Cheru and Obi, 2011). However, their 
individual models are markedly different, in their political and economic foundations, 
reflecting their diverse internal governance systems. India, a federal and democratic 
state, is presented as a country struggling with internal problems, but nevertheless 
rising economically. On the other hand, despite China’s authoritarian polity, and state-
backed market economy, it has seen unprecedented development, and has carried out 
the world’s most successful poverty alleviation programme. In the peace process, their 
institutional mechanisms present differing, and even opposing, examples to groups in 
Nepal and Myanmar. Citing an example of the influence of a Chinese form of 
governance, a think tank representative remarked: ‘China’s administrative model is 
built with a strong state at the centre and autonomous provinces, focused on economic 
development. The UWSA want to see this model of economic autonomy leaving out 
fundamental political questions to the Centre. While other EAOs want to model of 
federalism, which resembles other countries with ethnic diversity including India 
(Interview, 15 November, 2018, Yangon). Similarly, other mechanisms of inclusive 
governance in India, such as affirmative action, and federal experience, founded on 
the basis of linguistic identity, have been a major source of inspiration for groups in 





Thirdly, their level of engagement with other Western states, and those global 
institutions dominated by the West, is also varied. Armed with a Security Council veto, 
China seems to be more comfortable working with the UN, rather than individual 
Western states (Alexandra and Lanteigne, 2017). This is evidenced by the fact that 
China was only willing to share space with the UN, as the other formal observer in the 
peace process in Myanmar (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2015). This 
confirms assessments beyond the region, where China is seen to empower the UN, as 
the only legitimate decision-making body, when it comes to finding global solutions 
to issues of peace and security (Breslin, 2013). Contrast this with India, where India 
seems to be more comfortable working with individual Western states, such as the US, 
the UK or the EU, rather than the UN. Its hostility towards UNMIN, and its working 
with the UK and the EU, albeit limited to joint statements on Nepal for now, 
demonstrates this trend.  
 
Lastly, Indian and Chinese differences surface around sheer capacity of engagement. 
There is a considerable economic and political asymmetry in Indian and Chinese 
engagement globally, which is also felt in their regional engagements. India’s central 
role in the Nepali peace process, and peripheral role in that of Myanmar, contrasts with 
China’s significant role in Myanmar, but also its heightened role in Nepal. This reflects 
China’s growing engagement in South and Southeast Asia. Although Indian 
engagement is prominent in South Asia, it has yet to match China’s in Southeast Asia. 
Despite India’s increased prioritisation of engagement in Southeast Asia, through such 
policies as the Look East policy, and investments on infrastructure and connectivity in 
the region, these commitments have yet to materialise (Atmakuri and Izzuddin, 2020). 
While there is recognition in Myanmar that India should, and could, play a more 
important role in in the peace process, there is an acknowledgement that it is unlikely. 
A peace negotiator said, ‘We all want India to be more active but Indian obsession 
with Pakistan inhibits meaning full engagement elsewhere.’ (Interview, 15 November 
2018, Yangon). This was further substantiated by an acknowledgement of the red tape 
and bureaucracy surrounding Indian engagement in Myanmar. A representative of the 
signatory EAOs in the peace talks remarked, ‘when the Chinese commit we know we 




by’ (Interview, 22 November 2018, Yangon). Even within the Indian diplomatic and 
academic community, there is a recognition that India has committed to increased 
engagement, on which it has been unable to deliver, more specifically in infrastructure 
projects, which have taken years if not decades to materialise (Interviews, October 
2018, New Delhi). 
 
China’s Foray into South Asia and India’s Embrace of the West 
The scale and intensity of China’s engagement, especially after the launch of its BRI, 
has furthered reinforced the divide between Indian and Chinese approaches in South 
Asia.  In addition the BRI has escalated India’s worries about China challenging its 
position as a regional power (Ganguly, 2018). Even before the advent of BRI, India 
was already coping with Chinese inroads into South Asia, with critical trans-border 
infrastructure projects, including the Friendship Highway to Nepal, the Karakoram 
Highway between Xinjiang and Pakistan, as well as ports at Gwadar (Pakistan), 
Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Kyaukphyu (Myanmar) (Baruah and Mohan, 2018). 
India views the BRI project as a deliberate Chinese plan to formalise its strategy of 
making inroads in South Asia (Jacob, 2017). Indian suspicion has increased due the 
enthusiastic welcome South Asian countries have accorded the BRI, at a time when 
India itself plays no part in the initiative. India’s decision, not to join the BRI, emerges 
from concerns about the violation of sovereignty, given that the BRI’s China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor passes through such contested territories as the Pakistan-occupied 
Kashmir, in addition to China’s unilateral decision to embed the Bangladesh, China, 
India and Myanmar Economic Corridor into the BRI framework (Blah, 2018).  
 
BRI has elicited varied responses from India. Beijing’s drive has stimulated India to 
review and rethink on its own approach to connectivity and infrastructure development 
in the region, more so in frontier areas (Jacob, 2017). The Indian government has 
announced such plans as the Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal Initiative to enhance 
regional connectivity (Baruah and Mohan, 2018). Additionally, India has started 
articulating norms that seek to distinguish it from China and appear close to standards 
and norms articulated by Western states and multilateral institutions. India’s Ministry 




that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international 
norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality. 
Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid 
projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; balanced 
ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards; transparent 
assessment of project costs…’ (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2017b).  
 
More importantly, BRI has compelled India to rethink its global alignments, which is 
likely to change how it interacts with Western states in the region, thus fostering closer 
relations with such third parties as the US, and forming a diplomatic coalition against 
China (Bajpai, 2017). India, which has traditionally sought to exclude Western powers 
from regional engagement, is now considering cooperative projects with Western 
states on connectivity, good governance, and development, in order to counter Chinese 
engagement in Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka, and other Southeast Asian countries (Baruah 
and Mohan, 2018). This is reciprocated by Western states, who have welcomed 
partnerships with India, not only for access to the Indian market, trade, and investment, 
but also because of the growing alarm about the rise of China in the West (Tellis and 
Mohan, 2015). This mirrors the wider trend, where the West has viewed India as the 
most attractive partner, amongst the rising powers, owing to such factors as its 
democratic political system (Narlikar, 2013). Accordingly, India’s relations with 
regimes, such as Iran and Myanmar, as well as its expansive interests in Africa, have 
not caused the level of alarm that China’s stance on similar issues have aroused in the 
international community (Kugiel, 2012). Although India’s relationship with the West 
is still at an embryonic stage, it might signal increased cooperation as things evolve 
further, and thus change the terms of EPRCM.  
 
EPRCM and Interaction with Liberal Peacebuilding 
 
Having outlined the motivations of EPRCM, and its limits, this chapter now turns to 
how EPRCM interacts with and impacts liberal peacebuilding. In outlining the 




debate about emergent powers and their engagement with the liberal world order in 
general. Finally, the state of liberal peacebuilding is assessed. 
 
Co-existing with Liberal Peacebuilders 
Unlike other alternative forms of peacebuilding, including illiberal peacebuilding, and 
ACM, that have side-lined or co-opted peacebuilding (de Oliveira, 2011; Lewis et al., 
2018; Smith, 2014); EPRCM has both restricted and facilitated a space for liberal 
peacebuilding. On the one hand emergent powers have sought to limit and constrain 
the scope of the engagement of peacebuilders in their regions. Witness India’s difficult 
relationship with UNMIN, or China’s attempt to limit the role of peacebuilders in the 
formal NCA process (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2015; I. Martin, 
2012). However, the broader political and economic dependence, as well as the 
entrenched nature of engagement of India and China, has caused elites in Nepal and 
Myanmar to turn to liberal peacebuilding. Nepal and Myanmar both called for the 
greater involvement of liberal peacebuilders, in the initial phases of the peace process 
(Kumbun, 2019b; Sharma, 2017). Over-reliance and dependence on China has proved 
to be a critical factor in the invitation extended to peacebuilders in Myanmar (United 
States Institute of Peace, 2018). In addition, the involvement of peacebuilders is also 
thought to help the peace process become more holistic. In Nepal, a human rights 
activist remarked, ‘with the absence of peacebuilders, India would have led the peace 
process, and this would mean that ambitious agendas of state restructuring through 
inclusion, issues of human rights and justice would not make much headway’ 
(Interview, 18 August 2017(b), Kathmandu). Emergent powers themselves 
acknowledge that, given their historical disputes, and deep-seated dependence, 
countries like Nepal and Myanmar will be keen to rein in external third parties to 
balance their engagement (Lintner, 2016b; Martin, 2012; Muni, 2012; Sun, 2012a).   
 
It is often the case that, despite their reluctance, emergent powers are obliged to share 
space in the peace process with peacebuilders, or delegate the management of some of 
its aspects to such peacebuilders as the UN, due to their own inexperience, or the 




initially opposed the UN’s role in managing some critical aspects of the peace process, 
but the Nepali political leadership was quick to point out that, if the UN could not be 
brought in, India would need to undertake it, which was something India was not 
prepared to do (Muni, 2012). This paradoxical interaction, where EPRCM both 
constrains and facilitates liberal peacebuilding, enables a negotiated co-existence 
between the two approaches. This co-existence is ‘negotiated’, as despite 
acknowledgement of the other, these plural forms are firstly, marked by limited 
interaction between the EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding, given the differences in 
modality of engagement, thus bringing some form of ‘division of labour’ between the 
two approaches; and secondly, in some instances the differences in approach have led 
to active contestation, as discussed in the section below. 
 
Limited Avenues for Convergence and Areas of Contestation  
The founding elements of EPRCM, as examined in the first part of this chapter, deviate 
from liberal peacebuilding; and the attendant differences in modalities, between the 
two forms of engagement, limit space for convergence.  
 
As discussed in Parts II and III of this thesis, the engagement of peacebuilders and 
emergent powers operate on different levels. To start with, the normative and 
prescriptive approach of peacebuilders is at variance with the norm-free approach of 
emergent powers that are reliant on pragmatic calculations. More importantly, liberal 
peacebuilding actors are invested in the everyday deliverables of the peace agreement, 
while India and China are more interested in macro-level elite pacts. Here, 
peacebuilders are invested in anchoring the peace process through institutional reform, 
international normative commitments, supporting peace structures, and broader civic 
awareness; while China and India's support has largely been around brokering and 
facilitating negotiations between different political factions, fostering dialogue 
between various groups, and putting pressure on political developments when it can. 
Liberal peacebuilding is thus multifaceted while emergent powers have a more limited 
focus in the peace process, which contrasts with the scale and layers of their 




that more broadly, and to different degrees, peacebuilders have dominated the policy 
space of the ‘peace process’, while emergent powers have dominated the ‘political 
sphere’, given their influence on all parties. Additionally, given the macro-level 
political engagements of China and India, the impact of their engagement has an 
immediate effect, while the normative and institutional focus of peacebuilders take 
longer to materialise.  
 
Further, while peacebuilders have focused on the formal institutions, of the peace 
process, India and China’s role has been in both formal and informal domains. For 
example, China has actively engaged with groups in the North, who have, on the 
whole, shunned the NCA process; while Western donors have, in general, supported 
groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement, and are based in the South (Interview 
with researcher, 23 November 2018, Yangon). In the same way, peacebuilders were 
involved in the processes of the Constituent Assembly (CA), which was supposed to 
legalise the agendas of the peace process. Meanwhile India was making and breaking 
coalitions that undermined the CA. This matches the assessment by the Editor in Chief 
of one of Nepal’s largest daily newspapers, who described India as having ‘hard 
power’ in Nepal, in contrast to the ‘soft power’ of peacebuilders (Interview, 10 August, 
2017, Kathmandu).  
 
Further, given their dismal focus on deliverables of the peace process, but their vested 
interest in macro-level political dynamics, they help forge an informal dichotomy or 
disjuncture between the formal peace process and the informal political process, 
where the actual locus of power lies; all of which has a critical impact on the political 
settlements it seeks to change, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Most 
importantly, the divide between the high-level political engagements of India and 
China, and their not so intense engagement in the everyday aspects of peacebuilding, 
also signals some form of ‘division of labour’ between the two: working distinctly 
rather than converging. 
 
The net result of these differences, and the limited areas where they do agree, has been 




joint projects are visible on the ground, and even sharing information on critical issues 
is limited. While India and China are conspicuously absent from donor forums, a 
frequent complaint of peacebuilders is that: ‘China appears to be doing its own thing 
with peacebuilding projects having no access to it’ (Interview with researcher, 21 
November (b), 2018, Yangon). However, three Indian diplomats, who served in Nepal, 
were able to confirm their discussions of the macro-level political dimensions with the 
international community, their attendance at meetings, and their being on calls with 
international counterparts amongst others. This engagement was considered to be 
important, to inform the international community about India’s interests (Interview 
with diplomat, 7 October, 8 October, 17 October, 2018, New Delhi). These interviews 
also confirmed that this was limited to macro-level aspects of the peace process, and 
not about the everyday management of different agendas of the process.   
 
Despite their differences, the mediation and facilitation of peace agreements, by 
fostering elite pacts between contesting groups, became a core area of agreement. 
India’s role alongside, and in dialogue with, Western partners, during the facilitation 
of the 12-point agreements, is one such example. China and the peacebuilders in a 
similar way, joined together to support the NCA process in Myanmar. However, even 
in the conversion of these elite pacts into peace accords, both play distinct roles in 
comparison to those of peacebuilders, as will be discussed in the next section.  Yet 
another area of convergence, though again distinct in modality, is the financial support 
provided by India and China to some peace institutions. China supported the Joint 
Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, and the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, 
while India gave support to the Election Commission in Nepal, as well as providing 
equipment, such as camps for former combatants, to help in the process of their 
management.  
 
This limited space of convergence is not only determined by the elements of EPRCM, 
but also by the perceived ineffectiveness of liberal peacebuilding. The illiberal face of 
liberalism, as seen in Afghanistan or Iraq, has led peacebuilding to be viewed as 
hypocritical and futile.  Similarly, the failure to build viable institutions in post-conflict 




building projects has been counterproductive (Interview with foreign policy analyst, 1 
October 1 2018, New Delhi). There is also a tendency to view the way the liberal 
peacebuilding community operates, as wasteful and often ineffective. As a diplomat 
in India cited, ‘We are used to doing more with little, which differentiates us from the 
other international community working in conflict-affected states’ (Interview, 14 
October 2018, New Delhi). The work of NGOs, who were critical to the delivery of 
the liberal peace agenda, was also viewed sceptically in interviews with Chinese 
academics (Interviews, December/ January 2018, Sichuan). The considerable number 
and spread, of liberal peacebuilding agendas and actors, compounds this. Their 
operation across state and non-state territories, in both private and public sectors, and 
at governmental and international levels, makes any partnership with them difficult at 
a practical level.  
 
As mentioned above, this limited coordination between the two has also taken the form 
of active protest, where emergent powers have inhibited the scope of liberal 
peacebuilders. Witness China’s protest against a Western presence in the China- 
Myanmar borderlands, and India’s dispute with UNMIN, where it was seen to be 
seeking a mandate in the Terai, across the Indian border, and as threatening to weaken 
the NA through debates on the integration of Maoist combatants (Sharma, 2019). Such 
examples also demonstrate that both India and China have in general co-existed with 
liberal peacebuilders and, unless they consider their interests could be affected, they 
have been in fact largely ‘indifferent’ to peacebuilders.   
 
Interaction between the Liberal World Order and Emergent Powers 
The state of engagement between EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding, defined by 
negotiated co-existence, also helps us draw inferences on the broader question in 
International Relations, about the engagement of Emergent Powers with the Liberal 
World Order. When liberal peacebuilding is viewed as a manifestation of the liberal 





This thesis began by mapping out the two schools of thought that have shaped the 
debate, as to how emergent powers will interact with liberal world order. One school 
presents the liberal international order as integrative and flexible, which creates 
incentives for non-Western emerging powers, like China and India, to join in 
(Ikenberry, 2011). The other school of thought asserts that, with differences in an 
understanding of sovereignty, threats to international security, and statehood, 
emerging powers will not adapt to the existing liberal order (Hurrell, 2006; Kupchan, 
2012). Centring this debate particularly on China, some scholars argue for the 
existence of a middle path, in which they see a more ‘cooperative’ partnership 
emerging between China and the US, described in such terms as: ‘G2 with Chinese 
Characteristics’ (Zeng and Breslin, 2016). Others have suggested a possible similar 
co-existence between the US and China, where each would maintain their own distinct 
political and economic systems, and would require the US to partially adapt to and 
accommodate China (De Graaff and Van Apeldoorn, 2018). Yet others argue that 
China would rather ‘free-ride’ on the U.S. contribution to global governance than play 
an equal part (Schweller and Pu, 2011).  
 
India’s rise on the other hand is much less discussed. This is in part due to the Indian 
foreign policy elite shying away from unwanted discussion of India’s status, in the 
belief that it raises expectations of India assuming international leadership (Miller, 
2013). However, despite the scale of the debate, the discussion is largely similar to 
China’s. The quest for recognition from established major powers leads it to comply 
with elements of the liberal order, while a desire to maintain relations of solidarity 
with developing countries, and Cold War allies, leads it to resist elements of the liberal 
order (Sullivan de Estrada, 2015). On the one hand, a partnership with the US is 
thought to be important for its rise, fostering a greater integration with the liberal order 
(Tellis and Mohan, 2015). On the other, India is yet not ready to leave its allies in the 
developing world, which would see it leading the global distributive justice agenda 
and a call for changes to the liberal order (Narlikar, 2013). Yet another voice within 
the debate views the direction of Indian foreign policy, with regards to the liberal order, 
to be largely dependent on the dynamics between US–China–Russia in the Asia–





Looking ‘bottom-up’, from Naypitaw or Kathmandu, the outcome needs revisiting. 
Here, emergent powers have a ‘negotiated co-existence’ with liberal peacebuilders, 
but this co-existence is neither about accepting nor totally rejecting liberal templates, 
but simply about disengaging or engaging minimally with them.  Here, India and China 
do not speak the ‘peacebuilding’ vernacular, or articulate their engagement in the 
peace process as quests for inclusion, SSR, or human rights and transitional justice, 
unlike peacebuilders. While this signals a lack of acceptance of the concepts, India and 
China have not rejected it totally, especially when it does not relate to their direct 
interests and priorities. Even though their indirect engagement in the wider political 
economy has limited the scope of these agendas, India and China have not directly 
undermined these agendas, which have become central themes in the peace processes. 
In fact, in some instances, they have made use of liberal norms, albeit instrumentally. 
India, for example, appropriated the language of transitional justice and human rights 
only once to raise the issue at the UN Human Rights Council. Thus, the alarm over a 
displacement of the values of liberal order does not yet hold, even in the regions where 
they wield unprecedented power (Jacques, 2009). 
 
This coexistence is also distinct from the type identified by De Graff and Van 
Apeldoorn, where the liberal order and its leader, the US, appears to have to make 
adjustments for China. Rather, in Myanmar, it is China that will need to make 
adjustments, and adapt to sharing the space with such others as liberal peacebuilders. 
For instance, given the history of sanctions and entrenched Chinese dependence in 
Myanmar, Western countries, the UN, and the liberal peacebuilding programmes they 
support, are new players in the game. Their presence threatens to unravel the existing 
terms of bilateral relations between Myanmar and China (Goh, 2005; Goh and 
Steinberg, 2016; Sun, 2012a). Similarly, Indian engagement in Nepal shows that it is 
the peacebuilders, who were seeking to come to an understanding with India 
(Whitfield, 2012). Further, the findings, also depart from Schweller and Pu’s 
assumption that China will free-ride on US contributions to global governance 
(Schweller and Pu, 2011). In Myanmar, little chance of any profit from such ‘free-




which have, for the last nine years, barely been able to steer the debate beyond a 
contested ceasefire regime. 
 
Thus, the discussion on emergent powers and the liberal world order needs to be 
upturned in such regional contexts as Nepal and Myanmar. Here, the question is best 
read as how peacebuilders are adhering to, rejecting, or adjusting to, the policies and 
strategies of emergent powers. In short, this articulation of ‘negotiated co-existence’ 
mirrors Kupchan’s assertion that while elements of the West-led liberal order is 
weakening, it is not being displaced by another coherent dominant model (Kupchan, 
2012). 
 
State of Liberal Peacebuilding 
Beyond EPRCM’s paradoxical impact on liberal peacebuilding, where it both 
constrains and facilitates the space for its engagement, empirical evidence from Nepal 
and Myanmar can also draw some major inferences, as to the state of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ on the ground. On examining its ability to leverage the space available 
to engage in conflict-affected states, some determining factors emerge. These include: 
the legacy of Western engagement on to which peacebuilding can build; a reliance on 
formal institutions and policies, which often overlook informal power dynamics; a 
need to engage the elites, thereby according them some form of legitimacy; a 
selectivity in their promotion of some issues, while ignoring others; and finally their 
retreat in the face of an elite backlash. These key issues already feature in the academic 
analyses of peacebuilding (Barma, 2017; De Waal, 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2016; Pouligny, 2006). However, the case studies of Nepal and Myanmar add 
empirical depth to the discourse. 
 
A fundamental criticism of peacebuilding has been its inability to understand the ‘local 
context’ in which it operates (Autesserre, 2014; Boege, 2016; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013). A comparison of Nepal and Myanmar reveals that, in order to gain 
the ‘ability to comprehend the local context’ a prior history of engagement can be 




key principles of ‘liberal peace’ to the peace process.  In Nepal, peacebuilders gained 
an important role in policy-making networks, by capitalising on their historical 
engagement as development donors (Pandey, 2011). In contrast, in Myanmar, 
peacebuilders were building on a history of sanctions, and their lack of contextual 
knowledge of the conflicts led them to be marginal in the process. 
 
Secondly, institutions are pertinent, as demonstrated by the centrality of debates on 
institutional reform on the Constitution, forms of inclusion, federalism, and SSR, in 
the peace processes in Nepal and Myanmar. However institutions, as well as 
commitments to institutional reform, are malleable, and can be easily co-opted by 
elites (Hickey, 2013; Kelsall, 2018b; Pospisil and Rocha Menocal, 2017).  These 
institutions, as Nepal’s journey towards inclusion and transitional justice 
demonstrates, can be limited to a formal adoption only, or renegotiated over time. For 
instance, Nepal’s Commissions on Transitional Justice remains unable to deliver even 
a basic semblance of justice, while such institutions as electoral systems, affirmative 
action, and federalism, have been renegotiated. The misalignment between 
peacebuilders’ investments, in building institutions that seek to curb the elite power 
base, and the power elites continue to wield, leads the elites to circumvent these 
institutions, through the co-option of peacebuilders. 
 
Thirdly, a fundamental impediment to the commitment to inclusive political 
settlements is their inability to forgo the dependence on elites. Unlike emergent 
powers, in principle, there is a commitment by liberal peacebuilders to social justice, 
inclusion, and poverty alleviation, all of which, if materialised, have the ability to make 
the political settlements more inclusive. In fact, the very essence of peacebuilding is 
‘geared to a logic of exclusion and selective incorporation’, where those perceived to 
be committed to liberal peace projects are included and rewarded, while those 
considered against them are sanctioned (Rasaratnam and Malagodi, 2012).  However, 
despite promoting ideals that seek to constrain the role of elites, peacebuilders rely on 
elites to coordinate the peacebuilding structure, which means that elites are able to 
shape peacebuilding interventions to their own interests, or co-opt them when they are 




to work with the SPA in Nepal, and the Tatmadaw-backed Thein Sein government, in 
the lead up to the peace process, and by doing so legitimised them, despite both being 
viewed as champions of exclusive political settlements.  
 
Scholars have noted also peacebuilding’s shift to pragmatism (De Coning, 2018; 
Pospisil, 2019). In Nepal and Myanmar, this is manifested in peacebuilder’s ability to 
selectively promote some agendas, while neglecting others, as well as to alter their 
engagement over time. This is reflected in their decision to selectively promote the 
agenda of ‘inclusion’, while ignoring elements of ‘transitional justice’ in Myanmar. It 
can also be seen in the curtailment of support for such contentious issues as transitional 
justice, as Nepal’s peace process progressed, despite having raised it, as a matter of 
extreme importance, earlier in the process (Dixit, 2011). Peacebuilders, thus, have 
selectively abandoned graver agendas of human rights and rule of law, to focus on 
achievable, and smaller, projects and initiatives, that do not ‘rock the boat’ of the status 
quo or lead to an elite backlash.  
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the peacebuilders’ practice of relinquishing 
their support, in the face of an elite backlash. In Nepal, as the peace process was 
drawing to a close, peacebuilders were asked to refrain from commenting on 
contentious domestic issues, and to reduce their support on ‘political’ issues (Drucza, 
2017).  In fact, in 2018, Nepal decided not accept any funds from donors for legislative 
processes, which were key sources of international support during the peace process 
(Ghimire, 2018b). Amid the elite backlash, peacebuilders diluted their support for 
marginalised groups, and made an abrupt reversal of policy on their promotion of 
liberal peace. Due to the backlash, DFID withdrew its funding for the Nepal Federation 
of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) to work on Janajati rights (Rai and Shneiderman, 
2019). Peacebuilders, who had fully supported transitional justice in the past, were 
silent generally, as the peace process progressed (Dixit, 2011). The swift withdrawal 
and reversal of liberal peacebuilders not only reduced the momentum for change in 
these issues, leaving marginalised groups in limbo, but also enabled the elites to gain 
control of the agenda, through their adopting a narrow and minimalist version of their 





These impediments, however, do not mean that there have not been partial successes. 
Peacebuilders continue to be called on for their support in peace processes, and 
continue to be valorised for the legitimacy they can bestow on different policies and 
processes. They continue to dominate the normative and ‘policy’ sphere, which shapes 
the debates of the peace process. Their ability to push through liberal norms, including, 
human rights, inclusion and civilian supremacy into the peace agreements, and the 
emergence of these as central agendas in the peace processes in Nepal and Myanmar, 
does demonstrate the ability of peacebuilders to shape the foundations of political 
transitions (Interview with peace negotiator, August 6, 2017, Kathmandu). These 
norms and agendas have strengthened the ideational toolkit of marginalised groups 
and challenged the political settlements (Yanguas, 2017a).  For instance, in supporting 
‘inclusion’, peacebuilders by default, categorise the issue as ‘elite’s vs marginalised’ 
groups, thus providing a normative ammunition to marginalised groups and 
legitimising their quest to devolve power away from such elite groups as the Bamars 
in Myanmar, or the CHHE in Nepal. Through their support for different movements, 
peacebuilders have created greater space for Dalits, Janajatis and women, in 
comparison to the pre-war years, despite a failure to honour their commitment as 
promised in the peace agreement.  
 
Such partial successes call for a reappraisal of the three dominant critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding, which are described in such terms as: i) ‘crisis’ (Chandler, 2017) and  
‘loss of agency’ (Pospisil, 2019); ii) ‘goal-free’ and iii) lacking coherence (Zaum, 
2012). The assessment of a loss of agency is accurate, when compared longitudinally, 
relative to the heyday of liberal internationalism of the 1990s. However, such 
assessments are largely recondite in the eyes of the subjects of these interventions, and 
do not reflect the perceptions on the ground about the continued symbolic and 
normative power of peacebuilders. This chimes with Mac Ginty and Firchow’s 
assessment that ‘topdown and bottom-up narratives and understandings of conflict 





Despite appraisal of their diminished influence, in Nepal and Myanmar, peacebuilders 
are valorised by the legitimacy they accord, and the funding and support they bring, 
and, significantly, also for how they form a credible counterbalance to the intrusive 
policies of regional powers.  In fact, while Western academics lament peacebuilding’s 
loss of agency, in such cases as Nepal, stakeholders resent the enormity of 
peacebuilders’ agency and power. Despite the razor-thin mandate of UNMIN (Suhrke, 
2011), peacebuilders’ ability to socially and institutionally organise Nepali society, 
through the ‘power of the purse’ (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 
2017(a), Kathmandu), cannot be viewed as a loss of agency. In fact, even regional 
powers such as India have felt that, in the peace process, Nepal has been more 
amenable to accommodating demands from peacebuilders compared to those from 
India (Muni, 2015c). In dominant academic opinion the co-option of liberal 
peacebuilding by elites, leads to its ‘compromise’, and thus to a loss of agency (Barnett 
and Zürcher, 2008). However, the fact that elites are bound to co-opt peacebuilding 
projects, rather than reject projects and their agendas outright, testifies to the power 
they wield. For instance, when military elites in Myanmar speak the language of SSR, 
and elites in Nepal adopt institutions of transitional justice hostile to their own 
interests, despite seeking to co-opt them later, can be seen as partial successes and 
therefore as testimony to peacebuilders’ agency rather than as a complete failure. This 
should be hailed as a localisation and regionalisation of peacebuilding practices, rather 
than viewing the demise of liberal peacebuilding as a fait accompli, and writing its 
obituary.  
 
Secondly, peacebuilding is increasingly seen to be pragmatic and ‘goal-free’, and 
while the studies of Nepal and Myanmar confirm the pragmatism, this pragmatism is 
far from ‘goal-free’ (De Coning, 2018). The normative constraints are very much at 
play and cannot, or perhaps should not, be dismissed.  Despite the marginal role of 
peacebuilders in Myanmar, who have contributed minimal resources and input, they 
have been able to advance the human rights agenda. In fact, Myanmar was duty-bound 
to defend itself at the International Criminal Court, as well as face another round of 
US sanctions in 2018, on grounds of its human rights abuses across the country. 




institutions in Nepal after 2016, as it did not comply with international legal 
obligations (UNOHCHR, 2016). Additionally, on seeing the voluntary retirement, 
with no state monitoring, of former combatants as detrimental to the standard practice 
of DDR, peacebuilders refused to fund the process, leaving the Nepali state to bear the 
expenses (Wagle and Jackson, 2015). Beyond these examples, peacebuilders have 
influenced, and even driven, political forces to embed certain normative commitments 
in the peace accords in Nepal and Myanmar. These point to a reinforcement of norms, 
rather than being ‘norm-free’. What of course holds true is the selectivity of when, and 
in which issue-areas, these norms are enforced, and when they are left out.  Thus, 
despite its new pragmatic foundation, and its apparent discarding of a penchant for a 
wholesale package of liberalism to be transmitted on the ground, vestiges of it remain 
in the form of an iconisation of such values as democracy, inclusion, respect for 
civilian supremacy in civil-military relations, and human rights.  
 
In yet another critique, scholars, such as Zaum, call for abandoning the notion of liberal 
peacebuilding, given the heterogeneity and absence of coherence amongst the, largely 
Western, actors involved in peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012). Here, there seems to be a 
stark difference in perspectives: on how peacebuilding is viewed ‘bottom-up’ by elites 
in such countries as Nepal and Myanmar, and how it is perceived by scholars, generally 
in the West. Despite the heterogeneity, in Nepal and Myanmar, consortiums 
incorporating a mix of actors to lead peace process agendas are very evident. The 
Nepal Peace Trust Fund, and the Joint Peace Fund and Peace Support Fund in 
Myanmar are embodiments of this, both of which command an influential space in the 
peace process. Despite the risk of overstating the homogeneity of liberal peacebuilding 
(Goodhand and Walton, 2009), a degree of coherence is prevalent when faced with the 
‘local’. So the US support might focus on democracy, the British support on inclusion, 
and the Europeans on the rule of law, but in these varied policy domains and narratives, 
the only space accorded to countries like Nepal and Myanmar is ‘one that is lacking in 
all these liberal tenets’.  Perhaps, the feature, that binds liberal peacebuilders, is their 
pathologising of the ‘local’, who are seen to lack democracy, accountability for human 
rights, and the capacity to foster peace. Here, a factor much less discussed, in liberal 




rule the liberal peacebuilding system, in which citizens from Nepal and Myanmar are 
mere foot soldiers. As a former Minister in Nepal reminded me regarding the invalidity 
of the heterogeneity of peacebuilders, ‘they could be from the UN, EU or USAID. But 
a lot of the times these are the same people switching between different portfolios. 
Perhaps the biggest difference is that we don’t see people like you and me in the places 
they are’ (Interview, 4 September 2017, Kathmandu). This perception of homogeneity 
was also evident in interviews where interviewees tended to conflate and use terms 
like ‘liberal peacebuilders’, ‘West’ interchangeably, positing liberal peacebuilding as 
extension of foreign policy of Western states. The invisibility of Western heterogeneity 
to the world outside the west, is reflected in the thoughts of a Singaporean scholar-
diplomat who writes, ‘of the least understood (and surprisingly least studied) 
phenomena is how the West often functions as a single entity on global issues’ 
(Mahbubani, 2009).  
 
With these critiques not completely reflecting the contextual realities on the ground in 
Nepal and Myanmar, this thesis underlines the fact that, despite the failures of 
peacebuilders globally, they continue to hold enough ground. This in part echoes the 
assertion by Bargués-Pedreny, that peacebuilders, while they have assessed their 




This chapter shed light on the differing languages of peace spoken by India and China, 
and conceptualised as EPRCM. However, the opposing impulses brought about by 
these tenets of EPRCM, as well as the unevenness in the delivery of these tenets, is the 
source of many internal contradictions, which means that EPRCM cannot be pursued 
in a clear way. While EPRCM highlights the coherence of approaches in India and 
China, this chapter also sheds light on the differences between their forms of 
engagement. It also points to a resurgent trend, where India is seen to be attempting to 
foster greater cooperation with Western states against the rise of China, which is likely 





In seeking to understand how EPRCM interacts with liberal peacebuilding, this thesis 
stresses the existence of a ‘negotiated co-existence’ between these plural forms of 
international engagement. This co-existence is marked by divergent modes of 
engagement, limited interaction and coordination between the two, and active 
contestation in a few areas. This form of interaction draws inferences for the broader 
question, of how emergent powers engage with the liberal world order. Here, empirical 
evidence from Nepal and Myanmar, in the realm of peacebuilding, confirms that 
liberal values are not being adopted by emergent powers, but neither are they being 
contested overtly. Rather alternative frameworks such as EPRCM co-exist with liberal 
frameworks, like peacebuilding, albeit uneasily.  
 
A core inference from this chapter is that EPRCM, given its entrenched nature, leads 
elites in conflict-affected states to call on peacebuilding, creating a space for liberal 
engagement. Ironically, this space is also circumvented by emergent powers, 
especially when the agendas of peacebuilders are seen to be impeding their interests.  
Having underlined the space available for peacebuilding, this chapter has also shed 
light on the fragile and marginal state of liberal peacebuilding. However, the chapter 
has also cautioned that, despite the fragility, the critique about peacebuilding’s loss of 






Chapter 8: Impact on Political Settlements 
 
Building on empirical insights from Parts II and III of this thesis, and from Chapter 7, 
which outlined the elements of EPRCM, this chapter outlines how the co-existence of 
EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding has impacted political settlements. The first section 
looks at how EPRCM and liberal peacebuilders engage on different elements of 
political settlement, and the variation in their individual strength. The second section 
then looks inwards, to see how domestic elites have mobilised plural forms of 
international engagement to harness greater choice and autonomy. The third part traces 
how this enhanced autonomy of elites gives rise to hybrid forms of peace that bring a 
degree of change, but are geared towards strengthening the status quo in the political 
settlements. The fourth section, draws some inferences for the concept of political 
settlement, before proceeding to the conclusion. 
 
International Engagement and Impact on Political 
Settlements 
Existing scholarship has established the dialectic relationship between international 
engagement and political settlements in conflict-affected states: the agency of 
domestic elites to co-opt and shape international engagements in their favour; and the  
ability of international engagement to negatively or positively impact political 
settlement  (Barma, 2017; Barnett and Zürcher, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; 
Meehan and Goodhand, 2018; Parks and Cole, 2010). In the contested context of peace 
processes, where formerly warring groups seek to end the conflict by renegotiating the 
distribution of power and resources, this dialectic relationship becomes more crucial 
to the negotiations (Bell, 2015; Kelsall, 2018b). This chapter traces this dialectical 
interaction, in the context of plural forms of international engagement, and the 
differences in the influence or leverage of EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding 





Divergences and Convergences on Processes of Negotiating Political 
Settlements 
When discussions on international engagement in conflict-affected states take into 
consideration the plurality in international engagement, we find a fundamental 
difference on the ‘need to transform political settlements’. Liberal peacebuilders see 
an inclusive political settlement, which includes all major social groups, as a 
contributory factor for the durability of the peace process and long-term stability 
(Rocha Menocal, 2015). Accordingly, peacebuilders have invested resources and 
diplomatic capital, to intervene in the domestic peace negotiations in the peace process 
to ensure inclusivity (Bell, 2015; Castillejo, 2014). However, emergent powers do not 
subscribe to this formula of inclusive political settlements being solutions to conflict 
resolution. The extent of intervention and institutional engineering required to foster 
inclusive political settlements is seen to be not only undesirable, from their stability-
focused perspective on peace processes, but also unfeasible (Interviews, December 
2017 & January-2018, Sichuan; October 2018, New Delhi).  More so, as these 
contradictory readings of inclusive political settlements are launched in conflict-
affected states, the outcomes are mixed. On the one hand, liberal peacebuilders have 
the interest, but not the capacity, to translate their prioritisation of fostering inclusive 
political settlements in practice. On the other, EPRCM is not normatively committed 
to the cause of inclusivity. Instead, their engagement shifts pragmatically based on 
their core interests, and thus, the impact of their engagement is uncertain, and can 
either support or oppose the momentum for inclusive political settlements.  
 
To trace the how EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding engages with processes that seek 
to re-negotiate political settlements and the resulting convergence and divergences, I 
go back to Kelsall’s concept of political settlement which was introduced in Chapter 
1. To restate, Kelsall (2018) outlines three components of political settlements; 
i) An agreement or pact between elites that end the conflicts by re-
negotiating the distribution of power and allocation of resources  
ii) Political institutions that flow from the elite pacts and have distributional 




iii) Acceptable distribution of benefit.  
 
If political settlement is looked at through the three-connected elements or stages, the 
cases of Nepal and Myanmar highlight that there are differences in how emergent 
powers and peacebuilders engage on these three elements, as will be discussed below.  
 
Element 1: Crafting of Elite Pacts 
With EPRCM focused on mitigating instability, it is vested in fostering agreements or 
elite pacts between warring factions, as a means of ending the conflict. India’s role, as 
the guarantor of the 12-point agreement, paved the way for the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord, and remained the basis for the peace process in Nepal. Similarly, China’s 
mediation between the EAOs and the government in Myanmar was one of the most 
symbolic aspects of Chinese diplomacy. Thus, in the crafting of elite pacts, which 
materialise in the form of peace agreements or ceasefire agreements, there is a synergy 
between liberal peacebuilders and emergent powers as illustrated in the blue boxes in 
Figure 8 below.   
 
Despite a broad convergence on the need for elite pacts, three differences surface. 
Firstly, for EPRCM the need for elite pacts is based on concerns for stability. Thus, 
there is a proclivity for support to elite pacts that is largely focused on horizontal 
inclusion, or inclusion of contending elites, rather than elite pacts that cater to vertical 
inclusion, which caters to the relationship between elites and the wider society. This 
regional push for horizontal ‘elite pacts’ is noted in the nature of Indian engagement, 
where it supported the 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the other political 
parties, which ended the war, but has been averse to the long-term agenda of the 
Maoists on broad-based inclusion and civilian supremacy, which would have ensured 
vertical forms of inclusion (Slavu, 2012). Such limited focus, on horizontal inclusion 
between contending elites, reduces the incentives for elites in Nepal and Myanmar to 
seek a broader transformation. It also negates the impetus by peacebuilders on a wider 





Secondly, while EPRCM is invested in elite pacts and peace agreements that agree to 
halt the war, it is not interested in anything beyond that. For instance, the aversion to 
solution-based templates leads EPRCM to rarely be invested in supporting the content 
of the peace accord or the peace institutions that follow. Confirming China’s role in 
the NCA process in Myanmar, a representative of JMC remarked, ‘The Chinese have 
not influenced the content of the dialogue. Rather they seem to have very little detail 
on how things should work’ (Interview, 13 November 2018, Yangon). This contrasts 
with liberal peacebuilders who have actively crusaded to shape peace accords and 
institutions, and embed international legal norms and global good practice in peace 
accords. Such a normative thrust was highlighted by a peace negotiator in Nepal, who 
stated, ‘We said we wanted a peace agreement. They (peacebuilders) said it had to be 
a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We accordingly added to the content of the 
accord, including accountability for human rights’ (Interview, 6 August 2017, 
Kathmandu). Such active support for the ‘normativisation’ of peace agreements is 
evident in increased references to human rights, inclusion, and different international 
legal mechanisms in various peace agreements (Bell, 2017b; Kaldor, 2016).  
 
Thirdly, there are other elements of EPRCM, which can place conditions on, or even 
contravene, this support for elite pacts, rendering it incoherent and inconsistent. 
EPRCM’s prioritisation of regional stakeholders in the making of peace, as well as its 
developmental focus has, in some instances, led emergent powers to oppose elite pacts, 
when such pacts reduce their role or impede their developmental priorities. For 
instance, China dissuaded such Northern groups as the KIO from signing the NCA in 
2015, to penalise the Thein Sein regime for the cancellation of the much-publicised 
China-backed Myitsone dam project, and for providing increased space for countries 
like US and Japan to engage in the peace process (Myint-U, 2020). However, domestic 
developmental considerations such as BRI, as well as the leadership of the NLD in 
Myanmar, which has sought to re-cultivate ties with China, has again led China to use 
its leverage in trying to forge elite pacts. Similarly, India’s support to Madheshi groups 
for the economic blockade, in the aftermath of the promulgation of the Nepali 
Constitution, which would have formalised the peace process, stemmed from its  




on board, while being more open to accommodating concerns of external parties like 
the EU and China (Muni, 2015c). 
 
Similarly, given the multi-layered relations that bind India and China to Nepal and 
Myanmar, ‘stability’ can be contingent on evolving concerns and priorities in the 
broader relations, which has an impact on how they recalibrate their stance on elite 
pacts. For instance, support to cross-border groups are seen both as source of stability 
and instability at different times. This makes Indian and Chinese support to elite pacts 
between these groups, and with those of elites in Kathmandu or Naypyidaw, 
conditional on the vagaries of their national interests. Violence in Madhesh crossing 
the border and destabilising the country is of paramount concern to India (Nayak, 
2011). However, the violent uprisings in Madhesh were seen to be critical in 
weakening the Maoist base, and thus contributing to strengthening the NA, and this 
was seen to be of greater importance for Indian stability (Jha, 2014; Sharma, 2019). 
Such contrasting versions of stability led India to both support and oppose the 
Madheshi movement. Similar assessments can be noted of China’s relations with the 
strongest EAO groups, such as the UWSA, which have provided some form of stability 
across the Yunnan border, especially at a time when the political settlements in 
Myanmar is being negotiated (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). However, 
China’s strengthening of the UWSA, through formal and informal channels across the 
border, hinders the chances of the UWSA accepting the NCA.  
 
EPRCM’s prioritisation of elite pacts leads to certain interpretations. While the 
literature on political settlements highlights elite pacts as a means to foster stability in 
conflict-affected states (Kelsall, 2018b; Lindemann, 2011), EPRCM views stability 
not only as a domestic variable in neighbouring states like Nepal and Myanmar, but as 
a regional concern that impacts India and China too. In seeing ‘elite pacts’ as pertinent 
for regional security, there is a convergence with liberal peacebuilders, and ‘elite pacts’ 
are likely to be accepted as a standard norm as the global order shifts to Asia.  
However, forging ‘elite pacts’ for stability cannot be taken as a firm policy, but rather 












Element 2: Supporting Political Institutions and Distribution of Power  
While there is convergence, albeit conditional, between peacebuilders and EPRCM in 
forging elite pacts, when discussions on political settlements head to the second 
element, where institutions that re-distribute power are being designed, the two 
approaches diverge as shown in Figure 8. To start with, EPRCM does not seek to 
engage on the everyday aspects of peace process, once elite pacts guaranteeing 
stability are confirmed. The building-blocks of EPRCM, discussed in Chapter 7, 
including rejection of the purported universality of liberalism, as well as aversion to 
institutional templates, ensure that India and China are not interested in supporting 
institutions, which seek to translate the elite pacts into practice by re-distributing 
political power.  
 
This departs from liberal peacebuilders, where institutional engineering of conflict-
affected states is seen to be central to the making of liberal states (Chandler, 2006; 
Zaum, 2003). Peacebuilders have relied on several incentives, including aid (Wyeth, 
2012), enhanced diplomatic relations, mediation, legitimacy, defence assistance, and 
trade opportunities; in order to induce conflict-affected states to comply with 
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inclusion. As demonstrated in the case of Nepal and Myanmar, peacebuilders have 
also aided in the translation of these norms and commitments enshrined in peace 
agreements, by supporting various peace institutions, leading to many accounts of  
‘institutional mono-cropping’ (Evans, 2004). The institutional focus of peacebuilders 
is evident from their support in establishing institutions anchored in the peace 
agreements, such as the Joint Monitoring Committee in Myanmar, the Commissions 
for transitional justice in Nepal, as well as support for debates on federalism, SSR, and 
electoral reform. Such institutions, by their very purpose and through the incentives 
that flow from them, are entangled within larger power dynamics. For instance, 
Commissions on transitional justice are likely to implicate directly and indirectly, the 
security agencies and the rebel groups. Similarly, electoral reforms, especially when 
proportional representation is added, are likely to create critical political space for 
marginalised groups (Sisk, 2009).  
 
However, there are instances, where India and China have selectively engaged in 
institutional engineering, albeit when their immediate interests are at stake. This is 
demonstrated by India’s engagement in the debate on inclusion in Nepal. These 
interests could range from regional policies centred on stability, combating extra-
regional presence or influencing policies in the region, or due to the changes in their 
foreign policy parameters. This selective engagement of emergent powers, in shaping 
such political institutions, implies that they either choose to disengage or engage and, 
when they engage, whether they converge or diverge with liberal peacebuilders. Each 
of these three strategies: disengagement, engagement in convergence with liberal 
peacebuilders, or engagement with divergence with liberal peacebuilders, has a 
variable impact on the political settlement, as is discussed below.  
 
To start with, it needs noting that even when India and China are disengaged in the 
process of supporting political institutions in the peace process, their broader 
engagement in bilateral relations can still have an indirect impact. The flow of 
resources and ideas, and the legitimacy in broader bilateral relations can indirectly 
impact the peace process. These influences have been accentuated, with the global rise 




support, loans, market access; all of which impact post-conflict institutions 
(Chaturvedy and Malone, 2012; Lintner, 2016b). For instance, while not vested in the 
dialogue around federalism and powersharing in Myanmar, large-scale Chinese 
investments in the borderlands have impacted the negotiations on federalism in 
Myanmar (Pyidaungsu Institute, 2017). Similarly, India’s support to the NA 
suppressed any meaningful dialogue on issues of transitional justice (Sharma, 2019).  
 
Aside from flows of material support, despite their disengagement, the institutional 
and developmental models of India and China also provide an alternative normative 
influence realm (Cabestan, 2012; Taylor, 2012).  This normative allure has persevered 
with the ‘power of their example’, which impacts how elite groups in Nepal and 
Myanmar articulate and act on different agendas of the peace process (Interview with 
the former Indian representative to the UN, 9 October 2018, New Delhi). For instance, 
a Nepali Prime Minister, in articulating his vision of democracy argued for the 
centrality of ‘right to life’ saying, ‘no one is left hungry and no one dies of hunger’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, 2019), a view which resonates with that of  China 
on human rights. With the pluralisation of foreign policy, norms also emanate from 
political parties, witness the ideology of ‘Hindutva’ propounded by the BJP, which has 
influenced and shaped the prospects of secularism. Hindutva cannot be viewed as a 
norm promoted by the Indian state, since only one political party promotes it. 
Nevertheless, its cascade to Nepal epitomises varied transnational sources of 
normative influences that serve as prominent alternatives to the liberal one. Here, a 
salient part of the normative allure is India and China’s institutional governance 
architecture. For instance, different marginalised groups in Nepal have drawn 
inspiration from India’s experience of pathways of accommodation of minorities, from 
federalism, to affirmative action, experience of a constituent assembly (Hachhethu, 
2014; Shneiderman, 2013); while such EAOs as the UWSA have looked at China’s 
system of autonomous provinces.  
 
Thus, in short, despite the indirect impact, the EPRCM’s disengagement on supporting 
institutions, which translate elite pacts into concrete institutions, dilutes the strength of 




conflict-affected states. Instead, it is often the case that they have the power to undercut 
the moral and material force of peacebuilders, given their alternative norms well as the 
material incentives of trade and investment they bring. While the legitimacy of 
peacebuilders is still coveted, the incentives they bring for elites is far less attractive, 
as conflict-affected states can procure the same dividends from India and China, 
without conditions. 
 
Secondly, immediate concerns of stability can, however, compel EPRCM to engage 
on supporting institutions that seek to redistribute power. In their engagement they can 
coverge with the approach of liberal peacebuilders or diverge with them.  India’s role 
in supporting the Madhesh party and thus catalysing federalism in Nepal, and India’s 
opposition to the ‘democratisation of the Army’, an important agenda of SSR, can be 
seen in this light.   
 
Despite the meteoric difference in the nature of support, the support for inclusion by 
liberal peacebuilders neatly complemented the Indian support for Madheshi political 
parties, thus galvanising the momentum for federalism. The support by peacebuilders 
was based on the logic that inclusive processes, where marginalised groups had better 
stakes in society, would make the peace process more durable (Castillejo, 2014). 
India’s aiding of  the Madheshi parties, in turn, stemmed from India’s worries about 
Maoists gaining control of the state, which could be diluted by strengthening Madheshi 
parties (Jha, 2014; Tamang, 2017). The success of Madheshi politics, apart from 
domestic factors, which will be discussed below, can be owed in part to some form of 
convergence between emergent powers and peacebuilders. The liberal canon provided 
the moral narrative while the Indian support helped with the material aspect.  
 
Divergences can be seen in the issue of SSR. While UNMIN championed the 
enactment of the CPA’s commitment to the ‘democratisation of the Army’, India saw 
‘democratisation’, and the integration of former combatants into the Nepal Army 
(NA), as a means of weakening it, with a resulting impact on India’s own security 




diplomatic and material capital into the process, and UNMIN, even led to the latter’s 
exit (Ghimire, 2018b).   
 
Key inferences can be made. When EPRCM converges with liberal peacebuilders on 
institution building, it creates sustained international pressure to make political 
settlements inclusive. Whereas divergences between the two international approaches, 
on supporting institutions, heightens the misalignment between elite pacts, or peace 
agreements, and the institutions that develop to support such pacts (Cheng et al., 2018). 
This misalignment impedes the possibility of discussions on political settlement 
moving on from the elite pact phase, or Element 1, to the political institutions building 
phase (Element 2). This is demonstrated by the ‘unsettlement’ of such issues as SSR 
and transitional justice, which were promised in the Nepal’s CPA, but have not 
materialised (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). 
 
Element 3: Acceptable Distribution of Benefits 
In explaining the third element of the political settlement, Kelsall argues that if a 
‘settlement is to be sustained, their actual delivery must be acceptable to, that is to say, 
compatible with the expectations of, the aforementioned powerful groups’ (Kelsall, 
2018, Pg 8). However, as the case of Nepal demonstrates, despite elite pacts and 
institutional commitments to redistribute power, such commitments can shift with 
time, and the ‘distribution of benefits’ might not be acceptable and continue to be 
contested. Or to phrase it in simple terms: success in Element 1 and 2 does not 
necessarily lead to Element 3. Thus as Figure 9 demonstrates, owing to the 
indeterminacy of the peace process, where power distribution can fluctuate, and new 
claims on power distribution can emerge, there can be a stage between Element 2 and 
3, where the institutions agreed upon earlier can continue to be contested rather than 
accepted. Given Myanmar’s nascent peace process, which is only beginning to discuss 
the redistribution of power through formal and informal institutions, Nepal serves as 
the only point of reference. In Nepal, of the three agendas (inclusion, SSR, and 
transitional justice) discussed in the thesis, only one, inclusion, has transcended the 




phase (see Figure 9). However, even that ‘acceptability’ is only partial and much- 
contested, and is currently being discussed in the form of a Constitutional amendment.  
 




Even in the issue of inclusion, more specifically on federalism, the political impact has 
been uneven across different groups in Nepal. As demonstrated by the national election 
results of 2017, while it has benefitted Madheshi political parties, the Janajati and Dalit 
groups and women’s movements have made only marginal gains (Paswan, 2018). 
Again, Indian support, as well as a coherent strategy of political mobilisation, often 
accompanied with violent protests, is seen to be the key to the success of the Madheshi 
movement (Tamang, 2017). It also leads one to conclude that if regional powers had 
been equally supportive in the other peace process issues, such as transitional justice, 
it might have had a better fate. 
 
A core inference that stands out in the making of inclusive political settlements, in 
cases like Nepal, is the centrality of emergent powers vis-à-vis peacebuilders. This 
centrality comes from the strength of the leverage EPRCM has on political settlements 
regionally. Thus, national political settlements need to factor in the plurality of 
international engagement and, importantly, also take into account their comparative 
levels of leverage in conflict-affected states. It is to the strength of the leverage of the 





















Differences in the Strength of International Leverage  
Along with the variations in the nature of EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding, they also 
differ in their ability to leverage incentives that will transform political settlements into 
inclusive ones. EPRCM is deeply entrenched while liberal peacebuilding relatively 
feeble, undercut both by the agency of domestic elites in Nepal and Myanmar and by 
that of emergent powers. It is only peacebuilders who have purposively promoted 
narratives of inclusion, and sought a redistribution of resources, while emergent 
powers have only instrumentally promoted these issues. The strength of their 
individual engagement has had an immediate impact on political settlements, for as 
evidenced in Nepal and Myanmar, although liberal peacebuilders seek to, influence 
political settlements, and do so, they lack the capacity to effect significant changes, 
while emergent powers do have the capacity, but no sustained interest to take action.  
 
With immediate stakes in their own stability, as well as their regional foreign policy 
imperatives, India and China do have a sustained and vested interest in aspects of the 
transition of both countries, especially on issues that have a cross-border relevance 
(Dabhade and Pant, 2004; Sun, 2012b). India and China, in a bid to guard their 
priorities are able to leverage on the asymmetry that exists with countries like Nepal 
and Myanmar, and make use of such incentives as trade, investment, and access to 
markets to push through their interests (Sharma, 2019; United States Institute of Peace, 
2018). India’s support of the economic blockade of cross-border trading points in 
2015, which completely cut off the Nepali economy, serves as an example of the 
extreme levers emergent powers can use to influence post-conflict transitions in their 
region of influence. Further, the indispensability of India and China in forging elite 
pacts, and the economic and political dependence of elites in Nepal and Myanmar on 
these regional hegemons, ensures that they dominate macro political processes. This 
indispensability is channelled by emergent powers to change the direction of peace 
processes, with often an immediate impact. For instance, through its direct financing 
of political parties and the NA, India has made political parties accountable to itself, 




through their leverage with the most powerful EAOs, China has been able to control 
the pace and direction of the Myanmar peace process (Kumbun, 2019a; Lintner, 
2016b).  
 
The centrality of India and China in peace processes in Nepal and Myanmar are even 
acknowledged by peacebuilders themselves (United States Institute of Peace, 2018; 
Whitfield, 2012). This is more so in Myanmar, where peacebuilders acknowledge that 
they have limited influence and ‘clout’, especially in comparison to regional actors 
like China, and that they cannot match the levels of engagement and investments that 
come from regional actors (Interview with Head of a Peacebuilding Consortium, 10 
July 2017 (a), Yangon).  
 
On the other hand, the engagement of peacebuilders is largely contained within the 
parameters of the peace process. While peacebuilders have also used levers of 
bestowing legitimacy, sanctions, and aid to influence processes, these are neither 
sustained nor as effective as those given by India and China (Farrelly, 2009). Further, 
as described in Chapter 7, their very modality of engagement hampers their potential 
to change the pace of the political settlement, as witnessed by their reliance on elites 
to run the peacebuilding machinery, their dependence on formal institutions, and their 
inability to understand the context. Perhaps the most pertinent of these factors, when 
it comes to influencing political settlements is that the very normative foundation of 
projects, like inclusion, and transitional justice, is viewed as having the potential to 
constrain the power base of elites, through such institutions as electoral processes and 
judicial institutions (Parks and Cole, 2010).  While this rankles with the elites, it does 
not sufficiently empower the marginalised groups.  
 
Rather, the engagement of peacebuilders on issues of transforming political 
settlements might have an unintended negative impact on the state of the marginalised 
groups within the political settlement. To start with, overt international engagement in 
shaping political settlements, shifts the locus of accountability making  the elites less 
accountable to marginalised groups, but more so to international actors (Chandler, 




solutions but rather respond to external pressures (Phillips, 2016). In Nepal, for 
instance, the processes of the Constituent Assembly (CA) were so internationalised 
that technical drafts on many themes were prepared by international actors, rather than 
by CA members in consultation with their constituents (Interview with civil society 
representative, 16 August 2017, Kathmandu). Further, as the government sought to 
fast-track the process for its promulgation, allowing only a short time for CA members 
to vote on it, many CA members had barely read the draft of the Constitution, and thus 
found it hard to ‘own’ it (Interview with an Editor-in-Chief, 7 August 2017, 
Kathmandu).  
 
Conversely, international support to marginalised groups often leads the elites to 
deride their long-standing demands as ‘West- funded’, thus diminishing the agency of 
marginalised groups, and even facilitating an elite backlash against their demands 
(Interview with activist, 12 August 2017, Kathmandu). Reflecting this sentiment, a 
peace negotiator in Myanmar, stated ‘Peacebuilding agencies have funded and 
supported the opposition groups, and that there have been historic links between 
opposition EAOs and the West’ (Interview, 15 November, 2018, Yangon). Relatedly, 
if it is not implemented, such policies as affirmative action or quotas, funded and 
supported by peacebuilders, can worsen the situation for minorities. Such policies 
create a public perception that marginalised groups will benefit immediately, 
generating backlash while it often taken generations’ for policies like affirmative 
action to bring significant change (Rai and Shneiderman, 2019). Further, the support 
for peacebuilders to marginalised groups can make movements for inclusion appear 
‘NGOised’, with the articulation of demands on inclusion as seasonal as donor 
requirements (Tamang, 2011). 
 
In balance, what we see is that although the leverage brought about by peacebuilders 
can irritate the elites, it does not sufficiently empower the marginalised groups either, 
leaving few constituencies viewing peacebuilders as neutral. Thus, although liberal 
peacebuilders, and their over-reliance on supporting political institutions, can help 
with the transition from Element 1 (of crafting elite pacts) to Element 2 (of designing 




framework, it does not guarantee it then transcending to the third element (of bringing 
acceptable benefits).  This inability to move onwards to the third is demonstrated by 
Nepal’s journey on SSR and transitional justice. Here, while the peace accords 
committed to these agendas, and institutions were formed to translate these 
commitments into practice, it never graduated to Element 3, and these issues have 
instead either been limited to formal adoption only, or have been renegotiated over 
time.  
 
Mobilisation of International Engagement by Domestic 
Actors 
However the above-mentioned differences in the influence of plural forms of 
international engagement, on elements of political settlements in conflict-affected 
states, does not enter a  ‘political vacuum’ but rather an arena of highly contested 
politics (Chesterman, 2004). This is more so, as social groups seek external support to 
gain some local advantage in their pursuit to change political settlements (Barma, 
2017; Khan, 2018). While both elites and marginalised groups mobilise external 
support, the sheer plurality of international engagement enhances the choice for 
national elites. As the Indian strategist, Raja Mohan, points out regarding the  increased 
strategic options for countries like Nepal, ‘When you have single vendor- it is the 
sellers’ market but when you have multiple vendors it is the buyers’ market’ (Mohan, 
2020). The buyers here are the elites in Nepal and Myanmar, who are able to harness 
and choose from multiple vendors in the crowded marketplace of the peacebuilding 
arena. However, alongside this multiplicity of vendors, the differences in their 
approaches to the renegotiation of political settlements, as well as the disparity in the 
strength of their leverage, as discussed in the section above, introduce complex and 
contradictory incentives to elites in conflict-affected states.  
 
Elites in Nepal and Myanmar have been able to capitalise on these differences of 
priorities, and the contradictions between the approaches, and instrumentalise them to 




elites, have interacted with peacebuilding, scholars have looked at three facets. Elites 
are said to either comply, co-opt, or resist peacebuilders, and most accounts see peace 
is being co-opted (Mac Ginty, 2008; Newman et al., 2009; Pugh, 2005; Richmond and 
Franks, 2009; Zaum, 2003). The empirical insights from Nepal and Myanmar in the 
context of plural forms of international engagement attests to the unprecedented 
opportunities for co-option, but it also adds ‘hedging’ to the menu of options available 
for elites.  
 
Elite Responses: Transforming Pressures for Compliance to Co-option  
Elites in Nepal and Myanmar have invoked both regional and liberal peacebuilders to 
settle conflicts. There is a tendency to appeal to regional powers to gain some form of 
credible guarantee, and in turn call upon liberal peacebuilders to bestow some form of 
international legitimacy. This also helps to balance the deep regional dependencies 
with which elites have to contend, as outlined in Chapter 7. While the peace process 
in Nepal and Myanmar would perhaps not be possible without India and China’s 
involvement, an enlarged role for the wider international community helps circumvent 
dependency. The elites in Nepal and Myanmar understand the pragmatism of emergent 
powers, and consequently regard liberal peacebuilders, and their networks globally, as 
a safety valve, and a means of counter-balancing this dependency, especially 
considering the considerable leverage emergent powers wield.  
 
Facilitating Co-option 
This plurality of international engagements brings greater pressures to accommodate 
various international prescriptions. They include pressures from emergent powers to 
guarantee stability, and their broader security and economic interests, as well as from 
peacebuilders to embed liberal commitments in peace process. Often, these 
international pressures coalesce with bottom-up demands, aggravating the pressures 
on the elites. The movement for inclusion by Janajatis, Dalits, and Madheshis 
seamlessly merged with the push for ‘inclusive political settlements’ by peacebuilders 




peacebuilders resonates with the longstanding demands of EAOs and the democratic 
opposition, to make their case against the Tatmadaw’s domination in Myanmar.  
 
A complex vortex of contradictory international pressures, combined with opposing 
forms of national movements have led elites to comply with different forms of 
pressure. However, elites have only partly complied with these pressures and largely 
co-opted international engagement in their favour. Patterns of co-option include: lip 
service to norms, keeping peace institutions alive but incapable of functioning, 
superficial adherence to the commitments, as well as reneging on, or diluting, prior 
commitments (Miklian et al., 2011; Öjendal and Ou, 2015). The scale of co-option in 
Myanmar has led many to argue that the entire peace process is a ‘side show’, co-opted 
by the elites to consolidate their power, and generate Western legitimacy, without 
making any genuine commitment on issues like inclusion through federalism, or SSR 
(Interview with a think-tank representative, 16 November, 2018, Yangon). In some 
instance, elites have simply accommodated plural and contradictory international and 
domestic pressures, leading to a patchwork of agendas with hybrid outcomes. The 
issue of secularism in Nepal is a very clear case in point. International division about 
secularism in Nepal aggravated national discord on the issue. The Indian ruling party 
sought to retain the ‘Hindu’ character of the state, while peacebuilders lobbied for 
Nepal to become a secular state (Dahal, 2016). This ultimately led to a ‘masala’ version 
being adopted, as described in Chapter 4.  
 
In their ability to co-opt, elites are seen to have found it easier to co-opt peacebuilders, 
often even through resisting some of the peacebuilders’ undertakings. This co-option 
is enabled by the focus of peacebuilders on relying on normative and institutional 
endpoints, which can be easily instrumentalised. Co-option and elements of resistance 
have been seen to increase too, as the peace process has lengthened. In Myanmar, the 
military-backed Thein Sein government has been much more accommodating towards 
peacebuilders given the quasi-civilian government’s quest for international legitimacy. 
With no international legitimacy at stake, and the advent of the Western ostracisation 
of Myanmar after the Rakhine crisis, the NLD-led government in Myanmar has 




representative of a signatory EAO, 22 November, 2018, Yangon). Similarly, while 
Nepal welcomed the peacebuilders at the beginning of the peace process, as the process 
has progressed there has been active resistance on the issues of inclusion and 
accountability for human rights (Rawski and Sharma, 2012). In fact, as the process 
drew to a close the Government of Nepal asked the European Union not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Nepal, when its Election Observers Team recommended 
removing ‘Khas Aryas’ from the list of categories reserved in the proportional 
representation system (The Kathmandu Post, 2018).   
 
Hedging: An Additional Option  
Plurality allows elites in Nepal and Myanmar to hedge between peacebuilders and 
emergent powers to ensure their continued dominance. When liberal peacebuilding 
prescriptions are threatening their dominance in the political settlement, elites have 
turned to emergent powers and vice-versa.  Hedging, thus, unleashes a fundamental 
paradox: it aims to reduce pressure from either EPRCM or liberal peacebuilders, but 
also necessitates the co-existence of both forms of international engagement. While 
hedging against emergent powers can reduce only a small part of the wider 
dependence, hedging against liberal peacebuilders weakens their leverage to insist that 
elites comply with commitments for an inclusive political settlement. Thus hedging on 
the one hand reduces the agency of peacebuilders further, but on the other hand also 
ensures that elites will superficially continue to engage liberal peacebuilders, in a bid 
to counter-balance EPRCM. This leads to a superficial uptake of liberal peacebuilding 
with elites making negligible concessions for marginalised groups in the renegotiating 
of the political settlements.   
 
Hedging as a concept in international relations is used to describe the behaviour of 
states through which they can maximise their influence, leverage, and freedom of 
action (Goh, 2005; Medeiros, 2005; Salman et al., 2015; Tessman, 2012; Wolfe, 2013). 
Hedging enables states to guarantee their long term interests by placing their policy 
bets on multiple and possibly contradictory options, designed to offset risks embedded 
in international systems (Fiori and Passeri, 2015). Hedging has allowed Southeast 




siding with Western states on discussions about China’s use of force (Whiting, 1997). 
Diversified international engagement with strong relationships with different players 
is seen to be core to hedging strategy (Tran et al., 2013). Hedging, enabled by multiple 
forms of international engagement, often competing and contradicting one another, 
has however been largely absent as a concept in peace studies, despite being evident 
in such contexts as Sri Lanka (Cheng et al., 2018; Sørbø et al., 2011). However, 
hedging strategies bring critical opportunities that promise a degree of flexibility, 
choice, and even autonomy for elites in conflict-affected states, which have a direct 
impact on the political settlement, especially as these settlements are being 
renegotiated.  
 
So prevalent is hedging that the very initiation of a peace process in Myanmar in 2011, 
in its opening up to Western engagement, is largely seen as an attempt to hedge against 
increasing dependence on China (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). However, 
once the Western condemnation of the Rakhine crisis peaked post 2015, Myanmar 
came full circle and hedged against the international community, returning to its 
reliance on China (Interview with a former diplomat, 19 July 2017, Yangon). 
Similarly, the request of Nepali actors, for the UN to have a role in the peace process, 
can be read as a hedging strategy against possible Indian dominance in the transition, 
which would have de-legitimised the process, given the history of India’s political 
intervention (Interview with Editor-in-Chief, 10 August 2017, Kathmandu). However, 
when UNMIN’s alleged support for the Maoists, and its pressures on such issues as 
the democratisation of the NA, threatened to upset the status quo, the traditional 
political parties and the NA hedged against UMMIN to count on India’s support 
(Adhikari, 2014; Jha, 2014).  
 
Confirming this hedging strategy, in the context of the Nepali government’s decision 
to terminate UNMIN’s mandate in Nepal, a former Prime Minister confided: ‘there 
were divisions about UNMIN’s exit both domestically and internationally, including 
in my own political party. To force us to rethink our decision about UNMIN’s exit, on 
behalf of the UN Secretary General, ambassadors representing the five permanent 




threatened that if violence resumes after UNMIN’s exit, I could be tried at the 
International Criminal Court. However, in the interaction with these five ambassadors, 
I noted that the British, French and the American ambassadors were forthcoming in 
their persuasion to continue UNMIN’s role, but the Russian and the Chinese 
ambassadors were largely quiet. The silence of regional powers like China was 
reassuring for us. We realised that that there will be regional allies in case of Western 
backlash, and decided to go ahead with UNMIN’s exit’ (Interview, 12 December 2018, 
Kathmandu). In yet another instance, when India did not wholeheartedly support the 
Constitution of 2015, on grounds of continued exclusion and secularism, Nepali elites 
cited the acceptance of the Constitution by countries such as China as well as the US, 
and the EU amongst others, to counterbalance Indian stance (Sharma, 2019). Nepal 
also sought to internationalise the blockade, framing the issue as a violation of its rights 
as a Landlocked Least Developed Country to have ‘unhindered access to the sea’ (PTI, 
2015). 
 
While elites in conflict-affected states hedge also against the pragmatism of the 
regional powers, the hedging against liberal peacebuilders is directly designed to dilute 
commitments to peace processes. As seen in Nepal, hedging has not only diluted any 
commitment on the ‘democratisation of Nepal Army’, which is a fundamental tenet of 
the CPA, but it has also facilitated UNMIN’s untimely exit, leaving important agendas 
of the process in limbo. Similarly, hedging against peacebuilders and limiting their 
role has meant that Myanmar’s peace process has become more bureaucratic, centred 
on the NLD, and in fact stagnant.   
 
Contextual Determinants to Hedging and Co-option 
The ability to hedge and co-opt, especially against regional powers, is arduous and 
contingent on domestic determinants. Here, Nepal and Myanmar have been able to 
capitalise on their geo-strategic locations and investment opportunities and co-opt 
emergent powers. Myanmar’s rich deposits of oil and gas, minerals, forest resources, 
as well as its hydropower potential, have allowed elites to accord benefits to China for 




2011). For instance, the Myanmar government granted a contract to a Chinese 
company for oil and gas exploration, even though it had been outbid by an Indian 
company, after China vetoed a Security Council resolution against Myanmar (Kleine-
Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).  Likewise, Nepal has found it difficult to resist Indian 
pressures, and has also faced repercussions for non-compliance with India’s interests. 
Non-compliance to Indian pressures has not only led to governments in Nepal to 
collapse, but has also led India to take extreme measures such as supporting an 
economic blockade in 2015. However, by using the ‘China-card’, and diversifying its 
overall foreign relations, or by its mobilisation of nationalism, grounded on anti-India 
sentiments, Nepal has been able to ward off Indian pressures to a certain extent. Nepal 
and Myanmar, also, increasingly understand the pragmatism of emergent powers, and 
their quest for stability and regional dominance. This allows them to instrumentalise 
these vulnerabilities of emergent powers to their advantage, by making use of their 
geo-strategic location. Both Nepal and Myanmar have relied on diversifying their 
foreign relations to enable co-option and hedging against regional powers. This is more 
so in Nepal, given the enduring rivalry between India and China.  
 
A comparison of Nepal and Myanmar also demonstrates that the ability to co-opt and 
hedge depends on the consolidation of the power of elites: internally, by their relative 
distribution of power vis-a’-vis the marginalised groups (Behuria et al., 2017); and 
externally, by their levels of dependency on international actors. Internally, a 
consolidated elite group is able to devise a unified stance on how best to use 
international engagement and resist, co-opt or hedge dependencies. For instance, a 
greatly strengthened Tatmadaw, in seeking to redeem itself from possible Chinese 
pressures, has been able exploit benefits from China, but at the same time kept it at a 
distance and not allowing it to impinge on national policies (Goh and Steinberg, 2016). 
Accordingly, China is said to have been in the dark on important policy changes in 
Myanmar, including the dismissal of Premier Khin Nyunt in 2004, as well as the move 
of Myanmar’s capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw (Li and Lye, 2009). Conversely, the 
level of fragmentation and factionalism in Nepal has meant that political parties, and 
factions within them, have sought India’s support to consolidate their internal balance, 




external dependency, Nepal’s absolute dependence on Western actors as development 
funders, and on India for trade and transit has meant that external aspects are more 
important. The level of dependency is less for Myanmar, which has survived Western 
sanctions, and where patterns of dependency on China are shifting, in favour of more 
leverage for Myanmar, especially since BRI (Goh and Steinberg, 2016).   
 
Space for Marginalised Groups  
While the plurality and strength of international engagement facilitates co-option and 
hedging, in turn enhancing the agency for elites, it conversely also decreases the space 
available to marginalised groups. Marginalised groups are forced to depend on the 
pragmatism of both EPRCM and liberal peacebuilders. EPRCM can either supplement 
their demands by harnessing cross-border support, or inhibit their efforts when 
detrimental to interests of India and China, while peacebuilders despite their 
commitment are unable to make any net impact on inclusion.  
 
To mobilise international support to their cause, marginalised groups have used liberal 
norms of human rights and equality. In fact, the use of such norms to articulate their 
demands is what binds the different struggles in Nepal and Myanmar, from the Kachins 
and Karens to the Madhesis and Janajatis. In their articulation, they have continually 
sought international mediation and facilitation, and used global forums to 
internationalise their issues. As the state has failed to be inclusive, marginalised groups 
have largely relied on external avenues (Interview with activist, August 12, 2017, 
Kathmandu). For example, KIO supremo Brang Seng likened the Kachin conflict to a 
football match without a referee and called for international mediation to resolve the 
conflict (Shayi, 2016). Similarly, Nepal’s civil society activists and marginalised 
groups used the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to express concern 
over different forms of human rights violations during the peace process. Further 
Janajati groups in Nepal have used international conventions, such as ILO 169 on the 
rights of indigenous people, to validate their right to govern autonomous regions 




law, have made important inroads around the world, despite claims of arrested 
development (Sikkink, 2017).  
 
Beyond calling on the peacebuilders, marginalised groups in the borderlands have 
naturally sought to mobilise cross-border support through both formal and informal 
channels. For instance, some Kachin elites have sought to emphasise their closer ethnic 
and historical ties to the Jingpo minority in China, to negotiate preferential relations 
with local authorities in Yunnan (Sadan, 2015). Similar inferences can be made of 
many Madheshi leaders. In response to their mobilisation, while cross-border groups 
have been able to mobilise support from India and China, these have varied in 
accordance with Indian and Chinese priorities.  
 
Conversely, while liberal values are the natural lingua franca of marginalised groups, 
the peacebuilders have failed to carry out their commitments to transform the political 
settlements. Instead, as already mentioned, the insufficient support from peacebuilders 
has had the unintended effect of marginalised groups being labelled as ‘anti-state’, and 
investment in their issues to be seen as ‘infringing on internal affairs’. In Nepal, liberal 
peacebuilding received a great deal of ‘flak’ for funding ‘secessionist movements’, 
when supporting groups such as NEFIN for the empowerment of marginalised groups 
(Adhikari and Gellner, 2016; Onta, 2006). The anti-state accusation however 
overlooks the intended and unintended support that goes back to elite groups.  For 
instance, the large bulk of development assistance continues to flow through, or use, 
government channels, and/ or civil society organisations, which are led by individuals 
of the dominant group, thus oiling the machinery of an exclusive political settlement 
(Interview with activist, 12 August 2017, Kathmandu). Further, in the face of such a 
backlash, liberal peacebuilders have reneged on their commitment. In Nepal, even this 
little support was seen to have been drained as the peace process was prolonged, with 
the presence of the peacebuilders, and the Western states that fund them, being reduced 
to ‘cultural outposts’ (Interview with human rights activist, 18 August 2017 (a), 
Kathmandu). This makes for a bleak reading on the space for marginalised groups, 




pragmatism of emergent powers; and finally on the sporadic and extemporised support 
of peacebuilders. 
 
However, the case studies also reveal that a critical variable, in marginalised groups 
being able to extract agreements from elite groups, is also their organisational capacity, 
which has both national and international implications. Domestically, the greater the 
organisational capacity of marginalised groups, the more bargains they are able to 
extract from the elites. In Myanmar, the absence of convergence, between the 
democratic opposition and the EAOs, ensured that Tatmadaw continues to be the most 
well-organised and institutionalised entity (Callahan, 2009; Nakanishi, 2013). This 
enables the Tatmadaw’s continued dominance in the political sphere during the peace 
process. Conversely, in Nepal, a fragmented elite structure, with intra-elite 
factionalism in political parties, and multiple coalitions governing for periods, enabled 
a strong alliance of the Maoists, Madheshis and Janajatis, which characterised the first 
few years of the peace process, and which made credible gains on inclusion. The 
fragmentation of Madheshi parties, the changing stance of the Maoists on the 
inclusivity agenda, and the return of strengthened traditional parties in the 2013 
election, however, led to a reversal on issues of inclusion. In a similar vein, the inability 
of victims groups to promote a transitional justice agenda is due to their marginal 
organisational capacity, especially when faced with some of the most powerful 
sections of Nepali society, including the NA.  
 
The organisational strength of marginalised groups also determined its ability to 
harness international support successfully. Cohesion within, and alliance between, 
different marginalised groups can increase opportunities for an increased bargaining 
power. The success of the Madheshi movement is linked to their ability to leverage 
support from both India and the peacebuilders. Conversely, the fragmentation of 
marginalised groups, more so in Myanmar than Nepal, given their sheer numbers, has 





Outcomes of the Interplay between Plural Forms of 
International Engagement  
 
Prospects of co-option and hedging on the one hand gives elites access to autonomy 
and choice for elites, while limiting that access for marginalised groups. This allows 
the elites to decide when, how and to what extent they are willing to adhere to 
international pressures. However, co-option from multiple sources, as well as hedging 
in its very essence, needs a multiplicity of international actors and strong relationships 
with different players, which necessitates engagement with both emergent powers and 
liberal peacebuilders (Tran et al., 2013). In this bid to continually engage with diverse 
forms of international engagement, as well as pacify bottom-up demands for 
accommodation, elites have made partial compromises while not fully surrendering 
their dominance in the political settlement. This has resulted in a hybrid form of peace, 
which brings a degree of change but is largely status quoist.  These hybrid ‘peace’ 
structures, embed a semblance of liberal institutions and hence address in part the 
demands of the marginalised groups and liberal peacebuilders, but are neither 
transformative in reshaping the political settlements, nor do they live up to the 
commitments of the peace process. This thesis thus confirms Barnett et al.’s argument 
that ‘compromised’ hybrid outcomes are the order of the day in conflict-affected states 
(Barnett and Zürcher, 2008). It accentuates that in conflict-affected states like Nepal 
and Myanmar, such compromised outcomes are enhanced by the sheer plurality of 
international ‘interveners’, as well as by the differences and contestations in their 
approaches. This compromised form of hybrid peace is visible in each of the three 
areas, transitional justice, inclusion and SSR in Nepal, though they are yet to crystallise 
in Myanmar, given the nascent stage in its peace process.  
 
These hybrid structures emerge both as an unintended consequence of the strategic 
interactions between actors at local, regional, or international levels who compete, 
coalesce and engage in the politics underpinning the peace process, as described in 




Sanghera, 2012). However, they also emerge as a consciously crafted strategy, where 
elites seek to adapt and merge varied international prescriptions, as well as embed 
bottom-up demands to bring forth partial concessions. These consciously grafted 
hybrid forms resonate closely with the hybrid structures Belloni discusses in his work 
(Belloni, 2012).  It is to the details of the hybrid structures in Nepal, that this chapter 
now turns.  
 
Hybrid Forms of Inclusion 
Nepal’s version of inclusion reconciles different international and national pressures 
and has fluctuated with the political dynamics of the peace process. Here, bottom-up 
demands for a broad commitment to inclusion with multiple pathways including 
affirmative action, federalism, secularism, gender quality, electoral system, were 
largely supported by liberal peacebuilders. These demands contrasted with India’s 
parochial approach to supporting the inclusion of Madheshi forces and support for 
Hinduism, and China’s averseness to federalism.  
 
In negotiating these diverse pressures, and the shifting bargains, Nepal’s commitment 
to each of these issues has changed. In 2007, the Interim Constitution guaranteed 
secularism; a mixed electoral system, with 42:58 split between first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) electoral system and proportional representation (PR); affirmative action to all 
marginalised groups; and a commitment to federalism. The changes in the political 
equation, and the evolving international engagement, however, facilitated a political 
settlement, where Nepal did transform into a federal, secular state, but the settlement 
on inclusion was different to initial deliberations. It assimilated the concept, but not 
the spirit and the normative underpinning of inclusion.  
 
The Constitution of Nepal (2015) carved out 7 provinces, but only one of the provinces 
was created in such a way that it could have a non-CHHE majority, (Province 2 where 
Madheshis are dominant), leaving aspirations for identity-based federalism unfulfilled 




as the local governments, it leaves provincial governments rather toothless without any 
substantial powers (Interview with Constitutional lawyer, 12 August 2017, 
Kathmandu). Similarly, while the new constitution has declared Nepal a secular state, 
it continues to privilege Hinduism. Secularism has been defined as ‘protection of 
religion and culture being practised since ancient times and religious and cultural 
freedom’, which given Nepal’s history of being a Hindu state facilitates its protection 
(Bell et al., 2017). The Constitution commits to secularism but limits conversion, bans 
cow slaughter, as well as privileges Hindu traditions and emblems; in a bid to balance 
the contrasting domestic and international constituencies. Thus, while making minimal 
concessions to non-Hindu Janajati groups and other religious minorities in Nepal, it 
has continued to strengthen Hinduism. Instead, demands for genuine secularism is 
framed as an anti-national, and foreign-funded agenda (Letizia, 2012).  
 
Affirmative action, with reserved seats proportional to the population in civil service 
and state organs, which has the ability to mainstream marginalised groups, has been 
diluted by adding in the dominant group CHHE as one of the ‘reserved categories’. 
Notwithstanding the gains made for all marginalised groups, relative to their socio-
political standing in the years prior to the peace process, such a hybrid peace, which 
has emerged after a decade-long peace process, has neither lived up to the spirit of the 
‘state restructuring’, nor has it altered the status of the CHHE. In fact apart from 
Madheshis, no other marginalised group has been able to emerge as politically salient 
in the provincial elections of 2017 (Paswan, 2018). Perhaps more crucially, discussions 
on inclusion left salient economic questions such as land reform aside, thus excluding 
the landless and the peasantry from any peace dividends (Interview with civil society 
representative, 16 August 2017, Kathmandu). 
 
In Myanmar, discussions on models of federalism and inclusion are just emerging. The 
decades-long call for inclusion, bolstered by the support of peacebuilders, stands 
alongside China’s paradoxical impact on demands on federalism. In Myanmar, 
peacebuilders have invested on the issue of federalism, with technical assistance to 
civil society groups and different EAOs, for building capacity and a knowledge base 




14 November 2018, Yangon).  However, this liberal peace approach competes with 
regional realities, where prior to confirming any negotiation on federalism and 
resource sharing, Chinese investments have continued unabated (Interview with a 
think-tank representative, 15 November 2018, Yangon). The conflicting nature of 
international engagement, the reluctance of the Tatmadaw to make any significant 
changes, in addition to the absence of a uniform stance among EAOs, has meant that 
the any commitment, confirmed in the peace process to date, revolves round superficial 
issues that are difficult to interpret in practice. For example, one article agreed in the 
Union Accord states, ‘To allocate the national budget in a fair and equitable manner 
in accordance with the Constitution between the Union Government and Regions and 
States Governments and Governments of Self-administered Regions/ Zones’, while 
another asserts: ‘To share the management rights in economic affairs among the Union 
Government, Regions and States Governments and Governments of Self-administered 
Regions/ Zones in accordance with the Constitution’ (State Counsellor Office, 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2017). The political dialogue is ongoing, and 
might eventually finalise the modalities of ‘equitable’ resource sharing mentioned in 
the Accord, but for now, it conceals more than it commits. Further, the note on ‘in 
accordance with the Constitution’ is not only controversial, but also reinforces the 
sanctity of a Constitution that is premised on protecting the Tatmadaw and the Bamar 
majority.  
 
The only aspect of inclusion mentioned in the Union Accord is gender-based inclusion. 
Of the 14 articles signed as a part of the Union Accord, in the third session of the 
Panglong Conference, four were about gender mainstreaming or ‘equal treatment’, 
proposing a minimum 30 per cent female involvement in each sector of the state, the 
implementation of policies on gender-based violence, and increasing capacity of 
women (State Counsellor Office, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2017).  
 
Security Sector Reform: the Hybrid Turn 
Security Sector Reform, both in Myanmar and Nepal, was seen to encompass two 




military as well as of the police.  A clear disconnect can be seen however between such 
regional powers as India and China and the liberal peacebuilders. Much of the 
international liberal peacebuilding community has been supporting capacity building 
and policy on SSR. However, while disengaged in the debate of SSR, regional powers 
have strengthened the state through substantial military assistance, increased training 
for the military forces of Myanmar and Nepal, reifying the control of the military 
(Sharma, 2017). India’s unconditional support to the NA, guided by the belief that it 
had to be apolitical to be strong and ensure stability, led not only to delays and dilution 
of the process of integration of Maoist combatants in the NA, but also left the agenda 
of the democratisation of the Army untouched (Jha, 2014). In this hybrid version of 
SSR, while it responded to the call by such peacebuilders as UNMIN with a modest 
form of integration of combatants into the NA, it also adopted the Indian stance of 
leaving the NA untouched by the ‘democratising the Army’ agenda. It has further left 
concerns about former child combatants, discharged as minors unaddressed.  
 
Similarly, in Myanmar, the sequencing and the modality of SSR and DDR are under 
discussion. While the government wants the DDR to come first, the EAOs generally 
want to see it as a part of the wider SSR. This is likely to bring about a hybrid structure, 
where the Tatmadaw on paper agrees to ‘security re-integration’, but on the ground 
continues to inhibit any momentum towards it, owing to its considerable organisational 
skills and support from regional governments. Further, the role of China in supporting 
both the EAOs in the borderlands and the military in Naypyidaw is likely to perpetuate 
patterns of conflict, where the EAOs are too strong to be defeated, but too weak to win 
the Tatmadaw over.  
 
Transitional Justice: the not-so hybrid turn 
In Nepal, the edifice of transitional justice stands tall, in the form of Commissions on 
Investigation of Disappeared Persons, and Truth and Reconciliation. However, these 
institutions have rendered only interim relief and victims’ groups have largely been 
marginalised in the process. Instead for political parties, like the UML, transitional 




for its government, by giving guarantees of liquidating the transitional justice process, 
which had exposed the Maoists. The shifting sand of support from liberal 
peacebuilders on the issue has further emboldened elite hostility to the process. 
Further, with no interest from regional powers, and India only instrumentally using the 
transitional justice agenda, the issue has been a political bargaining chip both at home 
as well as abroad (Baral, 2016).  
 
In Myanmar, the discussion on transitional justice is little to none. China’s engagement 
is focused on bringing parties to the table, rather than such normative endeavours as 
transitional justice. However, liberal peacebuilders have also not pushed the 
transitional justice agenda either, due to their marginal position, as well as wanting to 
focus on ‘doable’ things (Interview with researcher, 14 July 2017, Yangon). The issue 
has lacked any strong support from the ethnic armed groups, and political parties, such 
as the NLD, have been equally silent. This can be seen as manifestation of the current 
political settlements in Myanmar, and the relative difference in power and 
organisational skills between the military and the other parties in the political 
establishment. Thus, albeit due to different factors, all parties seem to converge on the 
transitional justice debate in Myanmar.  
 
Contribution to the Debate on Political Settlement 
The sections above establish the dialectic interface between plural forms of 
international engagement and the agency of local actors on the ground in conflict-
affected states. The central argument on political settlements here is that the 
compromised form of hybrid peace structures is being facilitated by the autonomy 
obtained by elites, given the plural and competing forms of international engagement 
in conflict-affected states. Such hybrid peace structures are ‘compromised’, as they are 
largely illiberal and veer towards protecting the dominance of the elites. However, in 
making this argument, the empirical examples of Nepal and Myanmar also lead to 
inferences for the, largely under-theorised, literature on political settlements. Firstly, 
recent literature has acknowledged that power dynamics do not fit within the 




should be accounted for (Meehan and Goodhand, 2018). However, when looking at 
transitional influences, the focus has been on liberal peacebuilders, who have 
sought to tailor their interventions to foster inclusive political settlements (Bell, 
2018). The cases of Nepal and Myanmar serve as a caution that, in con texts of 
plural forms of international engagement, competing forms of international 
engagement from regional actors need to be focused upon. This is more so as 
regional actors have barely promoted the argument that ‘broad- based inclusion 
leads to domestic stability in conflict-affected states’, but have focused instead on 
elite pacts to end violence. Here, the overwhelming strength of their leverage has 
an impact not only on influencing the domestic political settlements directly and 
indirectly, but also in shaping the scope of the peacebuilders’ mandate.   
 
Secondly, the literature on political settlements highlights the theory that elite pacts 
bring stability (Lindemann, 2011). The cases of Nepal and Myanmar call for its 
reappraisal. In peace processes, which see an expanded international role, elite pacts 
can actually lead to instability in the long run. The quest of liberal peacebuilders to 
embed norms and institutions that echo liberal visions, might see the elites enshrining 
them into peace accords, despite the ability of these norms and institutions to undercut 
their power base (Parks and Cole, 2010). However these commitments do not match 
the distribution of power in conflict-affected states, thus introducing a misalignment 
between promises enshrined in the elite pacts and the commitment of elites for change 
(Cheng et al., 2018). Further, these pledges in elite pacts do not mean that there is elite 
commitment to change. Rather elites might embed these institutions to co-opt or revisit 
them later, creating the institutional expectation for change. This leads to unfulfilled 
expectations, and to marginalised groups continuing to demand changes, while the 
structure of the elite power base inhibits any change, eventually resulting in an 
‘unsettlement’ (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). This lack of determinism, about elite pacts 
leading to stability, is aggravated in the context of plural forms of international 
engagement, with contradictory and competing influences. Here, while a broad 
commitment to elite pacts led to a convergence between liberal peacebuilders and 




negotiations make it difficult to determine the direction of change in political 
settlement.  
 
Thirdly, as mentioned above, in elite pacts and institutional commitments to 
redistribute power, the institutional commitments can shift with time, and continue to 
be disputed rather than accepted. This puts Kelsall’s idea of political settlements to the 
test, and indicates that success in Elements 1 and 2 might not lead to it Element 3. 
Hence, the case of Nepal instead confirms Khan’s critique of Kelsall’s argument:  that 
pacts between elites to enforce critical institutions cannot guarantee that these 
commitments will be enforced, as elites can ‘free-ride’ on these commitments, or make 
informal modifications over time. It further highlights the linkages between the two 
theoretical approaches on political settlements: Khan’s longue durée approach, 
focused on an historically-determined understanding of political settlement, and 
Kelsall’s, which is focused on the agency of elite pacts. Elite pacts are conditioned by 
historical distribution of power between groups.  
 
Lastly, the political settlement literature has failed to articulate the complex linkages 
between the horizontal inclusion between different elite groups, and the vertical 
inclusion, between elites and non-elite actors, and has not examined how non-elite 
actors can exert pressures to alter political settlements (Pospisil and Rocha Menocal, 
2017). In fact, the very definition of vertical inclusion needs to be strengthened. While 
some scholars have defined vertical inclusion as the relationship between elites and 
their followers (Cheng et al., 2018), others see it as the relationship between elites and 
the wider society (Molloy, 2017). The difference between the two is blurred. This has 
made it difficult to operationalise non-elite actors in the context of vertical inclusion. 
Some groups, such as former combatants who were left out of the DDR debates, or the 
victims in transitional justice cases, do not fit within the ‘follower of elite’ definition 
of ‘non-elites’. However, what this thesis does demonstrate is that, in the context of 
plural engagement, defined by EPRCM with its focus on stability, and liberal 
peacebuilders with their limited leverage, the international engagement might only 




horizontal elite pacts, often overlooking vertical pacts, due to perceiving them as 
sources of instability, or not seeing them ‘as their business’.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined how plural forms of international engagement, and the 
differences in strength of EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding, are facilitating the 
increased agency of elites. In detailing how EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding differ 
in their impact on the various stages of renegotiating political settlements, this chapter 
has shown how emergent powers are vested only in elite pacts, albeit conditionally, 
and only engaged in supporting political institutions in a selective way. On the other 
hand, liberal peacebuilders seek to support inclusive political settlements, but offer 
limited incentives, and have equally limited leverage to enable elite compliance. The 
diversity in international approaches has not only resulted in conflicting engagement 
in political settlement negotiations in Nepal and Myanmar, but has also led to a 
misalignment between commitments in the peace accords, and the institutions that 
emerge to translate the commitments into practice.  
 
In the context of plural and divergent forms of international pressures, marked by frail 
peacebuilders, and ambivalent and pragmatic emergent powers, elites have been 
allowed to favourably co-opt and hedge varied international pressures, but 
nevertheless offer a degree of compromise, leading to hybrid forms of peace.  While 
hedging emergent powers is likely not to go far, hedging against peacebuilders has not 
only reduced the latter’s ability to compel the elites to make concessions on liberal 
precepts, but also pits them against emergent powers. The latter has led to 
peacebuilders being marginalised, and their scope and mandate being trimmed.   
 
The resulting hybrid forms of peace, as evident in the journeys of inclusion, SSR and 






This thesis argues that the scale and variety of international engagement in conflict-
affected states warrants greater attention, both in the policies to support such states, 
and also in the academic scholarship on these issues. As the ‘global marketplace’ of 
international actors supporting political transitions in conflict-affected states is rapidly 
changing, the often markedly different modes of engagement must be acknowledged 
and explored. More specifically, this thesis calls for a greater understanding for such 
regional actors as India and China, who are emerging powers globally, and who are 
shaping the parameters of the engagement of liberal peacebuilders and the political 
outcomes in conflict-affected states. In this regard, this thesis has made some key 
empirical and theoretical contributions that this concluding section seeks to 
summarise.  
 
With reference to Question 1, I argue that the engagement of emergent powers on 
peace processes is markedly different to that of liberal peacebuilding, and I 
conceptualise this form of engagement as EPRCM. Theoretically, by looking at the 
engagement of India and China, and conceptualising EPRCM, this thesis has 
contributed to the burgeoning literature on ‘alternative forms of peacebuilding’ (Lewis 
et al., 2018) and has highlighted ‘alternative sources of agency’ in peace processes 
(Kappler and Richmond, 2011). Further, as it has looked at non-Western international 
actors in the peacebuilding arena, rather than at domestic regimes leading on peace 
processes, this thesis is distinct from other theories of ‘alternative’ forms of 
peacebuilding, such as Authoritarian Conflict Management and ‘illiberal 
peacebuilding’ (Lewis et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2020).  
 
As regards Question 2, this thesis claims that there is a negotiated co-existence 
between EPRCM and liberal peacebuilding in Nepal and Myanmar.  This negotiated 
co-existence is defined by limited joint collaborations and co-engagement, and the 
asymmetry of engagement is inclined towards emergent powers in their regions of 
influence. A core area of convergence between the two is in the forging of elite pacts, 




between the two and, in such instances of contestation, EPRCM has the power to limit 
the scope of liberal peacebuilders. Thus EPRCM on the one hand has restricted the 
ability and agency of liberal peacebuilder; but on the other it has facilitated an 
uncontested space for liberal peacebuilders, as elites in countries like Nepal and 
Myanmar invoke liberal peacebuilders to balance the entrenched and pragmatic nature 
of engagement of India and China.  
 
Accordingly, it has contributed to the wider debate on emergent powers and their 
interaction with the liberal world order in International Relations. This ‘negotiated co-
existence’ between the two forms of international engagement, and the rise of illiberal 
peace structures affirms Kupchan’s hypothesis that while the liberal order is declining, 
it is not being completely replaced by another coherent model (Kupchan, 2012).  
 
In the case of Question 3, the thesis began with a basic hypothesis that hybrid peace 
structures emanate from the diverse forms of international engagement in conflict-
affected states. Insights from Nepal and Myanmar confirm this existence of hybrid 
peace. However, the empirical findings show that this hybrid peace is largely status 
quoist and illiberal, in the sense that it constrains the liberal leap that peace processes, 
and the peace agreements in particular, promised. This thesis has argued that the 
illiberal variant of liberal peace is facilitated by the agency of the local elites, who have 
relied not only on co-option, as is widely documented in peace studies, but also on 
hedging one form of internal engagement for the other, to circumvent pressures from 
plural forms of international engagement. 
  
This thesis therefore confirms the prevalence of compromised and hybrid structures of 
peace in post-conflict settings. However, it adds to the literature by outlining that this 
‘compromised’ hybrid form of peace is facilitated not only by interaction between 
local and the international actors, but also by the interaction between plural forms of 
international actors, with diverse motivations and strategies.  
 
In discussing the impact of diverse sets of international engagement in conflict-




concept of political settlements. It confirms the importance of international actors that 
influence domestic political settlements in conflict-affected states: an issue which has 
largely been overlooked (Meehan and Goodhand, 2018). More so, in looking at elite 
pacts, which are core to the conceptualisation of political settlements, it makes 
some key inferences. Here, empirical evidence demonstrates that, in the context of 
plural engagement, defined by EPRCM with its focus on stability, and liberal 
peacebuilders, with their limited leverage, international engagement might only 
facilitate horizontal inclusion rather than a broad-based vertical inclusion. It further 
cautions that, in shaping peace accords, international pressures to embed norms and 
institutions might led to a misalignment: between the power of elites and the nature 
of their commitment in the peace agreements. This might herald instability in the 
long run.  
 
This thesis has focused on three distinct questions and sought to conceptualise the 
engagement of emergent powers in their regions of influence. However, it needs to be 
noted that these insights have been based on a study of two cases. Accordingly, these 
findings indicate avenues for future research, which could advance the empirical 
validity. It could, firstly, be applied to, and tested in, other countries in their spheres 
of influence. Further, it needs to be taken into account that the EPRCM approach 
discusses the approaches of India and China to peace processes in countries in their 
immediate vicinity. To grasp the entirety of India and China’s engagement on 
conflicts, this inquiry could be extended to further comparative cases, on two distinct 
levels: one at a global scale in countries outside their immediate regions, for example 
South Sudan; and secondly, looking inwards to their engagement in various domestic 
conflicts or areas of tension, such as Tibet, Kashmir or Xinjiang. It is my hope that this 










Appendix 1: List and details of people interviewed  
 
Nepal (All interviews were carried out in Kathmandu) 
 
1. Political Commentator focusing on contemporary politics, August 4, 2017 
2. Peace Negotiator who headed a key USAID funded Track 1.5 Dialogue 
Initiative in the peace process, and a prominent political analyst writing on 
the peace process, August 6, 2017 
3. Editor-in-Chief of a major English newspaper in Nepal, August 7, 2017 
4. Peace Negotiator, who facilitated negotiations between the Maoists and the 
Seven Party Alliance. Also a former Speaker of the Parliament, August 8, 
2017 
5. Editor of the largest Nepali daily in Nepal and a prominent author writing on 
Indian engagement in Nepal August 10, 2017 
6. Member of the SC (Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and 
Rehabilitation of the Maoist Combatants), Government of Nepal, August 10, 
2017 
7. Constitutional Lawyer, and a legal advisor to a Provincial Government in 
Nepal, August 12, 2017 
8. Activist campaigning for ethnic inclusion and Head of a prominent NGO 
working on rights of Madheshis, August 12, 2017 
9. Member of Parliament, and a key interlocutor in the peace process, August 
14, 2017 
10. Member of Parliament and a foreign policy advisor to the former Prime 
Minister of Nepal, August 14, 2017 
11. Civil society representative and Head of a political foundation focused on 
peacebuilding and governance, August 16, 2017 
12. Political analyst and an author who has written on the Maoist movement, 
August 18, 2017 (a) 
13. Human rights activist, a prominent journalist and author on Nepal’s peace 




14. Political analyst covering the peace process, August 20, 2017 
15. Expert on Security Sector Reform, September 3, 2017 
16. Former Minister of the Interim Government in 2012-2013, and a key 
interlocutor in the peace process, September 4, 2017 
17. Researcher and a prominent expert on civil-military relations in Nepal, 
September 6, 2017 
18. Former Nepali ambassador to India and political scientist August 31, 2017(a) 
19. Member of the SC (Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and 
Rehabilitation of the Maoist Combatants), August 31, 2017(b) 
20. Member of Parliament and a Member of the Special Committee for 
Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Combatants, Dec 
11, 2018 
21. Former Prime Minister of Nepal, Dec 12, 2018 
 
Myanmar (All interviews were conducted in Yangon) 
 
1. Head of a prominent peacebuilding consortium, 10 July 2017(a) 
2. Peacebuilding consultant affiliated to a resource centre to support ethnic 
leaders and communities, 10 July, 2017 (b) 
3. Journalist with Myanmar’s only free media houses, 11 July, 2017 
4. Head of an intergovernmental organization supporting the peace and 
Constitution writing process, 12 July 2017, 
5. Representative of a prominent multilateral body funding peacebuilding in 
Myanmar, 12 July 2017 
6. Researcher focused on Chinese investment and also one of the member of 
joint research team for peace perspective on Sino--Myanmar relation, 13 July 
2017(a) 
7. Journalist focusing on the peace process, 13 July 2017(b) 
8. Researcher working on Myanmar, 14 July 2017 
9. UN representative working in locally in Southern Shan staten 17 July 2017.  
10. Former Diplomat associated formerly with ICRC and Centre for 




11. Political analyst formerly associated with the Communist Party of Burma, 19 
July 2017 
12. Civil Society Representative leading on a prominent peacebuilding project, 
20 July 2017(a) 
13. Independent Political Analyst formerly with Human Rights Watch, 20 July 
2017 (b) 
14. Expert on security sector reform and civil-military affairs, 21 July 2017 (a) 
15. Head of a leading peacebuilding organization, 21 July 2017(b) 
16. Former diplomat for Myanmar now working in a premium think tank, 24 July 
2017 (a) 
17. Head of an NGO working on peacebuilding and governance,  
 24 July 2017(b) 
18. UN representative in Myanmar focusing on humanitarian support, July 25 
2017 
19. NGO Representative of a peacebuilding project, 12 November, 2018  
20. Representative of JMC, Myanmar’s government’s key peace institution, 13 
November 2018 
21. Activist from the Kachin region leading a local organisation supporting 
conflict-affected areas, 13 November 2018 
22. Member of the Secretariat representing the EAOs in the peace talks, 14 
November 2018   
23. Peace negotiator in the Myanmar Peace Process, 15 November 2018 
24. Think-tank representative dedicated to supporting participation of ethnic 
nationalities in the peace process, 15 November 2018,  
25. Activist and a former political prisoner currently heading a peacebuilding 
project, 16 November 2018 
26. of Parliament, NLD, 18 November 2018 
27. Head of a think tank working on domestic transition and foreign policy, 21 
November, 2018(a) 
28. Researcher working on extractive industries, 21 November (b)  
29. Researcher on interim governance and federalism, 21 November 2018 (c) 




31. Researcher focused on China–Myanmar relations affiliated to a foreign policy 
think tank in Myanmar, 23 November 2018 
32. Political Analyst who writes on issues on the peace process and ethnic 
nationalities, 27 Nov 2017 (Scoping interview via Skype) 
33. UN representative in Myanmar, 16 May 2017 (Scoping interview via Skype) 
34. Representative of a donor organization funding peacebuilding programmes, 
Open Society (Scoping via skype, 28 February 2017)  
35. Researcher working on economic and developmental issues in the peace 
process, 7 August 2018 
 
India (All interviews were conducted in New Delhi) 
 
1. Foreign Policy Analyst, Research Fellow at a think tank in India, focused on 
India and South Asia, October 1, 2018 
2. Scholar- Diplomat, a Prominent Indian Scholar specializing in Nepal and 
South Asia who has also served as a diplomat, October 2, 2018 
3. Researcher with a focus on Nepal working at a premium Indian think tank, 3 
October, 2018 
4. Diplomat, Former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, 7 October, 2018 
5. Diplomat, Former Foreign Secretary of India and also former Indian 
Ambassador to Nepal during the peace process, 8 October 2018 
6. Diplomat, Former Indian Representative to the UN, 9 October 2018 
7. Head of an Indian think tank focused on Indian diaspora, October 9, 2018 
8. Former Indian Army General specializing on Nepal, October 10, 2018 
9. Diplomat, Former Indian Ambassador to Nepal and a Special Envoy on 
Nuclear Affairs, 14 October, 2018 
10. Professor, Indian Academic at Jawaharlal Nehru University focusing on 









China (All interviews were conducted in Chengdu, Sichuan province) 
 
1. Professor at Sichuan University, Focused broadly on South and Southeast 
Asia, December 22, 2017(a) 
2. Professor at Sichuan University, Focused on Myanmar, December 22, 
2017(b) 
3. Professor at Sichuan University, Focused on Southeast Asia and fragile states 
in Africa, December 27, 2017  
4. Professor at Sichuan University, December 30, 2017 
5. Professor at Sichuan University, January 4, 2018 
6. Professor at Sichuan University, January 5, 2018(a) 
7. Professor at Sichuan University, January 5, 2018(b) 
8. Roundtable discussion on China and its role in Myanmar and fragile states, 
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